Redefining Paradigms of Sustainable Development in South Asia

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REDEFINING PARADIGMS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA

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REDEFINING PARADIGMS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA

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Preface

Why is there a need to 'redefine' paradigms of development in South Asia? Are existing paradigms such as those prescribed in the Earth Summit 1992, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 2000, or the recent Rio+20 not appropriate for developing countries like ours? Did we lack capacity or resources to implement those prescriptions? Does the void lie with the concepts or with implementation? Or can one blame malfunctioning of governance due to which sustainable development might have failed the developing world in the last 20 years? All of the above mentioned factors or none of them?

While challenging existing paradigms, SDPI's 14^{th} Sustainable Development Conference (SDC) critically examined the above mentioned questions and analysed how the celebrated concept of 'sustainable development' was being implemented in the areas of environment, human development, economy and energy (amongst others) for the eradication of poverty, equitable gender rights, local governance, food security and peace in spite of overwhelming hurdles.

Although the high road to sustainable development is yet to reach its shining light at the end of the tunnel, authors of this volume have presented case studies from Pakistan to Palestine of ideas, projects and recommendations about what can work and how. The crux of their contributions is that one size cannot fit all and we need to follow local wisdom while thinking of possible solutions to problems facing sustainable development in a particular situation.

Of the dozens of papers presented at the 14^{th} SDC, this volume contains thirteen of the ones that were approved after a strenuous peer review and thorough editorial process. The beauty of these papers is that they don't merely present authors' point of view, but in most cases also present the input provided by conference delegates belonging to all walks of life.

I am grateful to all the contributors who submitted their papers for peer review purposes, the referees, and especially members of my SDC team, Ms Uzma T. Haroon, Ms Imrana Niazi and Ms Sarah S. Aneel who helped put together this anthology.

Happy reading.

Dr. Abid Qaiyum Suleri
Executive Director
Sustainable Development Policy Institute
Islamabad

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Donors and Partners

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In order to ensure academic honesty, the Higher Education Commission (HEC), Pakistan, provided SDPI access to their web-based plagiarism detection software.

Review Panel

This anthology was peer reviewed by experts having diverse academic and technical expertise. The independent reviews provided critical and honest comments that assisted the authors, as well as anthology editors, in making this publication as reliable and thorough as possible. The Institute wishes to thank the following individuals for their peer review:

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Cover Designer

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Editors

Apart from the cooperation of panel organisers and the entire SDPI staff, the Fourteenth Sustainable Development Conference (SDC) and this publication would not have been possible without the constant support of the following SDPI colleagues/co-editors:

- Ms Sarah S. Aneel, Visiting Associate, SDPI; and, Editorial Consultant.
- Ms Imrana Niazi, Associate Coordinator, SDC Unit, SDPI.
- Ms Uzma T. Haroon, Senior Coordinator, SDC Unit, SDPI.

About the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI)

To catalyse the transition towards sustainable development, defined as the enhancement of peace, social justice and well-being, within and across generations.

Introduction

SDPI, founded in August 1992, focuses on independent interdisciplinary research, rigorous advocacy and capacity building. The Institute is committed to the promotion and implementation of policies on all issues of sustainable development.

SDPI is a unique and dynamic entity since it came into existence on the recommendation of Pakistan's National Conservation Strategy (NCS), also called Pakistan's Agenda 21. The NCS placed Pakistan's socio-economic development within the context of a national environmental plan. This highly acclaimed document, approved by the Federal Cabinet in March 1992, outlined the need for an independent non-profit organisation to serve as a source of expertise for policy analysis and intervention; and advisory services. SDPI is registered under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860.

The Institute's activities are, therefore, designed to provide:

- policy advice to government
- a forum for policy dialogue
- support to in-house, visiting and external researchers
- research publications for public and private sector use
- a conduit for North-South dialogue
- an environment for information dissemination and training
- a base for national and regional advocacy and networking.

Goals

To

- serve as a source of expertise and advisory services for the government, private sector, and non-governmental initiatives supporting the implementation of Pakistan's environment and development agenda.
- conduct policy-oriented research on sustainable development from a broad multi-disciplinary perspective.
- promote the implementation of policies, programmes, laws and regulations that advocate sustainable, just development.
- strengthen national capacity as well as infrastructure for research and advocacy.
- provide high quality training to the public, private, NGO sector organisations and individuals and build their capacities for sustainable growth and development.
- initiate and participate in activities and networks with like-minded organisations within and outside the country.

Approach

SDPI produces knowledge that can enhance the capacity of government to make informed policy decisions and to engage civil society on issues of public interest. The Institute acts as a generator of original research on sustainable development issues, as well as an information resource for concerned individuals and institutions. Its function is, thus, two-fold: an advisory role fulfilled through research, policy advice and advocacy; and an enabling role realised through providing other individuals and organisations with resource materials and training.

Section I: New Directions in Energy Sustainability and Climate Change

- Imperatives of a Hydrogen Society for South Asia and Pakistan
- Institutionalising State Forest Resources for Adaptation to Climate Change: A Case Study of Uttarkhand State, Himalaya
- Farmers' Perceptions about Climate Change and Food Security: Evidence from South Asia

Imperatives of a Hydrogen Society for South Asia and Pakistan[1]

Aneel Salman,[*] Bilal Hamid[**] and Attique-Ur-Rehaman[***]

ABSTRACT

With the world on the brink of an economic and ecological meltdown, it is vital to look at the role which sustainable technological advances and practices can play in today's financial and environmental sectors. Like its neighbouring developing countries Bangladesh and India, Pakistan has also become an energy deficient country (WEC 2000). Over the past few decades, Pakistan's electricity generation has become largely dependent on petroleum fuels. However, the country faces a 4500 MW gap between electricity demand and supply, registering a shortfall of 43%. The ever rising costs, negative ecological impacts, not to mention rapid depletion of petroleum resources, are now posing serious threats to the country's development. Hence, the need to find alternative renewable energy sources has become all the more urgent.

Of the 40 GW hydropower potential in Pakistan, only 5.01 GW is being used. With respect to solar energy, Pakistan has an annual global irradiance value of 1900–2200 kWh/m² (Asif 2009); and although biomass serves as an energy fuel in rural areas, both are yet to be explored on a large scale, commercial level. Wind energy is another neglected area.

This paper examines factors such as demand and supply of energy, rapidly declining local oil and gas resources, ever rising cost of energy and security

[1] This paper is an extended version of "The Face of Renewable Energy in Pakistan," presented at the International Conference on *Innovation and Sustainability Transitions in Asia* which took place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (9-11 January 2011). Available online at:
<http://umconference.um.edu.my/upload/163-1/Paper%20110.pdf>

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issues that form the crux of Pakistan's energy crisis. Based on secondary data, solar, hydro and wind energy, and biomass as viable energy options are explored for South Asia and Pakistan, in particular. The advantages and disadvantages of hydrogen energy are discussed and it is concluded while fuel cells and a hydrogen infrastructure can together pave a sustainable energy future for the country (Mirza et al. 2009), the state has to play a critical role in encouraging and funding R and D in this unexplored terrain.

INTRODUCTION

The rapid industrialisation and fast paced urbanisation of the world has turned this global village into a 'global metropolis' that is increasingly hungry for energy. With the price of fossil fuels rising on an almost weekly basis, especially in a country like Pakistan, it is extremely important to tap new energy sources. It is estimated that if the current energy sources are utilised at the same pace globally as they are now, oil reserves will only last for another 40 years; gas for another 65 years; and coal reserves for another 155 years (Iwaro and Mwasha 2010).

Energy starvation has become a very real and grave threat to development sustainability since not only will this new form of 'starvation' push millions below the poverty line, it is also likely to cause violent conflicts within and across borders. The utilisation of fossil fuels is directly proportional to energy demand (Figure 1); therefore, it is vital to stop the existing fossil fuels from being depleted. Prevalent renewable energy and energy conservation policies of the global South are neither citizen-friendly nor cost effective. Since many governments continue to provide fuel subsidies, the rate of consumption will continue to increase. The only way to tackle this problem is to invest heavily in the renewable energy sector and to promote strong energy conservation programmes.

Figure 1: Global Primary Energy Consumption (2004-09).



Source: Siraj 2012.

While renewable energy resources such as solar, hydroelectric, biomass, wind, ocean and geothermal energy can not solve the world's energy crisis alone, they offer a host of benefits in comparison to conventional energy sources. Each renewable energy resource (RER) has distinct advantages which makes it unique; and together almost none create pollution. While non-renewables like oil, gas and coal are meeting the current energy demand (albeit at steep cost), the role of RERs should be emphasised and understood (Hepbasli 2008).

Many developing countries are blessed with abundant renewable energy resources which include solar, wind, geothermal and biomass. If these energy systems are tapped, the developing and emerging economies can significantly reduce their dependence on oil and gas which puts an additional burden on their economy. Another benefit of RERs is that they help to overcome the climate change urgency.

Together the global South possesses more than half of the global renewable power capacity. China and India are one of the leading countries of Asia which are heavily investing in the renewable energy sector.

> *'As of 2010, an estimated 3 million households get power from small solar PV systems…. Micro-hydro systems configured into village-scale or county-scale mini-grids serve many areas… More than 30 million rural households get lighting and cooking from biogas made in household-scale digesters. Biomass cook stoves are used by 40 percent of the world's population. These stoves are being manufactured in factories and workshops worldwide, and more than 160 million households now use those'* (Renewables 2010, p.12).

With the advancement in mass communication, people have become more aware of the disadvantages of burning fossil fuels. Renewable energy has become the need of the time. The environmental friendly nature of renewable energy compels human beings to focus on unconventional and reliable energy sources other than oil and gas. Human beings are desperate to find new ways of producing electricity and heating homes in an efficient and sustainable manner. The most interesting and vital advantage of renewable energies is that they can be used again and again without being dried up. In addition to this, these resources are free and abundant. The running cost of renewable energy is much less as compared to that of non-renewable energy ones, therefore it makes it easier for the domestic users to switch to it as well.

Renewable energy sources such as sunlight, wind, tidal etc. cannot only be restricted to the production of electricity. For instance, solar energy can be used for cooking stoves as well as heater panels. Small, local factories can install windmills for running small machinery. Although the initial cost or the capital cost would be higher, the running cost shall be lower making it feasible.

Fossil fuels such as coal and oil when burnt release many harmful and poisonous gases into the atmosphere. In addition to this many industrial processes not only release dreadful gases in the atmosphere, but also a lot of untreated industrial waste. Emission of these gases leads to global warming which is a concern for everyone nowadays. The major reason for global warming is the use of non-renewable energies. Hence, it can be concluded that it is high time that the world realises the need for some new environmental friendly energy resources.

Since centuries we have been relying on three primary energy resources coal, oil and gas. Rapid increase in the prices of these energy sources and their deficiency is making governments stand up and take notice of RERs. This again highlights the importance of making effective use of the natural resources present in the environment such as sunlight and wind.

Following this Introduction, Section 1 of this paper provides a global overview of renewables energy resources such as solar, hydropower and wind energy; while Section 2 briefly looks at the historical development of the RE sector in emerging economies, particularly in Asia, followed by Pakistan's energy and renewable energy situation in Section 3 and 4 respectively. Section 5 offers a potential new area for future investigation-hydrogen energy and is followed by the conclusion.

RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES

In many regions of the world, socio-economic growth is hindered due to the scarcity of energy services. This section describes the potentiality of solar, wind, biofuels, and hydro power renewable resources. Figure 2 shows two groups of energy sources i.e. renewable sources and non-renewable sources.

Figure 2: Classification of Energy Sources



Source: Energy Resources 2010.

Siraj (2012, p.1973), however, has offered a new energy sources classification: sun-dependent energy sources (SDES) which include hydro, wave, solar, tidal, biomas; and sun-independent energy sources (SIES) that are nuclear fission and fusion, and geothermal. He calculates the theoretical and technical potential of both these sources and posits these even these are not 'inexhaustible' unlike popular belief. In his paper, he recommends that considerable attention should be given to the:

> *'…..development of new technologies for efficient use of SDES before fossils and uranium fuels are phased-out. The research on the most important SIES, i.e., fusion should be limited only to make it feasible for commercial availability and to gain necessary technical experience. But its share should not be increased by more than 1% of the total energy requirement of the world as they offer the best long-term energy storage solution and should not be used when SDES are available in abundance.'*

The International Energy Agency predicts that renewable energy resources are likely to take over the monopoly created by fossil fuels. But this transition will take time. In 2009, renewable energy fulfilled 2-3% of the world's demand for energy (State of the World 2009). Briefly discussed below are the most common

RERs that are of critical importance for the developing and emerging economies.

Solar Energy

According to IEA (2011), the world's energy requirements for one year can be fulfilled by approximately one and a half hours of sunlight that strikes the planet. Among the potential candidates for renewable energy production, solar power has its own significance in the eyes of developing countries because it is plentiful, clean and eco-friendly. Every country not only has its own solar belt blessed with abundant sunlight; but also significant local sources of renewable energy. In African and South-East Asian regions, large amounts of solar energy can be utilised because these regions are naturally favoured with it. *'An area covering less than 4 % of the Sahara Desert could produce an amount of solar electricity equal to current global electricity demand'* (Sawin and Moomaw 2009, p. 135). Many developing countries or their parts lie in regions with adequate sunlight for energy production (Suni 2010).

While still an expensive source, it is predicated that solar technologies such as photovoltaics and solar thermal electricity could become important contributors to the global energy mix especially in sunny and dry climates such as in the subcontinent and Africa since it is the populations of these regions from where future growth in energy demand is going to arise. Inexpensive solar technologies can bring electricity to a large South Asian populace, most of whom live off-grid, circumventing the setting up of expensive grid lines.

> *'The costs of solar energy have been falling rapidly and are entering new areas of competitiveness. Solar thermal electricity (STE) and solar photovoltaic electricity (PV) are competitive against oil-fuelled electricity generation in sunny countries, usually to cover demand peaks, and in many islands. Roof-top PV in sunny countries can compete with high retail electricity prices'* (IEA 2011, p. 19)

Hydropower

The force of moving water can create hydro and hydraulic power which can be exploited for numerous purposes. Before the prevalent availability of commercial electric power, hydropower had various uses such as in irrigation and operation of watermills and textile machinery. Hydro is a source of low-carbon power and at present, it is one of the most important global electricity generation sources. Worldwide hydropower produced approximately 16% of global electricity in 2008 (IEA 2010).

However, large scale hydropower schemes require the construction of big dams and reservoirs which over the past several decades have usually been clouded in ecological, political and social controversy. The Kalabagh Dam and Diamer-Bhasha Dam in Pakistan are two cases in point (Mustafa 2010; Khan 2003; Kazi and Abbasi 2003). Literature documents some of the negative environmental impacts of dams such as ecological costs associated with flow disruption, methane emissions from reservoirs, biodiversity degradation etc; and social impacts such as community displacement and rehabilitation; and land acquisition. Also, reservoirs built by dams are not renewable in the sense that they have a finite useful life. When looking at their electricity supply portfolio, policy makers need to take hydropower decisions which ensure that there is economic equity amongst its citizenry; their lives and property are protected from floods and droughts; their rights due to expropriation of land to be inundated are safeguarded and the ecology of the area protected (IEA 2010).

Although categorised differently in various countries[2], small scale hydropower projects (unlike large dams) are seen as more environment and citizen friendly. Johnston (2011) reports how Japan is now moving towards small, local hydropower plants because for a mountainous country, it is a stable source of electricity and more importantly because it harnesses *'the power of flowing water, regardless of whether it is a natural river, stream, or man-made agricultural canal or public reservoir.'*

Wind Energy

Wind is a form of solar energy produced when the sun heats the atmosphere in an uneven way due to irregularities on the earth's surface such as terrain, vegetative cover, oceans, seas and lakes impact wind flow patterns, and because of earth's rotation. This wind flow is gathered by wind turbines and generated for electricity (WWEA 2010).

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[2] According to power ratings.

By the end of 2009, total energy produced by wind power generators globally was 159,213 MW, which has almost doubled every third year (Fig. 3); and the new wind turbines market increased by 42.1% with investments reaching 50-70 billion US $. This is indicative of the fact that despite the worldwide economic crisis, the financial sector has found wind technology investment to be much more low risk (WWEA 2010). Interestingly, while African and Latin American economies have not had the same commercial success with wind power as countries like USA, China, Germany, Spain and India, 2009 saw the highest growth rates in Mexico (100%), Turkey (132%) and Morocco (104%). 2% of global electricity usage was met by wind turbines and in countries like Denmark, Portugal and Spain, the wind sector has now become the largest electricity source (Ibid.). While India and China made Asia 'the world's wind locomotive' in 2009, countries like Pakistan need to urgently tap into their country's wind potential.

Figure 3: Global Annual Installed Capacity, Cumulative Installed Capacity, and Annual Generation as reported by IEA Wind Member Countries, 1995-2010



Source: IEA Wind 2011.

Bio-energy: Biomass and Bio-fuels

Biomass, also a renewable energy source, is retrieved from living or recently dead biological materials, for example, wood. Other sources include waste (hydrogen) gas, alcohol fuels. Biomass is a common matter in plants that is used to create electricity or produce heat. In retrospective, living biomass also has the tendency to produce electricity. Biomass is still produced in an orthodox manner i.e. from direct burning of things like forest residues, yard clippings, wood chips and garbage. Plant and animal matter are also used for produce products like fibers or chemicals. Another aspect of biomass is that it may contain biodegradable waste that can be incinerated as fuel. Organic fuels such as fossil fuels are not included under this category.

Bio energy is energy evolved from the fuel extracted from biomass, irrespective of the fact that an organism died recently or their metabolic waste is used. Small scale bio energy initiatives can contribute in uplifting rural development in developing countries (FAO 2009). In 2009, energy produced by bio fuels, equaled 5% of world’s gasoline output (Renewables 2010).

DEVELOPMENT OF RENEWABLE ENERGY SECTOR IN EMERGING ECONOMIES

By 2010, renewable energy reached its pinnacle in terms of global energy supply given the rise in the usage of renewable resources. For instance, it has been estimated that 70 million households globally have installed solar hot water heating systems. Data also reveals the huge amount of investment in renewable power capacity because in both 2008 and 2009 the investment done in this sector of power generation is over half the total global investment in new power generation. In the last five years, there has been constant development in every form of renewable technology. In the mentioned years, wind power capacity progressed by an average of 27% annually, solar hot water by 19% annually, and ethanol production by 20% annually. Energy from biomass and geothermal are also used for power, thus are mentionable assets of global renewable resources. Seeing the usage and potential of renewable resources, different countries have constituted policies and targets connected with these. Figure 4 shows the latest global investment figures in the renewable energy sector.

Figure 4: Investment in Renewable Energy



Source: Renewables 2010.

Following the league of America and Europe, Asia has also entered the stage where it has started investing in renewable assets. In terms of wind power capacity, India is fifth at a global level and is quickly multiplying many forms of 'rural renewables' in which biogas and solar PV are mentionable. According to renewable market analysis, Indonesia and Thailand are also showing speedy growth rates in this sector. Due to the commitment to renewable energies of countries like China, India and South Korea, manufacturing Asia is gradually taking control of the manufacturing industry.

China has increased 37 GW of renewable power capacity, which is greater than any other country. In 2009, China produced 40 % of the world's solar PV supply, 30 % of the world's wind turbines (up from 10% in 2007), and 77 % of the world's solar hot water collectors. China still rules the world market in solar hot water collectors, with 70 % of the present global capacity. In wind power generation, it excelled the market by adding 13.8 GW to its national reservoir of renewable energy. From Asia, China, Japan and India are the largest renewable energy promoters (Renewables 2010). In the solar PV market, Japan remains a world leader.

Bangladesh's government has set a goal to generate 10 % of their total electricity from renewable energy by 2020. The goals include the installation of wind turbines by 2013 which can generate at least 200 MW of electricity and establishment of solar power projects which can generate around 100 MW of electricity (Khan 2010). Grameen Shakti, a non- profit company has been established by the Grameen Bank to encourage renewable energy supplies in rural Bangladesh with a target to create employment.

In Cambodia, international aid agencies and organisations have supported the installation of photovoltaic systems in hospitals. In Vietnam, the Vietnam Women Union in collaboration with the Solar Electric Light Fund (SELF), USA, carried out a project of providing 200 homes with 22 MW solar home lighting kits. Furthermore, hydro turbine generator set of 1 KW or less have been installed to support 3000 families. In Sri Lanka, the promotion of photovoltaic started decades ago in 1980. In 1987, Australian and Sri Lankan government funded rural electrification to provide PV systems to 1000 homes in Pansiyagama village. A project like the installation of 74 large scale systems for rural hospitals was also financed in 1993.

The Government of Indonesia has launched a venture called *Fifty Megawatt Peak Photovoltaic Rural Electrification in Indonesia*. The idea of this project is to provide electricity to one million households within ten years.

In addition to above mentioned Asian countries, Iran has also started utilising its renewable assets. It has increased its hydroelectric capacity. Quite a lot of hydropower plants are presently in function, and a number of them are under construction. Recently, Iran has shown a great interest towards harnessing wind energy from appropriate sites with acceptable wind potential in different parts and locations. Solar energy has also grabbed attention due to its renewable nature (Mostafaeipour and Mostafaeipour 2009). Middle East has also become a part of renewable energy markets.

Such rural renewable energy measures help in creating small scale industries in the regions where these energies are applied (Renewables 2010). However, countries, especially the emerging economies have more than one promotional policy; and there is a lot of variation in policies and strategies at the national, sub-national and local levels. This needs to be streamlined. In terms of global renewable power capacity, developing countries have more than half the power capacity. Progress shown by Asian countries is significant in the renewable energy sector. These countries are also realising the importance of finding a substitute for fossil fuels and looking for a cheap source of energy; renewable energy sources fulfill both needs. Thus, Asian countries have now joined the same league as United States and many European countries in this area.

ENERGY SITUATION OF PAKISTAN

Pakistan's economy has never been a steady one. Upheavals have always been a part of it. However after the 1990s, Pakistan's economy started to grow at a steady pace. As a result of the growing economy, the demand for energy increased. The Government without realising the importance of energy requirements to cater to the massive industrialisation encouraged the establishment of various industries. This resulted in putting huge pressure on the limited resources of the country. Oil, natural gas and hydel are three primary energy sources which are currently fulfilling the country's energy demands. As a result of the limited oil and gas supply and the political nature of hydel energy, Pakistan is forced to import large quantities of oil and oil products from the Middle East especially Saudi Arabia.

Since late 1980s, very few oil fields have been explored. This has had an adverse effect on oil production. This puts immense pressure on the growing economy of Pakistan (Ahmad and Jha 2008; Mirza et al. 2009; Asif 2009). Gas consumption stands highest at 43.2 % of the total energy mix of the country, followed by oil (29.0 %). Consumption of natural gas increased by almost 4% during 2010-11 compared to 2005-06 (GoP 2012). Given the volatility of petroleum prices, Pakistan's energy consumption is projected to be shifting to other energy sources. It is noted that *'consumption of gas, electricity and coal has increased at an average of 5.1 %, 4.8 % and 7.7 % per annum for last ten years*' (Ibid. p. 197). Electricity consumption in 2010-11 stood at 77,099 GWh as compared to 74348 GWh of 2009-10. The following graph shows the difference between growing consumption trends and shrinking production of electricity for the past several decades:

Figure 5: Consumption and Production of Electricity



Source: GoP 2010.

Today Pakistan faces a huge energy crisis since there is a large gap between its demand and supply. There are several reasons for this: misallocation of resources and funds, incompetence of exploration sector, rapid increase of oil prices in the international market, less dams and power wastage.

Energy production of a country is basically seen as a measure of its economy. The rapid inflation is primarily due to energy shortage. The number of people living below the poverty line is increasing, the reason for which is basically unemployment and inflation which are caused by energy crisis. Currently, there is severe load shedding in Pakistan. Most of the industries are being shut down just because of this. This has resulted in declining exports, causing Pakistan's trade deficit to increase (GoP 2012; 2011) and thus making the country unstable.

Severe load shedding, increasing trade deficit, high inflation, unemployment, depreciation of rupee, etc. are reducing the living standards of people in Pakistan. The gap between the demand and supply is ever so increasing and must be tackled immediately in order to avoid serious consequences. The following graph shows the difference between the demand and consumption of electricity and the data is projected up to 2030 in Fig.6.

Figure 6: Projection of Demand and Supply Figures till 2030



Source: Ministry of Water and Power website.

Suicide bombings and a corrupt governance structure have already crippled the country's economy, and the energy crisis is an additional hatchet. The energy crises has not only damaged the large-scale industrial sector, but destroyed small-scale businesses as well. The GoP continues to make false promises and provide electricity, but in vain. In an 'energy saving move', the Government even ordered business associations to close all activity early in the evening (GoP 2012), but after a few days of implementation, things went back to business as usual. Electricity is not the only problem; gas-shedding has also created uncertainty in the industrial as well as small-scale business sector. If Pakistan is to overcome the prevalent energy crisis it must take immediate steps in developing and utilising renewable energy resources.

PRESENT RENEWABLE ENERGY SITUATION OF PAKISTAN

Pakistan is blessed with renewable energy resources. Given its geography and the climatic conditions, solar energy and wind energy have a huge potential. However, Pakistan also faces similar hindrances as other developing countries in the way of successful implementation of renewable energy systems. These include lack of technological resources, lack of government incentives and support, mistrust of the financial sector with regard to long term financing.

Despite this, renewable energy is a bright prospect for energy generation in Pakistan. Hydro power is one of the cheapest sources of power generation. Although it requires huge capital investment, running costs are low, making it feasible. Statistics show that during 2005-06 hydel power contributed 12.7% of Pakistan's total energy. Currently, Pakistan has two mega dams which contribute the major share of Pakistan's total hydel power production. Tarbela Dam is one of the largest in Asia and has a capacity of 3046MW, while Mangla Dam has a capacity of 1000MW. Apart from these two, other dams include Warsak (240MW). New projects such as Bhasha Dam are in the pipeline. Currently, there is a need for a state policy on wind and solar energy generation. With regard to development in the renewable energy sector, the Government of Pakistan has taken several initiatives. A few of these over the past few years include:

- Installation of 120 and 180 solar lights in AJK and Balakot respectively.
- Wind power projects of 50 MW and 10MW being initiated on BOOT (Build, Own, Operate, Transfer) basis at Keti Bunder and Gharo in Sindh (Business Recorder 2008; Salman 2010; GoP 2011).
- Exemptions of custom duties and sales tax on biodiesel production equipment and material; as well as subsidy for solar agri tube wells through easyfinancing (GoP 2012).
- Revised Renewable Energy (RE) Policy 2006 offering financial and fiscal incentives to local and foreign investors in RE sector (Ibid.).
- Solar Village Electrification Programme initiated and three thousand Solar Home Systems installed in 49 villages of district Tharparkar, Sindh (Ibid.).
- Installation of 4015 biogas plants (with net generation capacity of 17980 M3/day) on cost sharing basis throughout the country (Ibid.).

Potential of Solar Energy

Pakistan is ideally located in the sunny belt, thus, blessed with an opportunity to make the most effective use of solar energy. During the last 25 years, considerable developments have been made in the photovoltaic industry. Currently, solar energy is being used for various purposes. These include stand-alone rural telephone exchanges, repeater stations, highway emergency telephones, cathodic protection, refrigeration for vaccine and medicines in rural hospitals etc. Both the private and public sectors are playing their role in the advancement and up grading of photovoltaic activities in the country.

Companies not only trade photo voltaic products and appliances, but are also involved in the production of different components of photo voltaic systems. These components include PV modules, batteries, regulators, invertors, as well as practical low power gadgets for load shedding such as photovoltaic lamps, battery chargers and garden lights etc.

Non-governmental organisations are also active in installing solar panels in off the grid remote areas. Salman (2010) observed that a mosque and local school were being provided electricity with solar panel units in the coastal area of Keti Bunder, Sindh. The installation of these units is concentrated in creeks where there is no electricity. His survey results showed that villagers in general were appreciative of such initiatives and had strong ownership of these projects not only because they paid a minimum monthly fee for the electricity, but also because the process of deciding where these should be installed had been participatory. However, Haji Musa, an inland village which does have government provided electricity, remains in darkness on most days due to frequent power outages and high electricity bills. Zaidi and Sheikh (2009), estimate that the solar insulation potential of 5.5 KWh/m^2 per day exists in Pakistan, with Sindh receiving approximately 2MWh/m^2 / solar radiation annually.

Figure 7: Use of Alternative Energy- Solar Panel on Mosque in Bhoori, Sindh

Photo Credits: Salman, A.

Potential of Water Energy

Hydropower is a well-known name in the growing energy sector of Pakistan. Around 50000 MW of power can be generated from water. Hydro power resources are abundant in northern areas of Pakistan. According to the hydrological surveys carried out in these areas, there are many streams and waterfalls with powerful and aggressive flow of water. The surveys also reveal the fact that this water has adequate energy potential to create electricity via micro hydroelectric power plants. *'The recoverable potential in micro hydropower (MHP) up to 100KW is roughly estimated to be 300MW on perennial waterfalls in northern Pakistan'* (WEC 2000).

The 2006 Renewable Energy Policy of Pakistan maps out the country's short, medium and long term renewable energy development plans, a key feature of which is deregulation of small scale power production through renewable resources (GoP 2006). In this regard e.g. provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan has been investing in micro/mini hydro power plants and more than 2,000 plants have been installed in various off the grid areas. These projects have been found to be more cost and maintenance efficient given their decentralized nature which allows for greater community involvement. The Agha Khan Rural Support Programme has been quite influential in setting up and subsequently handing over these projects to local village organisations and communities (Ashden 2004).[3]

Unfortunately, as discussed in an earlier section, the water sector in Pakistan is mired by poor management, as well as by international and local hydropolitics (Mustafa 2010). Pakistan needs to focus more on bringing *'its surface and groundwater laws more in line with contemporary developments in water law,'* as well as developing its groundwater storage capacity and knowledge (Ibid.).

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[3] For more details see: Ashden (n.d.), AKRSP, 'Pakistan-Micro-Hydro Power for Remote Mountain Villages', <http://www.ashden.org/winners/akrsp>; and Economic Pakistan 2008, 'Pakistan's Hydroelectric Power Development', <http://economicpakistan.wordpress.com/2008/01/03/hydroelectric-power-development/> accessed 1 Dec. 2011.

Wind Power Potential

Although Pakistan has a huge potential for wind energy, the infrastructural facilities for generating electricity from wind are virtually not present anywhere in the country. The 1000km coastline has not been used to its full potential for installing wind farms. In coastal villages of Bhoori and Tippun, wind turbines have been installed for electricity production initiated through a public-private partnership (Fig 8). Communities paid for the installment of five turbines which are maintained by them. A minimum monthly payment is charged from the hundred or so households for maintenance. One wind turbine can create 500 watts of electricity for 20-25 households (WWF-P 2009). This intervention has strengthened community ties as they spend more time together at night where they discuss daily issues, as well as work on shrimp and fish grading. Women have started participating in other activities like embroidery and sewing at night as they have light (Salman 2010). Wind power generation, tidal/wave and geo-thermal potentials are estimated at 200,000 MW, 100 KW and 80,000 MW respectively in the coastal belt of Pakistan. Mirza et al. (2007) indicate that it may be technically and financially viable to set up small wind turbines/mills for electricity generation and water pumping in remote communities given adequate wind velocities and duration along the Sindh coast.

Figure 8: Use of Alternative Energy - Wind Turbine

Photo Credits: Salman, A.

Biofuels Potential

Salman (2010) found during informant interviews that through a partnership between WWF-P and a private corporation, ten acres of land are being converted into biofuel nurseries by planting Jatropha and castor oil in Keti Bunder, Sindh on an experimental basis. While communities were not aware of the project, it is hoped that if it comes to pass it may reduce local expenditures on kerosene, as well as provide a clean, alternative source of electricity to the people. Khan et al. 2007 (p. 30) conclude that *'promotion of bioethanol presents a win-win scenario for Pakistan. The country incurs an oil import bill of USD 3.1 billion every year. Substituting gasoline with bioethanol could result in considerable foreign exchange savings. Moreover, under current conditions there is no trade off between bioethanol and the food production cycle. Environmentally, beyond the traditional environmental risks associated with the agricultural phase, the bioethanol production process in distilleries* *exhibits a closed carbon cycle. Moreover, bioethanol substantially reduces GHG emissions from automobiles, at the same time allowing for better performance of vehicles.'*

HYDROGEN AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

Given the rich sources of renewables that Pakistan can tap into as discussed above, why should it look towards hydrogen energy and its potential?

The need for hydrogen is evident due to many reasons. Due to the depletion in the oil reserves throughout the world an alternate source of fuel is needed to substitute the oil in many energy generation processes. The demand for oil will increase in the upcoming future. And the increase is inevitable (Askari 2010). Most countries are importing oil from overseas reservoirs. The oil statistics in Asia are not different than the rest of the world. For Asia-Pacific region, most of the oil is imported from Middle East. China is basically an oil importing country since its natural reserves of oil are inadequate. In term of energy consumption India is sixth. Japan is fourth largest energy consumer. South Korea is the fifth largest oil importer. This is because it has no oil reserves. (Oxley 2005). Thus, Asian countries are majorly involved in the growing concerns for a substitute of energy generation. This is where hydrogen is seen as a potential candidate.

Many industrial cities have crossed the standard limit of nitrogen dioxide and destroyed the ozone. This ratio is particularly very high in developing nations. India and China are the major states of Asia that are suffering this problem. A consensus has now emerged among scientists and policy-makers that global warming represents a major threat to the environment and to the well-being of mankind and the biosphere (Stern 2007; IPCC 2007; Salman 2008). During the past millennium, average global temperatures have risen by 1°C approximately because of deforestation and fossil fuel burning. The rate of increase has accelerated during the past twenty years or so as human impact has begun to dominate natural processes. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projects global temperatures to increase by an additional 1.4°C to 5.8°C by 2100 and to continue to rise long after that. Scenarios of the likely consequences of such an increase differ substantially among regions, but include sea level rise, decline in fresh water availability, severe droughts and floods, frequent and intense forest fires/ storms/heat episodes, agricultural shortages, biodiversity loss and a rise in infectious diseases (Salman 2010). Business as usual is therefore no longer an option.

The usefulness of fossil fuels made them the dominant and popular form of fuel in the last century. Unfortunately, fossil fuels are not part of the renewable family. Furthermore, the pollutants emitted from burning of fossil fuels have deleterious effects on people and the environment (Quaschning 2005). In comparison to this feature of fossil fuels, the renewable based hydrogen energy system is far better (Mirza et al. 2009), especially when one is looking for long term and long range energy options (Momirlan and Veziroglu 2002; Sorensen 2004; Quaschning 2005; Mirza et al. 2009). Not to mention the facts that it has the *'highest energy content per weight (120MJ/kg)'* (Chattanathan et al. 2012, p. 2367), which is triple as compared to liquid hydrocarbon based fuels (Mazloomi et al. 2012), is not harmful for the environment (Chattanathan et al. 2012, p. 2367), and can be produced through numerous techniques that are 'green' (Mazloomi et al. 2012, p.3025) anywhere across the planet (Gregorio 2002).

Another important characteristic of hydrogen is that as compared to other fuels it has the 'lowest flashpoint[4]' and it can be used in anything from fuel cells, internal combustion engines (Verhelst et al. 2009; Balat 2008) to household heaters and stoves (Mazloomi et al. 2012). Important features of the hydrogen molecule include:

Table 1: Hydrogen Molecule Characteristics

Property	**Value**
Name, symbol, number	Hydrogen, H, 1
Category	Nonmetal
Atomic weight	1.008
Electrons, protons, neutrons	1, 1, 0
Color, odor	Colorless, odorless
Toxicity	None, simple asphyxiant
Phase	Gas
Flash point	−253 ◦C

Source: Adapted from Mazloomi et al. 2012.

[4] Flashpoint: temperature at which a fuel produces enough vapor to form a flame at its surface in air (Astbury 2008).

The locomotive industry can especially benefit from hydrogen since '*hydrogen based engines are expected to require less sophisticated starting and ignition equipment than those which are running on other fuels. As a practical example, hydrogen vehicles are reported to be able to start working after being left in cold temperatures without having ignition for few days….Also, many automotive, transportation and industrial producers have to make enhancements, include additional systems such as turbochargers or in some cases costume design their produced engines in order to be able to perform in low pressure circumstances such as high altitudes. However, hydrogen consumption makes it possible to design and build engines with more structural simplicity in order to perform the same in different situations*' (Ibid. p.3026). Pakistan's locomotive industry as well as consumers can benefit immensely from such an energy source given the country's diverse topography and terrain.

Worldwide production of carbon dioxide emissions to reduce the risk of climate change (greenhouse effect) requires a major restructuring of the energy system. The usage of hydrogen as an alternate energy source is an alternative option to reduce these emissions. Currently, hydrogen is no match to other energy carriers since '*The production costs of hydrogen from CO_2-free electricity (hydro, nuclear and solar) are typically 20–30 Ecu GJ^{-1} or more, which does not compare with today's oil and gas prices …. Fossil fuel conversion to hydrogen, with separation and storage of CO_2, might be an attractive transitional CO_2-free source of hydrogen..*' (Momirlan and Veziroglu 2002, p. 142-3).

Liquid hydrogen is also one of the finest transportation fuels as compared to liquid fuels such as gasoline, jet fuel and alcohols and gaseous hydrogen as the unsurpassed gaseous transportation fuel.

Hydrogen is also versatile. It can be converted to any useful form, for example, thermal, mechanical and electrical via different processes, while fossil fuels are only used for burning i.e. flame production. H2 has highest utilisation efficiency when it is converted to other useful forms of energy. Thus, it saves primary energy resources; and, the security concerns associated with hydrogen burning are lesser than other fuels. This is because the only product formed from hydrogen combustion is water, which isn't harmful for any living organism on Earth (Veziroglu 2007).

Figure 9: Cycle Showing Various Uses of Hydrogen



Source: Veziroglu 2007.

Considering the development of renewable sources as a source of producing energies, hydrogen production from those sources can't be neglected. Renewable resources can provide a cheaper route for the production of hydrogen. The flowchart below shows how renewable resources can be used to produce hydrogen.

Figure 10: Renewable Sources acting as Fuels for Hydrogen Plants



Source: Ibid.

Hydrogen Production

The most popular and cost effective methods of hydrogen production these days is from fossil fuels, especially steam-methane reforming (SMR). However, percentages vary across the literature about how much is produced. Mirza et al. (2009) put the figure at 99%, while Mazloomi et al. (2012) at 48%. For net cost and energy efficiency, uncatalyzed partial oxidation of methane for suitable optimization can be used for producing hydrogen as well. It can also be produced from biomass (Balat et al. 2010), coal, gasoline, bio-oil (Chattanathan, et al. 2010), methane and methanol (Zuttel 2008). However, hydrogen from fossil fuels is in contradiction to a green energy cycle and is also based on non-renewable sources.

Hydrogen from water via electrolysis has been under study since the late 1800s and early 1900s (Richards 1896 and 1905). The most unique aspect of this process is that it can be used in any place that has water and electricity, and the final output is clean and sustainable, especially if the electricity comes from a renewable source like wind or solar. According to Sorensen (2004) such systems can be developed almost 7-8 times more rapidly than those that use oil-base fuels. However, electrolytic hydrogen is less competitive than other fuels given the high cost involved including electricity expenses and weak conversion efficiency (Mazloomi et al. 2012).

The technology of splitting water into hydrogen and oxygen isn't ready to be exposed. Fundamental research still remains in this field. However, research at a large scale is in progress with an aim to find an economical method for the production of hydrogen and oxygen by splitting of water using sunlight as the source of ignition for this process. Several other hydrogen processes have reached a stage where they can be commercially employed (Mirza et al.2009). Table 2 shows the processes on hydrogen production and their standings in development phase:

Table 2: Processes on Hydrogen Production and their Standings in Development Phase

Production Process	**Status**
Steam methane reforming (SMR)	Mature
Catalytic decomposition of natural gas	Mature
Partial oxidation of heavy oil	Mature
Coal gasification	Mature
Biomass fast pyrolysis	R and D
Steam-iron coal gasification	R and D
Thermochemical cycles (pure)	R and D
Thermochemical cycles (hybrid)	R and D
Photochemical processes	Early R and D
Photoelectrochemical water splitting	Early R and D
Biological water splitting	Early R and D
Fermentation	Early R and D
Conversion of biomass and wastes	Early R and D
Solar Thermal Water splitting	Early R and D
Renewable/water electrolysis	Early R and D

Sources: Momirlan and Veziroglu 2002 ; NREL n.d. ; Chattanathan et al. 2012.

Figure 11 shows the various stages of hydrogen production and how they fit together to produce a green and sustainable energy supply system.

Figure 11: Hydrogen-based Energy System



Source: http://www.hydrogen.co.uk/h2/hydrogen.htm (accessed 12 Dec. 2011).

The Global Scenario

The cost for setting up hydrogen infrastructure is considered a 'large' investment. But recent research suggests that if hydrogen is used directly, stored in small to medium sized containers, it would be less expensive and can become *'a highly feasible energy carrier and energy source itself at consumer level'*, (Mazloomi et al. 2012, p. 3024.). A lot of effort is needed by the governments of various countries to promote hydrogen at a national level. For instance, the government of Iceland announced that they are going to become the first hydrogen society. For this purpose, multimillion dollar deals are being signed with the objective to convert the island's buses, cars, and boats to hydrogen and fuel cells over the next 30–40 years (Hannesson 2007). Having such a vision is no longer a Utopian dream since, car manufacturer Honda has been selling its electric FCX Clarity with its zero emissions hydrogen powered engine since 2007. The fuel cells in the car combine *'hydrogen with oxygen to make electricity. The electricity then powers the electric motor, which in turn propels the vehicle. Water is the only byproduct the FCX Clarity FCEV leaves behind'* (Honda FCX Clarity n.d.). In a few countries like Japan and USA, the hydrogen production/fuelling stations run on solar energy, making the process even more environment friendly (CNN Eco Solutions).

In Asia, South Korea has initiated its hydrogen programme. The Ministry of Science and Technology has allocated US$843 million for the development of hydrogen powered transportation. According to the plan, by 2020, South Korea will cut its national dependence of fossil fuels by 20 percent (Oxley 2005). From Asia, China, Japan, India and Republic of Korea have joined the International Partnership for Hydrogen Economy (IPHE). In UAE, '*the Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company (Masdar) is in charge for promoting renewable and new energy projects. Masdar is developing a 390-MW hydrogen-fueled power project through Hydrogen Power Abu Dhabi, a joint venture with Hydrogen Energy, which comprises the UK's BP Alternative Energy and Rio Tinto'* (Daniel 2009). China launched hydrogen fuel cell buses as a display project at the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008 to kick off a mass production of fuel cell vehicles from 2010 onward. It is estimated that by 2050, China and India will have one of the highest shares in the world's hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (IEA 2005).

The history of fuels reveal the advancement of fuels from solid to liquid and now gases; coal to mineral oil, natural gas and now hydrogen. Eventually, hydrogen will penetrate this carbon based energy circle (Figure 12) and replace the environmental hazardous fuels. The production of hydrogen will be far cheaper once the renewable energies step in the production of hydrogen (Dunn 2002).

Figure 12: Projected Shifting of Fuel from Solids to Gases



Source: Dunn 2002.

Drawbacks of Hydrogen Energy

Dunn in 2002 quoted a researcher that *'If we really decided that we wanted a clean hydrogen economy, we could have it by 2010.'* However, the political and institutional barriers are alarming. Plus, hydrogen is not a suitable carrier of energy. To be useful for locomotives, hydrogen must be liquefied or compressed to increase energy density, and these tanks are very expensive. In addition to this, energy losses that will be incurred at each step (electricity to hydrogen gas, hydrogen gas to stored hydrogen, hydrogen to electricity) are immense.

CONCLUSION

The need for renewable energy is ever increasing throughout the world. Many developed nations have already made effective use of renewable energy resources. During the past few years, the consumption of renewable energy resources in Asia has also increased. Countries such as China and India have realised the fact that there is no way forward without investing heavily in the renewable energy sector. Similarly, many developing nations such as Pakistan are currently facing severe energy crisis, unfortunately these countries are not making rapid progress in this critical sector. There is a tremendous potential of all renewable energy sources in Pakistan but the lack of funds and a sincere effort on the part of the government are missing.

While the world and even our neighbouring South Asian countries are investing and exploring the ‘hydrogen economy’ option, the infrastructure and expertise, at the research and development and limited production levels, barely exists in Pakistan. There is urgent need to take certain drastic measures to provide incentives and grants for its practical demonstration and develop pilot scale activities. These measures are essential to give a stronghold to industrial and commercial ventures in this technology. The Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB) and the Pakistan Council of Renewable Energy Technologies (PCERT) promote and facilitate renewable energy projects and research in Pakistan on behalf of the government. They should encourage and promote public-private partnerships at least to conduct comprehensive research into this new area. State subsidies can make such technologies more affordable for households and businesses (Salman 2010; Christoplos et al. 2009). Yes, this is a costly and risky ‘energy venture’ but lets be fair, solar cells and wind turbines also require huge investments and when the ideas for these were proposed, they too were considered extravagant but now we have both.

Hydrogen fuel cell is the next generation fuel. It is by far the most environmental friendly fuel. A lot of development has been done to make its production cheaper so that it can be implemented at a global level. Currently, western countries are involved in making the production of this fuel cell feasible. In the global South, governments of countries like Pakistan should look towards doing more R & D work in developing and promoting hydrogen fuel cells given their greater advantages.

While the private sector requires government support in the form of subsidies to invest in this technology, research and technical universities in Pakistan do have programmes and projects that can provide a suitable institutional set up for the promotion and implementation of new hydrogen-based energy technologies. Through their academic and research networks, international institutions that are funding hydrogen based technologies can be involved. Given below are some recommendations that are not just meant for transitioning to hydrogen rather these are applicable on all alternative energy directions Pakistan should take:

- Investigate and conduct R&D activities to determine whether a hydrogen economy can be realised.
- Exploratory research focused on new concepts requires additional funding. The state should provide academic and business grants and incentives in R&D and for transforming laboratory products into commercial products.
- Government institutions like AEDB should strive to create better linkages between its seemingly disconnected programmes and RE projects, as well as strengthen linkages with universities where energy programmes are now being run.
- Government leadership is critical, because the current incentives for companies to make early investments in alternative energy infrastructure are almost non-existent.
- Motivate entrepreneurs, especially in the transport sector, through policy initiatives such as tax breaks, reduction in duties and taxes.
- Accelerate and increase efforts in systems modeling and analysis for hydrogen delivery, with the objective of developing options and helping guide R&D in large-scale infrastructure development.
- Support the non governmental organisations in setting up renewable energy demonstration community projects.

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Institutionalising State Forest Resources for Adaptation to Climate Change: A Case Study of Uttarkhand State, Himalaya

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ABSTRACT

Natural forests in Himalaya carry large human population, including forest dependent indigenous societies. Consequently, in this region a large proportion of the population is dependent on forests not only for fulfillment of their basic resource needs, but also for their livelihood. Forests have not only been integral to development of Himalayan economy, culture and conservation values, but also an important mitigating agent to climate change. In the Indian part of Himalaya, 74 percent forests are state property and for thousands of years, rural communities have been enjoying traditional resource use rights and concessions and contributing significantly towards the conservation of these forests. However, after establishing a network of protected areas, community resource use activities have been prohibited in state forests. This has increased resource use pressure on the civil forests[1] which are a scarce 19 percent of the Indian Himalaya and an increased illegitimate encroachment and degradation of state forests.

Hence, forest resources have depleted steadily and significantly due to the collapse of traditional forest management institutions and climate change. Climate change has not only adversely affected ecosystem and destabilised indigenous adaptation mechanism, but also undermined livelihood and food security of local forest dependent communities. It is, therefore, highly imperative to bring all categories of forests under participatory management through inter-

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[1] Civil forests are village-forests situated within the villages and administered by the State Revenue Department.

linking forest conservation with rural livelihood and climate change mitigation and adaptation by establishing, reviving and strengthening traditional forest governance institutions at grass root level.

The main objective of this paper is to assess the feasibility of bringing all categories of forests, particularly the state property forests, under community based and participatory institutional governance framework for integrated and adaptive management of entire range of forest resources with case illustration of the Himalayan state of Uttarakhand in India. Besides a comprehensive survey of participatory forest management literature, an empirical and qualitative assessment of recently revived forest *panchayats* (village council) and Joint Forest Management (JFM) experiments in civil forests and their potential contribution to enhancing resilience of (both natural and social systems) to climate change was carried out. It was observed that in several cases participatory forest management system has not only enhanced carbon sequestration capacity of forest ecosystem through increase in forest cover, but also strengthened community resilience by improving traditional adaptation practices in water, biodiversity and livelihood sectors.

INTRODUCTION

Forests constitute one of the fundamental components of our natural environment and the most valuable natural resource on the planet (Forest Survey of India 2005). They provide diverse ecosystem services that sustain a variety of basic life support systems on Earth. People in all parts of Earth depend on forests for a wide range of resources (Singh 2007). Forests protect the landscape against various natural and anthropogenic processes such as soil erosion, landslides and desertification by providing protective cover and mechanical support to top soils (Natural Resource Canada 2011). They improve air and water quality by stabilising moisture and carbon-dioxide contents in the atmosphere, providing inward transportation to rain water under the surface of the land and a habitat for countless species of flora and fauna (Forest Survey of India 2005). They also offer a multitude of aesthetic as well as recreational opportunities to humans in all parts of the planet. Forests are a rich source of fodder, fuel and timber, and raw material for different forest based industries; they constitute one of the prime sources of livelihood and employment for a large proportion of population both in the developed and the developing regions (Singh 2007).

Forests help in mitigating the negative impacts of climate change through carbon sequestration and sustain both natural and human systems in adapting to changing climatic conditions. The carbon sequestration and conservation potential of the forests is much higher than the total carbon sequestration capacity of all other terrestrial ecosystems of the planet. The forests of the world account for 90 percent of the annual carbon flux between the atmosphere and the land surface of the earth (Gupta 2007). This has further improved our understanding of the importance of forests for the global environment, and has influenced forest management policy decisions around the world during recent years.

Over the past decades, forests have emerged as a major consideration in global discussion on sustainable development. Since, the United Nation's Earth Summit held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (1992), remarkable progress has been made in advancing worldwide consensus on the protection, conservation and sustainable development of forest resources (Tiwari and Joshi 2001). At the same time, the globalizing economy has increased the demand of forests in various economic sectors, and thus unlocked the valuable and rich forest resources of remote and inaccessible regions, such as high mountains, for their exploitation, degradation and depletion. Though, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol gives more emphasis to afforestation and reforestation programmes, however, conservation and management of existing forests is not included in it (Geoffrey et al. 2005).

According to Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance (2005), a significant proportion of the global population is currently involved in the conservation and management of their forests, particularly in the developing countries. The incorporation of forest management in the Kyoto Protocol or alternatively voluntary carbon market, would therefore, benefit a large number of communities in developing countries. The main objective of this paper is to examine the feasibility of existing participatory forest management experiences and models from Himalaya in institutionalising the state property forests with a case illustration of the newly carved Himalayan state of Uttarakhand in India. The study investigates the potential of integrating existing participatory and community based forest management institutions with the global carbon market based on the CDM.

Degradation of forest resources, particularly in developing countries is one of the major challenges in attaining environmental sustainability, mitigating climate change, alleviating poverty and improving livelihoods in many parts of the world (Baland et al. 2006; World Bank 2008). This is because of the high degree of dependence of rural communities on forests for their livelihood, as well as global concerns for environmental sustainability (Shyamsundar and Ghate 2011). In the recent past, variety of changes have emerged in traditional resource use structure, mainly in response to population growth, increasing political, economic and social marginalisation, globalisation, and inappropriate government policies, which have disintegrated traditional institutional arrangements and control mechanisms of forest resources in these countries (Tiwari and Joshi 2011). Consequently, forest resources have depleted steadily and significantly leading to their conversion into degraded lands disrupting ecological balance, declining productivity of agricultural systems, and collapsing food and livelihood securities of rural communities, particularly of poor and marginalised households (WRI 2005). Recently, it has been reported that the forest cover in India has declined by 367 km^2 between 2009 and 2011 (Times of India 2012). Understanding the drivers of forest depletion, and evolving effective community oriented forest conservation strategies are particularly important because of the high dependence of the rural people on forest resources (Srivastava et al. 2004; World Bank 2008).

One of the most important issues that has received much attention in forest conservation discussions is the nature of property rights and management mechanisms of forest resources (Weeraratne 2005). In South Asia, large-scale experiments have been carried out in decentralising forest ownership and management: forest *panchayats* in India and Community Forestry (CF) in Nepal, in particular have changed the relationship between forests, the forest departments and rural households (Shyamsundar and Ghate 2011).

It is frequently argued that state ownership and excessive state control on the management of forests have contributed to the degradation of forest and other natural resources in India. The local communities should be allowed to own and manage forest resources themselves as the case studies carried out in different parts of Himalaya have observed that community based management of forest resources is one of the core components of sustainable development, and it has proved more effective in protecting forests (Ostrom 1990; Somanathan 1991; Gibson et al. 2000; Jodha 2001; Shivakoti and Ostrom 2002; Srivastava et al. 2004; Varughese and Ostrom 2001). Further, the emerging evidence suggests that community forest management may indeed be contributing to improved forest health (Ray and Bhattacharya 2010).

FORESTS OF HIMALAYA

The diversified terrain characteristics, physiographic diversity, geological intricacy and climatic complexity of different parts of Himalaya are clearly reflected in the variety of its natural vegetation and forests. The sub-tropical, temperate and alpine vegetations occurring, respectively from foothill zone to the Great Himalayan ranges are primarily determined by the rising altitude and resultant rapidly modifying climatic conditions. The Indian Himalaya covers approximately a gross geographical area of 3.3 million ha of different types of forests. Out of this total forest area, 2.4 million ha forest, which is approx. (74 percent) is under the direct control of the respective state forest department. This vast forest area is state property and is considered reserved and protected forests. Nearly 0.6 million ha or 19 percent forest situated within villages is also considered state property and is under the control and management of the civil administration. Only 0.5 percent forests in Himalaya which is approximately

16500 ha is under private ownership and categorised as private forests (Forest Survey of India 2005).

During recent years, the forest ecosystem in Himalaya has come under increased biotic stress mainly due to high population growth, rapid urbanisation, industrial growth and tourism development. As a result, the forest resources have depleted and degraded steadily and significantly which has led to forest conversion into degraded and waste lands in many parts of the region. Besides, construction of roads, dams, mining and quarrying, and extension of cultivation and grazing areas have contributed significantly towards depletion of forest resources in Himalaya. Moreover, climate change has stressed Himalayan forest ecosystem through higher temperatures, altered precipitation patterns, more frequent and extreme weather events, and forest fires disrupting ecosystem services, depleting biodiversity and decreasing forest productivity (Singh 2007). These changes in forest ecosystem are undermining agricultural and food systems increasing the vulnerability of millions of poor agriculture dependent people to water, health, food and livelihood insecurity in large part of South Asia (Tiwari and Joshi 2011). This clearly underlines the need of evolving community based forest governance frameworks for the entire Himalayan region.

UTTARAKHAND AND ITS FOREST RESOURCES

The Himalayan State of Uttarakhand was carved out of the state of Uttar Pradesh by taking mountainous districts of Almora, Bageshwar, Chamoli, Champawat, Dehradun, Nainital, Pauri Garhwal, Pithoragarh, Rudraprayag, Tehri Garhwal, Uttarkashi with the districts of Udham Singh Nagar and Hardwar located in the Himalayan foothills in the year 2000 (see Figure 1). Out of the total geographical area of the state (53483 km^2) approximately 93 percent is hilly and mountainous and the remaining 7 percent land surface falls under low lying foothill zone located in the extreme south of state (FRI 2011; Joshi et al. 1983). Extending from approx. 300 m to over 7000 m from the mean sea level (msl), Uttarakhand is one of the few mountainous regions of the world that is richly endowed with large areas of natural forests (Joshi et al. 1983).

The National Forest Policy of India strongly recommends that a minimum 60 percent of the geographical area of the Himalayan states should be under forest cover (GoI 1988). Uttarakhand is one of the most forested states of India as the forest area of the state extends over 34651.014 km^2 that accounts for 64.79% of the total geographical area of the state and 4.53% forest of the country (Table 1 and Figure 2). The districts situated in the western part of the state in general have more area under forests as compared to the eastern districts. For instance, Rudraprayag and Tehri districts of the west have more than 90% of their area under different types of forests, followed by district Tehri (88.29%), Garhwal (72.26%), Dehradun (65.36%) and Chamoli (63.03%). However, the district of Haridwar located in a densely populated foothill zone has only 30.69% of its geographical area under forests (Table 1). In the eastern part of the state, the districts of Almora, Nainital and Champawat have more than 70% of their geographical land surface under forest, whereas, the mountainous districts Bageshwar and Pithoragarh district have respectively 49.05% and 28.96% of their area under forests. Similarly, the agriculturally colonised and densely populated district of U. S. Nagar situated in the foothill tract in the eastern part of state has only 36.91% forest land (Table 1; Figure 2 and 3) (GoU 2011). However, the actual forest cover in Uttarakhand is confined to only 45.80% of the total geographical area which indicates that nearly 19% of the area categorised as forest land has no forest vegetal cover at all (Table 1; Figure 2 and 3).

Figure 1: Himalayan State of Uttarakhand and its Mountainous Districts

Source: Authors' compilation.

Owing to the effects of rising altitude from the foothills (300m) to the snowline (7436m) and widely varying conditions of topography and soil throughout the state, the natural forests of Uttarakhand are highly diversified in composition as well as spatial distribution. As one moves up from the foothill belt lying in the extreme south of the state to the Greater Himalayan ranges in the north, different types of vegetation – from sub-tropical to alpine – are found. Geographically, the region being part of Western Himalaya constitutes one of three biodiversity hot spots (Western Himalaya, North-eastern Himalaya and Western Ghats) identified in India (Roy 2002).

Sal is the dominant species in the foothills, but it also occurs in stunted form in many river valleys in the interior of Kumaon (upto 1200m). Still northward and at higher elevations pine is the principal species. On the still higher altitudes, the forests generally consist of pine, oak, deodar, and rhododendron. Further northwards, the sub-tropical vegetation ultimately passes into temperate forests mainly including coniferous and evergreen species, such as fir, birch and rhododendron, oak, etc. In the higher parts of the Greater Himalaya, occurs a wide variety of alpine vegetation with numerous temperate deciduous species on the moist soils of lower elevations, while the upper part of this higher altitude zone contains alpine pastures (Joshi et al. 1983). Preliminary studies carried out in selected villages with different types of forest species composition and diverse forest utilisation pattern in the state indicated that on an average the forests were sequestering carbon at the rate of 3.7 tonnes per hectare each year (Singh 2007).

Table 1: District-wise Distribution of Forest area and Actual Forest Cover in Uttarakhand (2011)

S. No.	Name of District	Total Area (km²)	Total Forest Area (km²)	Forest Area % of Total Area	Actual Forest Cover % Total Area
1	Almora	3139	2361.841	75.24	50.24
2	Bageshwar	2246	1101.596	49.05	61.49
3	Pithoragarh	7090	2052.986	28.96	29.53
4	Champawat	1766	1323.375	74.94	66.87
5	Nainital	4251	2982.360	70.16	72.76
6	U. S. Nagar	2542	0938.370	36.91	21.26
7	Garhwal	5329	3850.942	72.26	61.72
8	Rudraprayag	1984	1803.653	90.91	56.70
9	Chamoli	8030	5061.002	63.03	33.56
10	Tehri	3642	3215.640	88.29	58.95
11	Uttarkashi	8016	7216.641	90.03	39.23
12	Dehradun	3088	2018.301	65.36	52.04
13	Haridwar	2360	0724.307	30.69	26.19
14	Uttarakhand	53483	34651.014	64.79	45.80

Source: GoU 2011.

Figure 2: District-wise Total Forest Area and Actual Forest Cover in Uttarakhand



Source: GoU 2011.

Figure 3: District-wise Area under Forests in Uttarakhand-2011



Source: *GoU 2011.*

CONVENTIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT IN UTTARAKHAND

The forest resources in the state are managed under diverse control, administration and ownership systems that include forests: (i) controlled, managed and owned by the state forest department, (ii) administered and controlled by local civil administration or State Revenue Department, and (iii) private forests owned and managed by semi-government and autonomous agencies, such as municipal corporations and cantonment boards, and by individuals. The forests controlled and managed by the state forest department are referred to as reserved forests, and protected forests and they are generally situated outside village-boundaries, whereas the forests that lie within the villages are administered by the State Revenue Department, and categorised as civil forests (GoU 2011). In many villages, the Revenue Department has created Forest Councils which are locally known as forest *panchayats* for the participatory management of civil forests, and has transferred the management of these forests to village based grass-root institutions. However, the state forest department has brought 96.85 km^2 and 42.81km^2 area of reserved category forest respectively in Chamoli and Uttarkashi districts of Uttarakhand under forest *panchayats* (Ibid.). It was observed during the field surveys that forest *panchayats* have been able to manage and conserve these state property forests on sustainable basis for the last 15 years. The private forests are completely managed by owner institutions and households. However, felling of any type of green tree is prohibited by law above an altitude of 1000 m in the country with the exception of allowing one tree per family in rural areas on annual basis that too with the prior approval of the forest department.

Out of the total forest area of 34651.014 km^2 in Uttarakhand as much as 70.46% is reserved and protected, 13.77% is civil forests, while the remaining15.32% comes under forest *panchayats* (created mostly within the civil forests and in very insignificant proportion), and only 0.45% of state forests falls under private property (Table 2). The reserved and protected forests which extend across the largest proportion of forest land in the state are supposed to be completely free from all kinds of resource dependency pressures and encroachment. However, the local communities in these forests have enjoyed limited rights and concessions that now, in most of the instances, have been withdrawn. The diversified forests of Uttarakhand sustain a great variety of natural habitats that support numerous species of animals and birds of which many have been identified as rare and endangered. In view of preserving the rich biodiversity and the critical genetic resources, a vast network of protected areas has been created in the forests of Uttarakhand. There are 6 national parks, 1 tiger reserve (including the Corbett National Park and Tiger Reserve which has the distinction of being the first of its kind in the country), 6 wildlife sanctuaries and 1 biosphere reserve located in the state, which encompass forest area of 7335.53 km^2 and are managed by the wildlife wing of the state forest department (Ibid.).

Table 2: District-wise Distribution of Forest Area State, Civil, *Panchayat* and Private Forest in Uttarakhand

S. No.	Name of District	Total Forests (km^2)	State Forest (km^2)	State Forest % of Total Forest Area	Civil Forest (km^2)	Civil Forest% of Total Forest Area	*Panchayat* Forest (km^2)	*Panchayat* Forests % of Total Forests Area	Private Forest (km^2)	Private Forest % of Total Forest Area
1	Almora	2361.841	785.195	33.24	848.558	35.92	698.531	29.57	29.557	01.25
2	Bageshwar	1101.596	690.333	62.67	23.021	02.08	387.829	35.21	00.413	00.04
3	Pithoragarh	2052.986	751.966	36.63	417.480	20.34	870.537	42.40	13.003	00.63
4	Champawat	1323.375	735.379	55.57	275.480	20.82	312.328	23.60	00.188	00.01
5	Nainital	2982.360	2574.452	86.33	111.892	03.75	280.678	09.41	15.338	00.51
6	U. S. Nagar	0938.70	938.370	100.0	00.000	00.00	00.000	00.00	00.000	00.00
7	Garhwal	3850.942	2327.024	60.43	983.675	25.55	528.140	13.71	12.103	00.31
8	Rudraprayag	1803.653	1277.783	70.84	318.854	17.68	207.016	11.48	00.000	00.00
9	Chamoli	5061.002	2817.198	55.66	447.174	08.84	1786.706	35.30	09.924	00.20
10	Tehri	3215.640	2315.175	72.00	768.665	23.90	131.80	04.10	00.000	00.00
11	Uttarkashi	7216.641	6954.914	96.38	231.889	03.21	29.838	00.41	00.000	00.00
12	Dehradun	2018.301	1522.708	75.45	342.016	16.95	76.586	03.79	76.991	03.81
13	Haridwar	0724.307	724.307	100.0	00.000	00.00	00.000	00.00	00.000	00.00
14	**Uttarakhand**	**34651.014**	**24414.804**	**70.46**	**4768.704**	**13.77**	**5309.989**	**15.32**	**157.517**	**00.45**

Source: GoU 2011.

TRADITIONAL FOREST RESOURCE UTILISATION STRUCTURE

The people of Uttarakhand are traditionally dependent on forests for their subsistence, and therefore the forests of the state have been integral to its culture, traditions, history and economy (Tiwari and Joshi 2001). Due to constraints of topography and climate, biomass based subsistence agriculture constitutes the main source of rural food and livelihood even though the availability of arable land is merely 6953 km^2 which accounts for only 13% of total geographical area of the state (53483 km²) and crop productivity level is very low (Ashish 1983; Maithani 1996). As a result, more than 75% population of the region completely depends on traditional subsistence agriculture practiced only on 13% land. This is mainly due to the absence of other economically viable means of livelihood in other resource sectors, such as forest which accounts for more than 64% of total resource base of the state. In order to preserve the productivity of agricultural system, the energy from the forests needs to be transferred to agricultural land. In the Himalayan agro-ecosystem, the transfer of biomass energy from forests to cultivated land takes place through livestock in the form of their compost manure and labour. Forest, cattle and cultivated land therefore, constitute the most critical components of the Himalayan agricultural system. One unit of agricultural production requires 9 units of biomass energy from surrounding forests in the form of fodder (Singh et al. 1984; Whittaker 1989).

The studies carried out in the region indicated that 5-10 ha of well stocked and dense forest area is required to meet the biomass-energy requirement of 1 ha of arable land in Himalaya (Singh et al. 1984). However, due to degradation and depletion of forest resources the availability of forest area for cultivated land has been estimated to be less than 3 ha in many parts of the state (Tiwari and Joshi 2011). This is substantiated by the fact that out of the total forest area of 34651.014 km² that accounts for 64.79% of total area forest cover, is confined only to 45.80 km² (Table 1). This clearly indicates that the forest resources in the state are under an increased biotic stress. The rapid growth of population, and the resultant increased demand of arable land, grazing areas, fodder and fuel-wood, and the inappropriate development strategies, have pushed crop farming and other resource development practices to forests and marginal and sub-marginal areas (Palni et al. 1998).

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF TRADITIONAL FOREST RESOURCE UTILISATION PATTERNS

The depletion of forests resources and the resultant intensified land use has not only destroyed natural habitats, eroded biodiversity and critical genetic resources, degraded land resources and disrupted hydrological regimes of Himalayan headwaters, but also, contributed significantly towards mitigating climate change through sequestrating atmospheric carbon. The hydrological investigations carried out in the region during the recent past clearly indicate that the amount of surface run-off from degraded and wastelands is much higher if compared to the amount of run-off from other categories of land, particularly, forests (Tiwari 1995, 2002; Rawat 2009). The studies revealed that more than 43% of natural springs in different parts of the region have completely dried up and a large number of them have turned from perennial to seasonal during the last 25-30 years, mainly due to large-scale deforestation and resultant decrease in groundwater recharge in the Lesser Himalayan Ranges of Uttarakhand (Tiwari and Joshi 2011; Rawat 2009).

These changes in forest ecosystems and natural resource base have increased the vulnerability of local communities to food and livelihood insecurity by reducing the supply of compost manure to cultivated land and irrigation potential respectively by about 5% and 3.5%. Consequently, not only rural livelihood opportunities in traditional forestry along with agricultural sectors have decreased considerably, but productivity has also declined to a mere 7% (Tiwari and Joshi 2011). Besides, the steady loss of natural vegetal cover has lessened the carbon sequestration potential and weakened the resilience of both the natural and socio-economic system to long-term impacts of climate change. Furthermore, the study carried out in some villages of district Almora, located in the Himalayan State of Uttarakhand indicated that loss of soil carbon due to deforestation and resultant degradation of land may be up-to the extent of 3 tonnes per hectare annually (Singh 2007).

NEED FOR INTEGRATED FOREST MANAGEMENT

As mentioned in the preceding sections of the paper, the traditional resource utilisation structure in Himalaya is closely interlinked with forests, farmland and livestock. The natural forests in Himalaya carry large human settlements, including forest dependent tribal communities. The rural population in the state is not only solely dependent on forests for the fulfillment of their various primary natural resource requirements, such as, fuel wood, fodder, timber, grazing and herbs but also for their livelihood (Tiwari and Joshi 1997).

It is, therefore, not practically possible to protect large proportions of forests without considering the needs and problems of rural communities living interspersed, particularly when their traditional activities are limited or prohibited in many parts of the state following the creation of large networks of nature preserves and protected areas in the form of national parks, wildlife sanctuaries and of late, the Biosphere Reserve[2] (Tiwari and Joshi 2001). This highlights the fact that the goal of sustainable development of forest resources cannot be attained through sectoral approach. It is imperative to analyse all crucial issues related with conservation and protection of forests in a holistic manner by considering forest management as one of the essential components of integrated and inclusive development policy, so as to evolve a realistic and integrated framework for the management of forestry as well as for sustainable development of rural communities dependent on the forests (Bisht and Tiwari 1996). This clearly underlines the urgent need of bringing all categories of forests including the reserved forests under participatory governance by linking forest management with rural livelihood improvement, food and livelihood security and climate change mitigation and adaptation.

Community based management of state property has been successful in Chamoli and Uttarkashi districts of the state. Moreover, 64.79% forest area has huge potential to provide livelihood to rural communities through sustainable management of forest resources compared to more than 75% population depending on merely 13% of agricultural land on unsustainable basis in the state. It is, therefore, imperative to institutionalise reserve forests, particularly those lying in the resource flow zone of villages for their community based management and participatory governance.

EXPERIENCES OF FOREST *PANCHAYATS*

Forest *panchayat* is probably the first of its kind of participatory form of statutory resource management institution that exists with a history of about 90 years. In Uttarakhand, forest *panchayats* emerged out of conflicts and compromise of settlements and reservations of forests in mountainous tract of the state, and the first state approved forest *panchayats* came into existence back in 1931 (Mukherjee 2003). India has an extensive experience of a traditional and decentralised form of democratic local rural governance in the form of village *panchayat*. Similarly, forest *panchayats* is a grass root level democratic institution created by the government for the participatory management of forests, mainly the civil forests.

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[2] The Biosphere Reserves have been created under UNESCO's Man and Biosphere Programme (MAB) to conserve the diversity and integrity of biotic communities of plants and animals within natural ecosystems.

Figure 4: District-wise Proportions of State, Civil and *Panchayat* Forests in Uttarakhand



Source: GoU 2011.

Forest *panchayat* is responsible for the management of grazing, collection of fuel wood, fodder and timber, and protection of civil forests within the village. A forest *panchayat* constitutes of one-third of the village population (above 18 years of age); and resolves and sends proposals (resolutions) to the district level civil administration. The forest *panchayats* work in close collaboration with the forest department for technical assistance for the formulation and implementation of forest management plans and with the civil authorities for administrative support. Thus, *'forest panchayats are a localised form of community forestry. They are locally elected bodies or voluntary groups of local people that govern the local forests with a view to fulfill the needs of local people for forest produce, in a sustainable and equitable manner'* (Mishra et al. 2008). However, this system of forest governance collapsed mainly due to more administrative control of civil administration and forest department over the *panchayats*.

During recent years, the forest department tried to revive forest *panchayats* across the state by making them more democratic, self-governing, autonomous in decision making, and community oriented. At present, there are nearly 7000 forest *panchayats* managing 5309.99 km^2 of forests which accounts for nearly 15.32% of total forest land of the State in Uttarakhand (Table 2 and Figure 4). As explained earlier, most of these *panchayats* have been created out of civil forests under the jurisdiction of the civil administration (Mukherjee 2003). Table 2 shows that forest *panchayats* are managing more forest land in the eastern districts of the state. The largest proportion of forests under forest *panchayats* is in district Pithoragarh (42.40% of total forest area) followed by Chamoli (35.30%), Bageshwar (35.21%), Almora (29.57%), Champawat (23.60%), Garhwal (13.71%), Rudraprayag (11.48%) and district Nainital (9.41%) (GoU 2011). The densely populated districts of Haridwar and U. S. Nagar situated in the foothill belt of the state have so far not created any forest *panchayats* for participatory management of their limited forest resources (Table 2; Figure 4).

EMERGING LESSONS FROM JOINT FOREST MANAGEMENT (JFM)

The State Forest Department conceived and evolved another non-statutory institutional framework for participatory management of civil forests in Uttarakhand in the form of JFM. The project has been implemented in Uttarakhand state since early years of the last decade to rejuvenate degraded forests with active involvement and increased participation of local communities and Forest Department (Mishra et al. 2008). JFM is a community based participatory forest governance programme for the villages where there are no forest *panchayats*, and implemented by duly constituted Village Forest Committees (VFCs) in collaboration with village *panchayats* – the grass-root level statutory democratic institutions of local self-government, and non- government organizations (Mukherjee 2003). The JFM makes provision for constituting Village Forest Committees (VFCs) linking it with village *panchayats*. The VFCs are more democratic in principle than the existing forest *panchayats* as these committees are expected to function as representative of key local interests, women, scheduled castes/tribes, backward groups, and for people with specific interest in forests conservation and governance.

Mishra et al. (2008) observed several shortcomings and constraints such as lack of cooperation among villagers; poor cooperation of forest officials; conflict among members; inequitable distribution of forest-usufructs; lack of rapport with villagers; and ignorance about participatory methodologies by various stakeholders right from the stage of conceptualisation to the implementation in these participatory and democratic forms of forest management institutions. Nevertheless, these new forms of forest management experiences have contributed significantly not only towards the conservation of forests, but also towards linking forest governance with rural livelihood improvement and betterment of quality of life in rural areas; empowerment of rural women in natural resources; capacity building of grass-root institutions and above all integrating forest management with climate change mitigation and the global carbon market. Singh (2007) and Kant (2011) observed that in several cases participatory forest management system has enhanced carbon sequestration capacity of forest ecosystem through increase in forest cover and strengthening community resilience by improving traditional adaptation practices in water, biodiversity and livelihood sectors.

SUCCESS OF COMMUNITY BASED FOREST MANAGEMENT: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES

A comprehensive empirical survey of 50 forest *panchayats* and five JFM villages was carried out across the mountainous part of the State of Uttarakhand. Besides making physical observation of forests managed under forest *panchayats* and JFM, detailed informal discussion was also held with local people, particularly women, members and office bearers of forest *panchayats* and JFM. It was observed that local people conserve their forests by (i) protecting forest by employing forest-guards on nominal wages or on voluntary basis; (ii) enforcing rotational grazing; (iii) collection of only minor forest produce; and (iv) controlling forest fires.

It was observed that out of the total 55 villages surveyed, the area under forests has increased between 2-5% in 45 villages during the last 20 years. The increase in the forest area was more in districts Almora, Nainital, Garhwal as compared to other districts.

This increase in the forest area has been brought through participatory rehabilitation and development of degraded and wastelands through afforestation and reforestation programme implemented by forest *panchayats* under JFM. Twenty one forest *panchayats* and all 5 JFM villages have replenished their conventional water sources through development of spring sanctuaries by employing traditional knowledge and planting water conserving species. This in turn led to water discharge and availability for both domestic and agricultural purposes in the respective villages. The livelihood opportunities in all 55 villages has improved a little for local people, particularly poor, landless and socially marginalised households with enhanced access to and availability of minor forest produce, such as, fresh water, firewood, fodder, wild-fruits, medicinal plants, resin and a variety of rejuvenated ecosystem services. Thus, improved forest management is positively affecting community health through improved water and air quality and reduced travel distances for collecting fuel-wood, fodder and fetching water. The regular income from forestry sector has also contributed towards reducing people's vulnerability to seasonal shifts in land-based activities for local communities in all the villages.

These grass root institutions are also helping in the mitigation of climate change by developing carbon sinks by sustainable forest management (Poffenberger 2006). The Central Himalayan Environment Association (CHEA 2012), Nainital, carried out an intensive study of Dhaili and Toli forest *panchayats* of Lagmara Development Block, in district Almora of Uttarakhand in collaboration with University of Twente, the Netherlands under the international project titled 'Kyoto-Think Global Act Local' (CHEA 2012; Gupta 2007). The project built technical capacity of these forest *panchayats* and enabled the local people to measure and monitor carbon sequestration in *panchayat* forests.[3] The study investigated that participatory management efforts of rural communities saved forests, and on an average the *panchayat* forests of these villages were sequestering 3.7 tonnes carbon per year.

It was observed that the conservation and protection of forests under forest *panchayats* provided a very good example of carbon sequestration and has the potential to go a long way in improving livelihood opportunities in rural areas

[3] Forest *Panchayat* is an institution constituted for the management of forest/s, whereas, *panchayat* forests means the forests managed by forest *panchayat.*

(Singh 2007). This is a good example of the amount of carbon that can be saved by local people managing their forests effectively (Gupta 2007). The project recommends inclusion of community based sustainable forest management practices in the Kyoto Protocol, and makes a claim for payment for carbon services provided by community forests in Uttarakhand (CHEA 2012). Further, it has been observed that the forests managed by forest *panchayats* and under JFM have been making a significant contribution to carbon sequestration in contrast to forests which are not managed by such participatory institutions in Uttarakhand. This was substantiated by the fact that carbon stock of biomass was depleting at the rate of about 5 tonnes per year in non-community managed forests in Uttarakhand (Rathore et al. 1997).

MOVING TOWARDS INSTITUTIONALISING STATE FORESTS

As mentioned in the preceding sections of the paper, forests of Himalaya play an important role in providing a variety of ecosystem services to both up-lands and lowlands besides contributing significantly towards mitigating climate change and adaptation to its long-term impacts. Moreover, the Himalayan forest-ecosystems are one of the most vital mainstays of Green Economy in attaining the goal of Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) plus in the entire South Asia (Kant 2011). It is, therefore, highly essential to restore the key ecosystem services in Himalaya through the conservation of forest resources, and this can be attained through the protection and development of state property forests across the Himalayan mountains through people oriented participatory governance and management. The forests conservation in Himalaya needs to be linked with climate change mitigation and adaptation, poverty alleviation and food and livelihood security of local people where people depend on the fragile ecosystems with low carrying capacity and support larger population living in the plains downstream (Gupta 2007). In view of this, the recent experiences of forest *panchayats* and lessons learned from JFM can best be replicated and used for institutionalising state forests and for their community oriented conservation and development.

The transfer of the management of state forests to local people on the pattern of forest *panchayats* or JFM would provide them with the opportunity of getting involved in global carbon credit process and enhancing their quality of lives through reduction of poverty, improvement of livelihood and restoration of ecosystem services. It has been estimated that the quantity of carbon accumulated in total forest biomass in Uttarakhand is approximately 6.61 million tonnes annually (Singh 2007). The portion of revenue generated through carbon credits could be utilised for development of alternative energy sources, sustainable agriculture, and for improvement of rural health and checking exodus of educated and talented youth from the state. In addition, several ecological benefits, such as conservation of biodiversity, increased forest productivity, erosion control, slope stabilisation and hydrological restoration, could be obtained by integrating participatory forest management with existing carbon markets (Byron et al. 1999). The international trading of carbon credits provides a new and powerful justification and funding opportunity for afforestation. Engaging and educating rural communities in these projects could become a new source for sustainable and equitable development by improving their standard of living (Gupta 2007).

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Farmers' Perceptions about Climate Change and Food Security: Evidence from South Asia

Bipul Chatterjee* **and Manbar Khadka****

ABSTRACT

The scoping study on the *Impact of Climate Change on Food Security in South Asia* mainly focuses on farmers' perceptions about climate change and its imminent impact on their livelihoods. The study covers four countries– Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. It aims toward addressing food insecurity and livelihood threats in South Asia by changing the region's cultivation practices and operationalising a regional food bank.

The perception study shows that climate change has adversely affected farmers across the Indian sub-continent. Recurrent natural hazards such as droughts and heavy floods have afflicted the region's poor population disproportionately. Farmers have reported shorter rainy seasons and increased temperatures over the years which have severely impacted agriculture and resulted in a substantial decline in subsistence farming across the region.

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INTRODUCTION

Changing trends of Mother Nature have perilous impact upon food security. While earth's surface temperature has increased, precipitation has decreased significantly across much of the globe in recent years. As such, unprecedented droughts and heavy floods have become common phenomena these days. Such climatic crises not only affect crop productivity, but also food prices and supply chain infrastructure, thereby affecting food security (Gregory et al. 2005). Climatic crises further destabilise food security by deepening poverty among poor communities around the world.

Given South Asia's geographical location and high incidence of poverty, the region suffers extremely from climate change. The increased temperatures have not only affected cropping seasons, but also melted Himalayan glaciers at an alarming rate. These changes have intensified flooding and raised sea levels, severely impacting rural livelihoods in the region. Furthermore, poverty is deep and widespread with approximately 600 million South Asians living on less than US$1.25 a day (World Bank 2009b). Millions of poor people heavily rely on natural vegetation such as coastal areas for sustenance. And during climatic crises, they get disproportionately affected.

In light of South Asia's vulnerability to climate change, CUTS International conducted a perception survey on climate change and food security among small and marginal farmers across the region. The study covers four countries – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. It mainly focuses on farmers' perception of climate change and its imminent impact upon their livelihoods. It highlights their concerns associated with climate change phenomena and illustrates their climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies. It aims at addressing food insecurity and livelihood threats in South Asia by changing the region's cultivation practices and operationalising a regional food bank.

While many studies on climate change and food security are available for Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan; not much study on the subject matter is available for Afghanistan. This research incorporates stories of rural Afghans on climate change and food security issues, and as such adds value to the existing research on this subject. Nonetheless, the study has its own limitations. It is based on a small sample size and is representative of only three agro-climatic zones in the surveyed countries. The study, therefore, makes some general policy recommendations as opposed to specific ones.

GLOBAL SCENARIOS: CLIMATE CHANGE AND STATE OF FOOD SECURITY

The increasingly rapid pace of global industrialisation and urbanisation have significantly warmed up earth's atmosphere over the past few decades. The surface temperature increased by 1.22 degree centigrade between 1955 and 2005 (Abbass 2009). 1998 remained the hottest year, thus making 1990s the warmest decade (World Bank 2009 a). Most alarmingly, temperature will continue to rise by 0.2 degree centigrade for the next two decades (IPCC 2007).

Because of global warming, earth's weather patterns will change drastically. While precipitation will increase at high altitudes causing flash floods, it will decrease in sub-tropical areas resulting in severe droughts (Abbass 2009). Tropical cyclones will increase by 10-20 percent with a rise in sea surface temperature of 2 to 4 degree centigrade relative to current base temperature. Snow-cover will melt and sea-level will rise as a result of past and future emissions of CO_2. Furthermore, storm surge heights will increase due to stronger winds, increased sea surface temperature, and low pressure (World Bank 2009 a).

Such changing weather patterns will disproportionately affect millions of poor livelihoods around the world. According to FAO 2010, almost 98 percent of the world's hungry population subsists in the developing world, where the rate of undernourishment is 16 percent. Sub-Saharan African countries account for 30 percent of the undernourished people. *'Two-thirds of the world's hungry populations live in just seven countries (Bangladesh, China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan)'* (FAO 2010, p. 2). In these countries, rain-fed agriculture remains the key livelihood strategy for millions of small farmers. But with increasingly erratic rainfall patterns, agriculture will be severely affected. Furthermore, during natural calamities like droughts, poor rural farmers will be faced with limited coping strategies. Hence, climate change will negatively impact millions of poor livelihoods, worsening food insecurity.

SOUTH ASIA: CLIMATE CHANGE AND MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGS)

With majestic beauty, South Asia ranges from Himalaya Hindu-Kush mountain belt to low-lying riverine land. The thundering rivers gushing from Himalaya not only sustain natural vegetation but also support millions of livelihoods living along the floodplains of their tributaries. But, over the past several decades, Himalayan glaciers have retreated alarmingly. This phenomenon has resulted in massive flooding and sea-level rise, affecting millions of livelihoods (World Bank 2009a).The following map shows the level of vulnerability of South Asian Region (SAR) to climate change.

Figure 1: Climate Change Vulnerability Index 2011



Legend
Extreme risk
High risk
Medium risk
Low risk
No Data

Rank	Country	Rating
1	Bangladesh	Extreme
2	India	Extreme
3	Madagascar	Extreme
4	Nepal	Extreme
5	Mozambique	Extreme

Rank	Country	Rating
6	Philippines	Extreme
7	Haiti	Extreme
8	Afghanistan	Extreme
9	Zimbabwe	Extreme
10	Myanmar	Extreme

Source: Maplecroft (2011).

Natural calamities have become more common these days, risking the attainment of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) within the agreed time period. One of the key MDGs is to halve extreme poverty and hunger by 2015. But, such is the scenario in South Asia: The region is home to one-fifth of the world's population. Vast majority of people live in extreme poverty, and because of insufficient calorie intake, significant percentage of children suffer from malnutrition. The region's poor rely on natural vegetation for subsistence. And during natural calamities, they get disproportionately affected due to disease outbreak and food supply deficiency.

Table 1: Poverty and Hunger in South Asia

2010 Progress on Millennium Development Goal 1 (MDG1) -Hunger Target				
Already met MDG1	*On track toward achieving MDG1*	*Insufficent progress*	*No progress or deterioration*	*Not relevant (hunger below 5% in 1990)*
Armenia	Angola	Bangladesh	Botswana	Algeria
Azerbaijan	Benin	Bolivia	Burundi	Argentina
Chile	Brazil	Central African Republic	Congo, Dem. Rep	Costa Rica
Congo, Rep	Burkina Faso	Cote d' Ivoire	Gambia	Egypt
Cuba	Cambodia	Dominican Republic	Guatemala	Iran
Gabon	Cameroon	El Salvador	India	Jordan
Georgia	Chad	Eritrea	Korea, DPR	Kazakhstan
Ghana	China	Guinea	Liberia	Korea, Rep.
Guyana	Colombia	Haiti	Madagascar	Lebanon
Jamaica	Ecquador	Indonesia	Pakistan	Libya
Kuwait	Ethiopia	Kenya	Swaziland	Malaysia
Mali	Honduras	Laos	Tanzania	Mexico
Morocco	Kyrgyzstan	Lesotho	Trinidad & Tobago	Saudi Arabia
Myanmar	Malawi	Maldives	Uganda	Syria
Nicaragua	Mauritania	Mongolia	Uzbekistan	Tunisia
Nigeria	Mauritius	Nepal	Yemen	Turkey
Uruguay	Mozambique	Panama	Zambia	United Arab Emirates
Viet Nam	Namibia	Rwanda		
	Niger	Senegal		
	Paraguay	Sierra Leone		
	Peru	Suriname		
	Phillipines	Tajikistan		
	Sri Lanka	Turkmenistan		
	Sudan	Venezuela		
	Thailand	Zimbabwe		
	Togo			

Source: FAOSTAT (2010).

Afghanistan

Despite Afghanistan's insignificant contribution to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, it faces a maximal impact of climate change on food security. Ravaged by years of foreign occupation and civil strife, the country lacks meteorological data on climate change and food security. But there exists foreign meteorological data, which indicates that changing climatic patterns have severe impact upon Afghanistan's agriculture consequently affecting its food security. Climatic models suggest that drought will be an accepted norm in Afghanistan by 2030 as opposed to a cyclical event (Savage et al. 2009). Moreover, with an ongoing retreat of Himalayan glaciers, the country faces periodic floods and a loss of natural vegetation. The earlier retreat of glaciers and the erosion of alluvial soil will result in high crop failures due to shortages of water supply and fertile land for cultivation. Hence, crop productivity will decline *'leading Afghan farmers to switch to drought hardy cultivation, including opium poppy'* (Ibid.).

Agriculture is the principal occupation of nearly 70 percent of Afghanis and accounts for approximately 40 percent of the country's GDP. Nevertheless, only 12 percent of Afghanistan's total land mass is arable. Out of 12 percent of total arable land, only four to five percent is irrigated, while seven percent is rain-fed and cropped opportunistically (UNDP 2010.). With erratic rainfall patterns, rain-fed agriculture of Afghanistan will be hardest hit. And rapid meltdown of glaciers will initially cause an overflow of water in the Helmand River resulting in severe floods. Subsequently, there will be '*drastic declines in water supplies in the Helmand River, drying up 99 percent of its downstream Sistan wetlands'* (Ibid.). This will be an irreparable loss to Afghanistan's agriculture, which is the mainstay of the nation's economy.

Bangladesh

Climate change in Bangladesh had exacerbated agricultural production in the past and will continue to adversely affect agricultural production in the future. The country is situated as a low-lying riverine between the foothills of Himalayas and the Indian Ocean. The movement of three major rivers, namely: the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna (GBM) have a significant effect on crop productivity. An overflow in these river tributaries causes flooding in Bangladesh during cropping seasons, severely affecting crop productivity (Yu et al. 2010). For example, the 1998 flood resulted into the loss of more than two metric tonnes (Mt) of crop production. Simulation studies of climatic models portray a negative impact of future climatic variations on agricultural output. With rise in temperatures and sea-levels, Boro (March-May) production will decline by three to five percent in 2030s and 2050s respectively. In coming decades, the southern sub-region will experience a loss of 10 percent in wheat yield during Aus (July-August) and Aman (December-January) seasons and a loss of 18 percent in wheat yield during Boro season. The country will suffer an average loss of 7.4 percent in rice yield over the 2005–50 simulation periods. Most alarmingly, *'climate variation will cost the country's agricultural sector US$26bn (in discounted terms) in lost agricultural GDP during the 2005–50 periods'* (Ibid.).

With rising sea level, millions of livelihoods in Bangladesh are under serious threat. Thirty-two percent of Bangladesh comprises of coastal regions and is home to 35.1 million people (Pervaiz 2009). It is estimated that '*65 percent of the 250-square kilometre area in the coastal island of Kutubdia, 227 sq km in Bhola and 180 sq km in Swandip in Bangladesh have already gone under water because of the sea- level rise*' (Ibid.).

India

In recent years, climatic patterns across India have changed and changes have negatively impacted agricultural sectors in the country. Due to increased heat waves, days are getting hotter and nights are getting warmer. These changes have affected summer monsoon precipitation, which in turn have affected food productivity. While rainy and winter seasons have shortened, summer season has extended with a record temperature as high as 48 degree centigrade in Rajasthan and adjoining states. Such rising temperatures and falling rainy seasons have resulted in the destruction of sown seeds and crop failure, worsening food security (Abrol and Ingram 1996).

Climatic variations have an unparalleled impact upon poor and marginalised groups of the population. Vast majority of rural Indians rely on rain fed agriculture. When rainfall patterns become more erratic and shorter, farmers are more vulnerable to many risks including droughts, diseases, and unpredictable market irregularities. Not only farmers but fishermen too in India have been adversely affected by climate change. Many rural poor people in India depend on coastal natural vegetation for subsistence (Sridhar 2002). But with climate change, their livelihoods are at serious risk. Rise in temperatures and release of industrial effluents into the sea have resulted in the depletion of fish (Ibid.). Moreover, with rising sea level, the upstream salinity in the sea will increase over the years. And this will '*adversely affect river-based fisheries, expand the range of warmer water species, and contract colder water species*' (Sud 2009).

Simulation studies of climatic models portray a negative impact of future climatic variations on agricultural output. For instance, in most places of north India, grain yields will decline by 15 to 17 percent for every 2 degree centigrade rise in temperature. In Rajasthan, production of pearl millet will decline by 10-15 percent for every 2 degree centigrade rise in temperature. In Madhya Pradesh, soybean yields will decline by 5 percent for every 3 degree centigrade rise in temperature. Overall, an increase of 2 degree centigrade in temperature will reduce rice production by about 0.75 ton per hectare and an increase of 0.5 degree centigrade in winter temperature will reduce wheat production by about 0.45 ton per hectare (Lal et al. 2010). In Jharkhand, Orissa, and Chhattisgarh, severe droughts will reduce rice production by 40 percent of total production; and in Gujarat and Maharashtra, rising sea levels will inundate and salinise coastal regions, thereby affecting agricultural productivity of the coastal regions (Ibid.).

Pakistan

Pakistan, too, suffers from grave consequences of climate change on food security. With the rise in global temperature, the snow-capped Himalayan Mountains in north are melting at an alarming rate. The Gangotri glacier is retreating 98 feet per year (Pati 2008). Such melting of glaciers has resulted in the loss of agricultural output. In the past, severe cyclonic storms in coastal areas and worst droughts have adversely affected Pakistan's agricultural output. Mahmood (2008) writes that increased heat waves across the Indian Sub-Continent in 2005 reduced agricultural yields by 10 to 40 percent of the harvests for that year.

Simulation studies of climatic models portray a negative impact of future climatic variations on agricultural output. In all climatic zones of Pakistan except humid zones, wheat productivity will decline with the rise in global temperature. For example, in arid southern plains, 5 degree centigrade rise in temperature over the baseline will decline wheat yield by 1000 kg/hectare. But in humid northern mountains, 5 degree centigrade rise in temperature over the baseline will increase wheat yield by 900 kg/hectare. With rising temperatures, the growing season will shrink by 14 days in southern semi-arid areas and by 35 days in humid northern mountains (Ibid.). This implies a total loss of agricultural output in rain fed areas of Pakistan. Similarly, in southern semi-arid plains, 5 degree centigrade rise in temperature over the baseline will decline rice productivity by 1400 kg/hectare. But rice and wheat productivity will increase with rising emissions of CO_2 (Ibid.). Nevertheless, net agricultural productivity will decrease with increasing environmental degradation.

Not only arid and semi-arid areas of Pakistan, but also coastal areas of the Arabian Sea in the south are vulnerable to climate change. In the past, coastal inhabitants enjoyed fishing and some subsistence agriculture. But in recent years, subsistence agriculture has been hard-hit by salinisation and inundation of sea water. Moreover, the quality of drinking water has been deteriorating with the intrusion of sea water (Abbass 2009). Table 2 summarises food security, climate risks, and natural disaster impacts in South Asian economies.

Table2: Agriculture and Food Security Indicators

Countries	Contribution of Ag. to GDP (%)	Ag. labour force as % of total labour force	Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (%)	% of undernourished population
Afghanistan	40	59.8		
Bangladesh	19.1	45.21	81.33	27
Bhutan	21.9	96.71	49.49	Na
India	19.0	55.75	75.59	21
Maldives	6	15.33	na	na
Nepal	32.9	87.73	77.57	16
Pakistan	20.4	41.33	60.31	26
Sri Lanka	13.2	47.27	39.74	19
Total	-	53.7	73.40	-

Source: UNCTAD (2010).

Table 3: Climate Risks by Country

	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	Bhutan	India	Maldives	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka
Sea-level rise	–	√	–	√	√	–	√	√
Glacier retreat	√	√	√	√	–	√	√	–
Temperature increase	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Floods more frequent	?	√	√	√	√	√	√	?
Drought more frequent	√	√ (some areas)	?	√	–	?	√	?

Likely: √ Not Present: – Unknown: ?

Source: World Bank (2009a).

Table 4: Reported Natural Disaster Impacts in South Asia (1990-2008)

Country	Population[56] ('000)	Deaths ('000)	People Affected ('000)	Population Affected (%)[57]	Damage (US$millions)
Afghanistan	22,615	6.1	5,410	23.9	69,060
Bangladesh	143,990	155.3	145,713	101.2	12,984,000
Bhutan	602	0.2	66	11.0	3,500
India	1,071,608	53.4	885,244	82.6	25,743,100
Maldives	279	0.0	2	0.7	500,100
Nepal	25,278	4.6	2,796	11.1	245,100
Pakistan	162,662	9.4	27,943	17.2	3,573,054
Sri Lanka	19,258	0.5	6,331	32.9	1,670,070
Total	**1,368,327**	**229.5**	**1,073,504**	**78.5**	**44,787,984**

Source: Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database) (http://www.em-dat.net) and United Nations World Population Prospects (http://esa.un.org)

Source: (Ibid.).

Farmers' Sample Size and Distribution

In each of the four project countries – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan – one local partner was identified and engaged to support CUTS in undertaking a survey of farmers. Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Pakistan; Centre for Community Economics & Development Consultants Society, India; Afghan Development Association, Afghanistan; and Practical Action, Bangladesh surveyed stakeholders in their respective countries. A total of 1200 small and marginal farmers (300 in each country) were sampled. The sample for each country was equally divided[1] into three sub-samples drawn from three agro-climatic zones. To ensure that each sub-sample is representative of the region chosen, it was drawn from three districts and ten villages in each zone with focus on small and marginal farmers. The official country-level data relating to households below and above the poverty line were used for surveying small and marginal farmers. The sample selection was largely based on three broad criteria as outlined below:

(a) Selection should be geographically representative,

(b) It should cover at least three agro-climatic zones, and

(c) The selected region should be a producer of at least one staple crop.

[1] There was one exception to this. In case of Bangladesh, four agro-climatic zones were selected with total sample size of 300.

Based on the above criteria, following agro-climatic zones were selected for the study:

Box 1: Sample Distribution			
Afghanistan	South-western Hot dry Zone (Kandahar)	Dand	100
	Wet/Moist Hot Zone (Nangarhar)	Khewa	100
	Central Colder High Altitude Zone (Panjshir)	Rukha	100
	Sub-total		***300***
Bangladesh	North-western Drought Prone Area	Dinajpur	77
	North-western Flood Prone Area	Gaibandha	40
	North-eastern Haor/Flash Flood Prone Area	Sunamgonj	83
	South-western Coastal Area/ Cyclone & Saline Affected Area	Satkhira	100
	Sub-total		***300***
India	Semi-arid zone (Rajasthan)	Tonk	100
	Western coastal region (Maharashtra)		100
	Humid wet agro-ecological region (U.P.)	Jhansi	100
	Sub-total		***300***
Pakistan	Northern ecological zone (Gilgit)	Gilgit	100
	Arid zone (Punjab)	Bahawalpur	100
	Lower Indus Plain (Sindh)	Badin	100
	Sub-total		***300***
	Total Sample *(four countries)*		**1200**

Administering Farmers' Survey

Based on sample selection, a detailed questionnaire was prepared. Farmers were asked whether they noticed any significant decline in crop yield in the recent past. If the answer was affirmative, an effort was made to ascertain causes of this decline and whether they associated such decline with weather variability (climate change) and/or social, economic, and technological barriers. Respondents were asked whether they practiced climate change adaptation measures such as water conservation and flood control initiatives. The survey was based on personal meetings between farmers and survey teams.

Household Characteristics

To make the sample representative of the South Asian region, a mix of households, nuclear and joint, were selected for survey in each of the selected countries. The sample also covered both people living below and above the poverty line. In South Asia, a large number of farmers are illiterate. In order to capture an overall view of rural perspectives, care was taken to cover both literate and illiterate households. Some basic characteristics of the selected households such as family type, economic condition, and literacy levels are depicted in the following graphs.

Figure 2: Household Characteristics



Figure 3: Distribution of Households



Figure 4: Household's Literacy Level



RESULTS

Findings of this study are consistent with what other studies have deduced on the impact of climate change upon food security. Nonetheless, this study is different from other studies as it examines small and marginal farmers' perception about climate change and food security. While findings of majority studies are based upon scientific analysis, findings of this study are based upon small and marginal farmers' observation about climate change over the years.

Previous studies show that climate change has worsened food security across the region. In Bangladesh, during the period of 1962-1988, 0.5 million tonnes of rice were lost annually due to floods, that accounted to approximately 30 percent of the country's average annual food grain imports (Paul and Rashid 1993). Because of climate change, wheat yields are predicted to decline by 6-9 percent in sub-humid, semi-arid, and arid areas of Pakistan (Sultana and Ali 2006). And wheat yields in India are set to decline by 2 percent as a consequence of climate change (GoI 2004).

This study shows that South Asian farmers identify climate change as change in weather patterns such as increased temperature, lengthened summer seasons, erratic rainfall and increased hailstorm, among others. According to farmers, these phenomena often destroy crops resulting in declined production, reduced income, increased poverty trap, and economic hardships. What makes the region more vulnerable is the fact that these farmers are not in a position to effectively counter challenges emanating from climate change and its resulting consequences. Their adaptive capacity is found to be very low mainly due to low economic capacity, low information and limited knowledge base, absence to alternative opportunities, low level of governmental and non-governmental interventions, among others. These attributes have made lives and livelihoods of poor farmers more vulnerable. Some details relating to farmers' perception about climate change and its impact on their livelihoods are enumerated in the following sections.

Perception about Climate Change Impact

Majority of respondents appear to be aware of climate change and its impact upon their livelihoods (Figure 5). The data revealed that awareness about climate change impact among farmers is higher in Afghanistan and Pakistan than in India and Bangladesh. Out of these four countries, Bangladesh is the only country, where a major proportion of surveyed farmers were unaware of climate change impact. This may be due to terminological error. At the aggregate level, data revealed an interesting finding that level of awareness across countries is not correlated with the level of literacy. For example, in Afghanistan, the awareness about climate change impact is very high. But Afghanis lag behind other South Asians on literacy level. This establishes the fact that people's awareness about climate change impact is more influenced by practical experiences than by prevailing literacy rates.

The survey data demonstrates significant variations in the level of impact awareness and occurrences of climate change across the select countries.

Figure 5: Awareness about Climate Change



Perception about Climate Change Occurrences

People's perception about climate change occurrences has varied with time across countries. At the aggregate level, nearly half of the respondents feel that there is a definitive shift in climate change occurrence during the last 11-20 year period. About one-third of the respondents opine that climate change is taking place over the past one decade. At country level, a majority of farmers in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan are of the opinion that climate change has gained momentum over the last two decades (Figure 6). These perceptions might have been influenced by more pronounced occurrences of floods and droughts in recent years.

Figure 6: Perception about Climate Change Occurrences



Perception about Change in Cropping Seasons

Climate change in South Asia duly gets reflected by people's perception about change in seasons – say months covering a season. In case of Afghanistan, there is a shift in duration of all other seasons with the exception of autumn. Most significantly, winter appears to have shrunk considerably (Figure 7). The survey also reveals that the length of summer has increased and the season has extended forward to cover parts of rainy season. This change in duration of summer and other seasons is adversely impacting cropping patterns and life cycle of crops in the country.

Figure 7: Fluctuation in Length of Seasons in Afghanistan



The situation in Bangladesh is not quite different from Afghanistan. The lengths of winter, summer, and rainy seasons have increased, but on the other hand, the length of spring has decreased. It is expected that an increase in the length of summer season will adversely influence plantation and an increase in the length of rainy season will adversely impact the timely ripening and harvesting of crops. In fact, change in seasons is expected to impact whole cropping cycles. Additionally, analysis of farmers' perception in different agro-climatic zones of the country shows that climate change impacts will be different for different zones in the country.

Figure 8: Fluctuation in Length of Seasons in Bangladesh



Similar weather patterns are observed in India and Pakistan as well. Farmers reported increased summer season and decreased winter and rainy seasons. In India, summer season has expanded by more than a month. This has shortened other important seasons, especially the rainy season. Farmers are now being pushed toward adapting to new strategies by changing their cropping patterns and taking other initiatives to cope with the scenario.

Perception about Frequency and Intensity of Natural Hazards

The change in seasons is taking place along with increased frequency and intensity of natural hazards. The respondents were requested to respond whether they have experienced any change in frequency and intensity of these natural hazards.

Table 5: List of Natural Hazards as reported by Respondents

Natural Hazards	
1. Drought	7. High intensity rainfall
2. Flood	8. Earthquake
3. Cyclone	9. Hailstorm
4. Dust storm	10. Landslide
5. Frost	11. Fire
6. Storm surge	

Although each of the above mentioned 11 natural hazards have varying impact on different countries, both frequency and intensity of natural hazards have increased in all the countries (Figure 9). In Afghanistan, rainfall, dust storm, and drought are the main natural hazards adversely impacting lives and livelihoods of rural people, especially the small and marginal farmers. Frequencies of these disasters in Afghanistan have increased considerably. In Bangladesh, drought, flood, and cyclone continue to devastate livelihoods of small and marginal farmers much more frequently. In India, drought is considered to be the most frequently occurring natural hazard. Nearly two-thirds of respondents opine that the frequency of drought has increased over the last few years.

Farmers' perception about natural hazards in Pakistan is found to be more widespread. They believe that frequency of natural hazards has increased alarmingly. More than 20 percent of respondents feel that almost all types of natural hazards are occurring much more frequently than previous decades. About 40 to 65 percent of respondents feel that the frequencies of dust storm, rainfall, flood, storm surge, and drought have increased over the base period.

Figure 9: Frequency of Natural Hazards in South Asia



But, there are visible variations in responses about intensities of different types of natural hazards in these countries (Figure 10).

In Afghanistan, nearly 100 percent of the respondents feel that intensity of rainfall has increased, and about 50 to 80 percent of the respondents feel that intensities of drought and dust storm have increased over the base period. In Bangladesh, about 20-80 percent of the respondents believe that intensities of drought, flood, cyclone, storm surge, rainfall, and hailstorm have increased.

Figure 10: Intensity of Natural Hazards in South Asia



Drought and storm surge are two major natural calamities affecting India. More than 20 percent of respondents in India opine that the intensity of storm surge has increased over the base period. Over 80 percent of respondents feel that the intensity of drought has increased over the years.

In Pakistan, 20-40 percent of respondents point out that intensities of drought, flood, storm surge, and rainfall have increased over the base period. Less than 20 percent of respondents feel that intensities of remaining natural hazards have increased over the years.

Impact of Changing Seasons on Agriculture, Productivity, and Food Availability

Impact on Irrigated Area

A decline in average irrigated area can indicate two things. First, there is a decline in underground water-level as a result of disturbance in water cycle. Second, there is a decline in affordability as a result of increased cost of irrigation. The perception survey reveals that in all countries, the underground water-level has decreased alarmingly. Thus, any decline in the average irrigated area can be due to disturbed water cycle and shortened rainy season.

At the country level, the trend indicates that average irrigated area in Afghanistan and Pakistan has increased considerably (Figure 11). However, data show that there is no increase in productivity despite an increase in the average irrigated area. While India has experienced a decline in this regard, Bangladesh has experienced no change.

Figure 11: Trend in Average Irrigated Area



The cost of irrigation is relatively lower in South Asia compared to the developed world. Because of lower irrigation service charges, irrigation water has not been utilised efficiently. Furthermore, an excessive use of irrigation water has resulted in a decline in underground water-level. This has gradually affected the availability of irrigation water resulting in the increased cost of irrigation. Thus, across the region, environmentalists and activists have argued for getting the water prices right (Shah et al. 2008).

Hussain (2004) writes that both irrigation charge level and the collection rate are lower in South Asian countries than those in China, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The author argues that the poor get disadvantaged as landholders immensely benefit from lower cost of irrigation. Moreover, the irrigation sector gets fewer funds for its maintenance. And most alarmingly, this further worsens *'income distribution especially in those settings where there is greater degree of inequity in land and water distribution (as in most South Asian system), as large part of benefits of subsidies to irrigation sector goes to larger landholders'* (Ibid., p. 1).

Impact on Area under Cultivation

Data show that current area under cultivation has increased over the base year (base year taken as 100) across all select countries except for Pakistan. The increase appears to be the highest in India followed by Bangladesh and Afghanistan. This may be due to reclamation of earlier unused land. Data also includes both sown and unsown area.

Figure 12: Trend in Area under Cultivation



Impact on Productivity

Agricultural productivity in India has declined considerably and this appears to be more prominent in India than in any other countries included in the present study. Farmers' perception in India and Pakistan show that the decline in productivity is more than 40 percent. In Afghanistan, the decline in productivity is about 10 percent. Bangladesh is the only country which has realised an increase in productivity over the base period (Figure 13).

Figure 13: Comparing Productivity over the Base Year



Impact on Food Unavailability

Small and marginal farmers in all select South Asian countries feel that food unavailability issue has escalated compared to the base period (Figure 14). In Pakistan, about 25 percent of respondents feel that it has now become a common phenomenon. Farmers' responses from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and India also indicate that food unavailability issue has become much more pronounced than before.

Figure 14: Households' Perception on Food Unavailability



Impact on Change in Mode of Securing Food

Data indicates that there is a definitive change in mode of securing food over the base period. An increased number of people appear to be dependent on both self grown agricultural production and the market for food. Farmers' dependence on own agricultural production has significantly declined in three countries, namely India, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan. As such, farmers' dependence on market for food has increased. It is further expected that this increased market dependence will continue and become more pronounced with the increased impact of climate change in near future.

Figure 15: Mode of Securing Food



Impact on Income Levels

With ongoing climate change, the real income level of small and marginal farmers across the select South Asian countries has decreased over the base year income (Figures 16 and 17).

Figure 16: Farmers' Perception about Average Income



Figure 17: Trend in Real Income Level



Impact on Factors that Influence Livelihood

Household responses reveal that weather variability has affected rural dynamics to a considerable extent. At a disaggregated level in Afghanistan, changing seasons have impacted agriculture and led to substantial decline in subsistence farming, commercial food production, and food availability from public distribution system (PDS). In Bangladesh, changing seasons have resulted in significant decline in seeds accessibility, commercial food production, and subsistence farming. In India, over 70 percent of respondents feel that subsistence farming has declined as a result of changing weather patterns. The situation is not much different in Pakistan, where two-thirds of respondents feel that there is a significant decline in subsistence farming. And all these factors have in turn negatively impacted income level of local communities (Figures 18-21).

Figure 18: Households' Perception about Factors that Influence Livelihood in Afghanistan (in percent)



Figure 19: Households' Perception about Factors that Influence Livelihood in Bangladesh (in percent)



Figure 20: Households' Perception about Factors that Influence Livelihood in India (in percent)



Figure 21: Households' Perception about Factors that Influence Livelihood in Pakistan (in percent)



Impact on Migration

Most of the household migrations are for alternative livelihood and income generating opportunities as a part of their adaptation measures to climate change. This is true for all select South Asian countries. About two-fifths of households in India have reported that household members are migrating to nearby cities for alternative livelihoods. In the other three countries, responses on migration vary in the range of 20 to 25 percent (Figure 22). Majority of households have indicated that less than 2 members per family have been migrating to cities (Figure 23). In Bangladesh and India, this segment has 100 percent share (Figure 23).

Figure 22: Trend in Migration



Figure 23: Intensity of Migration



Seasonal migration is most rampant compared with other types of migration in all four countries. But, this observation is much more prominent in India than in other South Asian countries. This activity shows that small and marginal farmers attach high importance to farming as they return home during monsoon seasons for farming (Figure 24).

Responses to reasons for migration vary across countries. The primary reason for migration in Afghanistan and India is for job search. Whereas in Bangladesh and Pakistan, the primary reason for migration is the need for more income (Figure 25).

Figure 24: Types of Migration



Figure 25: Reasons for Migration



Impact on Livestock and Fishing

Livestock is an important source of livelihood for farmers in South Asia. It has played a significant role in ensuring households' livelihood in earlier periods. But during the survey, it was observed that weather variability and increased temperature have led to significant decline in pasture land and animal feedstock. Such developments have forced farmers to sell their livestock, which in turn has increased their dependence on technology that they cannot afford. Furthermore, decline in livestock and cattle manure has increased their dependence on fertilisers and pesticides.

In case of fishing, some positive developments have taken place. In some coastal areas, fishermen have reported an increase in fish catch over the years. For example, fish catch per day has increased in Bangladesh as a result of advancement of rainy season. And this has helped a segment of farmers to some extent by protecting their lives and livelihoods in the face of climate change.

Continued Dependence on Firewood for Cooking

Data analysis show that declining level of income coupled with other livelihood issues such as declining production and productivity make farmers more dependent on firewood and cattle dung as cooking fuel. This is evident in all countries covered under the present study. In case of three countries, namely Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, it is observed that this dependence is above 80 percent. The situation is also not much different in Afghanistan where such use for fuel is over 75 percent.

Figure 26: Continued Dependence on Firewood for Cooking



Adaptation Strategies Practiced by Farmers to Reduce Climate Change Impacts

South Asian countries, which are characterised by high incidences of food insecurity and poverty, are yet to take comprehensive steps to help farmers reduce adverse impact of climate change on their lives and livelihoods. Support from the respective governments is limited to a certain level. In such a scenario, farmers are trying to adapt to emerging conditions on their own. Some major adaptation practices followed by farmers in South Asia are as follows:

i. migration to nearby cities in search of alternative livelihoods,
ii. increased dependence on subsidised fertilisers and pesticides,
iii. increased participation in government employment schemes (especially in India),
iv. crop insurance,
v. usage of improved variety of seeds,
vi. increased dependence on loans,
vii. increased use of cattle dung as cooking fuel,
viii. creation of sanitation facilities and water storage capacity, and
ix. increased dependence on pond/river fishing.

CONCLUSION

Plagued by deep poverty and backwardness, food insecurity widely prevails in many South Asian economies. All South Asian countries, except India, are net food importers. High incidences of malnutrition among children and anaemia among women are prevalent in the region. South Asia alone accounts for approximately 40 percent of the world's hungry population (IFPRI 2010). And most disturbingly, the state of food security has further worsened due to declining agricultural growth (1993-2006) and increasing population over the past several years (Mittal and Sethi 2009).

Besides deep poverty, climate change has further destabilised these economies, plunging them into food security crises. With rise in global temperatures, natural calamities like droughts and floods have become a recurrent phenomena. The region heavily relies on rain-fed agriculture, and with erratic rainfall patterns, agriculture has been severely affected in recent years. Moreover, rising temperatures are expected to negatively affect crop productivity.

While some developing countries have made considerable progress toward securing food security, many South Asian countries still lag far behind in hunger reduction. For example, developing countries like Armenia and Chile have already achieved MDG 1, i.e. halving extreme poverty and hunger by 2015. Ethiopia, Peru and other developing countries are on track toward achieving MDG 1. But South Asian countries like Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan lag far behind the rest of the world in hunger reduction (FAOSTAT 2010).

Perception analyses, undertaken in four select South Asian countries, have shown that farmers in the region are aware of climate variability and its impact upon agriculture. Across the region, small and marginal farmers have reported observation of changed weather patterns over the years. They have lamented over the loss of crop yield due to changed weather patterns and recurrent natural hazards. And farmers in the region have practiced adaptation strategies such as crop insurance, reliance on subsidised fertilisers, and migration to nearby cities in search of alternative livelihoods.

In general, poverty alleviation is vital to securing food security in South Asia. The poor communities are the ones who suffer the most from climate change. These people rely on natural vegetation for sustenance and face limited coping strategies during climatic crises. Hence, in order to minimise the impact of climate change on such vulnerable communities, poverty must be addressed first. Initiatives such as land entitlement to poor communities and empowerment of small and marginal farmers through microfinance loans can be some of the effective measures to alleviate poverty. Such initiatives will increase the poor's asset base and limit their reliance on natural vegetation for subsistence.

In order to alleviate poverty, economic growth is indispensable. But economic growth at the expense of natural resources is detrimental in the long-run. In South Asia, industrialisation is occurring at the expense of environmental degradation. If economic growth continues in this fashion, then future generations will suffer immensely. Hence, any developmental process must incorporate environmental aspects to achieve a sustainable economic growth in the region.

Furthermore, elimination of intra-regional trade barriers is essential for economic development and greater cooperation in the region. Over the recent decades, South Asia has become a food surplus zone (Sanderatne 2008). But despite being a food surplus zone, vast majority of South Asian children and women suffer from malnutrition and anaemia respectively. So where does the surplus food of the region end up? While South Asian countries have extensively engaged in overseas trade, the intra-regional trade has been disappointingly low due to host of trade barriers, protectionism, and distrust among member countries. When intra-regional trade alone can address significant aspect of food insecurity, the respective governments of the region must not exhibit pessimism toward intra-regional trade. Let free trade prevail for an overall economic development of the region. This enables them to spread the risks of climate change and thus increase resilience to its impacts (ADB and IFPRI 2009).

Bilateral initiatives to tackle climate change and food security:

a. <u>Food Bank:</u> Despite being enacted several years ago, the SAARC Food Bank continues to remain at its nascent stage mainly due to lack of effective initiation from member countries**.** Although the notion of a bank implies profit, the SAARC Food Bank can be established as a non-profit humanitarian aid organisation. If the SAARC Food Bank can be materialised, it will greatly enhance food security in the region. Most importantly, the region does not have to rely on foreign food assistance in times of natural catastrophes.

b. <u>Intellectual Property Rights and Sharing of Knowledge and Experience:</u> While India has been a leader in Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) issues in the region, other South Asian economies lag far behind in this field. As such, other South Asian countries can learn from Indian experience. Furthermore, an increased transfer and share of SAARC technology is essential for promoting economic growth and regional cooperation in the region.

c. Climate Resiliant Agriculture: In order to better adapt to changing weather patterns, South Asian economies need to invest in research and development of climate resilience agriculture. There is a greater need for improved farming systems, diversification of agricultural products and development of breeds that adapt to climate change. The region can seek foreign technical assistance in this regard. For example, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) assists South Asian countries like Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan by developing measures to deal with the increased summer drought and competing irrigation and water supply demands. These measures include cultivation of drought resistant crops, improvement of irrigation efficiency, enhancement of water resources management, rehabilitation of degraded forests and pasturelands, and protection of watershed (ADB 2010).

If greater economic cooperation is sought-after in South Asia, then it is imperative that South Asians be aware of the importance of SAARC and its initiatives. Even after decades of SAARC establishment, a vast majority of South Asians are practically unaware of SAARC and its declarations. By contrast, in Europe, Europeans are aware of the importance of the EU zone and participate in EU policies by voting in referendums. But no such activities exist in South Asia. Hence, until and unless the civil society in the region is aware of SAARC and its greater manifestations toward economic development and regional cooperation, SAARC ministerial summits and subsequent declarations will have little significance at all.

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Section II: Sustainable Livelihood Options and Local Communities

- Whose Right to Livelihood Matters? A Case Study of Local and Migratory Fishermen in Trincomalee, Sri Lanka

- Access to Land Resources: Process of Social Exclusion and Power Relations in Conflict Prone Areas of Nepal

- ICT as a Rural Livelihood Option: A Study of Nangi Village, Nepal

Whose Right to Livelihood Matters? A Case Study of Local and Migratory Fishermen in Trincomalee, Sri Lanka

Gayathri Lokuge* and Mohamed Munas**

ABSTRACT

The main objective of this paper is to analyse the emerging issue of resource competition between local fishermen in selected areas of the conflict-affected Trincomalee district in the Eastern province of Sri Lanka and migratory fishermen from the southern and western parts of the country. As precursor for a more comprehensive study on fisher livelihoods, this paper intends to provide indicative insights into these undocumented emerging issues. Although they share historic linkages, the mechanisation process and the protracted war damaged these linkages and introduced tensions between local and migrant fishers. Due to loss of equipment because of the war, the local fishers are unable to compete with the migrants. The situation is rife with potential conflict which can erupt into violence if not managed sensitively. The analysis will draw on themes of possible conflict triggers linked to identity and perceptions and potential mitigation methods in terms of integrated resource management systems and alternate livelihood options.

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BACKGROUND

Global literature discusses seasonal migration of fishers as a common phenomenon (Aburto et al. 2009; Haakonsen and Diaw 1991; Jorion 1988). Sri Lankan counterparts also show the same phenomenon (Bavinck 1984 and Alexander 1982 cited in Stirrat 1988). Stirrat (1988) argues that it is difficult to differentiate between 'permanent migration' and 'seasonal transhumance' of fishers in the Sri Lankan context. He also explains the formation of permanent settlements in the migratory host areas in the 70s and 80s which was symbolised by the setting up of the Catholic church. However, the mechanisation process and the protracted conflict introduced advanced fishing methods, new power relations, bargaining patterns and coping strategies for people in the conflict affected areas in general and for fisher households for which there seems to be a lack of documented evidence. This paper attempts to prepare the ground work to fill this gap by examining historical linkages of the two fisher groups based on the literature and by examining the new developments and dynamics between the two groups through indicative primary data collection. There is, however, a growing body of literature around the conflicts between Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen which this paper does not address.[1]

Sri Lanka's history since independence in 1948 has been dominated by conflict centred on competing ethno-political interests, particularly in terms of access to the state. Discontent with the perceived privileging of the Sinhalese led to the formation of Tamil militant groups including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (formed in 1976), an organisation that from the early 1980s fought against the armed forces of the state. The LTTE demanded a separate state of Tamil Eelam be carved out of the North and East of the island. The killing of 13 Sri Lankan Army soldiers in 1983 in an ambush by the LTTE resulted in widespread anti-Tamil riots in the capital Colombo. This event triggered a protracted war, between the Tamil militants and the state for the recognition of ethnically-based secessionist demands, which lasted until May 2009 (Pratap 1984 cited in Diprose et al. forthcoming). The three decade long violent conflict between the LTTE and Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) came to an end with a military victory in 2009. The Government of Sri Lanka gained control over the

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[1] See Centre for Maritime Research (MARE) work headed by Dr. J. M. Bavinck <http://www.marecentre.nl/organisation/bavinck.html>

entire territory under LTTE control, which resulted in the country moving into a post-war phase with varying degrees of affectedness across the country.

The Northern and Eastern provinces of the country, where most of the fighting took place, are the worst affected in terms of number of deaths, property destruction and waves of displacements and forced migration. The Government of Sri Lanka gained control of the Eastern Province 'liberating' the region in mid 2007, whereas the North was 'cleared' in May 2009. Since the East came under government control comparatively earlier than the North, development initiatives in the East are in a more advanced stage than in the North.

Resettlement of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) is complete in the East, while it is still an ongoing and a challenging process in the North where physical infrastructure was completely destroyed during the war. However, the quality of the resettlement process and the nature and development orientation of the Government have raised several concerns. The Government of Sri Lanka has prioritised infrastructure led economic development in the North and East. There is a specific focus on livelihood development as expressed in the development plans for the North-"Northern Spring" and for the East-"Eastern Revival"[2]. There is very little attention being paid to reconciliation efforts and a narrow space to engage in a discourse that encourages reconciliation in a post-war context. It is evident that the efforts to address the causes of conflict were minimal and as a result tensions prevail. Certain simmering tensions, such as Muslim-Tamil tensions over land and livelihood opportunities in the East, point to a renewal of violence at the regional and possibly national levels.

There are historical precedents of localised tensions snowballing into more violent conflicts drawn on ethnic lines. Further, there is a marked absence at the national level to initiate attempts at reconciliation that aim to address issues of damaged trust and prejudices at the community level through state structures. These combined reasons make it pertinent that informed measures be taken to avoid the resumption of violence. The deliberation for this paper is contextualised within this framework. Field work done by CEPA following the end of the war, looking at livelihood issues in the East showed that one such

[2]The main development plans prepared by the Government have identified the essential needs in the areas including a budget to provide for them.

tension or latent conflict is emerging between the local and migratory fishers in the Eastern coast which has traditionally hosted migrant fishers from the Southern and Eastern coasts over generations. Despite long standing relations and a certain level of integration, rapid mechanisation of fishing methods/equipment in the areas not affected by the conflict and the restrictions on fishing brought on by the war in the North and East have created these tensions. The paper attempts to explore these tensions within the context explained above, and attempts to analyse the emerging issue of resource competition between the newly resettled local fishermen in the Trincomalee district of the Eastern province and migratory fishermen from the southern and western parts of the country. The fisheries sector in Sri Lanka constitutes three main sub-sectors; coastal fisheries, offshore marine fisheries and inland fisheries/aquaculture. The focus of this paper is the coastal and deep sea sub sectors, because the interaction between migrant fishermen and local fishermen occurs mainly in these two sub sectors.

Fishing is an important livelihood activity in the conflict affected North and East provinces of the country, which together comprise about 60% of the coastal area of Sri Lanka. In 1980 prior to the violent conflict, the then combined North and East Province contributed 64% of the total fish catch in the country and showed a dramatic drop to 20% by 2000. However, more than in monetary terms, the fishery sub-sector is a major provider of employment in the province. The three districts in the Eastern province employ the highest numbers nationally, in absolute numbers in the fishing trade (Ministry of Fisheries 2010). With 40% of the total fisher households in Sri Lanka coming from these three districts in the East, Trincomalee district in the Eastern province is proposed as a case for the indicative study due to:

- fisheries being an important livelihood source for local communities;
- the district employing 32,970 active fishers- the highest number of people engaged in the coastal fishing sub sector in the country;
- the local fishing communities are comprised of a mix of all three major ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, i.e. Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim;
- traditionally being a destination for migratory fishers due to the abundance of fisheries resources; and,
- migratory fishers using a range of fishing methods and engaging in a range of fishing activities within the fishing value chain.

In terms of fish production, there has been a percentage change of 30.9% in the Trincomalee district between 2009 and 2010 and a steady increase from 2007 of 8,150 metric tonnes to 36,250 metric tonnes in 2010 (Ibid.). According to the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (2010), the highest number of 137 multi-day boats on the east coast is registered in the Trincomalee district. However, this number is relatively low compared to 1,102 from Matara or 588 from Chilaw in the southern and north-western coasts. In terms of fisheries infrastructure, Trincomalee district has four rice plants--all privately owned--with a production capacity of 313 tonnes per day, which in fact, is the highest next to the Gampaha district in the Western Province where the capital Colombo is located.

The State has identified the development of the fishing sector as an important driver of livelihood recovery in the conflict affected areas as seen by the Accelerated Fishing Development Plan for the North[3] and Eastern Revival programme in the East. However, recent research by CEPA shows many constraints, especially for small scale fishers affected by war: the destruction of fishing related livelihood assets including social networks, skill and knowledge drain through internal displacement and migration of traditional fishers that used to pass their skill through generations, being trapped in cycles of debt because of seasonality, lack of capital to access appropriate technology and to diversify fishing methods, reluctance of the younger generation to engage in direct fishing related activities such as fish capturing and de-prioritisation of small-scale coastal fisheries by government policy which encourages capital intense off-shore fishing (Lokuge and Munas 2011).

METHODOLOGY

The paper uses a ***qualitative approach*** using a combination of secondary and indicative primary data sources. The secondary data includes studies on resource conflicts in Sri Lanka and in selected regions, including the production and demographic databases, annual reports of the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and the Department of Fisheries; specific fisheries studies at the

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[3] For more details visit <http://www.fisheries.gov.lk/English_link/ActionPlan_NE-NEW_Final%20EDITION_.pdf>

national and district levels; and, a literature review at global level to locate the analysis within the wider discourse.

Primary data was collected using ***qualitative techniques*** to identify stakeholders involved, to understand the context and the issues in the industry in-depth and understand the interactions and changes that have taken place in the post conflict period and the implications of these changes on the overall social fabric of the fisher communities in the study sites. The main tools used in this phase were key person interviews with experts on the subject and with fisheries officials at the district level; and, in-depth interviews with selected fishers and their family members using life histories and key person interviews. Primary data was collected from both migrant and local fishers whom the study identifies as two groups with differentiated access to assets and markets and their family members; and, other actors who are part of the fishing value chain such as fish buyers living and operating in the ArisiMalai, Kokkilai, Pulmoddai and Kuchchavelu areas in the Trincomalee District (see Figure 1 for map).

ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK

The main research question that the paper addresses is *'What are the opportunities and constraints for resource sharing and peaceful social relations between migratory and local fishers in a post-conflict situation?'* This question is posed in the context of technological and environmental changes in the fishing industry and increased competition among fishers with differentiated access to fishing assets and markets for a depleting resource, as well as ethnic relations which have deteriorated due to the conflict and are evolving in a post-war context. The analysis, based on two lines of inquiry, will attempt to draw out indicative insights of possible conflict triggering issues in relation to resource competition in fishing, and potential mitigation methods in terms of strengthening local-migratory fisher relations, providing alternate livelihood options and value addition opportunities.

The first line of inquiry of the paper is to provide *a comprehensive analysis of social relations among migratory and local fishers in relation to past and potential conflict over fishing resources in a post-conflict contex*t in the Trincomalee district. This would include, but not be limited to exploring ethnic group interactions. The following key research questions relate to this line of inquiry:

1. What were the localised and coast-to-coast **migration patterns** among fishers in the time leading up to the conflict and in the aftermath of the ethnic conflict in the deep sea and coastal fishing sub sectors?
2. What are the **conflict triggering aspects** between the local and migratory fishermen in the post conflict situation?

The second line of inquiry is to create/increase awareness of the potential for conflict over fisheries resources and propose methods of managing existing tensions and working towards establishing peace and stability among the range of stakeholders in a post-conflict context. The following research questions elaborate this line of inquiry:

1. What are the **resource conflicts** that are present between migratory and local groups and to what extent are these conflicts ethnicised?
2. What are the **mechanisms** that need to be strengthened/introduced to facilitate peaceful interactions between migratory and local fishers? Can the shared histories and hybrid identities play a positive role in this?
3. What is the potential for strengthening of **alternative livelihood options** and **upward movement in the fishing value chain** as a mitigation method for resource competition?

MIGRATORY PATTERNS OF SRI LANKAN FISHERS: PAST TO PRESENT

Fishers in Sri Lanka belong to four ethnic groups, i.e. Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim and Malay, who practice four religions, i.e. Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity respectively. The majority of fishers are distributed among the Sinhalese and Tamils with 80% belonging to the *Karawe* caste (Tamil: *Karaiyar*), which is the only caste in Sri Lanka that cuts across the two ethnic groups (Weeratunge Unpublished). Their origins can be traced back to the medieval period when migrants from South India arrived on the west coast of Sri Lanka. Groups of migrants who went north remained Tamil speaking and mainly Hindu, whilst those who went south were Sinhala speaking and eventually took on a Sinhala-Buddhist identity. However, in the west, until the beginning of the ethnic conflict in the 1980s, there were groups who were bilingual in both the Sinhalese and Tamil languages and maintained a hybrid identity. These fishing communities converted to Christianity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thus, the historical development of the fisher community in Sri Lanka is of one caste, speaking two languages and practicing three religions (Roberts 1982). However, primary data from the Trincomalee district proves that Muslims also form part of fisher groups both as producers and buyers.

Fishing is seasonal in Sri Lanka and is influenced by monsoon patterns. Enterprising fishers tend to follow the fish, which migrate according to the monsoon, to be able to benefit from particular fish species in different places at various times of the year, resulting in both localised and coast-to-coast patterns. The primary data collection proves this pattern in the study communities in Trincomalee district as shown in Figure 1. However, monsoon patterns and the resulting seasonality of fisheries is not the only reason for fisher migration. From a North-western coast migrant sending point of view, Stirrat (1988) describes that fisher migration takes place both as a response to the climatic changes brought on by the monsoons and also as an individual choice on the possible economic benefits that the life in camps will bring to them. In the 70s and 80s, these fishing camps, commonly clustered along the beach, were relatively isolated and presented very little opportunities for spending money; thus, almost forcing them to save.

Figure 1: Migratory Routes into the Study Areas in Trincomalee District



Source: Derived from primary data.

The major migration is between the west coast and the northeast and eastern coasts during the South-east monsoon. Bay of Bengal programme (1984) states that about 4,000 fishermen migrate to the east coast from the west and southern coasts every year. These fishers spend three to five months of the year in migratory fishing camps on the north-eastern and eastern coasts. However, as there are new entrants to the fishing trade as stated by Amarasinghe (2009), possibly there are new migrants--specially more successful southern coast fishers--into the east coast, but there is no up-to-date data on numbers of migrant fishers by district or province to determine the major migration trends and migrant sending regions at present. Fish are plentiful during this time in the rich fishing grounds of the north and east and migratory fishers had long-standing social relations and informal arrangements with local fishing communities to share these resources.

In contrast, there is no documented evidence to show a reversal of the migratory patterns; east coast fishers migrating to the South or West coasts during the North-East monsoon, which is the off season for fishing in the east coast. The reasons for this are not clear and given the linkages they would have created with the west and southern coast fishers, this aspect warrants further study in the future. During the off season, the east coast fishers engage in lagoon fishing and take on daily wage labour in agriculture fields. A key person interviewee mentioned that pre-war eastern fishers used to travel daily to the central province of the country that is closer to the eastern province like Badulla for agriculture wage work.

The cordial relations between migratory and local fishers were based on historical kinship ties drawn on caste lines, despite the fact that they spoke different languages and belonged to different religions. Some west coast fishers intermarried with local communities and lived on the north-eastern and eastern coasts (Weeratunge Unpublished). For example, one of the fishers that we spoke to during the primary data collection has continued to migrate seasonally to the Pulmoddai area (in the Trincomalee district) from the north western coast since 1984, and in 1996 had settled down permanently as a fisher in Pulmoddai. Others continued to journey between the two coasts and some had two families on each coast. The migratory and local groups developed long-standing and intricate social relations and there is no evidence of serious conflict within the two groups during centuries of co-existence.

With the war, the main difference in the long established migration patterns was the decreasing number of Tamil fishermen who migrated due to personal security concerns.

> *'It was mainly the Sinhala fishermen from Negombo who came here during the war time. Tamils come very rarely now. Muslims also come. During the war, only the men came and engaged in fishing, but now the whole families come. They build vaadi (temporary camps) and stay in those as families'* (Local fisherman, Arisimalai village, Trincomalee district, 22.10.2011).

CONFLICT TRIGGERING ASPECTS BETWEEN LOCAL AND MIGRATORY FISHERMEN

Two main interlinked factors changed these intricate social relations between the local and migratory fishermen. The first was the 'Blue revolution' from the 1970s which modernised the fishing industry by motorising and improving fishing gear. State-supported development interventions enabled the transition from canoes to better equipped motorised boats in the southern, western and north-western coasts. Amarasinghe (2001) talks about regional disparities in distribution of state support where the bulk of the support is going to the South as opposed to the North and East which he sees as a factor that would increase the tensions between the two regions. This lack of opportunity for the northern and eastern fishermen has created a gap in craft and equipment ownership between the two groups which is, in turn, contributing to the tensions between them. Through investment in smaller trawlers with inboard engines, a new class of boat owners emerged mainly in the southern and western coasts (Weeratunge Unpublished).

During this period, conflict between fishers with different types of gear began to emerge, especially between less equipped east coast Tamil fishers and migratory Sinhala dominated small trawler owners from the south, as well as among Tamil and Muslim fishers in the east, as witnessed in the Karainagar fishing incident between mechanised boat owners and traditional canoe fishers in 1978[4] and the Kokkilai incident in 1981[5] between migratory fishers from Chilaw on the west coast and local fishers from Kokkilai in the north-east coast. These are a few examples of ethnicised conflicts based on competition for resources brought on by mechanisation prior to the war (Fernando 1994). However, there is no evidence to suggest that conflicts of this nature were a common occurrence

[4]Conflict between the small scale artisanal fishermen and mechanized boat owners in Karainagar was resolved by assigning designated days of the week for the two types of fishermen. For more information see <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/ad899e/AD899E21.pdf>

[5] Conflict between local and migrant fishers in Kokkilai was settled by limiting the number of fishers using the lagoon to 2000, designating the fishermen who are allowed to fish in the lagoon which consists of fishers in the surrounding villages and settled migrants and specifying the type of fishing gear to be used. For more information see <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/ad899e/AD899E21.pdf>

between east coast Tamil fishers and migratory fishers with a hybrid Sinhalese-Tamil identity in the pre-war times (Weeratunge Unpublished).

The tsunami that hit the coastal areas from the north to the west of the island further widened the gap in craft and fishing gear ownership between north and east fishers and their southern and western counterparts. Tsunami relief from 2005 supported the north and east as well mainly providing projects to fishers with welfare benefits such as housing, related infrastructure, fishing gear and canoes but provided much less support for more advanced fishing crafts and equipment. With the fisher groups in the south and west coast advancing in technology, the eastern fishermen faced a negative growth in the sector because of the war.

The second factor – shown as the main catalyst for tensions and conflict in the indicative primary data – which impacted social interactions between the two fisher groups was the militant conflict between the LTTE and government forces which began in the early 1980s. The war impacted fishing and lives of fishers in the directly conflict affected areas in different ways which in turn had repercussions for the historical local-migratory fisher linkages. The war made the migrant fishers change their hybrid identity to suit the need of the hour (explained in detail in the section on fisher conflicts and identity) and the geographic location based identity of the locals was affected by the displacement that they faced as a result of the war.

Most importantly, the physical space for fishing reduced because of the war. The conflict had periods of intense violence during which restrictions were imposed on fishing grounds based on security concerns. The establishment of high security zones (HSZs) coupled with the depletion in fisheries stocks brought about by technological and environmental factors led to intensified competition on fisheries resources. Second, the destruction of fishing craft, equipment, assets, increased personal insecurity and also loss of lives discouraged continuous engagement in fisheries for the local fishers in the east coast, who unlike the migrant fishers had to face this reality in their day to day life. Restriction on the usage of boats with higher engine capacity and usage of high speed engine boats further discouraged investment.

However, two years after the end of the violent conflict in the East, these restrictions have been relaxed almost completely. In the Trincomalee district, restrictions on fishing have decreased with the removal of the 'pass system' through which the fishermen were allowed to access the sea during the war, and withdrawal of the officially gazetted coastal high security zones. The primary data shows that the fishers were not allowed to fish close to the Navy camps until about mid September 2011. The Navy is now allowing them to fish close to the camps but only with the use of cast nets. However, in the North fishing is still constrained in certain districts such as Muliathivu and Mannar due to the presence of HSZs which either completely restricts access to the sea for fishermen or which provides controlled access through a pass system (Lokuge and Munas, forthcoming).

Thirdly, the war increased the inequality in asset ownership horizontally among the migrant and local fisher groups. The gap in asset ownership of the local fishermen from the conflict affected North and East and those from the South, who operate multi-day boats and beach seines[6] make the inequalities more striking because the local fishers are the ones who lost their fishing equipment during the war and are unable to compete with external fishermen.

> *'They (migrant fishers) use modern technology and equipment, more powerful and faster engines to fish and we can't compete with the migratory fishermen. They have received support of the government but we haven't received even 10% of this support. So how can we compete with them?'*(Local beach seine owner, Pulmoddai village, Trincomalee District, 23.10.2011)

There are instances where the migratory fishermen were also affected by the war, for example as reported in Kallarawa fishing village in the Trincomalee district where the beach seine operators and workers had to abandon all their equipment and flee to save their lives from LTTE attacks. Incidents where beach seines had

[6]Beach seines in Sri Lanka are called *'maadal'*. The average beach seine measures about 2-3km in extent with the length of the rope varying from 1-1.5km. The body and the bag (or the cod end) measures around 7m. The ropes are made of coir fibres, whereas wings are made of coir rope meshes and Kuralon meshes. The bag is totally made of Kuralon. The net is set in water with the use of a wooden craft (8m in length) known as '*maadalpaaruwa'*. The beach seine craft is paddled by four oars, two on either side, and each oar is paddled by two men. In addition, there are two men in the craft to set the net, and a leader to give directions and coordinate activities.

been damaged due to intensified Navy patrolling off the Kallarawa coast have also been reported.

However, whilst the conflict made seasonal migration difficult, opportunities arose for other types of fishing related activities. For example, in urban Trincomalee, the fish trade became dominated by Sinhalese traders and boat owners due to their ability to transport fish stocks to the south and west with relative ease through the military check points based on their shared ethnic identity with the military personnel. These factors resulted in polarising local and migratory fishers on ethnic lines. The solidification of identities was marked among the west coast Catholic fishers, who moved from being a bi-lingual, hybrid group to a Sinhalese-speaking group (Weeratunge Unpublished).

FISHER CONFLICTS, IDENTITY AND PERCEPTIONS OF INEQUALITY

Jega (2002) contends that identity consciousness in itself and its varied forms - ethnic, religious, communal, gender, labour and youth are not major problems in plural societies such as in Sri Lanka, but they become problematic when they are negatively mobilised and used as a platform on which socio-political action is organised in the struggle for access to scarce resources by various competing groups. The case of Trincomalee shows that the migratory fisher groups seem to be mobilising themselves along ethnic identity lines leaning towards economic action more than socio-political action.

According to Thalayasingam et al. (2009), there are two main approaches popularly followed with respect to the concept of identity. Firstly, the primodialist approach which takes the sense of self and belonging to a collective group as a fixed thing, defined by objective criteria such as common ancestry and common biological characteristics. Second is the social constructionist approach where identity is formed by a predominantly political choice of certain characteristics. Depending on the situation and power dynamics, the migratory fishermen who had a Sinhala-Tamil hybrid identity chose to highlight one element of their identity over the other, which was a conscious decision that they took in order to maximise their chances. For example, it would not have been possible to interact with the Tamil speaking local fishermen in the east throughout history if the migratory fisher groups spoke only Sinhalese. In contrast, however, during the war, the migratory fishermen from the south and the north-west coast chose to highlight their 'Sinhala' identity by speaking Sinhala in order to negotiate access to the sea with the mainly Sinhalese dominant state military. As a result of this, the Tamil speaking local fishermen perceived these Sinhala speaking migratory fishermen as Sinhalese fishermen taking the local resources away with support from the military or the government. The war has also changed the demography of the migratory fishermen by creating opportunities for more Sinhalese fishermen to access fish resources in the east.

> *'Some migratory fishermen come in large boats via the sea, and engage in fishing activities while they are in the sea without landing. They will take our fish resources away and there won't be much fish for our fishermen'* (Local one-day boat operator, Arisimalai village, Trincomalee district, 22-10-2011).

However, in between the primordialist and social constructionist approaches, various alternative approaches can be also identified and the idea of identity as an evolving process that reacts to diverse and ever changing social experiences seems to be most appropriate to explain the behaviour of the migratory fishermen in the face of changing demands brought on by the war. The location based identity construction or changes of the 'local' fishers is also an interesting area for further study given the displacement (multiple and protracted displacement in certain instances) and the resettlement experience that they went through.

The indicative primary data identifies a number of reasons that may have exacerbated these tensions/conflicts between the migratory and local fishers following the war. Even though migration from the west coast to the east coast has a long history of shared resource use, it has become contentious with the changes in perceptions on 'who migrates' and 'from where'. With the changes in the way identity is presented and used by the migrant fishers, local fishers' perception that the migrants were outsiders exploiting their resources was strengthened. The negative perception on migratory fishermen grew with increased restrictions for local fishers. These perceptions affected the relationships between these two groups causing negative interaction and mistrust. These factors have led to tension and sometimes violent conflict between the two groups:

> *'Large quantities of fish are caught by the migratory fishermen and sold outside the village. Sometimes there won't be sufficient fish to sell in the local market to meet the local demand for fish'* (Local fish buyer, Pulmoddai village, Trincomalee district, 23-10-2011).

Many authors have argued that in conflict situations perceptions matter as much as objective realities (see for example Stewart 2008; Brass 2003; Diprose 2009a cited in Diprose et al, forthcoming). Thus, the perception of inequality in asset ownership described above combined with the perception of unequal treatment by the relevant authorities which includes the fisheries related officers and the military actors such as the Navy and Police have added fuel to the fire. The perception of favouritism towards the Sinhala migratory fishers grew because the responsible authorities such as government, police or the military failed to take notice of the fishing practices of the migratory fishers.

> '*Police, military and even the government don't notice these things, they back these people (migratory fishermen). If it was us - the local fishermen - the officers take strict legal action, they burn our nets, to intimidate us. But they support the migratory fishermen. They give the migratory fishermen more opportunities so we feel that we should move out of this livelihood'* (Local one-day boat operator, Arisimalai village, Trincomalee district, 22-10-2011).

Migratory fishermen disrespect the traditional beliefs within the local communities; for example the migratory fishers engage in fishing during the time that the local fishers worship and give offerings to the *Kadal Matha* (regional practice of worship of the 'Ocean Goddess') and do not engage in fishing.

The local fishers perceive the methods of extraction of fish resources of the migratory fishers as a threat to the sustainability of fish resources/stock. Overfishing/excessive resource extraction, fishing in fish breeding areas, and disregarding the protection of the sea shore are perceived as possible threats to fish resource accumulation. Usage of illegal fishing methods, such as dynamite and banned net types, is also causing reduction in fish stock. Certain fishing methods that are not suitable for fishing are also used by the migrants according to the local fishers.

> *'They don't know the specific fishing practices in this area, they use illegal/banned fishing nets, use dynamite and destroy the fish and in the future there won't be any fish left because of this'* (Local one-day boat operator, Arisimalai village, Trincomalee district, 22-10-2011).

In contrast to the view of local fishermen, the other debate about 'who came first' indicates that the migratory fishermen introduced fishing to these villages in Trincomalee. This argument also points towards the fact that the fish resources on the eastern coast do not belong to one group of fishers and strongly supports the perspective that the migratory fishers also have a stake in this discourse and they also hold fishing rights anywhere on the waters that belong to Sri Lanka. This also challenges the viewpoint that the migratory fishermen are 'external' as discussed above.

> *'They say that migratory fishermen from other areas are fishing here. It is wrong to say that because those days they (local fishermen) did not engage in fishing and these fisher villages never existed. The Sinhalese fishermen from (mainly from the Negombo area) other areas came here and trained the local fishermen in fishing and engaged in fishing together. These migratory fishermen got married here and settled in the long run. Then these areas developed as fisher villages. Still the Sinhalese fishermen own bigger nets here. This shows their maturity in the fisheries'* (Fisheries Officer, Trincomalee district, 31-10-2011).

Tensions also arise about how the fish market operates in these areas. The migratory fishermen have relatively strong linkages through pre-agreed contracts, with the fish buyers from outside who come to the site and buy directly from them. In comparison to the price given by the local buyers these external buyers offer a better price which encourages the local fishermen to sell their fish to them. This undercutting of the market by external buyers is a possible cause of tension between the local and external buyers or even local buyers and local fishermen given that the local fishermen prefer to sell their fish to external buyers.

> *'External buyers, who are linked with the migratory fishermen, buy the fish from local fishermen at higher prices than the price in the local market. This is the biggest challenge for us. Sometimes this becomes a conflict between us and*

> *the local fishermen'* (Local fish buyer, Pulmoddai village, Trincomalee district, 22-10-2011).

> *'The mudalalis (buyers) come in Pajeros, some own lorries. They come here, take their fish and go. Sometimes they buy our fish also, we see this as an opportunity for us because sometimes they give us a better price. They ask us whether we need any help'* (Local one-day boat operator, Arisimalai village, Trincomalee district, 22-10-2011).

CONFLICTS BEYOND LOCAL AND MIGRATORY FISHER GROUPS

The field data shows that the fishers within a community see themselves as a close knit group.

> *'Fishermen, even though they live in different houses, act like one family in their day-to-day dealings. If one person has a problem they worry about each other, they care about each other'* (Local beach seine owner, Pulmoddai village, Trincomalee district, 23-10-2011).

However, tensions between migratory and local groups seem to affect these close linkages as well. A closer analysis of fisher group tensions show that the conflict is not always between the migratory and local fisher groups, there are conflicts and tensions that prevail within the migratory fisher groups as well as within the local fisher groups. The conflict between the migratory fishers arises as a result of the race to fish, based on the geographical origin of the fishers and fishing grounds/boundaries when it comes to beach seines. Apart from place of origin and fishing grounds, it is possible that the tensions could arise based on ethnic differences of migratory fishers, though this study did not find sufficient empirical evidence to support this. Tension between local fishermen is seen as an influence of migratory fishermen due to certain local fisher groups that are seen to support the migratory groups. These tensions get aggravated when these local fisher groups are seen by the rest of their community to be supporting the migratory fishermen in the event of conflict between the migratory and local fishermen.

> *'Because of this families/relatives become estranged, and people end up in Police custody. And the officers ban fishing for everyone for a certain period of time. Even though this is centred around an individual or a group, in the end the whole community is affected'* (Local beach seine owner, Pulmoddai village, Trincomalee district, 23-10-2011).

In addition, the conflict between Indian and Sri Lankan fishers adds another layer of complexity to this situation. Indian trawlers fishing within visibility range from the shore, take away the fish resources that belong to Sri Lankan fishermen. Over-fishing and the fishing practices of these Indian trawlers threaten the sustainability of the fish stock too. Both migratory and local fishermen see Indian fishermen as a common enemy and seem to be united in their effort to take any possible action against this. However, the level of negotiation that is needed to influence a more permanent settlement seems to be beyond them at the moment, given the higher level diplomatic relations and politics involved in this issue. This study does not delve further into this issue.

MECHANISMS TO ENSURE PEACEFUL INTERACTIONS

The primary data shows that various actors are involved in the conflict resolution process in different capacities: the fisheries societies/cooperatives, community level leaders, leaders of religious institutions such as the head priest of the Buddhist temple, mosque leaders (*Maulavi*), priests of the church, non-government organisations, the Police, government institutions and officers and fisheries inspectors. The war has added another layer into the stakeholder landscape in the form of the military and more specifically the Navy whom the fishers seem to take their complaints and grievances to. The involvement of religious leaders in community level conflict resolution was common in conflict affected regions of the country where the formal justice system was not fully functional or was not accessible to the people due to costs involved or transport and connectivity related constraints. These decisions seem to hold true to a great extent given the respect that these leaders at the community level still hold, and people seek their involvement when a conflict is usually at its latent stage and has not erupted into violence (Thalayasingam et al. 2009). Strengthening these community level mechanisms by providing them with skill development programmes in mediation and conflict resolution through state and non-state sponsored programmes can help diffuse the tensions in this area. However, it is very clear that the tensions and conflicts discussed above need to be addressed at different levels because they involve individuals/groups that are perceived to be external by the local fishers and also due to the fact that the power dynamics are not perceived to be equal by at least one party to the conflict.

Creating peaceful interaction between groups that are already in a conflicting situation is a challenging exercise, but necessary in order to prevent further exacerbation of conflict. Strengthening interaction among the different actors involved is a potential avenue of diffusing tension and avoiding conflict. As stated in Diprose (2009b p.112), Allport (1954) contends that conditions for interaction that lead to *'cooperation rather than animosity include equal status between people involved in the interaction, cooperation towards a common goal, and institutional support for positive inter-group interactions'*. The situation presented in the analysis above could be examined through this concept. It is uncertain whether there is a question of equal status as the local fishermen perceive the migratory fishermen as politically better backed, economically more powerful group of people in comparison to them. Moreover, perceived support for migratory fishermen by the government, military and police because of the 'Sinhalese' identity, challenges possible inter-group interactions. The institutional support to create positive interactions is also debatable. The discussion with a responsible state officer on the conflict between the local and migratory fishermen indicates that the conflict between these two parties is not as severe as the fisher groups, mentioned by the local fishermen.

> *'There is no big conflict between the migratory fishermen and the local fishermen, but there are minor issues that arise from time to time'* (Fisheries Officer, Trincomalee district, 31-10-2011).

Against this backdrop, the empirical data from the fishermen --both migratory and local fishermen -- proves that these conflicts are significant and that attempts should be made to resolve them.

> '*If they (migratory fishers) come and damage our nets, we take the boats, go to their fisher camps and attack them. Then the Police come and arrest us and my father has to come and bail me out'* (Local beach seine owner, Pulmoddai village, Trincomalee district, 23-10-2011).

This disjunct could be created because of the gap in communication between the local fisher groups and the state authorities. Even though the local fisher groups are organised and work through fisher societies/cooperatives, their ability to deal/communicate with state authorities could be limited because of their low education levels and lack of exposure and awareness brought on by their socio-economic condition and further constrained by the war. In the study area, there are no formal methods to lodge or review any complaints within the fisheries authorities. The complaint mechanism takes place in an *ad hoc* manner, usually a verbal communication which is hardly documented. Their interaction with relevant state officials is limited to the fisheries inspector and the knowledge and awareness of higher ranking officers in the fisheries authorities is also limited. These factors challenge the institutional support for positive inter-group interactions in this context and state and non-state actors interested in working with fisher groups and for fisher rights should focus on creating this awareness and strengthening the linkages between the fishers and the fisher authorities.

An exploration of changes in identities of local and migratory fishers over the years will provide a basis to revive the historical linkages between the two. Social research institutions have a role to play in attempting to explore these changes in identity or identity markers. Meanwhile, it helps to find a commonality between various groups that could enhance interaction, such as historically shared kinship networks. This could be done via innovative, interactive modes of communication and research methods such as oral histories in local languages and forum theatre techniques using cultural traditions closely associated with the fisher societies such as the Passion plays. The target should be to change perceptions of each other's identity.

Fernando (1994) discusses dispute resolution mechanisms by appointing a commissioner based on his/her experience and analysis of the southern coast of Sri Lanka shows that this seems to be sustainable. Mechanisms such as interactive governance and co-management are adopted to resolve certain types of conflicts at the community level by fishermen in Sri Lanka. To a certain extent, the same approach could be tried out for the present situation as well based on lessons from the past. However, it is uncertain whether these approaches are best fitted to resolve issues between the migratory and local fishers. These approaches provide a participatory approach to resolve the conflict by bringing all the concerned parties and the relevant state officials to one forum to discuss the issues and possible resolutions in the form of a negotiated settlement. However, it is arguable whether these approaches could be applicable to a situation where the power dynamics are not equal between the two or more conflicting groups. In this case the migratory fishermen are perceived to have more socio-economic as well as political power.

ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOOD OPTIONS

The analysis reveals that competition over fisher resources drives the tensions and causes conflict between the local and migratory fisher groups. As a way of improving this situation, alternative livelihood options available for the local fisher groups can be strengthened. Given the fact that local fishers are struggling to compete because of lack of modern fishing gear, technology and methods of fishing due to lack of capital, they should be directed towards possible alternative income generation activities. The suitability of these possible livelihoods should be carefully studied before they are introduced. The livelihoods that are predominantly introduced in similar situations in the eastern coast are fishing of high value fish species, and small–scale high value aquaculture products such as sea cucumbers, lobsters, and oysters. New livelihoods such as linkages with the tourism industry that could capitalise on their existing skill-base can also be introduced so that these groups can find an option to earn an income without having to compete for the same resources. Another idea behind introducing alternative livelihoods/income diversification is to strengthen the economy of fisher households by generating incomes even during the off season.

Strengthening economic interaction between the local and migratory fishers could be seen as one way of building positive interactions. The local fishers – mainly the youth who are reluctant to engage in fisheries activities -- could engage in providing support services to the economic activities that the migratory fishers (as well as local fishers) engage in. These activities could be repairing of boats, cleaning and maintenance, production of ice, transport, procurement of food provisions and providing mechanical parts for the boat engines. These activities would create a wide range of employment opportunities for the unemployed youth, who would in general prefer to be employed in the formal sector given the security it provides and the relatively higher respectability attached to it. In the long run, this will also lessen negative perceptions and enhance the positive interaction between the local and migratory fisher communities. The issue of resource competition can also be addressed by this movement away from coastal fishing that could help the sustainability of fishing resources.

CONCLUSION

Historically, following the monsoon patterns, migrant fishers to the east coast come mainly from the north-western coast of the country. As the literature reveals, they hold a hybrid identity which they seem to have used for their socio-economic advantage over the years. Over generations, close linkages have been formed through the shared Tamil identity traits between the local fishers and the migrants. However, two events have introduced tensions into this interaction. The first is the Blue Revolution or the mechanisation of the fisheries industry through state subsidy schemes which benefited the western and southern fishermen more in relation to their eastern counterparts. This created a gap in livelihood asset ownership between the two groups. Second, the protracted war caused destruction of fishing craft and gear and restricted access to the sea for the eastern fishers which further widened the gap in asset ownership and severely constrained the livelihood activities of the eastern fishers.

In the war and post war context, the migrant fishers with their hybrid identity, chose to highlight their Sinhala identity in order to ensure smoother access to the area and interactions with the fisher authorities and the military. This coupled with the gap in asset ownership created, made the local fishers view the migrants as outsiders. The perception of inequality of local fishers in the interaction of the state officers and military with the migrant fishers which hints at favouritism further exacerbates this tense situation.

Both groups are competing for a depleting resource. The locals accuse the migrants of using banned fishing methods, ignoring the need for coastal conservation, engaging in fishing in fish breeding grounds and damaging their fishing gear. The fisheries authorities are of the view that the migrants also have a right to fish in the area. The small scale local fishers lack the capital to move into more lucrative offshore fishing techniques and compete with the migrant fishers. Given the serious resource depletion concern, alternative livelihood activities which can be based on the existing skill base of the local fishers can be introduced, such as tourism and service provision into the offshore fishing value chain mainly operated by the migrant fishers. These economic linkages will provide some basis for interaction between the two groups and contribute towards a more positive perception of each other.

Creating practices of co-existence between the local and migratory fishers could be done at several levels. The community level dispute resolution mechanisms should be strengthened to build on what they are achieving at present at the ground level in terms of mediation. Complaint lodging and processing mechanisms at the regional fisheries authority level should be made more visible and methodical. The shared historical linkages between the migratory and local fishers should be revived through innovative and creative methods of traditional oral history and forum theatre, which have the potential to create attitudinal change.

In conclusion, this paper attempts to provide indicative insights in to the tensions and conflicts between the local and migratory fishermen based on perceptions of inequality and identity changes which seem to manifest in the competition for resources. The changes in identity perceptions, historic linkages and the impact of the migratory fishers in terms of quantity and quality needs to be further studied in order to enhance fishing productivity.

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Access to Land Resources: Process of Social Exclusion and Power Relations in Conflict Prone Areas of Nepal

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ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to understand the process of social exclusion and power relations in a conflict area while focusing on access to land and livelihoods. Land being a productive livelihood asset in an agrarian society, its political economy is complex with implications on both power relations and social conflict. Exclusion from resources can be understood through natural monopoly (the absolute scarcity of land in nature) and social monopoly (the relative scarcity of land, also known as social distribution of land) (Shrestha 2001). The fundamental reason for the monopoly is due to the privileged and non-privileged. Privileged groups in terms of class, caste and gender have higher say and voice and therefore can influence the non-privileged groups (Shahbaz 2009; Shahbaz et al. 2010). Accordingly, they maintain hegemony and status quo in unequal agrarian structures. Their livelihood shocks and stress (livelihood insecurity) and inequity/injustice are historically institutionalised and regulated in an agrarian society (Seddon & Hussein 2002).

With the help of empirical research results generated from the author's Ph.D. research 'Landlessness, Livelihood Insecurity and Social Conflict in Far Western Region of Nepal' (Nepali 2011 unpublished), this study aims to identify social categories (caste, class and gender) which either have access to land or not. It also aims to find out the process (mechanism) and underlying causes of exclusion especially from land resources. After identifying social categories, how these groups interact and mutually influence/reinforce each other in an agrarian society will be examined. The analysis of power relations was performed through the structural and institutional perspective (North 1990, 2005; Scoones

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1998, 2009). Hence, this paper aims to analyse exclusion in relation with power and land resources in Nepal.

INTRODUCTION

Land is an important productive (economic) asset and it is also a broader indicator of socio-economic status in an agrarian society. Not only is it a productive asset, it is also a measure of social power, prestige, pride, dignity, and a symbol of prosperity (Müller-Böker 1981; Regmi 1988 & 1999; ICIMOD 2000; OECD 2003; and CBS 2006). It is also considered a means of empowerment, poverty alleviation, and a basis for good governance (Sharma 2004). In this line, Amartya Sen (1981) argues that resource entitlement, through command over alternative bundle of commodities and then using economic, social and political opportunities, avoids deprivation. Thus, it is considered as a key asset or means for overall socio-economic empowerment of an individual and household. Hence it provides a basis for social inclusion in the Nepalese society. Furthermore, it is the key asset that promotes accessibility of potential gain in the local labour market (e.g. through increased owner's bargaining power) and international labour market (e.g. through collateral of land to obtain loan for seasonal migration) by virtue of its productive and entrepreneurial characteristics (CBS 2006).

In the same line, Sen's seminal work on resource entitlement and capability failure has demonstrated the relationship between resource entitlement, social exclusion/inclusion and deprivation. Landless people, being devoid of productive resource are bound to face socio-economic deprivation and social exclusion. Accordingly, landless households have no basis for further socio-economic empowerment and socioeconomic security. This landlessness is the cause as well as effect of rural poverty in an agrarian society because other means of sustenance are severely limited. The poor and the landless people are always subjected to violence and systematic discrimination. Not only this, landless people are also not in a position to benefit from development interventions by the state nor its service delivery. This, then, enhances increasing gaps and inequality between haves and the have-nots. Despite these studies on livelihoods, very few studies on structural aspects of land questions (especially institutions and power focusing on caste and class dimensions) have been undertaken.

Several studies (Giddens 1984; Scoones 1998; Bebbington 1999; and Ellis 2000) have revealed that land is a source of livelihoods and a determinant factor of power structure. A person's asset such as land is not merely a means with which he or she makes a living; it also gives meaning to that person's world. Assets are not simply resources that people use in building livelihoods (Bebbington 1999; and Shahbaz 2009). They are assets that give them capability to be and to act. Assets should not be understood only as things that allow survival, adaptations and poverty alleviation. They are also the basis of an agent's power to act and to reproduce, challenge or change the rules that govern the control, use and transformation of resources. Access to means or resources is required to undertake activities that secure livelihood, i.e. it determines certain level of well being. Access to resources is socially mediated or it is shaped by social institutions that enable people to construct meaningful livelihoods (Scoones 1998).

There is lack of information on how landless and poor people are excluded and exploited in unequal power structure in an agrarian society. Political economy of land distribution would help to understand how the majority of Nepalese people with differential wealth and power groups are dissociated from land as a resource and how they are being excluded in the existing power structure. Structural and institutional dimensions of exclusion and their effect on power relations have an intricate relationship in society. Skewed distributions of land, feelings of exclusion/injustice are the underlying causes of the decade long violent conflict of Nepal from 1996-2006 (Geiser 2005; Seddon and Hussein 2002; and Upreti 2001, 2004, 2008).

Furthermore, agrarian political economy (Bernstein 2010) states how land is distributed, who has access to it, who does what, and who gets what, and what is done with the created surplus wealth. Due to structural reasons, especially having no asset, they are under stress or socio-economic insecurity. In other words, it can also be said that they are under institutional constraints by which their growth is totally suspended. Several studies (Regmi 1999; Shrestha 2001; and Pandey 1999) depicted such results. But this study attempts to understand the mechanism and process that unfold and unravel the exclusion process from the productive resource; and implication of skewed distribution of land on livelihood and power relations in society.

In this backdrop, the paper attempts to examine the process of social exclusion and power relations in conflict areas focusing on land resources and livelihood.

In particular, it also tries to answer the following research questions: i) Who has better access to land as a resource and why so? What are the mechanisms or processes of exclusion from land? How do various agrarian social groups interact with each other and what sort of power relations appear in society for their livelihood?

Access to land has been at the centre of every social and political struggle in Nepal since 2007. Moreover, 'land to tiller' and its associated exclusion, skewed power relations, historical injustice have been some of the forty-point demands of the decade long Maoist violent conflict (1996-2006). As a result, the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) mobilised the landless and excluded people with the hope of their liberation and the overall socio-economic and political transformation of nation. In line with the framed research questions, especially to determine causal relationship among given variables, the succeeding sections describe the analytical approach of this paper.

Section Two describes the analytical approaches (i.e. political economy of landlessness, exclusion/inclusion based on monopoly paradigm, and power relations in an agrarian society) employed for this paper. Section Three contains the methodology emplyed for the study, while the fourth section presents empirical evidences in line with the objectives. Accordingly, these empirical evidences have been discussed in section Five. Under this section, sub-sections include the historical political economy of landlessness in Nepal; mechanisms and causes of social exclusion in an agrarian society, structural and institutional exclusion and power dynamics. Section Six concludes the discussion.

ANALYTICAL APPROACH

Using the three theoretical concepts of 'Political Economy of Landlessness', 'Monopoly Paradigm of Social Exclusion', and 'Structural and Institutional Dimensions of Power Dynamics' an analytical approach has been proposed.

Political Economy of Landlessness

Shrestha (2001) has introduced the concepts of natural and social monopoly that are more related to the political economy of landless and nearly landless. It is a function of land scarcity. There are two types of scarcity, i.e. relative scarcity and absolute scarcity in the realm of political economy of man-land relations. First, relative scarcity of land is the social monopoly of land or social distribution of land. Social monopoly (agrarian social formation process) is a social phenomenon in which a privileged minority, invariably under tutelage of state, controls large amounts of land, whereas the majority has little or none; this is a kind of distribution pattern that produces relative land scarcity and consequently landlessness and near landlessness[1] occur. Second, there is the absolute scarcity of land. It is also called the natural monopoly of land, i.e., there is only little land available in nature. Hence, both these concepts, 'social monopoly' and 'natural monopoly', are responsible for explaining the phenomenon of 'landlessness as a process'.

In this regard, Marxist perspective also gives sound theoretical basis to explain landlessness. But this perspective does not fit into Nepalese reality to explain near landlessness. In particular, landlessness in an agrarian society is more related to agrarian capitalism i.e. most of the land is concentrated in the hands of few for their own economic interest; and the rest are landless. However, in Nepal, there is a widespread prevalence of near landlessness, as explained by Shrestha (2001), which is not addressed by Marx. In a similar line, Max Weber does not agree with uni-dimentional inequality as explained by Karl Marx. According to Weber (1948), there are several dimensions of inequality viz: i) economic; ii) social prestige or status groups; and iii) political party or political

[1]Landless households simply refer to households having no land entitlement or ownership (CBS 2002). Müller-Böker (1986) states that ownership is opposed to possession of land (which means just access for utilization). The former one, i.e 'ownership' is right belonging and it should be taken to mean actually having land, that is, they are certified legally and also given a land certificate. The latter one 'possession' gives only usufruct right, but not to transfer and sell legally. In particular, ***landless households*** are those which have no land entitlement (or are devoid of land entitlement) legally. Accordingly, they are devoid of virtues of asset entitlement for any purpose. ***Near landless households*** have land only for homestead and kitchen garden. In Nepalese context, about 2 ropani or 3 Kattha land (equivalent to 0.1 Ha-Hectare) is sufficient for this purpose. Households having this area of land are also understood as agriculturally landless or semi-landless (UNDP 2004; & CBS 2002).

power group. His interpretation of inequality is not only limited to class or economy, but also to several other social and political dimensions. For example, in a research report of TEAM Consult (1998), and CBS (2006) reveals that *Brahmin*, *Chhetri* and *Newar* (BCN) are at the top, *Janjati* or indigenous people in the middle and *Dalit* at the bottom based on poverty outcomes in Nepal. This also emphasises that caste and gender are determinant factors for empowerment and inclusion.

Similarly, in Nepalese context, Koirala (1996) has also analysed 'caste' through three perspectives viz, functional, organic structural and Marxist. For functionalist, caste is an ideological system to smooth functioning of society and there is manifestation of political power. It is also ritualized on theory of pollution and purity where pure caste remains at the top and impure caste (*Dalit*) remain at bottom. For Marxist, caste is a by-product of continued domination of bourgeoisie over the proletariat (worker or poor) by creating attributional categories such as land owner and landless and intervention categories based on power relations between caste groups. Hence, it is an economic exploitation. For Weber, it is a combination of status and distribution of power within society (Ibid.). In fact, caste is a form of social stratification, expression of hierarchy and inequality.

Women's land entitlement is key to social exclusion and inclusion because land is the basis of empowerment, social and political status for them (Agarwal 1994). There are several advantages of women's property rights: i) improved food security of family, ii) higher possibility of reducing violence against women, iii) enhancing political participation, and iv) enhancing confidence of women for self reliance.

Exclusion and Inclusion given by Silver 'Monopoly Paradigm'

The former concept of 'social monopoly' as explained by Shrestha (2001) is very similar to monopoly paradigm of social exclusion and inclusion as described by Silver (1995) and de Hann (1998). According to them, society consists of power groups (interest groups) and their hierarchies. Powerful group forms a boundary and imposes barriers to those who do not belong to a group. This group helps to make changes in state processes and practices (e.g. law and politics) that help them to gain access to resources. Accordingly, group distribution and identity overlap. For example, white are rich and black are poor.

Following Sen's concept of resource entitlement, landlessness is a condition devoid of resource endowment, especially land, which may lead to instrumental deprivation or entitlement failure, like 'A family without land in a peasant society may be deeply handicapped.' It can generate several socio-economic deprivations. It is a condition of capability deprivation i.e. inability to participate in social processes and social exclusion occurs through deprivation process. Hence, landless people lack capability (capability failure) to live under certain conditions. This landless population is about one-third of Nepal's total population, which are under severe social exclusion, as mentioned above, due to not having or owning a productive asset (land) (CBS 2002; and UNDP 2004).

Power Dynamics and Agrarian Relations in Society

Karl Marx, who is one among various scholars to support a structural model of power relations, views power as capacities to act in pre-given realities of structure for rules, resources, positions, and relationships (Turner 1995). To him, political power is in the hands of possessing classes or ruling class for the protection and enhancement of economic interests. The basic assumption behind it is that a mode of production determines the political superstructure of society. Marxist ideology does not believe in autonomy of political power, rather political power is subservient to economic power, and fundamental changes in society are determined and caused by the economic forces or the modes of production. Any change in the modes of production will affect corresponding changes in political and social superstructure. In short, economic structure (base structure) determines superstructure. In contrast, the Frankfurt school, neo-Marxist scholars state that it is bi-directional i.e. both base and superstructure reinforce each other (Frankfurt School 2009).

Besides these classical theories, two schools of power theory influenced the power debate, namely: i) Conflictual power (Dahl 1961; Bachrach and Baratz 1962; and Lukes 1974 as cited in Csaszar 2004), and ii) Consensual power (Parson 1963 as cited in Csaszar 2004).

The former school views power as something inherently negative and noxious: power inhibits, power makes a person do what they would not have done otherwise, or to act against their interests. Power is regarded as a zero sum game. The representatives of this school built on one another, creating what is called three-dimensional power debates. These three dimensions are: power as decision making; power as agenda setting; and, power in terms of interests. The latter school states that power is not necessarily linked with conflict and it does not have to be a zero sum game. Instead, power is the capacity to achieve outcomes, whether it is achieved by force or it benefits only a certain sector of society.

Citing Parson 1963, Csaszar (2004) mentions that power is created and legitimized by society. However, he points out by referring to Michel Foucault (1980 as cited in Csaszar 2004), Anthony Giddens (1984), and Stewart Clegg (1989) that power operates in the middle ground between conflictual and consensual schools, and that power is constituted by both conflict and consensus (Csaszar 2004).

To shed light on this issue, the work of Anthony Giddens on Structuration looks appropriate. Giddens (1984) conceptualizes social structure as a 'resource' and 'rules' that actors use to sustain/reproduce social structure. Rules and resources are transformational and mediating. They create patterns of relation in process as a social system. In the process, institutions, as rules of game, exist and power also operates (is generated) for its continuation. This theory is helpful for understanding how actors and resources interact to produce institutions and social system. Power dynamics operated (generated) as a result of interaction and interplay are a complex web and pattern of relation in society.
Based on the mentioned theoretical concepts and several other studies (Giddens 1984; Silver 1995; de Hann 1998; Sen 2000; Miller 2003; and World Bank/DFID 2005), an analytical framework is devised and accordingly this study attempts to pick up key points in relation to social exclusion and inclusion and access to resources, especially land:

i) Social categories of people (caste hierarchy): *Dalit* and castes within *Dalit* community in relation to land ownership and possession; ii) Social institutions (relational), such as caste system, *Haliya*, *Khalo*, *Haruwa*, *Charuwa* system in an agrarian society; iii) Barriers of social inclusion, due to access to land, in socio-economic and political affairs in Nepali society; and iv) structural causes of social exclusion: *Class* determined by land ownership, *Caste* determined by caste hierarchy and hierarchy within *Dalit*, *Gender* perceived difference between men and women in society and access to land. Furthermore, gender issues (disaggregating by sex) and issues related to autonomy and dependency (due to resource possession and ownership within household and community level) are also taken into consideration.

Nepali social structure and social stratification in terms of class, caste and gender have been instrumental in maintaining society. All these conditions lead to exclusion and inclusion in different levels. The framework provides guidelines to assessing access to land and causes of landlessness and social exclusion in an agrarian society.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Three districts namely, Kailali (plain), Doti (hill), and Bajhang (mountain) in the far western region of Nepal were sampled covering all three ecological belts. Altogether 625 respondents were sampled i.e. 37.10 % (230) from Kailali, 31.84 % (200) from Doti, and 31.05 % (195) from Bajhang. Rationale behind this way of selection was to get a balanced representation of three ecological belts which could truly represent the Far Western Region of Nepal. These three districts have different socioeconomic characteristics due to variation in altitude, available natural endowment and respective livelihood opportunities.

Quantitative and qualitative methods were employed to complement each other to produce synergy. In particular, survey method was used for collecting factual information whereas case study, group discussions, field observation, and key informant interview were used to gather qualitative information i.e. process of social exclusion and power relations in society. In particular, group discussion and observations were useful to understand how different classes, caste and gender interact with each other to determine a particular set of social relation in society. Data was processed, coded, and analysed through the use of MS Excel and *Statistical Package for Social Science* (SPSS). Qualitative data was processed and analysed by data reduction, data display, and conclusion and verification. Particularly, after data gathering, masses of data was categorised, compared and interpreted as per nature of proposed objective with special reference to aforesaid analytical approach.

FINDINGS

This section describes the access to land in the sampled districts; and its relation to social exclusion/inclusion and power relations in an agrarian society.

Access to Land

In general, there were about one-third (30 %) landless households (Table 1). 'Landless' is an aggregate of households with no land entitlement. Shrestha (2001) explained landlessness as a process with the help of concepts such as *natural and social monopoly*[2] which come under political economy of man-land relation. This percentage was highest in Doti (39.5 %) followed by Bajhang (24.61 %) and Kailali (24.56 %). Chi-square test (value 14.603 and p=0.001) showed a significant relationship between ecological variation and land ownership. It means that land ownership varied with ecological belts attributed to natural monopoly of land as explained by Shrestha (2001). The percentages of landlessness in the study area are higher than national average which is 24.44 % landlessness in Nepal (CBS 2002, and UNDP 2004).

Table 1: Land Entitlement by Ecological Belts

Ecological Belts/Districts	Land Ownership					
	Yes		No		Total	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Kailali (Plain)	173	75.43	57	24.56	230	100
Doti (Hill)	121	60.5	79	39.5	200	100
Bajhang (Mountain)	146	75.38	49	24.61	195	100
Total	440	70.65	185	29.34	625	100

Source: Field Survey 2007-08) n=625

Similarly, in case of caste dynamics, *Dalit*[3] landlessness was 86.88% against *Non-Dalit*' landlessness (13.11 %). Chi-square test with value 26.765 and p value 0.000

[2] Concepts such as social and natural monopoly are more related to the political economy of landless and nearly landless. It is a function of land scarcity. The former one is relative scarcity of land which is the social monopoly of land or social distribution of land i.e. privileged minority occupied more and other are less or none. The latter one is absolute scarcity of land i.e. there is only little land available in nature and consequently majority of people have no land.

[3] *'Dalit'* is used to refer to the so-called lower and former untouchable caste referred to in Old Legal Code of 1854 of Nepal as*'Pani nachalne, chhoi chhito haalnu parne jaat'* (caste from whom water is not accepted and after whose touch sprinkling of holy water is required for sanctification) (Dahal et al. 2002). Further, Hoefer (2004) mentions that the caste structure is based on Hindu Varna System which divides people into four categories according to their occupational activities viz., the *Brahmin* (learned people, priest), the *Chhetri* (warriors), the *Vaishya* (trader and agriculturist), and the *Sudra*

indicated that relationship between caste and land ownership was significant. Caste membership determines land ownership. It is explained by social monopoly of land distribution in which privileged caste owned more and vice-versa.

In the three sampled ecological belts, women land entitlement was only 4.1 % against men's land entitlement (95.70 %). This women's land ownership is less than national average (about 8 %) (CBS 2002). Looking at disaggregated data by ecological belts, Kailali, Doti and Bajhang have 5.57, 2.00 and 4.61 % women's land ownership respectively. It is similar to social monopoly (in terms of gender, i.e. men and women) and prevailing gender discrimination and subordination within household based on patriarchal norm and values (Bhasin 1993; Cameron 1995, 1997; Tiwaah 2008).

Following the seminal work done by Sen (1981) on resource entitlement and capability failure, landlessness is a cause of several socio-economic deprivations in society and consequently, it has several effects on livelihood of landless households, and power relations in society. It can give the state a condition of social exclusion. For illustration, food sufficiency is a good measure of livelihood outcomes which is closely related to social exclusion. It is understood as availability of food with own farm production in a year. Food sufficiency of three sampled districts was 2.9 months in a year on an average. Kailali, Doti and Bajhang had food sufficiency up to 2.6, 2.5 and 3.5 months in a year respectively. F-test reveals that food sufficiency ($p= 0.001$) varied across the ecological belts. In terms of caste, *Dalit* had 2.4 months in a year. But *Non-Dalit* had double of *Dalit* i.e. 4.01 months in a year. Statistically, it was highly significant ($p=0.000$). Food deficiency in terms of ecological belts and caste were directly associated with landlessness.

With reference to their living standards, more than one-third (75%) of the respondents claimed themselves to be in low living standards. When asked about the key determinants of living standard, most of them listed land entitlement, family size, and reliable sources of income and employment as the most important factors. However, even among them, land entitlement was

(people in menial services). They are also known as artisans by virtue of their caste-based skill and knowledge, who have been contributing to civilization of Nepalese society for many centuries.

perceived as the most important basis for a decent living standard, with 99.83% weightage, confirming again that land entitlement has a key role to play in determining livelihood and socio-economic status. This is similar to earlier research findings (CBS 2006; Regmi 1999; Upreti 2001, 2004; and Zaman 1973).

Due to lower possession of livelihood assets, land-poor households were found to frequently face food crisis at most times during the year. The most common coping strategies were borrowing money and purchasing food on credit, seasonal migration to India, practice of relying on less preferred food, spending less on non-food items; relying on less expensive food and wild food, skipping meals, and reducing portions and number of meals. All these are indicators of livelihood insecurity to a large extent.

The above states of social exclusion linked to land as a resource and livelihood have a close relationship with social institutions. These institutions can better explain how power dynamics exist and operate/regulate in an agrarian society.

Social Institutions in Relation to Livelihood Options

The social structures determined by class, caste and gender have implications on power and social relations in society by virtue of resource entitlement and social belonging/positioning. Power relations and social relations appear in society through interplay of informal social institutions, such as *Haliya, Kamaiya, Khalo, Balighare, Pulo, Kamaiya Pratha,* etc. By and large, they are characterised by patron-client relations possessing three characteristics viz, i) social structure especially class structure determined by land holding, ii) caste system and continuation of traditional system like *Balighare*, *Rithi*, *Pulo*, *Khalo Pratha*; and iii) economic reciprocal interest and dependency for their livelihood.

These institutions have positive as well as negative social relations. On the one hand, positive relations are mutual sharing of the productive resource (e.g. land) and labour/skill, good employer and employee relation, mutual help and trust, etc. On the other hand, negative relations are characterised by unfair wages, semi-slavery, serfdom labour management, debt bondage, physical exploitation, mental torture (harassment), social discrimination (gender and caste). Hence, it possesses feudal characteristics.

Above mentioned informal social institutions have some kind of relationship (either fostering or hindering) with livelihood options. Few illustrations are presented below.

Wage labour was an important livelihood option for land poor households and they were paid in kind in the form of *Khalo*[4]. In fact, it was regulated by *Khalo Pratha* in which landless *Dalit* provide their service (labour or caste based skill) and in turn they are paid in kind (e.g. grain). For example, in Doti, people generally worked for at least seven days (i.e. 2 days for tillage, 1 day for transplanting, 1 day for weeding, 1 day for harvesting, 1 day for threshing, and 1 day for storage) and they were paid grain in kind equivalent to NRs 150 (about US$ 2). It was less than the usual rate (i.e. NRs 100). Due to lack of productive resources like land and non availability of other livelihood options they have no option but to accept these terms.

Under *Khalo Pratha*, they were adopting caste based occupation and they had to go to threshing floor (*Khalo*) to collect *Khalo* (grain) at the time of harvest. In fact, they were paid lower wage rate. However, they were not in a position to bargain. This system is also called *Balighare Pratha* in Kailali and also in eastern part of Nepal. Husked or unthreshed grain in the form of bundles given at the threshing floor is called *Pulo Pratha*. It seems unfair wage and semi-disguised form of employment. It was also noted that majority of *Dalit* had adopted *Khalo, Rithi, Balighare,* and *Pulo Pratha* for many centuries. Hence, caste system and its hierarchy were at the centre for their operation and regulation.

Haliya and *Kamaiya* are semi-bonded agricultural labour found in study areas and they are also strongly associated with their subsistence livelihood characterised by semi-bonded (e.g. debt bondage with higher interest rate), semi-slavery, unfair wages, economic exploitation and social discrimination. These two institutions appeared in society to varying forms and intensity. Basically, *Haliya* and *Kamaiya* were landless and even sometimes homeless. Due to dispossession or lack of ownership of resources, they fell to the bottom of the agrarian structure and they were too vulnerable to ensure their basic needs and

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[4] Khalo is the grain paid to services of Dalit community. It operates under Khalo Pratha or system which is very similar to patron-client system i.e. mechanism through which various services of Dalit are supplied in context of an ongoing relationship between client and craftsman. It is practiced in Far Western Region of Nepal.

livelihoods. Along with this structural cause, caste system made them weaker as mentioned above in *Khalo Pratha* in case of caste based occupations.

Share cropping (*Adhiya*) was also considered a source of livelihood and it ensures food sufficiency for two to six months depending upon the household size. Though it is equal sharing of cost and benefit in principle, it looks different in practice. Being landless households, they had to rent the master's land and they were supposed to undertake his household's extra work. If they did not follow the master's instruction, there were possibilities of ad hoc eviction from share cropping with the likelihood of loss of livelihood. Under *Adhiya* system, they had to do hard work for their livelihood. But they were not getting good economic return. In rare cases, it was also found that they had to work for ½ *bigaha* (0.33 Ha) land for free, if there was 1 *bigaha* (0.67 Ha) land under share cropping without any economic return. As they cannot get wage labour all the year round, it was compulsion for them to adopt. Share croppers also helped the land owner in household spheres, such as firewood collection and rice/wheat milling. They also had to help in special ceremonies like weddings and festivals. Share cropper had to help in planting winter crops like maize, mustard plantation freely. But only the harvest of summer crops like paddy was divided between them equally. In exceptional cases, share cropper looked happy and they were satisfied because it was considered one way of accessing land for landless household.

Furthermore, it is interesting to note that women headed households are considered physically weak and they are not preferred for share cropping. This is only due to gender differences and especially patriarchal norms and practices. They did not keep bullock or oxen to plough and women were also not allowed to plough culturally. They had to provide additional services to household spheres like cleaning houses, washing kitchen utensils, working at *Bari*/kitchen garden to please their masters.

Above empirical evidence showed that sharecroppers were not free. Rather, they were highly tied up with land owners. Due to unavailability of any other viable livelihood options, their sociopolitical affairs were controlled by land owners despite their interest and preferences.

Khalo Pratha, Haliya Pratha, Adhiya system are social institutions that shape the lives of land poor households. Landless households suffer from unfair payment i.e. partially paid and under employment. Furthermore, it was also noticed that share cropping did not seem gender friendly because women headed households (de facto) were not preferred to provide access to land for share cropping.

As land is a structural variable, land holding patterns create social structures and landless households are always at the bottom and they are supposed to undertake various activities for their livelihood despite their interest and satisfaction.

DISCUSSION

Political Economy of Landlessness: Historical Analysis

Throwing light on political economic approach, social and natural monopoly can explain the process of landlessness. However, it would be better to look at historical distribution of land among Nepali people.

Historically, there are noticeable changes in land ownership since 1769. Before the unification by the Shah Kings, there were different rulers such as *Kirats, Lichhavis, Devas* and *Mallas* who governed particular territories independently for centuries. They had community managed resource tenure system for land and forests, based on historically evolved traditional institutions. The tenurial regime for land and forest also overlapped as they were exchangeable (Regmi 1999; Sharma 2006).

Until 1950, the state exploited the country's natural resources like land and forests to regulate its administration and other functionaries. The major emphasis of the state was to exploit the country's resources to sustain a central state and administration so as to ensure the personal enrichment of rulers and their families and elites who helped to sustain their power. As a result, traditional institutions or the rules governing the tenure of resources were often modified by the state so that the rulers could benefit. In addition, the state had special interest in natural resource rich areas. On the other hand, in areas where resources were not rich in terms of taxes or income to be raised for the state, the local way of life and the tenurial regimes were allowed to continue. The unification carried out by the then King Prithvi Narayan Shah (1746-1769) was also done primarily to capture the arable land and plentiful forest areas in Kathmandu and Terai region (Ibid.).

Historically, the *Birta* system undoubtedly served the social, economic and political needs of the ruling classes of Nepal. It was a form of privileged land ownership that enabled them to exploit the state's land resources for their personal advantage. Regmi (1999) stated that this system was one of the worst manifestations of socio-economic inequality. *Birta* land gave privilege to tax exemption, which resulted in loss of revenue, which in turn made local administrations difficult to manage their expenses. Due to the absence of tax liability, *Birta* owners were enabled to maintain large areas as waste or forestland. This process resulted in wastage of national resources, particularly in situations where the incidence of landlessness were high and ubiquitous. This system also led to the concentration of land ownership rights in the hands of a privileged minority (Ibid.).

Agrarian policy of the state was shaped by the *Birta* and *Jagir* owning members of aristocracy and their bureaucracy. Their major emphasis was to achieve returns and taxes, ignoring agricultural development and conditions of the peasantry. Elites did not have any role in farm productions and this scenario remained unchanged throughout the history of Nepal. A peasant's worth was limited to his or her role as a tiller of the land and a source for securing tax and labour service. Based on the ratio between service rendered and surplus taken away from the class of peasants, the relationship between the *Rajas (kings)*, the *Birta* owners and the *Jagirdars*, on the one hand, and peasantry on the other, was clearly exploitative. The contrast between the thatched huts of the peasantry and the stucco palaces of the *Rajas*, the *Birta* owners, the *Jagirdar* or the economic and psychological gulf that separated them, were a characteristic feature of the 19th century Nepali economy and society. The peasant-aristocracy relations remained unchanged as the *Ranas* used their political authority to extract economic benefits for themselves primarily by virtue of their role as an important constituent of the traditional aristocracy (Regmi 1999).

Badal (1995) states that until 1951, there were different land management systems prevalent in Nepal, such as *Jagir, Rajya, Rakam, Birta, Kipat, Jimindari and Ukhada*. But now only Raikar and Guthi (and its derivatives) are found.

Residual effect of aforesaid historical tenurial practices can still be seen because the state's land reform programme has not been successful yet. Before and during the Rana regime, most people were not treated as citizens and non-privileged were tenants of privileged people. This demonstrates not only some gap between privileged and non-privileged, but is also the basis of class formation. In the long temporal dimension, it created class inequality.

Various studies (Müller-Böker 1981, 1986; Seddon 1987; and Cameron 1995) have also pointed out that all those privileged people are from so called higher caste (*Brahmin*/*Chhetri*/*Newar*). In particular, caste system provides the privilege to *Non-Dalit* to own resources such as land. Historical distribution pattern of land and granting land in the form of *Birta* to relatives and loyal followers; use of state's machineries or apparatuses to register land; social structure and caste system; and heavy dependence on caste-based occupation institutionalised by *Khalo*, *Rithi*, *Balighare*, *Pulo Pratha* are the main reasons behind such differences between privileged and non-privileged groups. It might also be division of work or labour. So called upper caste (non-*Dalit*) are supposed to contribute to different functionaries of state whereas *Dalit* or former untouchables were supposed to provide artisan services or manual work for Nepali society. Even untouchables did not have a chance or opportunity to have access to land. Its continuation for many centuries resulted in landlessness of the *Dalit* community. Hence, the analysis above gives a brief description of how caste inequality operates in terms of possession/ownership of land resources.

Looking into gender dynamics, within household (intra-household), women were subordinated. Reasons behind this was patriarchy, unitary notion of household: household is sufficient for socio-economic progress (or empowerment). Within household, they were ignored.

Social Exclusion in Access to Land: Mechanism and Causes

Following social monopoly paradigm, this section looks at how powerful privileged groups monopolise in occupying the productive resource land. Society is made up of powerful groups creating hierarchy. Privileged groups (in terms of class, caste and gender) create a boundary which imposes a barrier 'to own the resource'. It is historically devised for a certain section of class, caste and gender. In temporal dimension, it has been legitimised. This legitimacy is reflected in politics, policy and law. For illustration though several amendments of Muluki Ain (MA), 103 caste discriminatory law (NDC 2000), and 208 gender discriminatory laws (FWLD 2009) were found.

Evidence shows that land is considered to underpin all social, economic and political development of a person or household. Access to land also defines one's inclusion (exclusion) in social, economic and political processes. It forces landless or land poor people to accept hegemonic relationships as explained in succeeding sections.

Power Dynamics: Structural and Institutional Exclusion

Land being a socio-political asset (Bebbington 1999; Scoones 1998, 2009) has implications for socio-economic and cultural spheres of society. Land is also a determinant of social structure, inequitable and skewed distribution of land creates unequal power structure in an agrarian society (Upreti 2004; Upreti et. al 2008).

Following Giddens (1984), resources and rules interact with each other to form several institutions. By taking some inferences from aforesaid institutions, agrarian social groups (privileged and non-privileged) interact with each other for some socio-political and economic interaction. Visible pictures of power relationships are negative as well as positive. Negative scenarios are unfair, exploitative and often create differential wages. Positive scenarios are social harmony, cohesion and mutual help.

Land holding is a key determinant of agrarian relations in a society, which is further controlled by social structures such as class, caste and gender. These social structures have implications on power and social relations in society by virtue of resource entitlement and social belonging/positioning. The findings of this study confirmed several findings earlier evidenced by Seddon (1987), Müller-Böker (1981, 1986), and Ellis (2000). Different informal social institutions operate differently under certain rules of the game and these are dynamic and transformational over time (Giddens 1984).

It was observed that the livelihood options of the surveyed population was by and large shaped and regulated by existing social institutions such as *Khalo Pratha*, sharecropping, *Haliya* and *Kamaiya Pratha*, characterised by unfair wages, debt bondage, social control and caste-based discrimination. They were strongly tied up with these social constraints. Since skewed and inequitable distribution of land inherently makes a society structural and hierarchical, it allows big land owning classes to exercise power over landless and nearly landless people. It has been also observed that the caste system, as an institution, restricts or prohibits *Dalit* from opening tea shops or hotels (Kollmair et al. 2002). Similar patterns have also been found in this research. These institutions determine social relations and hence modify access to livelihood assets as Scoones (1998), and Ellis (2000) have demonstrated. This study has also shown that the SLF does not provide basis for describing dynamic social processes and transformation, which is very similar to the arguments of Scoones (1998), Ellis (2000), and Pokhrel (2010).

In an agrarian society, resource (e.g. land) determines vertical social structure, and people who remain at the top are allowed to exercise power over people at the bottom. For example, *Haliya*, *Kamaiya*, and landless labourers were subjected to various forms of discrimination and exploitation by exhibiting common characteristics i.e. landlessness, debt bondage, physical exploitation and discrimination which is also well demonstrated by other studies (Thapa 2000; Regmi 1999; Adhikari 2006; Upreti 2001, 2004).

Studying the social institutions minutely, there are a few like *Haliya* and *Kamaiya*, which cannot sufficiently be explained by class alone. The question arises, why only *Tharus* and almost all *Dalit* are *Kamaiya* and *Haliya* respectively. One explanation is the caste system. In particular, caste system creates social structure in which Brahmin and Chhetri are on top, Janjati in the middle and *Dalit* at the bottom as explained earlier. Hence, vertical structure (caste hierarchy), in conjugation with resource possession and entitlement, is found to operate in various interactions and interplays to determine agrarian relations (Hoefer 2004; Giddens 1984).

In case of *Khalo*, *Rithi, Pulo*, and *Balighare*, caste system remains at the centre. It exhibits a relation between the *Dalit* and Non-*Dalit* in patron-client relation (Caplan 1972; Dahal et al. 2002). In case of caste-based occupation, the *Dalit* are supposed to sell their skills with grain characterised by unfair wages. Though they are not satisfied, they have to continue due to unavailability of any other livelihood options as being landless; they have lesser voice or say. The lower the land holding, the lesser the voice and bargaining power for reasonable wage rate. Here caste system and land entitlement (due to its distribution) determines social structure and confirm as Weber (1948) explained several dimensions of inequality in a plural society.

In the beginning, through the *Khalo*, *Pulo, Rithi* and *Balighare Pratha*, the households were interdependent upon each other. Both *Dalit* and Non-*Dalit* were mutually sharing the benefits i.e. 'production of land asset of Non-*Dalit*' and 'human skills of the *Dalit* '. But in today's world, *Dalit* caste based skills are being replaced by availability of similar products by modern companies in open and globalised market (Dahal et al. 2002). Now, even Non-*Dalits* do not have sufficient land as before and they are not in a position to pay *Dalit's* services reasonably. Thus, the *Dalit* are being further exploited by unfair wages and debt.

Hence, class and caste dynamics operate together in case of Nepal, and uni-dimensional concept of inequality as described by Marx (1988) is not sufficient to explain this reality. Instead Weber's concept of plural society has been employed (Weber 1948).

In case of share cropping, it is again the function of unequal resource distribution. It is necessary to illuminate the fact that the women are not preferred for this because they are considered physically weak. So due to patriarchy women are excluded from resource sharing and are also paid lower in wage labour system. Hence class (resource) and gender play crucial roles in the functioning of power relations in Nepal's agrarian society. This confirms with the findings of Agarwal (1994).

CONCLUSION

Inequitable distribution of land in Nepal has been there since decades and it is one of the underlying causes of social exclusion, injustice, inequity and disparity and has created skewed power relations in this agrarian society. This paper looked at how the political economy of existing land distribution explained who the privileged are and who are not; and who has done what in creating unequal power structures. Historical analysis of the state's governing system also provided key commentary on these trends. It can be argued that existing privileged social groups such as high land owning classes and non-*Dalits* (as well as the non-privileged groups are landless or land poor, women and *Dalit* caste groups) emerged through the passage of time over centuries. The latter have been exploited and face discrimination; and, they have higher degree of livelihood shocks and stress. Political entrepreneurs exploited their vulnerabilities and mobilised them for their political benefits erupting in different political struggles of 1951, 1990, and from 1996-2006. The 'livelihood conflict' is at the centre of every political and social struggle in Nepal. Ironically, their livelihood vulnerabilities still remain due to incomplete socio-economic and political transformation in Nepal.

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ICT as a Rural Livelihood Option: A Study of Nangi Village, Nepal

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ABSTRACT

Like other Asian countries, Nepal has also witnessed major changes in information and communication technology (ICT) in the last decade. This paper assesses the impact of the Nepal Wireless Networking Project, which is in operation at Nangi village in western Nepal, on the livelihoods (viz., physical, financial, social, human and natural aspects) of people living in a place beset by armed conflict. The study analyses the rural-urban connections, the benefit augmentation and the harm reduction measures and discusses sustainability and replicability of such projects in the Nangi village of Myagdi district in Nepal.

Apart from the questionnaire survey, focus group discussions with women's group and field observation methods were used for data collection from 33 out of 106 households. This paper argues that even if the presence of state mechanisms is rare, peoples' concerted actions may result in stronger livelihood options. However, mere access to technology cannot produce geometric success; communities need skills to use such facilities as livelihood options.

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INTRODUCTION

The past two decades in Nepal have been marked both by democratic changes as well as development of media. With this, the use of ICT has accelerated. Onta (2006) states that people's livelihoods, be they rural or non-rural, are shaped by modern techniques. Further, rural knowledge system, socialisation, small enterprises and even the integration of rural communities with the urban ones are associated with digital development (Chapagain 2006). In this context, the paper assesses impacts of ICT on the livelihoods of the people in a village beset by the Maoist insurgency (during the period 1996-2006) in Nepal.

The paper looks at the benefit augmentation and harm reduction measures while assessing impact of a wireless fiber (wi-fi) project in Nangi on different livelihood assets (such as physical, financial, social, human and natural). It also analyses the rural-urban connections generated by ICT during times when state institutions were less effective because of the armed conflict. Sustainability and replication of such interventions are important factors. It delineates how ICT is functioning, or should function, to be an alternative livelihood means and to address the root causes of conflicts.

Conflict and Livelihoods in Nepal

The ten-year Maoist insurgency in Nepal affected people's livelihood in many ways. The Maoists waged the insurgency mainly to highlight the exclusionary social and political practices as well as economic imbalance and regional disparity of development. Health, education, agriculture and transportation were severely disrupted due to the armed conflict (Upreti and Müller-Böeker 2010). Schools were used as war-shelters, health-posts were bombarded, and many agricultural fields became land mines. Natural resources are considered the supporting pillars for rural livelihoods but, for many villagers, there was no secure access to such resources (Ibid.). Social harmony disappeared in many conflict-ridden areas and post-war communalism rose, especially in the Terai-Madhes, the southern plain of Nepal (Upreti et al. 2012). Infrastructure worth US $70 million (approximately) was destroyed, reconstruction of which is estimated to cost US $50 million (approximately) (Upreti 2009). In the given situation, it is safe to say that people were compelled to either cope up and live with the same situations or search for alternative livelihoods. The following section features a case study on the role of ICT on the livelihoods of a village during the armed conflict in Nepal.

Emergence of ICT in Nangi

Nangi village falls in Ramche Village Development Committee of Myagdi district in western Nepal. Although 80 kilometer away from Pokhara, the western regional headquarters, in terms of state services and infrastructures it is farther than its physical distance. The seven hours long uphill climb to reach Nangi has earned itself the title of rural hinterland in the lap of Himalayas. Even though the village has high potential for the cultivation of medicinal herbs, yak farming and rhododendron, it only became known a decade ago. The village also gained popularity when Nepal Wireless Networking Project led by Mahabir Pun took momentum (Pokharacity n.d.). Before this project, the provision and quality of three basic services, education, health and communication, were pitiful. The village suffered from lack of quality education; there were no doctors in the area and people had to travel great distances to seek medical facilities at the regional headquarters Pokhara. Also, communication was significantly hampered as people had to travel to convey and receive required information. These three things have changed overtime under the strong leadership of Mahabir Pun- the proponent of rural wi-fi system in Nepal. The development of wi-fi benefited the locals tremendously and the community leadership shown by Mahabir Pun earned him the prestigious Ramon Magsaysay Award 2007.

Born in Nangi village, Mahabir Pun spent his school years with no proper books or efficient teachers, yet he was determined to do 'something' for his remote village. However, his family migrated to Chitwan during this time and he completed his school life there and taught in a local school for 12 years. After winning partial undergrad scholarship to study Science Education in 1996 from Nebraska, he returned to Nangi village after 24 years and established Himanchal Higher Secondary School. Later, he went back to the US to study Educational Administration.

Pun decided to work on rural education and networking science in which he had expertise, to improve upon the livelihoods and associated problems of the people of Nangi. He succeeded in accumulating some resources and technical assistance after continued efforts and fund-raising to connect the village to the World Wide Web. After this successful connection, Himanchal Higher Secondary School established the Nepal Wireless Networking Project under its management committee in 2003. This simple and cost-effective wi-fi project helped interconnect rural and urban places, facilitated tele-medicine and tele-communication services and introduced the successful approach of livelihood development to the rest of Nepal. As that was a peak time of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, working on it ran a high risk. See Box 1 for details on the beginning of this project.

Box 1: The Day of Antenna Installation
It was 2001, when we planned to connect Nangi to the internet for which we needed one relay station. We decided to install it at Maurya Danda (the hilltop), which was a no-man land. Mahabir went out alone to the high hill carrying the telescope. It was a feasibility test to see if internet signals from Pokhara could be captured. *The second time, a Belgian citizen (Yohan), Mahabir, myself, along with 3 porters went out to establish the relay station. For that trip, two disk antennas (one 12 and another 6 feet in size) were carried to the hilltop. After the installation, Yohan tried using his laptop to send and receive an e-mail; e-mail a concept that I didn't know at that time. It was a success.* *Yohan had brought three bottles of beer so that we could drink if we succeeded to connect. We celebrated, but it did not work the second day. We spent the next two days trying to get it working again. The situation became worse, as the conflicts in Nepal presented a series of hardships to achieve our goals. But Mahabir dealt with both the state armies and the Maoist insurgents whenever problems would arise; given his clear vision and the strong community ownership of the project.*[1]

The objective of the Nepal Wireless Networking Project was to interconnect the rural mountainous villages of Myagdi, Kaski and Parbat districts (Baniya 2007). The project gained notable popularity in international media. Dozens of rural Nepali villages have already replicated this approach to connect rural areas to urban areas and provide education, health and communication facilities at low

[1] Pun, Krishna. 2010, pers. Comm. 14 October.

cost and with simple operating equipment.[2] Chapagain (2006) writes that most of the Nepalis in urban places are still not up to date on information and communication technology and news-portals, whereas the rural people from Nangi are getting used to exchanging goods online.

Wi-fi Programmes

In Nangi, there are different programmes related to wi-fi: tele-medicine, tele-media and tele-teaching are major in this. This section explains some visible impacts of these programmes.

1. Tele-medicine: Decreasing the Distance to Doctors

On-demand health service was a far cry a few years ago in Nangi. Patient deaths were common as there were no immediate and well-equipped health facilities in the village.[3] But today, there is a tele-medicine clinic operated by the Nepal Wireless Networking Project. There are two health officials connected online to the doctors in Om hospital in Pokhara and Model Hospital in Kathmandu. The clinic is now equipped with high resolution webcam with LCD monitors. With their help, the doctors can see their patients virtually, cities apart.

Field observation shows that the health-post is popular and effective among the villagers. As seen in the register, there are 15 clients on an average per day. A focus group discussion with the women in Nangi also concluded that the Wireless Project had been a great achievement for them. These evidences prove that the project had a remarkable impact on the villagers' health.

2. Tele-teaching: Economising Human Resource

Similar to tele-media and tele-medicine, a tele-teaching system is being developed by the community. Even though this concept is currently not operational, some donor agencies have shown their interest in it.[4] With its introduction, teaching in a school at one village could be broadcasted via video conference to other schools as well in nearby villages. This may address the problem of lack of skilled teaching staff. With internet connectivity and schools

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[2] Interview with Mahabir Pun in Kathmandu on 13 February 2011.

[3] Purja, K. 2010, pers. Comm. 12 October.

[4] Interview with Mahabir Pun in Kathmandu on 13 February 2011.

connected to one portal, one qualified teacher can link up with several schools at the same time.[5]

3. Tele-media: Bridging Businesses

In Nangi, tele-media is the provision of buying and selling goods via intra-net. With the use of internal networking in the adjacent villages, people can demand, market and supply products, poultry and animals as well. With this internal networking, around a dozen tele-centre operators help local people upload their information about goods and animals. They mediate the potential buyers and the suppliers with the use of an online marketing software called Haatbazar.com.

Anyone who reaches the village after seven hours of continuous walk from Pokhara, the headquarters is surprised to witness the technological advancement in such a geographically isolated setting. Sheron Suri, an American volunteer at Nangi Clinic and Women's Centre, expressed, *'Though I am from Silicon Valley, the city known as the ICT capital of the world, I do not know much about technology. But, I really admire the people here who have interconnected their livelihoods with information and communication technology.'*[6]

With all the above-mentioned successes, Nangi village in Nepal is now characterised as a model village for ICT-led development. Because of its note-worthy works in rural health, education and marketing systems, Nepal Wireless Networking Project has been practically important to replicate the successes and academically important to study and analyse the impacts on rural livelihoods.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

For the research, two wards (ward no. 1 and 2 where the wi-fi project concentrates) of Ramche Village Development Committee (VDC) of Myagdi district were selected. These wards include 106 households, of these 33 households were randomly sampled and interviewed.

The key respondents were asked a total of 48 questions that were mostly objective. For subjective information, local teachers, leaders, executive members

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[5] Interview with Mahabir Pun in Kathmandu on 13 February 2011.
[6] Suri, S. 2010, pers. Comm., Kathmandu, 11 October.

of the school management committee and local experts were interviewed. After this, experts such as Mahabir Pun- the initiator of the wi-fi project; Dr. Bharat Pokharel- livelihood expert (and the then Country Representative of Inter-cooperation-Nepal); and Samesh Adhikari- Data Analyst at Kathmandu University were also interviewed in Kathmandu.

Since the study principally emphasises on primary data, field visit was the crux of data collection. The research was conducted in two weeks with three enumerators. During the research, villagers were interviewed and their daily lives observed. The primary sources of information were as follows:

i. Semi-structured questionnaires for household survey;
ii. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with Women's Groups, students and teachers of Himanchal Higher Secondary School;
iii. Key informant interviews with the office personnel and master-mind people in the wi-fi project;
iv. Case studies of some of the beneficiaries; and
v. Observations of the project activities and documents.

In addition to the primary information, statistical reports, information and communication plans and profiles, scientific studies, government policy documents and other published and unpublished materials of relevant organisations were consulted as the secondary sources of information. The impact of the project on the five different aspects of Nangi villager's livelihood is given in the following section.

IMPACTS OF ICT ON LIVELIHOODS

The Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) by the Department for International Development (DFID) is used to analyse and assess the impact of internet on the five assets/capitals of rural livelihoods. Figure 1 displays these five aspects.

Figure 1: Sustainable Livelihoods Approach Pentagon



Source: Chambers and Conway (1992).

As described by DFID (1999), SLA is a human-centric approach which places human life at the centre of development. Pokharel (2010) and Chambers and Conway (1992) also admit that SLA helps enhance capabilities and provides sustainable opportunities. It also helps measure the effectiveness of livelihood-related development interventions.

The wi-fi project of Nangi has facilitated skill development of the local people, as well as assisted in intercommunication between villages. The advantages of wi-fi are diverse and indirect. Generation of social capital is one such advantage.

Social Capital

Social capital is an asset gained through institutional or individual networking. In recent years, social scientists have been closely studying this concept, considered as a necessary element in the development equation. In this regard, networking is an important social capital that access to internet can generate. For this research, individual networking within a family was observed as one of the components.

In Nangi, the familial bond is found to be emboldened by the entrance of ICT as the field survey shows that a substantial share of the interviewed household members (about 57 percent) were strongly encouraged by their family members to be engaged in the project and use the internet and related products.

Social interaction has grown due to the programme. Baniya (2007) writes that it is also because of the strong leadership that the project got. Despite being a technocrat, Mahabir Pun stays far from a luxurious lifestyle and lives a very simple and cordial rural life. Because of this, his personality has been a motivating force to engage youth in the village. Supporting this fact, survey results demonstrate that it was this perfect leadership that led the village to success. This also created people's strong ownership for the wireless project.

Since the wireless technology has enabled people to work together with people from other villages like collaborating on various projects such as paper-making, plum jam and rhododendron juice-making, it has resulted in increased social interaction. Daily gathering at the wi-fi centre positively impacted decisions related to road construction, women's education, family planning, and nutrition education. As networking is an eminent social dimension of livelihoods, Flor (2008) also opines that the social capital generated through it may increase exponentially through intranet and internet connectivity.

Access to information and communication technology has much to do with inclusion of all groups of society (Garside 2009). Since Nangi has a relatively homogenous caste structure, there are little or no cases of racial disparity. But there is a difference in possession of physical assets as seen in the context of individual economic backgrounds. For instance, school teachers, and some financially secure families have personal computers at home, whereas most of the villagers do not. This inequality of access may affect the level of knowledge and expertise as well as access to opportunities in future.

Rural women's groups tend to closely communicate while spending time during work and leisure (Flor 2008). Further, they have capacity to cope with diverse roles and challenges. The women's group in Nangi has also accumulated considerable social capital through group work in paper, juice and spice-making factories.

Highlighting the role of libraries in Nepal as an effective medium of generating social capital through public gatherings, Parajuli (2006) writes that public libraries were not only places to read books and newspapers, but also a common forum to meet and discuss various issues with other community members. In Nangi, a basketball court, computer lab, tele-medicine clinic, school hostel, paper-making factory, and other social initiatives are concentrated in the Himanchal School itself. Thus, the daily gatherings in the evening are essential for social integration. Such places are a hub for social interaction and education. Such gatherings and discussions enrich cultural harmony which is vital for social transformation.

Physical Capital

Physical capital here refers to the changes in livelihood assets, household assets, housing conditions, and community infrastructures. The field observation shows the usefulness and efficacy of the wi-fi project. Figure 2 depicts the situation of households that own computers and the use of internet for various purposes. Of the surveyed households, only 15 percent owned computers (i.e. minimum of one computer every household). The wealth ranking and profession of the respondents show that most of them are either school teachers or are from affluent financial background. About two third of the respondents surf the internet regularly, while the rest did not. They are either unable to use it or do not have time because of their household chores. Usefulness of physical capital determines the capability to harvest success from those assets. But sadly, the figure shows a grim picture of the use of internet other than for personal communication, as very few people were found to have used tele-media for economic/business purposes.

Figure 2: Possession and Use of Computer



The number of recipients, using the wi-fi system, to access state services (specifically that of Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education), was also small, but instances suggest that the use could help make access to various services more economical. Getting results of School Leaving Certificate examination, higher secondary examinations and British Gurkha recruitment and sending photographs electronically for administrative purposes with the help of internet, has reduced physical costs of the related offices. This may further reduce human resources and infrastructural expenses related to the delivery and receipt of state services for both the government and the citizens.

Human Capital

Chambers and Conway (1992) state that human capital in SLA talks about the changes in employment skills, social skills, dignity, self-respect and alteration in allocation of work within the household. Gender relation is an integral part of human capital. The occurrence of the gender divide in access and use of ICTs is more noticeable in developing than developed countries (Duncombe 2006). This may be due to socio-cultural norms and practices in developing countries that have broader role in shaping gender roles.

It is imperative to communicate the information needs of women especially in rural contexts. Silva (2008, p. 4) writes, *'.. given that women are twice as likely to be engaged in agricultural related activities as men, a more thorough understanding is needed to know the differences in livelihood strategies among men and women.'*

Taking into consideration that interrogating gender issues may include social sensitivity in Nepalese Hindu society, respondents were given a choice, should they feel uncomfortable they may choose not to respond. Almost one-fifth of the households did not want to respond to the question on how gender-friendly the families were while encouraging male and female family members to use the internet. Even among the households who answered, the ratio of female users to the male users was almost half. Only about 15 percent of the responding households said that both males and females in their families use internet equally.

Human health is another aspect of human capital. The wi-fi in Nangi has provided modern options for health solutions. It was widely quoted by many aged respondents that, just one decade ago patients would die mid-way while rushing to the medical headquarters for treatment. But the wi-fi has now linked patients in rural areas to the medical experts in city centres via internet.

Opportunity for computer education has encouraged Ramche village students to seek high school education in Nangi. To accommodate them, the school has made arrangements for student hostels.

Financial Capital

Financial capital deals with the vulnerability or changes in income, its sources, stability, savings and debt. Silva (2008) reiterates that the rural and underprivileged people need information to fulfill a variety of needs: availability of jobs, condition of the market, access to government programmes and services etc. Financially speaking, ICT projects are more likely to succeed as secondary livelihoods if they are associated with the pre-existing primary livelihoods in the community, such as small retail stores, marketing cooperatives, food service providers, transport providers, micro-finance establishments, and others (Flor 2008).

People in Nangi do not seem to have benefited substantially in financial terms through ICT intervention in their area. They have only associated the business of herbs and other commodities with internet. The high school has a paper-making factory that produces Nepalese papers and diaries from the bark of the trees; women in the area sell these items via internet. But the efficacy of the internet is still being considered. Had Nangi used simple digital systems such as radio and cell phones, digital marketing would have been better. The finding by InfoDev (2009 p. 2) supports this fact, *'while internet-based market information systems work well in more developed, literate markets, other media, such as mobile phones or community radio, could be appropriate alternatives in least developed countries.'*

People need not spend money on internet use because it is free of charge for the locals. But there is no optimum use of the internet. Most of the users surf internet merely once a week. As Figure 3 reveals, about one fifth of the respondents use internet after nearly a month's gap, about one third does so monthly, nearly four-tenth does so weekly, and only about one-tenth use it on daily basis. So, there is only a slim chance of the internet being used to generate considerable financial capital.

Figure 3: The Pattern of Internet Use in Nangi



Survey results disclose that most of the people use internet only for regular personal communication, emails and online chatting and use it less for financial purposes. Some laudable entrepreneurial works related to ICT are video-making, editing and CD burning for the special days of festivals, fairs, and family observances.

Connecting the village with city markets is another way to enhance financial capital. But there are more exports than imports with the use of the internet. Villagers sell the commodities from their place, but do not buy goods via internet themselves. The commodities sold are mainly luxury goods, not the normal goods[7] and the marketing channel is also narrow. The export items are available to a very limited market even after the availability of the internet. The state's responsibility and instigation for this seems almost non-existent.

[7] In the consumption principle of economics, the goods other than the basic goods (normal goods) for daily human life are called as 'luxury goods.'

Natural Capital

With respect to natural assets, ICT projects play a significant role in providing relevant information. As Silva (2008) highlights that provision of land records to determine ownership rights of farmer plots (e.g. the Bhoomi project in India[8]) or timely information on natural disasters (e.g. the Haz Info project in Sri Lanka[9]) help rural poor reduce damage to their land and natural environments. By enhancing their communication abilities, ICT indirectly eases global advocacy on environmental matters by connecting the rural poor to national and worldwide advocacy groups. It also can give support to social change among the underprivileged and marginalised people. For instance, e-krishi in India is a rapidly expanding ICT enabled platform. Members in such platforms get information, transact and make or receive electronic payments (Ibid.).

The same is the case for agriculture. McNamara (2008) writes that market information systems can improve income for producers on one hand and result in lower costs for consumers on the other. He further states that ICT can help restructure supply chains and improve market access. Similarly, *'digitisation of land rights and land registration processing can improve transparency and the speed with which claims can be processed'* (Ibid. p. 32). But none of these efforts are made from the school-centred service of the wi-fi programme.

SUSTAINABILITY AND REPLICABILITY

Himanchal Higher Secondary School has become an instance of entrepreneurship for the rest of the educational institutions. The introduction of a wi-fi project has presented a forum for the villagers to come together for social works. Even if wi-fi has not directly benefited the village as expected, it has presented the people numerous livelihood choices and eased their lives. For example, hen-keeping, fishery and yak-keeping are conducted under community ownership. It has given employment opportunities to many villagers. The school has invested in tourism too. Almost half of the teachers in the school are financed

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[8] This project was implemented by Karnataka State Government for computerization of land records. This e-governance project recorded land records of all the landowners in Karnataka.

[9] Haz Info project in Sri Lanka was funded by Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and its primary aim was to establish and evaluate a community-based hazard warning system with the use of wireless technologies including mobile phones.

by the school's own resources. This success is exemplary in the context that the teachers at government schools in Nepal are mostly paid by the state. But due to the lack of sufficient financial resources, the state is not able to employ sufficient number of teachers for all schools in the villages. Despite this inability of the state, Himanchal School has been successful in employing teachers with its own financial resources.

The existing community efforts, if continued with operational success and organisational management, seem to make the educational institution self-reliant and sustainable. Even if the state has not paid apt attention, the villagers feel that they are responsible for their community. This consciousness must be considered replicable as the village is able to present an excellent example of rural development. Once the wi-fi project was introduced to the village, it encouraged them to be integrated for noble causes. Even if the wi-fi project has not remarkably contributed to ICT-based development there, other forms of local development efforts have been initiated. Thus, it is safe to say that even if the internet has not been a medium of development, it has been at least the initiator of development in Nangi.

Hanna (2006) very critically states that there is an underlying assumption that e-government development programmes are often designed by international consultants. Most of the times, such projects are merely considered *'accountability and governance requirements of the donors'*. He further argues that e-government projects lack *'a vision of the leadership and institutional capabilities required for sustainable development'* (Ibid. p. 9), which often make feeble the already weak state capacity. The respondents during the survey were asked whether they think this programme can run in the future as it is doing now if external aid was ceased. The survey result shows overwhelming majority (70 percent) on the surety of its continuation with independent efforts from the villagers.

Replicating the success of Nangi, tele-medicine services have also started in some other districts of Nepal. Ministry of Health and Population Nepal has begun this in Sindhupalchowk district in eastern Nepal as a part of the programme to implement tele-medicine service in 25 remote and mountainous districts. As of March 2011, the human resources and infrastructure for this had been laid out (Merosindhu 2011). Similar experimental projects were conducted by Health Net Nepal from July 2004 to December 2006 to ensure better access to efficient doctors and treatment in Amda Hospital-Damak, Siddhartha Women and Children Hospital-Butwal and Siddhi Memorial Hospital-Bhaktapur. Experts from Tribhuwan University Teaching Hospital, Kathmandu Medical College and Martyr Gangalal National Cardiac Centre had provided services in those places (Pradhan 2009).

Nineteenth century European sociologists Durkheim, Weber, Toennies and others have written about the changes that occur as a result of the transition of societies from community to the society. They had opined that during rapid social change, communities, with strong interconnection among households, turn into a society, where interconnection exists but in a very small degree. So, it seems that the mono-cultural background of the village and the homogeneity in caste in Nangi have been favorable for group works. People easily offer voluntary services for social works within the village. If it were in a commercialised society, this same integration and cooperation would have been only an imagination. With the wave of urbanisation and commercialisation, societies become more individualised and less integrated.[10]

Not all Nepalese villages are as culturally homogenous as Nangi is. The success of Nangi is based on communal, rather than social integration. So, it may not be the same if the locality is either multicultural or commercialised with heterogeneity of caste groups.

CHALLENGES AND LOOPHOLES

Amidst the potential, there are numerous challenges and loopholes in the approach of ICT-led development in Nangi. Some loopholes can be seen in the framework of the project and some in its implementation. There are some weaknesses in the optimisation and distribution of benefits too.

Development plans in Nepal are so far less demand-driven and more supply-driven because of the flaws in either policy-making or priority-setting. Jordhus-Lier et al. (2009) state that this is a universal reality of developing countries. If we analyse this fact with reference to Nangi, the wi-fi project here was not designed by the villagers. Rather, it was an individual intervention to serve the locals; so it

[10] Adhikari, S. 2010, pers. Comm.Pokhara, 26 September.

is innately a supply-driven programme which had not properly calculated the ICT-based needs of the villagers. It was good that later the local community owned the project and addressed some key problems of the village. But still the major masterminds behind this project seem primarily focused on availability of the internet, rather than increasing its usefulness.

The villagers of Nangi do not have to pay for the internet but for photocopy, scanning, internet call etc., which involves stationery costs. This concession might have been possible because of the waived tariffs by the Internet Service Provider (ISP) (here Worldlink Communications Nepal). This became possible through Mahabir Pun's effective public relations. But the possibility of free ISP provision to all the villages in Nepal is bleak. One may analyse this fact with reference to Onta's argument (2006) that tariff is a major problem for the availability of internet in Nepal. He suggests that until the access costs (both the computer hardware and server charge per minute) are drastically lowered, it is unlikely that the majority of people in Nepal will participate in any significant numbers to take up internet usage. The same is in the case of Nangi where the people have taken only limited benefits even with the rich technical infrastructure.

Being advanced software, the intranet (Haatbazar.com) is not yet fully utilised as a tele-media marketing tool. Hence, the efficacy of digital marketing is limited due to the poor rate of computer literacy. *'Yes, it (Haatbazar.com) was a hopeful initiative. But not much success is achieved so far in tele-media as the people are yet to fully understand the fundamentals of e-commerce'*, opines Kishan Pun, one of the in-charges of Himanchal Computer Lab.

Another challenge for Nepal Wireless Networking Project is the apathy from the state. The state had not paid proper attention to this project until this project received international fame with Ramon Magsaysay Award. Now, the government agencies invite Mahabir Pun frequently to take suggestions regarding internet-based rural development. Yet, there is no budget allocation from the state to contribute to this project. Pun himself admits that he has not so far asked for government funds. During its early years, the project used to request donors and organisations for assistance; nowadays they themselves approach the project to offer assistance. This has been the sustaining pillar for the project.[11] It is all because of the international fame that Mahabir Pun received. As there are no successors like him, the sustainability of such assistance is at risk. Only limited people involved in the project know how the financial assistance is gathered; from where it comes and how to contact the donors and uplift the project activities. Hence, leadership transfer is also one of the major challenges of this project.

CONCLUSION

Many development activities have taken place in Nangi without the assistance and involvement of the state. It has proved that better and more programmes are possible at a local level. The village shows that development is possible with collective works. This gives a very good lesson that many progressive changes are possible if an initiative is owned well by community even during political/civil unrest.

We cannot increase the use and efficacy of information only by providing the opportunity to gain information. The opportunity to access information has to be linked with the creation of income mechanisms and fulfillment of basic needs of life. There is no guarantee of the donors' long-term involvement in maintaining the project infrastructures and sustaining the programmes. Therefore, self-reliance on maintenance and expansion of the existing programmes in Nangi seems doubtful. It is because there is no diverse use of internet so as to make it a ladder of social and economic transformation.

Developing marketing skills in the internet users is essential in Nangi so as to help ICT leave a more profound impact. Further, ICT literacy is also necessary for the villagers for marketing purpose. Instances from Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Lao PDR, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam under ICT4L (ICT for Livelihood) are exemplary in this regard (Flor 2008). Use of internet in Nangi is limited mostly to personal use. This is why the villagers here need marketable skills with the use of internet. Internet has a wide relationship with agriculture, health, education, micro-finance and disaster preparedness. So, it can promote

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[11] Interview with Mahabir Pun in Kathmandu on 13 February 2011.

better income-generating mechanisms in Nangi. But such potentials are not identified; if identified, are not yet utilised.

The job seems to be more challenging in a country where a majority does not have access to electricity and very few can afford to buy a computer (Onta 2006). In this context, there are more challenges than successes in the ICT-led development in Nepal. But the instance from a very remote place such as Nangi can be a positive lesson for other villages in Nepal. If the challenges are addressed properly, the efforts in Nangi can be the best example of rural livelihood development. To conclude, there is ample potential for ICT to have meaningful impact on Nepalese rural livelihoods, but insurmountable challenges still exist in every step.

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Section III: Readapting Forest Management

- Contested Forest Ownership: A Study of Swat District, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, Pakistan

- Innovative Interventions in Nepal for Implementing REDD+ at the Community Level

Contested Forest Ownership: A Study of Swat District, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, Pakistan[1]

Sultan-i-Rome[*]

ABSTRACT

Historic Swat is part of the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) and Malakand Division of the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. The area remained without government for centuries before 1915 except from 1849/50-1857. In 1915, Swat State came into being which was extended to the territories outside Swat, but some areas of Swat remained outside its folds. Swat State survived till 1969 when it was merged in the then province of West Pakistan and later in the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pukhtunkhwa) with its restoration after about fifteen years in 1970.

After the merger, the former Swat State area was made Swat District to which Kalam—not part of Swat State—was also added. Later, in 1976 the right bank Indus Kohistan portion of Swat State and then Swat District was separated and made part of the newly created Kohistan District. In 1991 and 1995, Buner and Shangla respectively, were separated from Swat District and were granted status of separate districts.

This paper deals with the crucial point of Swat District's forest ownership in 2011 contested by the provincial government and the people concerned. Though based on archival record and statutory sources, this paper also derives information from oral sources and personal knowledge. Its focus is the provincial government period, i.e. post-Swat State period (1969–2011). For better understanding of the issue in proper historical perspective, it also outlines the pre-Swat State and Swat State periods.

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[1]This paper is a consolidated and updated version of some sections of the author's study on forest issues published in two working papers, now consolidated and updated in a book entitled *Land and Forest Governance: Transition from Tribal System to Swat State to Pakistan* (Rome, forthcoming).

PRE-SWAT STATE PERIOD

The ownership of forests in non-Kohistan Swat areas was traditionally claimed and held by the concerned *dawtar*[2] landowners after the occupation of the areas by the Yusufzais in the 16th century and in some cases also by the *serai*[3] landowners, where they held hills or hillside lands, e.g. the Akhun Khels of the tract between Pia and Madyan, the Sayyads of Sar-Sardaray, and the Miangan of Lalku.

Ownership of forests has a direct link with land ownership.[4] An important aspect in this regard is that the ownership of forests with respect to the forests related with the *dawtar* land was established to the extent that they were owned on the whole by *dawtar* landowners, but the ownership of particular forests changed frequently for specific periods between the particular sub-branches as a result of each *wesh*[5] because the respective lands went into the lot of other sub-branches due to their transfer or shifting to those areas for the next tenure.

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[2] The land liable to periodic re-allotment or interchange in the traditional *wesh* system. The owners of *dawtar* possessed proportionate shares in all categories of land of the village or locality where they had their shares in the *dawtar* and in related privileges and obligations as well.

[3] Lands, which were under permanent ownership and were not liable to the periodic re-allotment or interchange in the traditional *wesh* system. The *serai* lands on the whole had no proportionate share in other categories of land and *shamilat* of the village or locality. There, however, are *serai* lands which possess *shamilat* and had share in forests.

[4] In Swat proper, almost all the villages have a share in the adjacent hills. Presuming that at the time of the occupation of the valley by the Yusufzais and the adoption of the *wesh* system, all the hills were forested, all the agricultural land had some forestland linked to it. However, when the lower or easily accessible hills were slowly and gradually deforested or denuded, the agricultural land to whom these forests—or better called hills—were linked continued to have these hills and to that effect also what it contained, e.g. grass, brush trees. But they did not have a share in the still existing forests linked with the agricultural land of other villages. Therefore, with the deforestation of the hills, the agricultural lands to which these deforested hills were linked (and continue to be linked) possess no forests. This arrangement continued during the Swat State period, i.e. that forests, *banday* and alpine pastures were always linked to agricultural land (see Figure 1); and also in the post-State period.

[5] For detail about the *wesh* system, and the *dawtar* and *serai* lands, see Rome 2005, pp. 31-41; Rome 2008a, pp. 229-37.

Figure 1: The Principle of Land Ownership in Swat



Courtesy: Dr. Urs Geiser.

Each landowner did not necessarily have tenants because the small landowners or little shareholders cultivate all their land themselves. However, it has been so on the whole.

In Swat Kohistan Torwali tract too, the forests were owned by those belonging to that lineal group. Hence, the right to sell trees for export was vested in certain clans, e.g. Torwals, Narer, Drey Khel, and Mankials. The 'Gujars and other smaller communities' or in other words, those who had no share in the land had no share in the forest ownership and hence *'in the revenue accruing from the sale of trees'* (Khan 1926, p. 5). Nevertheless, every villager and also an outsider could collect minor forest produce such as mushrooms and medicinal herbs.

The same rules (or *riwaj)* were also applicable in other parts of Swat in the traditional society. Similarly, every villager had free access to the forests of the concerned village or locality for the purpose of grazing cattle and flock, for cutting timber for household purposes, for manufacturing agricultural implements, and for the provision of fuel and grass. Miangul Jahanzeb alias Wali Sahib also refers to the case in the discussion of land tenure and the *wesh* system. He states:

> *'The hill area was not allotted to* ***shareholders****, but was held jointly [by the shareholders]. So there was no value put on the forest –* ***every man could go***

> ***and cut a tree in his own tribe's forest'*** [emphasis author's] (Barth 1995, p. 70).

Just like the Swat Kohistan area, every villager and also an outsider could collect minor forest produce. The right to sell trees for export, however, was vested in certain clans namely those who held the proprietary rights in the land of the concerned villages or area or sub-tribe. So the Gujars and other communities and professionals, or in other words, those who possessed no share in the *dawtar,* held no ownership or proprietary rights in the forests and hence, no share in the revenue accruing from the sale of trees. However, as mentioned above, in some cases *serai* landowners also owned and held forests and hence had proprietary rights and share in the revenue or sale proceeds accruing from sale of those forests.

In *riwaj* (customary law), prior to the emergence of Swat State, all the community members were either right-holders or concessionaires in the concerned forests. The forests, however, were the property and ownership of the concerned landowners, and were not communal property.[6] There was no demarcation of the forests and non-forest lands.

Another thing directly related with the forests and having pivotal role in determining ownership of the concerned forests, were the *banday* or *bandahjat* (*bandahs*). Situated in the hills and the forests, the *bandahjat* are known by naming the season in which they are used or by the name of the local valley or locality in which they are situated. The *banday* too remained specified and divided on the basis of sub-tribes or sections or *qaums*. These have two types: *qalangi banday*[7] and *ghair qalangi banday.*[8] The Wali Sahib had also discussed the traditional rule and use of the *banday*. He wrote:

> *'Then there were also settlements in those hills and forests, called Banda, inhabited by Gujars and other hill tenants. They did not work in fields allotted to particular landowners, as did the tenants in the valley floor, on the irrigated or unirrigated land there. They paid kalang [qalang], that is rent; it was collected by the Malik or*

[6] Shoaib, M. 2003, pers. comm., 7 December.
[7] The *bandahs* that are given on rent.
[8] The *bandahs* used by the people concerned themselves.

> *Khan and divided among the landowners, in proportion to their shares. But the Malik had the right to fix the price of the kalang. Some did it honestly, and some took a little bribe from the Gujars, saying pay me this and I will give you a little bit of good land. In some parts, there were large populations of kalang-paying tenants under the Pakhtuns; other tribal sections had little such land'* (Barth 1995, p. 70).

SWAT STATE PERIOD

After coming into power, Miangul Abdul Wadud—ruler of Swat State, who ruled from 1917 till 1949 and who was commonly called and known as Bacha Sahib in Swat—gave attention to the forests and forestry sector. He took steps and initiatives that led towards some sort of planning and management of the forests and also embarked upon the policy to end private ownership of forests.

For this, he even violated and did away with the agreements he made with the tribes after their accession to the State or his occupation of their areas by him. For example, he entered into terms with the *jargahs* (here means consultative councils of the area) of the Torwali tract of Swat Kohistan, after the accession of the Chail Valley in 1921 and occupation of the other portions in 1923 in which, inter alia, he undertook that the State would not interfere in the ownership rights with respect to the forests and other properties of the people concerned. Therefore, when he urged that the forests might be under State control and its ownership also be held by the State, Masam Khan (the chief of Bahrain tract) repudiated his insistence by terming it repugnant to the agreement executed between both the sides, i.e. the ruler and the people concerned; and refused to comply to his whims and recognise the change and new arrangement. Upon this, the ruler resorted to his strategy and well-known technique and sought services of Pasand Khan of Satal Garhi. Pasand Khan acceded to his whims. Consequently, the ruler got control and ownership of the concerned forests. In return, beside other favours, the ruler awarded Pasand Khan the title of Khan Bahadar. It is, however, noteworthy that the Kohistanis later on shot dead Pasand Khan mainly on the explicit ground of the aforesaid conspiracy of acceding control and ownership of forests to the State.[9]

[9] Khan, S.S. 2003, pers. comm., 30 November.

The archival record and sources consulted are silent on the point when the Swat State ruler declared/made forests 'State property' with payment of 10% of the sales proceeds as royalty, as it is called, to the respective landowners or the former proprietors and also with the safeguards of their traditional rights. However, in his report written in 1925, Allah Yar Khan has frequently used the word 'proprietor' which refers to Swat State's ruler. Similarly, the Political Agent of the Agency of Dir, Swat and Chitral, has stated in his letter dated 2 November 1925: *'I enclose in duplicate copies of the report made by Khan Sahib Malik Allayar Khan, Forest Officer, deputed to examine* ***the forests of Swat owned by the Mian Gul*** *[the ruler]* [emphasis author's]' (Khan 1926, p. 35). While referring to a dispute between the Kohistanis and a firm—namely Dir Swat Forest Company—the Political Agent said: *'The Kohistan owners of the forests, before the Mian Gul established himself as ruler of the country'*; and *'the previous owners'* (Ibid., p. 37). Malik Allah Yar Khan, however, also has stated that *'the tribesmen who sold trees to traders during the past years,* ***still consider themselves to be the sole proprietors of most of the forests*** [emphasis author's]' (Ibid., p. 13).

Although the ruler declared/made forests State property and hence he, being the ruler, as the proprietor, the former owners/proprietors still considered themselves the rightful owners and proprietors. All this, however, leads to the conclusion that it was prior to 1926 that the ruler declared forests as State property liable to payment of 10% of the sale proceeds to respective landowners or former proprietors, and also with adequate safeguards for other traditional rights of the traditional right-holders and concessionaires and the special rights of the traditional proprietors.

The following statement of J.W. Thomson-Glover, Political Agent (PA), Dir, Swat and Chitral, however, leads the point of the payment of a portion of the sale proceeds to the former owners, by the ruler of Swat State, to another direction. While stating the ruler's strong support to Mian Musharraf Shah Kaka Khel in his forests' dealings in the Gawri tract, Thomson-Glover (1929) has written:

> *'From the start the Mian had received strong support from the Wali [Swat State ruler], as the Wali undoubtedly hoped to extend his influence over Kalam which had slipped from his grasp. The advantage is clear,* ***in his own State he claims all deodar as his property*** *[emphasis author's] and only pays the owner a meagre Rs.*

> *2/- and where the trees lie in an area occupied by Gujars as at Chukel, the Ruler takes the whole price.'*

The same is also evident from the statement of Allah Yar Khan, made in the Working Plan for the Upper Swat Valley forests (1928-31) in which he has stated:

> *'Deodar is declared to be the property of the State whether inside the demarcated forests or outside them. The price to be paid by the State to the former owners, if any, is Rs. 10/- per tree (24'' or more in diameter) cut and removed from forests for export. Deodar trees cut by the State for local building are not to be paid for'* (Khan n.d., p. 11).

The point of note in the statements is that at declaring the forests as State owned, the ruler at first paid to the former owners a share in the sale proceeds at a flat rate of Rs.2 or Rs. 10 per tree (or any other rate); that he paid no share in the sale proceeds in the extraction of the trees in the areas occupied by the Gujars; and that at first he claimed only deodar trees as the State's property.

This was so because in those days only deodar had market value and so was felled for income-generation or export purposes. The other types of trees had no such market value and therefore were cut only for minor or other local uses which as such were allowed to the people. As no fellings for income generation in other types of the forest trees were done, there was no need of their declaring or bringing them under State ownership. When these trees, other than deodar, achieved market value they were also declared or made subject to State ownership. It was not the limitation of the ruler to enforce full State control which compelled him to limit the State ownership only to the deodar, rather the value of the type of the trees which guided him.

One comes across no formal agreement over the point between the landowners and the ruler with respect to the ownership rights of the forests; and so to that effect there is no formal legal document that made the State's ownership claim over forests formal.

Nevertheless, Miangul Abdul Wadud (the Bacha Sahib) ruled mainly through verbal orders. This was also noted by a special correspondent of Daily Telegraph in the course of the Second World War[10] that he issued such orders verbally. The people, though still considered themselves as the rightful owners, acceded to his order/arrangements at least at face value by acceding to and accepting to receive a minor portion (at first a fixed sum per tree and later 10%) of the sales proceeds. This practice gives a sort of formal legal status to the State claim. It is, however, not clear when share of the former owners in the sales proceeds was fixed at the flat rate of 10% and when all the trees of the forests were declared the State property.[11]

Though the ownership of the forests was claimed by Miangul Abdul Wadud, the then ruler of Swat State, the people still considered themselves as the rightful owners. Thus, the question as to who were the rightful owners of the forests during Abdul Wadud's reign is somewhat difficult to answer.

The claim on the forests being State owned has also been made during the reign of Miangul Jahanzeb—who ruled from 1949 till 1969, and who is commonly called and known as Wali Sahib in Swat—in a memo in 1964 from the Chief Secretary, Swat State, to the Working Plan Officer (WPO) of the Swat State. [12] It contained answers to some queries made by the WPO, and it stated that the *'forests belong to the State'*. The concerned landowners have also been referred to as right-holders, to whom only a meagre portion, i.e. 10%, of the sales proceeds of the trees harvested was paid (Khan n.d., pp. 228-29).

This royalty was raised to 15% in 1969 before the merger of the State. It is noteworthy and of great significance that though the forests were subjected to the State, laws and decrees of the ruler, he paid a share of the sales proceeds to the concerned landowners and thus the traditional owners of the forests. This, in

[10] See Moore, n.d.

[11] It is worth mentioning that 10% of the sales proceeds of those trees were paid to the concerned landowners that were sold for harvest for export purpose only. Felling for local and the State uses were exempted. Moreover, the 10% of the sales proceeds, when paid by the State, was distributed by the concerned landowners according to *riwaj* of the area, which was not uniform throughout the State.

[12] Memorandum No. 247/J, dated Saidu Sharif, 8 February 1964, from the Chief Secretary, Swat State, to the Working Plan Officer, Swat Kalam Forests, Saidu Sharif, Swat State.

other words, means that the ruler recognised the ownership of the concerned landowners and shared their views by giving them a share in the sales proceeds—thereby accepting that the State was not the sole owner.

Moreover, a letter from Mashir-e-Maal (Revenue Adviser) to Wazir-e-Mulk (Minister of State) has stated that first names of 'the owners of the forest' (*da zangal da maalikaanu*) who have a right to the amount of *mundan* (stumps)[13] of the forest should be written down.[14] This means that the State still considered the forests to be the property of the concerned people—and not of the State itself; otherwise they would not have been mentioned as owners (*maalikaan*), but as concessionaires or right-holders, instead.

Notwithstanding this, the people themselves recognised the State as owner (or at least co-owner) of the forests in agreeing to receive only a meagre share of the sales proceeds as royalty. Otherwise they would have refused to receive such a meagre share and would have claimed the whole amount of the sales proceeds as was the case previously before the reign of Miangul Abdul Wadud. Consequently, the mentioned practice on the part of both the State and the people concerned gives some kind of formal legal status to the claims and viewpoints of both sides.

KALAM AREA

Before continuing further, a special reference to the Kalam area is required. The tract of Kalam, Ushu, and Utror is commonly called Kalam (this along with the Aryanai area is collectively also called Gawri tract). The Kalam area remained independent till 14 August 1947, having treaty relations with the British Government of India. The area, however, was occupied by Swat State at the time the British rule was going to end at midnight of 14-15 August 1947. The Government of Pakistan did not recognise this occupation. It pressed upon the Swati ruler to renounce his claim to the area. The issue rested when at last it was resolved by both sides upon signing an agreement on 12 February 1954 called 'Agreement Regarding Administration of Swat Kohistan (Tracts of Kalam, Ushu

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[13] As the State paid the sale proceeds of the forests on the basis of the number of trees sold and harvested, the stumps of the felled trees were counted and hence the sum paid to the right-holders was called *raqm-e-mundan* (stumps' amount).

[14] Mashir-e-Maal, Riyasat-e-Swat, 1968. A copy also available with the author.

and Utrot [Utror])'. Under this agreement, the Swati ruler recognised the Kalam tract as part of 'Tribal Areas' included in the federation of Pakistan and renounced his claim of owning it; and the Pakistan Government, on its part, appointed him as 'Agent' to the Government of Pakistan to be called 'Administrator' for administering the area on its behalf.[15] Interestingly, the people of the tract were neither consulted on the issue nor were made party to the agreement.

Ownership of the forests of the tract was vested solely in the people concerned before the occupation of the tract by Swat State in August 1947, and the whole sum accrued from the sale of the trees went to the people concerned and distributed among them per *riwaj* or the traditional law of the land.

With the occupation of the tract by the Swati ruler, the ownership of the forests was subjected to the same rule as had been introduced and in vogue in Swat State. But the Government of Pakistan did not recognise this and considered the concerned landowners to be 'the rightful owners' as is evident from a letter of the Deputy Secretary to the Local Administration in the Development Departments to the Political Agent at Malakand, which deals with the issue of the fellings in the forests of the tract under contract with the Swat State; and in which the Political Agent has been directed:

> *'The balance of the sale proceeds will have to be kept in a suspense account for distribution* ***to the rightful owners of the trees.*** *If the Sipah Salar has made some payment to the Wali as price of these trees he shall have to be compensated by recovery from the Wali of the sale proceed thus received by him'* [emphasis author's].[16]

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[15] For the 'Agreement Regarding Administration of Swat Kohistan (Tracts of Kalam, Ushu and Utrot [Utror])', see *TARC*, SN 32/Swat, FN 33/2-F.R.P., Vol. II, from 17 December 1929, Subject: Relations between Government and Swat Kohistan (Kalam area). For detail about the political status of Kalam or Gawri tract, and the wrangling for its possession by different aspirants, see Rome 2008a, pp. 123-25, 159; Rome 2005, pp. 77-98; Rome 2008b, pp. 102-108.

[16] Deputy Secretary to Local Administration in the Development Departments to PA, Malakand, No. 9370/41/47-DD, 13 October 1955, *TARC*, SN 60/Swat, FN 11/46-F.R.P., Vol. II, Subject: Unauthorised felling of trees from Kalam & Serai Forests.

The agreement of 12 February 1954 entered into between the Government of Pakistan and the Swati ruler is silent about the ownership of the forests. Technically speaking, the forests were now not the property of Swat State because the area was no longer part and parcel of it, but the proprietorship was not transferred from Swat State to the Government of Pakistan or provincial government. In connection with a request for clarification from the Finance Department, Government of West Pakistan, the Political Agent, Dir, Swat and Chitral, made it clear that '*the people of Kalam are defacto owners of the forest and for this reason no forest Act has been applied to this tract.*'[17] Similarly, another official report also stated in 1950s that *'at the time of disbursement'* of the sales proceeds among the Kalamis, *'the Government's right and firm intention of conserving the forests should be made clear to the "owners" so that it may not be construed as a recognition of unfettered private rights in the entire forest area.'*[18] Here too the people concerned are recognised as the 'owners'.

It is crystal clear that the ownership of the forests did not remain with Swat State after the agreement of 12 February 1954. So, the assertion that *'Forests in Kalam Kohistan belonged to State'* (Stucki and Khan n.d., p. 6), meaning Swat State, does not corroborate with the facts.

Nevertheless, the landowners concerned still received only 10%[19] of the sales proceeds of the trees harvested under commercial sales and the remaining 90% went into the Kalam exchequer, which was *'spent on the development of the area, cost of the administration and allowances to tribal elders.'*[20] In this way, the situation here too became analogous to that of Swat State areas discussed in the previous section 'Swat State Period' due to which the ownership or proprietorship became fifty-fifty.

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[17] PA, DSC, to Commissioner & Resident in Frontier Regions [henceforward CRFR], West Pakistan [henceforward WP], Peshawar, No. 3580-C/ST/7, 17 December 1959, *TARC*, SN 70/Swat, FN 1160-S.F.R. I, Subject: Budget Estimates of Kalam.

[18] A Note on the Illegal Fellings from Kalam Forests, *TARC*, SN 60/Swat, FN 11/46-F.R.P., Vol. II, Subject: Unauthorised felling of trees from Kalam & Serai Forests.

[19] See PA, DSC, to CRFR, WP, Peshawar, No. 3580-C/ST/7, 17 December 1959, *TARC*, SN 70/Swat, FN 1160-S.F.R. I, Subject: Budget Estimates of Kalam.

[20] *The North-West Frontier of Pakistan: Report on the Administration for the year 1953-54*, p. 13.

POST-SWAT STATE/PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT PERIOD

As stated above, Bacha Sahib, the then ruler of Swat State, declared forests to be State property, but without any formal or legal agreement with the traditional owners. Despite their deeming themselves to be the rightful owners, the concerned people acceded to the claim at its face value by accepting a meagre share of the sales proceeds. The same remained the status during the Wali Sahib's reign. But the State too acceded to the claim of the ownership of the people concerned by paying them a share of the sale proceeds as a royalty and by also providing them other rights as right-holders.

When the Swat State came to an end in 1969, the provincial government also behaved in the same manner. Initially, it maintained the status quo but later appointed a commission—named *Dir-Swat Land Disputes Enquiry Commission*—in October 1970.[21] This commission was required, inter alia, *'to enquire into and identify the nature and extent of the agrarian problem in Swat District with Special reference to the property disputes between (a) the Wali and the ousted claimant owner[s], and (b) the Land owner[s] and the tenants.'*[22] However, further terms of reference were added later to the commission's work,[23] which inter alia included the task of determining what was Swat State property and what was private property of the ex-Wali, viz. the Bacha Sahib.[24]

At the completion of the commission's work and upon approval of the report and its recommendations by President of Pakistan, two Martial Law Regulations (MLRs), i.e. MLR No. 122 and MLR No. 123 of 1972, were promulgated on 11 April 1972[25] for the report to be implemented.[26] MLR No. 122 of 1972 was meant

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[21] Notification No. 66/SO(Spl)HD/70 dated 8 October 1970.

[22] Working Paper on the Report of Swat Land Commission, *Files of the Governor's Secretariat, NWFP (now Khyber Pukhtunkhwa), at the Provincial Archives, Peshawar* [henceforward *GSNWFP*], Bundle No. [henceforward BN] 28, Serial No. [henceforward SN] 234, FN M-45, Subject: Dir, Swat, Chitral Dispute Enquiry Commission. See also 'Minutes of the meeting held in the Government House Peshawar on 11 August 1972 under the Chairmanship of the Governor, N.W.F.P., Peshawar.

[23] Notification No. OSD/SO/HD/70 dated 6 January 1971.

[24] See 'Working Paper on the Report of the Swat Land Commission', Ibid.

[25] For MLR No. 122 and No. 123 of 1972, see Khan 1979, pp. 128-30.

[26] Minutes of the meeting held in the Government House, Peshawar on 11 August 1972, under the Chairmanship of the Governor, NWFP, Peshawar, *GSNWFP*, BN 28, SN 234, FN M-45, Subject: Dir, Swat, Chitral Dispute Enquiry Commission.

for notifying by the provincial government that all the property held by the ex-ruler in his capacity as ruler was to devolve to the provincial government.[27] Therefore, the provincial government notified on 15 September 1972:

> *'In pursuance of clause (a) of paragraph 3 of the Devolution and Distribution of Property (Dir and Swat) Regulation (Martial Law Regulation No. 122) and on the basis of the recommendations of the Dir-Swat Land Disputes Enquiry Commission, and in accordance with the directions of the President, the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province is pleased to order that:-*
>
> *(a) the property specified in column 2 of the Schedule to this Order, and more particularly described in the file of the case specified in column 3 of the said Schedule, shall be the State property of the former State of Swat;*
>
> *(b) all Forests situated in the former State of Swat shall be the State property (subject to payment of fifteen per cent of their income as royalty to the local right holders).'*[28]

Moreover, serial No. 198 of the Schedule of the said notification also declared the forests the property of the former State; as it also stated there about the former State's property: '*All Forests and Minerals subject to payment of 15% of forest income to private owners.'*[29]

Therefore, the provincial government unilaterally declared that all forests in the former Swat State were its property on the basis of their being recognised as former Swat State property and did not seek agreement or consent from the people concerned.

A step further forward was made in 1975 when provisions of chapter IV of the Forest Act, 1927, were applied to the said forests and they were declared as Protected Forests.[30] Moreover, not only were all the trees therein declared as

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[27] See Khan 1979, p. 128.

[28] Notification, No. 10/16-SOTA-II/72-1521, dated 15 September 1972, Extraordinary, Government Gazette, Home Tribal Affairs & Local Government Department, Govt. of NWFP.

[29] Notification, No. 10/16-SOTA-II/72-1521, dated 15 September 1972, Extraordinary, Government Gazette, Home Tribal Affairs & Local Government Department, Govt. of NWFP SN 198 of the Schedule, Column 'State Property'.

[30] See Notification, No. SOFT(FAD)V-168/71(i), 20 December 1975, Agriculture Department, Govt. of NWFP, in Khan 1995, p. 132.

reserved, on the plea of section 30 of the said Act, but at the same time *'the quarrying of stone, the burning of lime or charcoal, or collection or subjection to any manufacturing process, or removal of any forest produce in any such forests and the breaking up or clearing for cultivation, for building, for herding cattle or for any other purpose, of any land in any such forests'* was prohibited, with immediate effect.[31] In this way, the rights and concessions of the right holders and concessionaires were further restricted.

On the other hand, the concerned landowners continued to regard the forests as their property (which also is endorsed by the fact that people established their own forest check posts in some areas later when they understood that the forests they considered their own property were being destroyed) but then accepted the provincial government's claim at least at face value by accepting a portion of the sales proceeds. The fact that the relevant landowners or right-holders' royalty on the sales proceeds is mentioned in the Notification No. 10/16-SOTA-II/72-1521, dated 15 September 1972, quoted above, does however strengthen the people's claim, for a 'royalty' is paid to the person(s), body or authority that is basically considered or acknowledged to be the real owner.

Besides, the North-West Frontier Province Management of Protected Forest Rules, 1975,[32] twice mentions—in sections 4 and 6—the people concerned as 'the owners' by stating: *'Free grant of trees for domestic needs may be made to the owners or right-holders…'*; and: *'For the grant of trees to non-residents, the Tehsildar will first obtain the concurrence of the Jirga of the owners or right obtain holders of the respective village...'*[33]

But when the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, was extended to the then Swat District and the land settlement process was started, it was required of the settlement staff, under section 39 sub-section (1) of the said Act, to prepare a record of rights for each estate, unless otherwise specified in the said chapter VI,

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[31] Notification, No. SOFT(FAD)V-168/71(ii), 22 December 1975, Agriculture Department, Govt. of NWFP, in Ibid., pp. 132-33.
[32] Issued as Notification No. SOFT(FAD)V-168/71(iii), dated 24 December 1975, of the Department of Agriculture, Government of NWFP.
[33] Notification, No. SOFT(FAD)V-168/71(iii), 24 December 1975, Agriculture Department, Govt. of NWFP, in ibid., pp. 124-25. See also in Niazi, 2005, p. 508.

which according to section 39 sub-section (2) was to include the following documents:

a) *'Statements showing, so far as may be practicable:-*
   i. *the persons who are land-owners, tenants or who are entitled to receive any of the rents, profits or produce of the estate or to occupy land therein;*
   ii. *the nature and extent of the interests of those persons, and the conditions and liabilities attaching thereto; and*
   iii. *the rent, land-revenue, rates, cesses or other payments, due from and to each of those persons and Government.*
b) *a statement of customs respecting rights and liabilities in the estate;*
c) *a map of the estate; and*
d) *such other documents as the Board of Revenue may with the previous approval of Government prescribe'* (Mahmood 2004, p. 112).

In this scenario, we come across statements by the people concerned, in the *Wajib-ul-Arzs* prepared under the said section 39 sub-section (2) that the rights and restrictions, etc., related to the forests and forestland of the Swat State time continued even after the merger of the State and that the provincial government issued different rules and regulations for the management of Protected Forests in the year 1975[34] in which inter alia the forests are written as property of the provincial government (protected forests) with the payment of 60% of the sales proceeds to the right-holders or the concerned landholders in the village, which they distribute according to *riwaj* of the relevant place.[35] However, the *Wajib-ul-Arzs* of *muzas* (estates) Sapal Bandai, Gul Bandai, and Marghuzar further states that the forests have been declared Protected Forests instead of the property of the provincial government.[36]

Such statements strengthen the provincial government's claim because the government has made no agreement with the people that would have binding force on them in this respect. But by recording such statements by the people in

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[34] Notification No. SOFT(FAD)5-168/71(iii), dated 24 December 1975.
[35] See *Wajib-ul-Arzs* of the *muzas*: Kukrai-Chitor, Islampur, Sapal Bandai, Gul Bandai, and Marghuzar of the Marghuzar Valley, and Muza Laikot, Swat Kohistan, at District Qanungu Office at Gulkada, Swat.
[36] Notification No. 276-78/1(32)DC/A-II, dated 20 February 1981.

the *Wajib-ul-Arzs*, the Revenue Department has bound them to abide by this. This is also evident from the following extract.

> *'Entries in the Wajib-ul-Arz may be of two kinds. They may be statements of local customer [sic, custom or] usage or they may be recitals of agreements. As statements of local custom or usage they are strong evidence of the existence of such custom or usage but they have only an evidentiary value. Agreements incorporated in the Wajib-ul-Arz are, however, binding but only on the parties to the agreements, and even in such cases it is open to a party to prove that in fact no such agreement was entered into though the task would be difficult. [PLD 1954 Lah. 356]* ***All entries in the Wajib-ul-Arz, though rebuttable are presumed to be correct unless the contrary is proved*** *[emphasis author's]. [AIR 1930 Lah. 159] However, entries in the Wajib-ul-Arz are generally not valid beyond the settlement for which they are made'* [*PLD 1950 Pb. (Rev) 1156*] (Mahmood 2004, p. 251).

Further provisions of section 52 of the said Act are:

> *'Any entry made in the record-of-rights in accordance with the law for the time being in force, or in a periodical record in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter and the rules made thereunder,* ***shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted thereof'*** [emphasis author's] (Ibid., p. 245).

Mohammad Raashid, however, has faithfully recorded: '*the local people are not fully reconciled to the ownership of the forests by the Government*' (Raashid 1999, p. 19) because in fact they still consider themselves to be the bona fide owners despite having on the face of it agreed to the government's claim and laws. The assertion that the local people still regard themselves as the rightful owners of the forests, is further supported by the fact that the Mians of the Lalku area of Matta Tahsil, i.e. the concerned landowners or the owners of the forests as they deem themselves, of their own initiative *'barred the non-local users coming from the down stream villages from collecting medicinal plants and herbs'* (Khan 2005, p. 7).

An important aspect of the North-West Frontier Province Forest Ordinance, 2002, which was also extended to Swat District, is that it too had declared the forests as the provincial government property. Instead of using the term royalty of the sales proceeds, which give a clue to the ownership by the people, the word 'seigniorage fee' has been used, which has been defined as under:

> *'"seigniorage fee" means a reciprocal fee payable by Government to right holders for trees harvested for sale from reserved forests, of one or other of the kind, entered in the seigniorage (fee) list and similar fee payable by right holders to Government for trees harvested from guzara forests and protected wasteland for sale declared so under section 36 of this Ordinance and in areas wherever there are reserved forests.'*[37]

The concerned people have not only been clearly mentioned right-holders in the aforementioned sub-section, but also under sub-section 34 of section 2 by stating:

> *'"right holder" means a person* ***who does not have proprietary rights over forest*** *[emphasis author's] but has rights or privileges over reserved forests, protected forests, wasteland as per record of rights admitted at the time of settlement or subsequently admitted as right holder by Government.'*[38]

In section 5(1) of the North-West Frontier Province Protected Forest Management Rules, 2005, the concerned people (or owners, as they claim and consider themselves), are mentioned as right-holders; but in section 2(2) they have been referred to as 'concessionists'.[39]

All the aforementioned are significant and gradual steps towards eradicating the idea that the people concerned own the forests or that they are the owners.

The people concerned, however, in fact have not recognised this, which is evident not only from the preceding pages but also from the fact that the people of Qalagay (in Tahsil Kabal or Nikpi Khel tract) have cut and sold most of the forest of their area. Similarly, the people of Manarai (in Tahsil Kabal or Nikpi

[37] Section 2(41), Notification, No. Legis: 1(6)/99-II/4525, dated 10 June 2002, The North-West Frontier Province Forest Ordinance, 2002 (NWFP Ordinance No. XIX of 2002), Extraordinary, Government Gazette, Law Department, Govt. of NWFP.
[38] Section 2(34), ibid.
[39] See Notification, *No. SO(Tech)ED/V-105/2004/Vol:VII*, dated Peshawar 23 April 2005, Environment Department, Govt. of NWFP.

Khel tract), who previously on their own banned cutting the forest of their area, sold most of the forest trees being their owners to contractors during the upheaval of 2007–2009, and hence were cut by the contractors and the timber smuggled.

There are also ownership disputes between the people of Swat and Dir in some forests of the present day Matta Forest Range of the Swat Forest Division (Raashid 1999, p. 9), which also testify to the people's concerned claim of being owners of the forests.

Significantly, in the post-Swat State period, the people of Kalam have overtly '*shown resistance to accept the ownership of Provincial Government over the Forest land*' (Stucki and Khan n.d., p. 11). And it was mainly due to their refusal to concede to provincial government's claim of ownership of the forests that they boycotted the land settlement. G.M. Khattak too has noted the point by stating:

> '*The more politically conscious among the people also see the Forest Department's desire to plant up the forest openings as a bid to strengthen Government control over the forests, and to augment Government's claim to their ownership –* ***a claim which the local people contest, as they consider all land – cultivated, forest, grazing – situated in their tribal jurisdiction, to be their property***' [emphasis author's] (Khattak n.d., p. 16).

As stated earlier, the Kalam tract did not remain part of Swat State—due to the agreement concluded between the Swat State ruler and Government of Pakistan on 12 February 1954, without taking the people of the tract on board or making them a part to it—the forests of the tract, therefore, did not become property of the provincial government on the basis of Notification No. 10/16-SOTA-II/72-1521, dated 15 September 1972, because the said notification was issued in pursuance of MLR No. 122 of 1972. This MLR was only to determine which property in the former Swat State belonged to the ruler personally and which to the State—so as to devolve its proprietorship to the provincial government. To make the position easy to understand, MLR No. 122 of 1972 states:

> '*3. The Provincial Government, on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission [namely Dir-Swat Land Disputes Enquiry Commission], and subject to*

any directive given by the President shall, by order notified in the official Gazette, determine—

- *(a)* ***what property is State Property of the former State of Dir or Swat respectively*** *[emphasis author's];*
- *(b) what property is private or personal property of the late Nawab Sir Shahjehan Khan, ex-Ruler of the former State of Dir, and the late Sir Abdur [sic, Abdul] Wadud Mian Gul Sahibzada [sic, Shahzada], K.B.E., Badshah Sahib of the former State of Swat respectively;*
- *(c) the respective shares of the various heirs of the aforesaid two Ex-Rulers in their personal or private property.*

4. On the issue of an order under paragraph 3—

- *(a)* ***the State property shall vest and shall be deemed to have vested in the Provincial Government on and from the coming into force of the Regulation*** *[emphasis author's]; and*
- *(b) the Private or personal property of the two Ex-Rulers referred to in paragraph 3 shall devolve upon and be distributed among their respective heirs in accordance with the said Order.'*[40]

Whereas, Notification No. 10/16-SOTA-II/72-1521, dated 15 September 1972, on itself states:

- *(a) the property specified in column 2 of the Schedule to this Order, and more particularly described in the file of the case specified in column 3 of the said Schedule, shall be the State property of the former State of Swat;*
- *(b) all Forests situated in the former State of Swat shall be the State property (subject to payment of fifteen percent of their income as royalty to the local right holders).'*[41]

It is, therefore, clear[42]that determining the State and to that effect the provincial government's proprietorship was concerned only with the Swat State areas, and not the Kalam tract. Hence article (b) of the said notification did not apply to the

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[40] Regulation No. 122, 11 April 1972, in Khan 1979, p. 128.

[41] Notification, No. 10/16-SOTA-II/72-1521, dated 15 September 1972, Extraordinary, Government Gazette, Home, Tribal Affairs & Local Government Department, Govt. of NWFP.

[42] From both MLR No. 122 of 1972 (dated 11 April 1972) and Notification No. 10/16-SOTA-II/72-1521 (dated 15 September 1972).

Kalam tract. And as no separate notification under the relevant clauses of the Constitution (and in accordance with the steps required thereby) has been issued with respect to the provincial government's ownership of the Kalam tract, the claim that the said forests were the property of the provincial government has no legal basis.

CONCLUSION

The forests of the present-day Swat District area were not communal property, but their ownership was traditionally held by the concerned *dawtar* landowners and in various cases also by the *serai* landowners, and hence the right to sell the trees and divide the sum accrued among themselves according to the *riwaj* of the tract.

The ownership of the forests was claimed by Swat State, but there were no written laws or regulations to back this up. Even the term forest was not clearly defined, and was generally used for *'all lands having tree growth'* (Khan n.d., p. 11). Though the forests were declared or at least claimed as the Swat State property, the people concerned still considered themselves to be the owners, despite receiving a minor portion of the sales proceeds from the trees that were harvested for commercial purpose, but at instances they have been mentioned in the Swat State documents as the owners.

In the post-Swat State period, the provincial government unilaterally declared the forests their own. This was followed by a number of steps, detailed above, to consolidate the provincial government claim, including the North-West Frontier Province Forest Ordinance, 2002 and the North-West Frontier Province Protected Forest Management Rules, 2005. However, the people concerned have not reconciled with this position, detailed above, and stuck to their stand of being the owners, which they exercise on occasions by selling the forests to contractors for harvesting, when they find a chance. Therefore, the crucial point is to decide clearly, and settle the issue once and for all, who the owner is: the provincial government or the landowners concerned?

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Innovative Interventions in Nepal for Implementing REDD+ at the Community Level

Bhaskar Singh Karky*, Seema Karki**, Eak B. Rana***and Rajan Kotru****

ABSTRACT

It is now well established that a major source of the world's greenhouse gas emissions is related to deforestation and forest degradation. In Nepal, the deforestation that occurred between the 1950s and 1970s can mainly be attributed to the failure on part of the state to control deforestation and consequently, the perceived Himalayan environmental degradation emerged as a major concern by the mid 1970s (Karky 2008). Community participation in managing and conserving forests to recuperate and restore degraded hills is now being widely promoted and accepted by the government. An incentive based mechanism, i.e. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), is being discussed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to recognise the role of local communities in conserving forests. This paper discusses five major innovative interventions in community forests of three watersheds in Nepal through a REDD+ pilot project. They are: a) community based monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV); b) creating forest carbon additionality and permanence; c) establishment of Forest Carbon Trust Fund; d) distribution of REDD+ payment to local communities; and e) initiation of institutional and biophysical bundling.

It further discusses how under the UNFCCC REDD+ policy, countries will be paid at the national level on an output or performance basis compared to an

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agreed national forest emissions reference scenario (baseline). Since the South Asian region shares similar types of forest ecosystem, culture and gender based issues, learnings from Nepal's pilot project based on community forestry/participatory forest management can be useful to upscale/replicate and out-scale the learnings made so far.

INTRODUCTION

Globally it is now realised that past regulatory instruments alone have not been effective in halting deforestation and forest degradation (Karky 2008). However, countries like India and China are exceptions. Now, a new paradigm in natural resources management is emerging which is based on an economic incentive mechanism to reward conservation and good management practices. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) is an incentive based mechanism which is being discussed under the aegis of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in an effort to reduce concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. In recent UNFCCC discussions, REDD has been expanded to REDD+ with the inclusion of a wider range of forest-related activities/services to previously proposed, which allows REDD+ to recognise roles of participatory forest management regimes in promoting sustainable forest management (e.g. community forestry, joint forest management, collaborative forest management) enabling local communities to access financial mechanisms provided by the climate regime, at least in theory.

REDD/REDD+ in principle is about a win-win situation where local communities who manage forests are also regarded as custodians and are eligible to receive economic incentive for the ecosystem services they generate by sequestrating carbon and maintaining the carbon stock on terrestrial ecosystem (Danielsen et al. 2011; Skutsch 2011). The global community benefits mainly from reduced concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO_2). However, implementing this incentive based mechanism to manage forest resources at the local level (while mutual benefits for climate and community occur) requires innovative interventions and strategies. This paper discusses the innovative interventions required for REDD+ implementation based on lessons drawn from a pilot project in Nepal.

The aim of this paper is to draw lessons and experiences on REDD+ governance and share learnings that can be applied by policy/decision makers and planners/practitioners, and to develop capacity-building systems that can be used to implement REDD+ at the national level based on the sub-national pilot project learning and outcomes. The following section will discuss various innovative interventions for implementing REDD+ at the local level.

COMMUNITY FORESTRY IN NEPAL: ENABLING CONDITION FOR REDD

To understand the implications of community driven REDD in Nepal, a concept promoted by this paper, it is essential to learn how community forestry as a mainstreamed forest sector policy emerged in the country. Due to more than three decades of history and experience of community forestry policy and practices, grassroots level institutions are functional in managing their community forests. This has created an enabling environment to promote REDD at the community level as existing local level community based institutions participated in REDD. This was a unique opportunity for REDD in Nepal where the forestry policy is devolved. Box 1 describes the evolution of the community forestry policy in Nepal.

Development of Community Forestry Policy in Nepal

In Nepal, the concept of Community Forest Management (CFM) emerged in response to the deteriorating condition of the state controlled forests in the late 1970s. Nepal's forestry sector has undergone a paradigm shift that reflects devolution of forest resources from state control to community control (Gilmour and Fisher 1991; Hobley 1996). Hobley (1996: pp.65-92) refers to the phases in this shifting paradigm as Privatisation, Nationalisation and Populism. The development of CFM policy and its implementation were shaped by internal and external developments with support from the international donor community.

Within Nepal, the political developments and administrative changes of the period paved way for various policies that were subsequently refined enabling implementation of community forestry as we find today. The loss of forested land from 1950s to the 1970s reflected failure on part of the state to control deforestation and consequently the perceived Himalayan environmental degradation emerged as a major concern by the mid 1970s. For example, Ives (2006) shows how deforestation in the 1970s led to the theory of Himalayan Environmental Degradation, and the belief that there would not be trees left in the Himalaya by the year 2000. Policies promoting community forestry were promulgated in National Forestry Plan-1976, Panchayat Forest Regulation and Panchayat Protected Forest Regulation-1978, Forest Act-1993 and Forest Regulation-1995. Additional administrative policy like the Decentralization Act-1992 further facilitated in implementing community forests at village levels.

These policy shifts that increasingly relied on people's participation in management and conservation of forests were possible with restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1990 which removed the bottleneck for such participative policies that were people-centred.

At the international level, in 1960s, development started to embrace a new 'bottom-up' approach (Chambers 1983) since the effectiveness of top-down approach was in question as it failed to address the concerns of poor people. This new development concept was characterised by giving more importance to enhancing rural livelihoods and rural environment over monetary income (Gilmour and Fisher 1991). In parallel to this changing development perspective, another type of global thinking was emerging: the neo-liberal economic ideals of the 80s forming over arching economic development paradigm of that period. The expansion of CFM in Nepal Himalaya by mid 90s reflects an attempt to correct the market failure by delegating usufruct rights to local communities and it also fits rather well with the neo-liberal school of thought in terms of operationalising the 'User Pays Principle' (UPP) (Pearson 2000, p. 285). Community forestry (CF) is about giving usufruct rights of state owned commons to the locals who subsequently derive benefits from the commons by managing them and protecting the forest. Under state management, CF was prone to 'the tragedy of the open access' (Ostrom 1990); anyone and everyone had unlimited access any time because the state owned the resource. This was turned around by implementing CFM. Usufruct rights were spelled out on the commons (Gilmour and Fisher 1991; Hobley 1996) and deforestation rates were considerably reduced, particularly in the hills (Acharya and Sharma 2004; Banskota 2000). At present 1.1 million ha, or about one quarter of the country's forest (Kanel 2004) is being managed by communities with 93 percent of this in the hills and 7 percent in the Terai (plain areas) (Springate-Baginski et al., 2007, p. 47).

Handing over forests to communities for management has over time improved the forest condition (Malla 1997) with positive impact on biodiversity conservation (Jackson and Ingles 1994) and increased production of firewood, timber, fodder, forest litter and grass to assist in improving subsistence livelihood (Kanel 2004; Acharya and Sharma 2004). The same has also been acknowledged by Banskota (2000) who states numerous degrading ecosystems have improved due to decentralized and participatory development strategies.

The impact of this policy in the forestry sector has undoubtedly been positive in reducing deforestation and forest degradation in Nepal Himalaya. Although, as noted, community forestry is carried out in only about a quarter of the country's forests, national deforestation trend has been reduced from -1.90 percent per annum between 1990 to 2000 to -1.35 percent between 2000 and 2005 according to the FAO (2005) data which coincides with the rapid expansion of CFM (Karky 2008).

PILOT PROJECT IN NEPAL HIMALAYA AND INNOVATIVE INTERVENTIONS AT COMMUNITY LEVEL

Nepal is one of the first developing countries to adopt community forest management conferring authority to local communities to manage forest resources as forest user groups of an autonomous institution. Giving management authority to user groups ensures that the communities benefit from the use of forest products, build local level capacity for self-governance, and increases understanding of democratic principles (Pokharel 2011). Aiming to design and setting up a governance and payment system for Nepal's community forest management under REDD+, International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) in partnership with Federation of Community Forestry Users', Nepal (FECOFUN), and Asia Network for Sustainable Agriculture and Bio-resources (ANSAB), is working on piloting[1] REDD+ in three watersheds (Charanawati in Dolakha, Kayarkhola in Chitwan and Ludikhola in Gorkha) of Nepal as shown in Figure 1.

[1]The REDD Pilot project is financed by the Norwegian Agency for Development and Cooperation (NORAD) under Climate and Forest Initiatives. ICIMOD is implementing this project (2009-2013) through its national partners in Nepal – the Federation of Community Forestry Users, Nepal (FECOFUN) and the Asia Network for Sustainable Agriculture and Bio-resources (ANSAB).

Figure 1: Map showing Three Watershed Sites from Three Geographic Regions of Nepal



Source: ICIMOD 2011.

The watershed area ranging from 245m – 3549m covering over 10,000 ha of Community Forest (Table 2), is managed by 105 community forest user groups (CFUGs) of around 90,000 diverse population such as Indigenous People (IPs) [2], *Dalit*[3], Brahmin and Chhetri (Table 1a and b).

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[2]Indigenous people are those ethnic groups or communities who have their own mother tongue and traditional customs, distinct cultural identity, social structure and written or oral history of their own as defined in the National Foundation for Development of Indigenous Nationalities Act-2002.

[3]Dalits are defined by the National *Dalit* Commission 2002 as '*those communities who by virtue of atrocities of caste-based discrimination and un-touchability, are the most backward in social, economic, educational, political and religious fields, and are deprived of human dignity and social justice.*'

Table 1a: Socio-Demographic Information of CFUGs within Three Watersheds

Name of the Watersheds (District)	No. of CFUGs	No. of CFUGs Households	Population	Major ethnic groups in the project sites
Charanawati (Dolakha)	58	7870	42609	Tamang, Chhetri, Brahmin, Thami, Dalit
Kayarkhola (Chitwan)	16	4146	23223	Chepang, Tamang and Brahmin/Chhetri
Ludikhola (Gorkha)	31	4110	23685	Magar, Gurung, Tamang, Dalit, Brahmin and Chhetri
Total	105	16126	89517	

Source: ICIMOD 2010.

Table 1b: Physiographic Information of Three Watersheds in the Project Site

Name of the Watersheds (district)	No. of VDCs and Municipality within the watersheds	Watershed Elevation Range (masl)	Total Watershed Area (ha)	Total Community Forests (CF) Area and (ha)
Charanawati (Dolakha)	5 VDCs and 1 Municipality	835-3549	14,037	5,996.17
Kayarkhola (Chitwan)	4 VDCs (Among 4 VDCs, one VDC has CF users only)	245-1944	8,002	2,381.96
Ludikhola (Gorkha)	4 VDCs and 1 Municipality	318-1714	5,750	1,888.00
	13 VDCs and 2 Municipalities		27,789	10,266

Source: ICIMOD 2010.

Based on the variance of forest status by pilot forest inventory, the project has established a total of 572 permanent sample plots[4] in community forests with the help of Remote Sensing based technology and Geographic Information System (GIS) based mapping to carry out regular forest carbon monitoring. Forest Carbon Measurement Guidelines were developed and local communities are trained extensively in order to measure their forest carbon within their forested area (www.communityredd.net). Looking into three sites and different strata,

[4]A circular plot of 250 sq.m (permanent sample) was established in the forest to measure the forest carbon stocks in four carbon pools such as above ground carbon (tree and sapling), below ground (root carbon), leaf litter and soil carbon.

there has been total incremental stock of 100,500 metric tonnes of carbon dioxide in the community forests of three watersheds over the baseline year (Table 2). The incremental forest carbon stock (above ground, below ground, leaf, litter and soil carbon) not only shows the amount of atmospheric carbon sequestration, but also illustrates biodiversity richness in that particular area through forest regeneration and enhancement. The project sites have 16 floral species (Seebauer and Zomer unpublished, 2010); this natural forest forms an important corridor-connectivity and habitat for biodiversity conservation outside of protected areas.

Table 2. Total Average Carbon Stock in Two Consecutive Years (2010 and 2011)

Name of Watershed	Total Community Forest (CF) Area (ha)	Strata wise CF Area (ha)	Strata	Total Average Carbon (C) stock in 2010 (tonnes)	Total Average Carbon (C) stock in 2011 (tonnes)	Differential Carbon (C) Stock in 2011 in tonnes	Incremental Carbon dioxide (CO_2 in tonnes)
Charanawati	5996	3899	Dense	891222	902090	10868	39887
		2097	Sparse	349672	352870	3198	11737
Kayarkhola	2382	1902	Dense	564040	567010	2970	10901
		479	Sparse	123006	123338	332	1220
Ludikhola	1888	1634	Dense	353501	362514	9012	33076
		252	Sparse	41217	42226	1009	3704
Total	10266			2322659	2350051	27391	100527

Source: ICIMOD 2010 and ICIMOD 2011.

1. Community based MRV

The project is facilitating sub-national level monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system for implementing REDD+. The project has developed Forest Carbon Stock Measurement guidelines based on IPCC 2006. Using this guideline, communities are trained and involved in monitoring and measuring forest carbon which is one of the activities under MRV. In future, a project is coming up with MRV framework focusing on inclusive participatory approach for *Dalits*, IPs, women and poor households.

2. Creating Forest Carbon Additionality and Permanence

Meeting the additionality requirement of REDD is the first and foremost criterion for meeting REDD+ standards/requirements. Additionality needs to be proven by real emission reduction or real enhancement of forest carbon as a result of the project activity. Community forestry is already being promoted at the national level for three decades in Nepal. Forested areas are being handed to local communities since then and granted usufruct rights. Many degraded landscapes have been rejuvenated after communities imposed management regimes allowing natural regeneration. In this scenario, establishing evidence for additionality is a challenge.

Mountain dwellers are not only the managers, but are also largely forest dependent for livelihood options. Project data indicated that over 70 percent of forest users depend on forest biomass based household energy as a source in project sites (ICIMOD 2010). REDD+ must take cognizance of this; and, must recognise and allow local communities to extract forest resources in a sustainable manner to meet subsistence requirements otherwise REDD+ payment will not provide the intended incentive (Karky and Skutsch 2010). Recognising this, the project has introduced alternative energy technologies such as biogas and improved cooking stoves (Table 3) to reduce pressure on the forests. Similarly, there has been enrichment plantation of native and culturally valuable tree seedlings in community and private forest land within the three watersheds (Table 4). Trees on farms intended to meet demands from the forests will eventually reduce pressures on them. The project has also identified major incidences of forest fires that affect forest carbon permanencies and have adopted an improved grazing and forest fire management system to stimulate natural forest regeneration as well as avoiding forest damage. Regular and enhanced monitoring of illegal felling, forest fires are undertaken by REDD Network to reduce risks of leakage.

Table 3. Alternative Renewal Energy Technologies (ARET) Installed Households in Three Watersheds in 2010-2011

Watersheds	Type of ARET	No. of households installing ARET			Total no. of ARET installed
		Dalit	Indigenous People	Others	
Charanawati	Improved Cooking Stoves	23	150	71	244
	Bio-gas	7	6	17	30
Kayarkhola	Improved Cooking Stoves	53	10	12	75
	Bio-gas	38	5	22	65
Ludhikhola	Improved Cooking Stoves	38	70	42	150
	Bio-gas	7	15	5	27
Total	Improved Cooking Stoves	114	230	125	469
	Bio-gas	52	26	44	122

Source: ICIMOD 2011.

Table 4. Enrichment Plantation in Three Watersheds (June 2010)

Categories	Ludikhola Watershed			Charanawati Watershed			Kayarkhola Watershed			Total		
	Private forest	CF	Total	Private forest	CF	Total	Private forest	CF	Total	Private Forest	CF	Total
Plantation area (Ha)	0	4.6	4.6	4.6	34.3	38.8	3	11	14	7.6	49.9	57.4
# of seedlings planted	0	7400	7400	7290	54835	62125	5017	17609	22626	12307	79844	92151
Planted key tree species	Lapsi (*Choerospondias axillaris*); Lakuri (*Fraxinus floribunda*); Bakaino (*Melia azedarach*); Epil Epil (*Leucaena leucocephala*)			Champ(*Michelia champaca*); Phalant (*Quercus oxydon*) ; Salla (*Pinus spp*) ; Loth Salla (*Taxus baccata*)			Bakaino (*Melia azedrach*) ; Kapoor (*Cinnamomum camphora*) ; Bamboo (*Dendrocalamus strictus*), Khamari (*Holoptelea integrifolia*) ; Champ (*Michelia champaca*)					
Survival rate (% survived)	NA	60	60	60	50	51.3	55	50	51			54.1

Source: ICIMOD 2011.

3. Establishment of Forest Carbon Trust Fund

A third innovative aspect of this pilot project is the establishment of a Forest Carbon Trust Fund (FCTF). A pilot FCTF mechanism was developed through a multi stakeholder interaction, consultation and feedback process at the national and local level. It was designed to regulate REDD+ seed grant to local communities for recognising their efforts for conserving forests. Operational guidelines of FCTF feature the structures, system and standards to run REDD+ payment from central trust fund to local forest groups.

Learning from the operationalisation of the trust fund will provide an opportunity to see *'how governance systems can be adapted to implement performance-based REDD+ at local level within a community forestry setting'* (CCMIN 2011) and what social and environmental safeguards are essential to address equity and sustainability issues. This will promote a new paradigm in forest management policy that entails benefit sharing on a *'performance-based financial incentive to local communities in recognition of their efforts to conserve forest and prevent deforestation'* (Ibid.). The fund is administratively run by central and district level trust fund advisory committees represented by multi-stakeholders like government, civil societies and private sector (Figure 2). Project management unit at central level and watershed REDD Network are fund management entities which facilitate payment as per decisions made by the advisory committee. On the other hand, two technical entities such as verification and monitoring committee perform to validate and verify data, process and standards required for advisory committee to make payment decisions. Communities assess forest carbon increment and claim for payment. This is a bottom-up approach responsible for monitoring and regulating forest management activities, validating carbon stock data from the community, and paying claims based upon incremental forest carbon stock.

Figure 2: Forest Carbon Trust Fund Management Structure and their Functions



Source: ICIMOD 2011.

4. Distribution of REDD+ Payment to Local Communities

In the global debate on REDD+, concerns have been raised as regards respecting and ensuring rights of indigenous peoples and local communities when REDD+ payments are made. Equity issues between the wealthier and marginal farmers, men and women are also of great concern when the benefit from REDD+ is distributed. The fourth innovation is the distribution of REDD+ payment based on criteria defined in FCTF guidelines to regulate seed grants for establishing economic incentives for forest management and conservation. This payment mechanism is performance based which takes into account social and environmental equity issues in benefit sharing.

The essence of REDD+ is to incentivise performance based forest management, so payment should be quantitatively related to carbon stock enhancement resulting from communities' sustainable management practices. Areas of community forests do not correspond to household sizes or population in project sites; forests are not distributed equitably, and thus carbon growth and the potential for economic benefits from this are unequal. In the three pilot sites, the area of forest per participating household ranges from 0.5 to 0.8 ha/households (ratio of CF area to households) and in other areas the differences might be greater. However, the ecological, climatic variations and age of the forests with diverse growth rate of tree species may result in differences in biomass enhancement within the study areas, even with similar levels of labour input.

In order to address these equity related concerns in community forestry, the REDD+ pilot project in Nepal has been considering a system by which payment is made to local communities (Table 5) considering quantity of forest carbon pool, forest carbon saved above the baseline, the number of households of indigenous peoples and *Dalit*, population of women and number of poor households within the project area.

Table 5. Payment (in US$) to Watersheds based on Payment Criteria

Watershed (District)	**Payment for Forest Carbon Stock in baseline year 2010**	**Payment for Forest Carbon increment (2011-2010)**	**Payment based on Indigenous Peoples' (IPs) HHs**	**Payment based on number of Dalit Households**	**Payment based on Female population**	**Payment based on Poor house-holds**	**Total payable (USD)**
Charanawati (Dolakha)	10928	7286	4553	6830	6830	9107	**45535**
Kayarkhola (Chitwan)	5257	3505	2190	3286	3286	4381	**21905**
Ludikhola (Gorkha)	6614	4410	2756	4134	4134	5512	**27560**
Total	**22800**	**15200**	**9500**	**14250**	**14250**	**19000**	**95000**

Source: ICIMOD 2011.

The percentage of weightage given to each of the six attributes that forms part of REDD payment criteria is shown below and the corresponding payment received in each watershed based on the six criteria is shown in Table 5 (in US$).

Payment = f [forest carbon stock (24%) + forest carbon increment (16%)+ number of households of indigenous people (10%) + number of households of Dalit (15%) + population of women (15%) + population of poor households (20%)

Each CFUG would categorise its households into different strata by participatory well-being ranking with a set of social and economic standard indicators. The CFUG would forward information on household status, men/women ratio and data on indigenous peoples along with forest carbon data to the Watershed REDD Network, a sub-national institution, which is the implementing body for the project. The Watershed REDD Network compiles and makes claims for payment to the multi-stakeholder board at the central level. Based on the review and recommendation of the national technical committee, the committee in charge of funding disburses the payment to the Watershed REDD Network. The fund advisory committee at watershed level follows a similar process while distributing the fund to individual CFUG. The REDD+ payment reaches individual CFUG within the project area, which would be allowed to decide how to invest their money within the guidelines adhered for its utilisation. In principle, REDD+ funds should be expended following a consensual plan, and should be limited to REDD+ activities, forest carbon inventory, capacity building of women, *Dalits* and IPs, and livelihood improvement and social inclusion activities. REDD+ fund utilisation activities are aligned with the Forest Operational Plans (FoP) endorsed together by the District Forest Office (DFO) and CFUGs. FCTF is fully functional now and communities have formulated fund utilisation activities focusing on environmental and social safeguards as given in Box 1.

Box 1: REDD+ Fund Utilisation

- Activities that reduce deforestation
- Activities that contribute to reduce forest degradation (with the use of alternative energy technologies)
- Activities related to conservation of forest carbon stocks
- Sustainable management of forest and biodiversity conservation (as indicated by UNFCCC)
- Activities that enhance forest carbon stocks
- Poverty reduction/livelihood improvement activities
- Forest carbon monitoring
- Awareness raising and capacity building on REDD and climate change
- Auditing of FCTF and verification of carbon data.

Source: ICIMOD 2011.

5. Initiation of Institutional and Biophysical Bundling

Community forestry system was evolved in Nepal to address local demands and issues of deforestation and forest degradation. Under this policy, any accessible and manageable national forest land is handed over to local communities in the form of a forest user group. Legally, each CFUG is an autonomous and self governing institution despite forest area and number of households involved. In this way, micro management practices prevail in the CF system which is guided by two formal documents i.e. forest operational plan and group constitution. The project facilitated institutional bundling of scattered CFUGs by forming a single network representing all CFUGs within the watersheds which deals as a monitoring and learning centre and also for conflict resolution.

REDD Network is a platform where CFUGs gather and discuss issues of REDD+ which demonstrates an efficient approach for dealing with inter CFUGs leakage and non-permanence forest activities. Additionally, roles of CFUGs are discussed and plans are made during their monthly meetings thereby developing common understanding and ownership of outcomes.

DISCUSSION

Under the UNFCCC REDD+ policy, countries will be paid at the national level on an output or performance basis compared to an agreed national forest emissions reference scenario (baseline). Whether this includes only above ground carbon or also below ground vegetation and soil carbon is still to be decided by UNFCCC, but what is clear is that payments will be strictly output related (i.e. per tonne carbon of reduced emissions or increased sequestration). This is typically also the principle used in most projects in the Voluntary Carbon Sector. It is used because carbon is being treated as a tradable commodity and because the payment system is transparent and intended to provide direct incentives to promote forest management, maximizing carbon savings. The main difference between REDD+ and earlier approaches to forest management in the Voluntary Carbon Market is that UNFCCC policy envisages sector-wide programmes at national level, such that only the overall carbon savings are rewarded; if a country loses carbon in one part but gains in another, it is only the overall positive balance that is rewarded. This means that at least within the country there is no leakage possible. This is quite different from e.g. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) forestry projects and those in the Voluntary Carbon Standards (VCS), which are rewarded on their own individual gains, although a certain amount of leakage is usually deducted.

Under a national REDD+ programme, the government will be free to make payments to its own stakeholders/forest managers in whatever manner it thinks most appropriate (or not at all), and as noted above, need not necessarily use a performance based system. The international community (UNFCCC) will not interfere with this. National governments will essentially be dealing with a whole array of internal projects, as different sets of forest managers will be taking care of different parts of the national forest estate. Most governments have proposed some kind of payment for environmental services system, but they will have to think very carefully about the basis on which payments to such managers (in Nepal these managers will be mostly communities/CFUGs) are to be made, taking into account the reality that:

- depending on the dates which are used to construct the national reference scenario/baseline, communities which have been engaged in forest management for some years may not be contributing to additional carbon savings at the national level, but are effectively part of the 'business as usual' scenario - this is the disadvantage of early starters.
- government receiving funds for carbon at the end of crediting period will represent balance of losses and gains nationally, thus communities which are successful in increasing carbon stocks will inevitably have to subsidise areas which have lost carbon.
- transaction costs of making payments may be higher under some payment systems than others, meaning that the amount left to pay communities would be less.

These three realities call into question the wisdom of using a purely output based payments system for carbon at the local level, and suggest that alternative basis for payments could be considered. It should be noted that in this paper, we discussed various means by which payments will be made to communities or CFUG responsible for managing a particular forest unit by the national government. Clearly, the division of the payments between members of the community or CFUG could lead to conflicts and difficulties. In addition, there are numerous problems facing communities who want to manage their forests, such as ancient rights of nomadic and transhumant peoples who by custom graze their livestock in forests nominally managed by sedentary communities. These are not negligible challenges, however, since they arise regardless of the basic architecture of payment system; we do not address them here.

WAY FORWARD

This is the only pilot project to establish a REDD government mechanism in the community forest sector. It needs to be linked with carbon finance for sustainability and more importantly, in all forest management regimes. A continuous source of finance is necessary for effective management and conservation. There is an overwhelming interest among government and REDD+ promoters about the pilot Forest Carbon Trust Fund and how it can be up-scaled to national trust fund, however, finding finances is a challenge. As there are no tested models to follow in the community carbon forestry sector, this project had to innovate five key strategies with an aim to synchronize global REDD policy with local institutions and their existing practices.

REDD is concerned with climate change mitigation combined with adaptation measures; and is also an ecosystem based adaptation strategy for the communities depending on forest resources. A multi-stakeholder process is essential, but is tedious and needs an intensive dialogue process at the micro and meso-level between diverse stakeholders. REDD should focus on social and environmental safeguards for REDD mechanisms as our region is confronted with issues of poverty and equity. REDD incentives, alone, will not lead to sustainable forest management and climate change mitigation and, therefore, public investment is essential to play a complimentary role in getting convergent outcomes for poverty reduction, micro finance and local micro economy.

Since the South Asian region shares similar types of forest ecosystem, culture, and gender based issues, Nepal's pilot project based on community forestry/participatory forest management can be useful to upscale/replicate and out-scale learnings made so far. Lessons from Nepal can be used to design future regional concepts and programmes for REDD and REDD+ on how to plan a REDD+ with triple dividends, i.e. mitigation, adaptation and economic incentive.

Acronyms

REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
CO_2	Carbon dioxide
CFM	Community Forest Management
UPP	User Pays Principle
CF	Community forest
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
ICIMOD	International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
FECOFUN	Federation of Community Forestry Users, Nepal
ANSAB	Asia Network for Sustainable Agriculture and Bio-resources
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
CFUGs	Community forest user groups
masl	mean above sea level
IP	Indigenous People
Ha	Hectare
VDC	Village Development Committee
GIS	Geographic Information System
C	Carbon
MRV	Monitoring, Reporting and Verification
IPCC	International Panel on Climate Change
ARET	Alternative Renewal Energy Technologies
FCTF	Forest Carbon Trust Fund
MC	Monitoring Committee
FOP	Forest Operational Plan
DFO	District Forest Office
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
VCS	Voluntary Carbon Standards

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Section IV: Interrogating Religious and Gender Identities

- Debates and Discourse on the Ideals of Polity and Religious Identity in Pakistan

- Palestinian Women's Movement: A Missed Opportunity

Debates and Discourse on the Ideals of Polity and Religious Identity in Pakistan

Ali Usman Qasmi*

ABSTRACT

This paper details the historical origins of a religiously defined citizenry in Pakistan. It is argued that a national identity embedded in Islam necessitated religion as an identity marker between different communities which, in turn, required a legal criterion whereby an individual's identification with Islam could be formally qualified. The centrality that Islam holds in the affairs of the Pakistani state and its national identity inevitably leads to an advanced role of the *Ulema*.

Ironically, it was not the demand for providing a definition of a Muslim, Hindu or Christian which triggered a huge crisis in Pakistan during different periods of its history, rather the agitation for excluding the Ahmadis from the fold of Islam. For this purpose various agitations were launched, theological polemics triggered and recourse made to Pakistan's top legislative and judicial avenues. As a result, the definition of a Muslim and a non-Muslim that emerged in the judicial and legislative history of Pakistan, hinge on the Ahmadiyya community. A brief historical trajectory of these developments has been traced in this paper.

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THE LEGACY OF THE ANGLO-MUHAMMADAN LAW

Before focusing on the legal, religious and constitutional debates which took place in Pakistan after 1947, it is important to take note of developments in these fields from the late 19th century onwards.

During the British period, the colonial administration had introduced the practice of 'stock-taking' of their subjects by means of census. This served as an index of the populace defined within the constraining ambit of essentialised categories with ensuing ambiguities sliced off and calcified in the cauldron of Colonialist-Orientalist knowledge. Such an abridged understanding of the populace was essential to the working of a gradually evolving judicial system in which 'communities' were to be adjudicated in accordance with their respective sacred and immutable laws. Accordingly, Hindus were to be adjudicated in matters of personal law (e.g. marriage, divorce, property) under the code of Manu, while Muslims under the Anglo-Muhammadan law (Qasmi 2009). The latter comprised of a growing corpus of judicial rulings given by English judges with the mediation, for some period, of Muslim assistants, in accordance with the English translations of such basic texts of Hanafi *fiqh* as *Hidaya*.[1] In order for law to have a definite authority of adjudication and arbitration, the subject population had to be indexed along strictly compartmentalised religious communities, i.e. between Hindus and Muslims, Christians and Sikhs, and so on. The classification ran even deeper than that, for example, the categories of caste and tribe were deployed to the same effect; however, this falls out of our current preview.

Ahmed (2010) observes that even in differentiation along religious lines, the determining factor was an insistence on 'belief' rather than 'rituals' and practices. It was felt that the latter, because of its variegation, would upset the judicial-legal and administrative stability of the Muslim population.

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[1] Hanafiyya is one of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence founded by one of the most famous jurists of Islamic legal history, Imam Abu Hanifa (d. 767). The majority of South Asian Muslims follow Hanafi *fiqh*. *Hidaya* is a classical work on Hanafi *fiqh* dating back to the 12th century and authored by al-Marghinani (d. 1197).

> *'…'belief' was privileged so that the state could demarcate and regulate the boundaries of a homogeneous and identifiable social group of 'Muslims'. On the other hand, ritual, the manifestation of concrete difference, was minimized since it threatened the homogeneity required by judicial administration. Paradoxically, 'ritual' was considered 'proper' religion, beyond the purview of the courts. The relegation of ritual in effect enabled the courts to ignore religious differences among Muslims while the insistence on 'belief' as indexing identity, performed through the enunciation of the kalyma, sustained an imagination of a unified Muslim community'* (Ahmed 2006, p. 66).

There were various instances during the British period, when the court's opinion was sought to adjudicate about the religious identity of an individual or a group. Such legal issues arose mostly in divorce cases or property disputes where religion (and in many cases particular 'sect') of a person determined the outcome of the case. In the late nineteenth century, the courts had arrived at the decision that recitation of *kalima*[2] signified the initiation of a person into the fold of Islam and was hence to be considered as a marker of Muslim identity. By reducing the inclusionary criteria for Islam to the recitation of *kalima*, the court got rid of the complexities of meddling into trivial and numerous details of ritual and theological nuances which set one group of Muslims apart from the rest. These differences included such details as folding or unfolding of hands during prayers, recitation of a specific chapter from Quran during prayers and debates about whether Prophet Muhammad was a semi-divine supra human figure or 'just' a human being like the rest of the believers. Without becoming party to the resolution of such disputes about theology and ritual, the court could apply Anglo-Muhammadan law to all those who claimed to be *kalima-go*, i.e. those who recited *kalima*.

This 'definition of a Muslim' was put to serious challenge in some court cases against the Ahmadis. However, the question of Ahmadis was different. Although the definition thus established had been used in cases where disputes

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[2] It literally means 'the word'. In Islam, it means 'the word of Islam' and is one of the five pillars of the religion.

about an individual's religious identity were involved, it was not invoked in any serious question about the 'heresy' or 'heterodoxy' of an individual or a group. Various Muslim groups had long been contesting the religious beliefs and practices of their rival groups (whether Shiite or intra-Sunni) and had even been issuing religious decrees of *kufr* (infidelity) against them, but there was no serious attempt in a matter of legal dispute to obtain a judicial decree against other Muslim individuals or groups on the basis of such a theological perception. In case of Ahmadis, however, there was almost unanimity of opinion among the *Ulema* about their exclusion from Islam. More importantly, the distinguishing feature of Ahmadis was most prominent in the matter of their beliefs rather than rituals. In terms of rituals, the Ahmadis did not differ at all from the majority of Hanafi Sunnis of British India. It was their belief in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet that set their belief system prominently apart from the rest of the Muslims. This was in sharp contrast with previous legal disputes that the British courts had to settle where matters of minute ritual details or hypothetical theological debates constituted the basis of complaints on the part of contesting Muslim groups. In case of Ahmadis, it was a 'simple' and clear case of making an addition to the belief system of Islam which could have implied a certain modification in the *kalima* as well – the very basis on which the legal definition of a Muslim predicated in the British judicial system in India.

Ahmed (2006) has cited a case dating back to 1922 in which the question of considering Ahmadis as Muslims was discussed in some detail. In *Narantakath Avullah v Parakkal Mammu (1922)* decided by Justice Oldfield and Krishnan of the Madras high court, the validity of a woman's second marriage was to be ascertained which she had contracted after her first husband had become an Ahmadi. The lower court had ruled in favour of the plaintiff by relying on the religious decrees offered by the *Ulema*. The high court overturned this ruling. The counsel for the plaintiff argued that the matter of determining the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of an individual lay outside the jurisdiction of the court. The Ahmadis, on their part, were arguing that the principle of recitation of *kalima* was already well established and there need not be any revision of it. The court seemed to have disagreed with both these positions. In case of Ahmadis, it held the opinion that earlier cases were disputes about worship in a certain mosque or ownership of *waqf* properties (religious endowments) and not of schism and apostasy. It was an emphasis on these latter categories that the court rejected the arguments of plaintiffs' counsel. The court was more concerned about who held the authority to decide on matters of schism and apostasy in cases where this was contested. The court could not allow *Ulema* to have jurisdiction over these questions (Ahmed 2006, p.116). The court then arrogated that authority to itself and enumerated fundamental beliefs of Islam and the points of departure between Ahmadis and the rest of the Muslims. It arrived at the decision that since Ahmadis believe in such fundamental beliefs of Islam as acceptance of *kalima*, Prophethood of Muhammad and authority of Quran, they could not be regarded as 'heretics' but only as a 'reformed Muslim sect' (Ibid. pp. 116-7).

There were other court cases as well, both inside British India and outside, where the question of Ahmadiyya 'heresy' was contested. An important case was contested in South Africa in 1983-85. There the dispute was about the religious belonging of the Lahori *Jama'at*[3] of the Ahmadis. The Government of Pakistan under General Zia-ul-Haq offered help to the Muslim council of South Africa contesting this case by sending a team of legal and religious experts from Pakistan. Later, this team of experts refused to contest the case on the plea that an ecclesiastical issue could not be discussed in a secular court of law and that too by a Jewish judge. The court, nevertheless, went ahead with the proceedings as it was not unprecedented in South Africa for courts to deal with doctrinal disputes where necessary (Aziz 1987). In the final verdict issued by the court in November 1985, it was stated:

> '*The essential doctrine of the Mohammedan religion is that God is only one and that Muhammad is His Prophet; hence Ahmadiyyans who also hold that belief are only a sect of Muhammadans, notwithstanding the fact that they differ from other Muhammadans in some other matters of religious belief. Hence on a Muhammadan becoming an Ahmadiyyan he does not become as apostate*' (Ibid., p. 37).

Since it was the religious doctrines of the Lahori Jama'at – which did not consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a Prophet but only a reformer – that was under discussion, the court's decision left the question of the beliefs of the Qadiyani Jama'at unresolved.

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[3] Congregation.

An anomalous departure from the tradition of Anglo-Muhammadan law was established in the princely state of Bahawalpur which lay outside the domain of British India’s law courts.[4] In 1926, a woman named Ghulam Ayesha of Ahmad Pur Shirqiya filed a petition of divorce from her husband Abdul Razzaq on the plea that he had become an apostate by converting to Ahmadiyya which allowed for divorce to be enforced according to the Hanafi *fiqh*. Initially, the chief court of Bahawalpur rejected this petition in concordance with the precedence set by British courts. A review petition was filed with the Adalat-i-mu’alla Ijlas-i-Khas (Supreme Judicial Council of Bahawalpur) which sent the case back to the lower court asking the judge to solicit multiple juristic rulings about the beliefs of Ahmadis. This led to a lengthy court trial in which numerous *Ulema* across India offered their assistance to the court. The most notable of these was Anwar Shah Kashmiri. Hundreds of pages of written disputations were exchanged between Ahmadis and their opponents. The final verdict of the court was reached in 1935. Judge Akbar wrote a voluminous verdict in which he decreed the Ahmadis as non-Muslims and conversion to Ahmadiyya an act of apostasy which dissolves the bond of marriage. An important feature of this judgement was that it did not focus on the commonality of religious doctrines, rather on the divergences made in Ahmadiyya theology, especially with regard to the finality of Muhammad’s Prophethood (Islamic Foundation 1988). In the Bahawalpur court, the proceedings were similar to that of an inquisition in which the religious doctrines of a ‘heterodox’ new group had to be measured against the verdicts given by revered and specialized doctors of religious law. As such it was outside the purview of the court to give a unanimous set of doctrines agreeable to all, but to single out those factors *alone* on the basis of which Ahmadis could be considered to have differed from the rest of the Muslim community.

THE MUNIR-KIYANI REPORT OF 1954

Within two years of the creation of Pakistan, Objectives Resolution was passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1949. With that resolution, which has served as a preamble to all of Pakistan’s constitutions, Islam came to occupy a central position in the polity and society of the country. In accordance with the provisions of the Objectives Resolution, various political parties and religious

[4] The detailed judgement of the Bahawalpur court and the statements, evidence, arguments and counter-arguments presented before the court were recently published in three volumes.

organisations raised the slogan of converting Pakistan into an Islamic state. These demands received further impetus when the Basic Principles Committee (BPC) of the assembly assigned the task of outlining a consensual basis for future constitutional setup, recommended that Pakistan's head of state must be a Muslim. This specific provision not only created faith-based distinction between Muslim majority and non-Muslim minority but also, inadvertently, raised the need of providing a legal definition of a Muslim so as to exclude the possibility of any non-Muslim ascending to highest office.

Amid such a situation during the early 1950s, disparate religious groups launched *tehrik-i-khatam-i-nabuwwat* (movement for the protection of finality of Muhammad's prophethood). This movement, in which Majlis-i-Ahrar[5] played a prominent role, demanded that Ahmadis should be declared as non-Muslims; Pakistan's Ahmadi foreign minister Sir Zafarullah Khan should be removed from office; and Ahmadis, in general, should be disallowed to hold higher positions in the political and civilian-military setup of Pakistan. These demands snowballed into a massive display of emotion, religious zeal and emotional sensitivity. From 1952, this movement gained strength and momentum and by March 1953 led to a situation where the Government of Punjab almost lost control and martial law had to be imposed in Lahore in order to suppress the movement. Once peace had been restored, the Government of Punjab set up a court of inquiry to be headed by Justice Muhammad Munir and Justice Malik Rustam Kiyani. This court of inquiry was to probe the background and the events leading to the outbreak of disturbances in March 1953 and the imposition of martial law. The final report was published in 1954. It is generally referred to as the Munir Report after its senior judge, Justice Muhammad Munir.

Although the court of inquiry was not given the task of discussing the outlines of an Islamic state or the question of defining a Muslim, the judges took up this

[5] Majlis-i-Ahrar emerged in the late 1920s as a breakaway faction of Muslim *Ulema* of Indian National Congress. It espoused the agenda of complete independence of India. As a religious organisation, Ahrar was famous for its anti-Ahmadiyya rhetoric even during the colonial period. Its main leaders included Sayyid Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari, Mazhar Ali Azhar and Shorish Kashmiri along with many others. The Ahrar was staunchly opposed to the creation of Pakistan. After 1947, Sayyid Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari renounced participation in active politics and vowed to transform Ahrar into a religious organisation although it continued to have considerable political importance and influence as well in different ways.

question on the pretext that in order to fully understand the rationale of religiously inspired disturbances it was essential to explore various theological issues affecting the movement. This included questioning the *Ulema* on their concept of an Islamic state and, more importantly for this paper, definition of a Muslim on the basis of which demands were being made to exclude Ahmadis from the fold of Islam.

One did not have to have even an ordinary understanding of law and the history of religious legal disputes of British India to know about the legal definition of a Muslim. Justice Munir in his later writings mentioned that this question had been dealt with in the rulings given by Justice Abdul Rashid among other Muslim judges of the British courts (Munir 1979, p. 70). But during the proceedings of the court of inquiry, the judges did not make an allusion to past judicial practices. They did not tell the respondents as to what constituted a 'Muslim' in the strict legal sense of the word. They simply asked the *Ulema* who were called upon to guide the court about various aspects of an Islamic state for Pakistan and '*to give the irreducible minimum conditions which a person must satisfy to be entitled to be called a Muslim*' (Munir and Kiyani 1954, p. 215). It is astonishing to see that not a single religious scholar opposing the Ahmadis (with the exception of Ghazi Siraj-ud-Din who was an activist or Mirza Bashir-ud-Din Mehmud) or their legal counsel referred to the precedence set by British courts and its Anglo-Muhammadan law. While one could assume that the rulings of the British court did not serve the *Ulema's* purpose of excluding the Ahmadis from Islam, it still gave an idea about the precision of legal jargon and judicial exactitude required for resolution of such issues in a court of law.

From the testimony of the *Ulema* before the court of inquiry, it can be seen that almost all of them referred to belief in *tauhid* (unity of God), *nabuuwwat* (Prophethood), Quran, *sunnat* (the practice of the Prophet), *mala'ika* (Angels), and *qiyamat* (the Day of Judgement) as fundamental beliefs of Islam. Overall, all of them simply outlined the 'basic belief structure' of Islam and there were differences in their responses *only* to the extent of number of fundamentals cited by them as essential for entry into Islam.

On the basis of the 'definitions' given by the *Ulema*, the Munir-Kiyani Report made its best known statement:

> *'If we attempt our own definition as each learned divine has done and that definition differs from that given by all others, we unanimously go out of the fold of Islam. And if we accept the definition given by any one of the ulema, we remain Muslim according to the view of that alim but kafirs according to the definition of every one else'* (Munir and Kiyani 1954, p. 218).

The inference drawn by the Munir-Kiyani Report erred on several counts. There were several reasons for which the *Ulema* had failed to show unanimity in their statements. In the first place, the court of inquiry – while admitting different *Ulema* and religious groups as party to the proceedings – had not asked for a definition of a Muslim from the *Ulema* in their written responses. They had only been asked to give their explanations for the course of events and the reasons for which Ahmadis were to be considered as non-Muslims. During the proceedings of the court, however, the judges realised the importance of the definition of a Muslim on the pretext that since a distinction between the Muslims and the non-Muslims is being made in terms of citizenship rights, there ought to be a defining criterion whereby these two categories could be distinguished and entrusted with different sets of rights.[6] In doing so, the court was taking upon a question which it had not been asked to address.

Only Amin Ahsan Islahi and Abu Ala Maududi could realise the potential damage done to the reputation of *Ulema* due to apparent differences in the definitions of a Muslim given by them. In a critique published a couple of years after the Munir-Kiyani report had been made public, Maududi argued that it was natural to have differences in definition of terms in the fields of social sciences and philosophy. He then pointed that none of the *Ulema* had described their definition as having a binding force of arbitration between the Muslims and the non-Muslims. These were individual opinions expressed in response to a

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[6] This question of definition of religious identity in a constitutional state with different set of citizenship rights had also been addressed in Israel where a distinction was to be made between the rights of Jews and non-Jews, 'Israelis' and Arabs. In Israel, the question of Jewish identity – which entails privileged property and electoral rights in Israel – has been a contentious one in which the orthodox definition of a Jew has remained prevalent. It defines Jew as a person who was born of a Jewish mother. Only in 1970 a change in law recognised Jewish converts as part of Judaism (Englard 2000, p. 38, fn 22).

question asked by the court. Maududi also pointed out, the definitions were not irreconcilable to the extent described by the authors of the report. He wrote:

> *'Therefore, whatever these eight men have declared in different words is just one and the same thing. There does not exist among them even the slightest difference on the real concept and meaning of the word 'Muslim'. Whenever you so desire, you pick up any one of these eight definitions and present it before any Alim anywhere in the world, he will, without a moment's hesitation, declare that it is the true definition of a Muslim. And you may even ask these eight persons themselves. Every one of them will declare that the definition given by* (the) *other is not wrong. As regards the assertion that whichever person's definition you might accept, all the rest will declare you to be a kafir, if it has not been said in the Report by the way of sheer humour, the readers will find it difficult in what respect to consider it weighty* (Maududi 1956, pp. 163-4).

Asad Ahmed too concurs with Maududi's estimate that an outcome of war of apostasy by all against all, as inferred by the Munir-Kiyani Report, could only have been logical if the *Ulema* had described their definitions as comprehensive and absolute, admitting of no variation. Contrary to that, most of the *Ulema* merely enunciated the numerous beliefs and pious acts required of a virtuous Muslim instead of giving a definition in precise legal terms (Ahmed 2006, pp. 51-2). They never claimed to be challenging the definition given even by their rival *Ulema* or to imply that those defined by others did not give the exact criteria for a Muslim.

The irreconcilability was hence not in the definitions given by the *Ulema*, rather the methodological approach adopted by the judges and their respondents. As Ahmed points out, the *Ulema* did not fully understand that the question asked of them required an understanding of the language of law in order to translate their theological discourse into a liberal juridical discourse with its concern for precision of legal identity (Ahmed 2009, p. 427). On the part of the judges, it can be argued that they were trained in the British legal system and not in Islamic theology to fully appreciate the implication of statements given by the *Ulema* as definitions for a Muslim. Because of their lack of knowledge of Islamic theological and juristic methodologies, the judges *'deemed it fit to let the evidence* *stand in the Report as it was recorded and they arrived at the conclusion that there existed considerable confusion in the minds of our Ulema about the definition of a Muslim'* (Munir 1979, p. 71).[7] Justice Munir, however, rebutted this criticism about the ignorance of judges in matters of theology and Islamic jurisprudence on the basis that students of law, even in British India, had to study Muslim personal law and acquaint themselves with the sources of Muslim law.

The *Ulema* could have erred in their understanding of the requirements of a legal system continuous in tradition from the British period. But this does not explain their lack of understanding about the subtleties of theological and juristic approaches to the question of defining a Muslim within the precincts set by Hanafi *fiqh*. As Ahmed points out, the juristic position of the Hanafi *fiqh* is concerned with observable facts – the performance of rituals and liturgical acts what he describes as 'ontological identity'. It is on the theological premise that an individual or members of a group are described as Muslims or non-Muslims by *Ulema*. The 'belief' is the marker of demarcation which, for juristic purposes, is an unobservable fact (Ahmed 2010, p.282).

It was only Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi who in his response to the proceedings of the court inquiry showed an acute understanding arising from the problem of identifying a Muslim in strictly theological terms and the juristic implications of such identification in a postcolonial nation-state working within the framework of equal citizenship rights. Cognizant of the fact that theology's emphasis on belief could best serve as an index for measuring one's commitment to Islam, i.e. whether a person was a staunch or true believer (*momin*), there *had to be* juristic basis which did not rely on the vagueness of inner belief to argue for differentiation of citizenship rights between Muslims and non-Muslims. There were some other scholars as well who made distinctions between essentials of religion and its supplementary provisions, but they remained confined to theological aspects of this differentiation and did not elaborate it into a juristic theory for a nation-state marked with plurality of religious views in its population. Islahi's differentiation between *siyasi mussalman* (political Muslim)

[7] This criticism was made by Javed Iqbal who later retired as the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court.

and *haqiqi mussalman* (true Muslim) addressed this epistemological gap (Munir and Kiyani 1954, p. 226). In order to qualify as a political Muslim, an individual was required to have a belief in the essentials of Islam. It would be enough for a person to be a Muslim if he merely professes his belief in the articles of faith irrespective of whether he is a practicing Muslim or not. In case of a person not fulfilling all these obligations in a strict manner, he will be regarded as a *bay-amal mussalman* (non-practicing Muslim) but still entitled to all the rights of a political Muslim. The true Muslim then, by default, was the one who followed all the fundamentals of Islam, detailed by Islahi, in its true spirit and with rigorous commitment.

The judges failed to realise that Amin Ahsan Islahi had made an attempt to resolve the contradiction arising from the theological underpinnings of Muslim identity in the form of recitation of *kalima* and its expression in legal terms. However, the only way of exposing the inherent flaw of Islahi's proposed differentiation between a political and real Muslim would have been to stretch his argument to its limits by invoking references from various theological and juristic works of, especially, Hanafi *fiqh*. The judges, instead, chose not to elaborate upon this important statement in their report and just made a passing reference to it.

Islahi's categorisation had shown the possibility of an 'Islamic citizenship theory' whereby there were to be different set of rights not on the basis of citizens or non-citizens, but between believer citizens and non-believer citizens. Even a non-practicing believer citizen, i.e. a political Muslim was entitled to full citizenship rights. Whether an individual was a practicing Muslim or not was to be excluded from the purview of law and left to an individual's faith and practice. The 'real *mussalman*' of Islahi, hence, did not need any definitions or external signs of identification with Islam**.** As a *momin*, the individual had to deal directly with God.

Ironically, then, the *momin* or a real Muslim is a completely secular entity in the Islamic state falling outside its legal and juridical framework. It was the apparently non-religious category of a political Muslim which required understanding and elaboration for the purposes of state. Although envisaged as a political category, it still invoked the problematic of defining it with some theological basis. It was no longer a matter of personal faith but that of a social contract between the individual and the state which necessitated that the state be able to identify those among its citizenry who were to be granted privileged rights in contrast with its non-Muslim population. This required *some* means of external identification of an individual's faith. What Islahi had suggested for this purpose was in line with the precedence set by Anglo-Muhammadan law as he was calling for a verbal affirmation or declaration of faith for the grant of status as political Muslims. But his 'catch' concept of finality of Prophethood, specifically meant to prevent Ahmadis from enjoying this status, could not be incorporated in it. The onus lay on Islahi, as well as Maududi, who similarly believed that a mere affirmation of belief in fundamentals of Islam was sufficient basis to be considered as Muslims or endowment of privileged rights. In fact Maududi had in clear terms yielded to what the judges of the court had been implying, without realising the contradictions arising from it, in accepting the faith of an individual simply on the basis of *kalima*. In his critique of the Munir-Kiyani Report, Maududi wrote:

> *'If a person says he believes in the Quran, or says he believes in the Prophethood of Muhammad, or declares separately in his belief in the two, in all three cases he is making actually one and the same declaration about his belief in Islam. Similar would be the case when he simply declares the Kalima: La Ilaha Illallah Muhammad-ur-Rasulullah [There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His Messenger*]' (Maududi 1956, pp.163-4).

In case Islahi was to admit that recitation of *kalima* sufficed identification as a Muslim for the purposes of state, he ran the risk of allowing Ahmadis to be included within the category of Muslims as well. Hence, there had to be a juristic or legal basis for determining the status of an individual as a Muslim or political Muslim for the purposes of the state. This was achieved in Pakistan in 1970s and 1980s when, firstly, definition of a non-Muslim and, later, that of a Muslim was provided. These definitions were to be reaffirmed in an individual's interaction with the everyday state in such mundane activities as opening a bank account or submitting college admission forms. This has been discussed in the following section of this paper.

THE 2ND AMENDMENT OF 1974 AND ORDINANCES OF 1980s

The 'failure' of the *Ulema* during the movement of 1953 was two-fold. On the one hand, they had failed to force the government to accede to their demands in a direct and absolute manner. Secondly, during the proceedings of the court of inquiry, their poor show portrayed them in the eyes of the public as incompetent even in matters of religious affairs. Majlis- i-Ahrar's narrative for the events of 1953 (Wasaya 2008) and the court of inquiry lashed out at Justice Munir for suggesting as if it was impossible to define a Muslim. This, claimed the Ahrar writers, was proved wrong when Pakistan's parliament finally passed a constitutional amendment in 1974 amid growing public pressure whereby Ahmadis were declared as non-Muslims. What the Ahrar historians do not mention is the fact that the constitutional amendment of 1974 *only* listed specific beliefs (like finality of Prophethood) whose non-acceptance was to be regarded as expulsion from Islam. In other words, the amendment gave the definition of a non-Muslim instead of a Muslim. The 2nd Constitutional Amendment of 1974 said:

> *'A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (Peace be upon him), the last of the Prophets or claims to be a Prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (Peace be upon him), or recognises such a claimant as a Prophet or religious reformer, is not a Muslim* ***for the purposes of the Constitution or law****'* (emphasis added) (Ahmed 2010, p. 284).

Although the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto denied a fair public hearing to the case against Ahmadis, he did try to live up to his ideals of liberal democracy by deftly restricting the scope of legislation *for the purposes of constitution or law* alone. In Asad Ahmed's estimate, this meant that even without a legal sanction the ontic identity of the Ahmadis continued to be that of a Muslim. The real damage to the Ahmadis was the ordinance passed by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1984 which disallowed the Ahmadis to *pose* themselves as Muslims. A section of this law said:

> *'Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves 'Ahmadis' or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations, refers to the mode or*

> *form of call to prayers followed by his faith as 'Azan',* ***or recites Azan as used by the Muslims****, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine'* (emphasis added) (Ahmed 2010, p. 297).
>
> *'Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves 'Ahmadis' or by any other name), who directly or indirectly, poses himself as Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written or by visible representations or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine*' (Ibid. p. 297).

The promulgation of such an ordinance which was vague and open ended resulted in widespread persecution of the Ahmadis and litigation on such charges as calling of *azan* (call to prayer). The Ahmadis challenged the veracity of this ordinance in the courts on two counts. First, they argued the ordinance deprived the Ahmadis of their fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution of Pakistan which allow them to practice and propagate their religion. Secondly, they argued within the theological framework of the Hanafi *fiqh* that even if the legal-constitutional apparatus did not recognise them as Muslims, the Ahmadis were allowed by *shari'at* to live and practice the life of a Muslim. This led to a series of court cases which continued into the 1990s as well.[8] As complainants, the *Ulema* were arguing that Ahmadis, by *posing* themselves as Muslims, were infringing upon their rights by appropriating Muslim ritual terminologies and practices (Ahmed 2010, p. 290). Once again, as Ahmed has argued, there was an inherent tension between the Hanafi juristic position which accommodated an individual's ontic identity as a Muslim and the theological interpretation which called for strict measures against heresy and apostasy.

[8] The details of such cases starting from 1980s onwards have been extensively discussed by Ahmed (2010).

The *Ulema* plaintiffs were arguing that Muslim identity, as expressed in the form of public rituals, was protected under civil law because properties and rights were attached to it. For them 'Muslim' was a legal status/identity protected under the law and the Ahmadi appropriation of this status/identity constituted an infringement on the exclusive rights of Muslims to this status. This was, as Ahmed describes it, a result of the colonial project of constructing and defining communities in law and endowing them with legal rights with the concomitance of transforming, for instance, 'Muslimness' into property – '*something that could be owned, possessed and bounded off from others who have no claim or right over it*' (Ibid. pp.290 & 306). This Muslimness was to be regarded as the exclusive property of the Muslims alone whose public display, in the form of ritual performances and a variety of other means, amounted to violation of copyrights and trademarks. The court, in its decision, justified the ban on Ahmadis to publicly display themselves as Muslims or perform ritual performances signifying Muslimness. In doing so, one of the arguments invoked by the court compared the practice with the violation of property and trademark laws. It is in this context that Ahmed has said that the exclusion of Ahmadis has been brought about within the liberal-legal thought and practice (Ibid. pp. 305-07). It was, hence, not a promulgation of an obscurantist theological interpretation, but stretching the limits of a liberal-legal thought on the basis of which Ahmadis were disallowed to practice their religion publicly.

Another significant development during the period of Zia-ul-Haq was to amend article 260 of the constitution in 1985 to give a definition of a Muslim. It said:

> '*Muslim means a person who believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him), the last of the prophets, and does not believe in, or recognise as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (peace be upon him)*' (Pakistan Constitution Law 2011).

So while the Ahrar and *Ulema* were able to argue in their narratives that Justice Munir had been proven wrong in taunting about a lack of consensual definition of a Muslim, they overlooked that a theological or faith-based identifiable criteria has remained evasive. After all the legal definitions and constitutional amendments, it is still by affirmation of faith alone – which means nothing else than recitation of *kalima* – that an individual is enunciated into or declares his/her identity or affiliation with a set of religious beliefs and practices called Islam. The commonality of belief, practices and *kalima* of overwhelming majority of Hanafi Sunnis and Hanafi Ahmadis makes it compulsory for the former not to emphasise on affirmation of faith alone, but to demand legal and administrative procedures which can heighten their separation from the Ahmadis on everyday basis. Hence, in order to create and enforce this differentiation and make the Ahmadis suffer for their religious beliefs in an institutionalised manner, they have to put down their beliefs in writing and affix it with a signature or thumb impression. This is done by making it compulsory in Pakistan to sign a declaration affirming belief in the finality of Prophethood and *kufr* of Ahmadis for the purposes of acquiring a national identity card as well as forms for college admissions and also for several other official purposes. The religious groups have been successful in pressing the government to force every individual to indicate his/her religion on the passport. This has ostensibly been done in order to prevent Ahmadis as non-Muslims to go for pilgrimage to Mecca which is a sacred space open to Muslims alone. However, it has not been possible for them, despite repeated attempts during the 1990s, to enforce a similar provision in national identity cards. Unlike the passport, the ID card is even more relevant in an individual's interaction with the everyday state.

CONCLUSION

As Pakistan's political elite instrumentalised Islam as means of forging an all-inclusive national identity in a state marked with religious plurality and ethnic diversity, it inevitably implied distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens of Pakistan. Since these two categories were to have different set of rights, it became imperative to arrive at a legal criterion whereby the religious identity of an individual could be determined in order to determine his or her constitutional status and rights. More importantly, as this paper has shown, those making such demands were least concerned about drawing a distinction between Muslims and Hindu or Christian population of Pakistan. Their main concern was to ensure the exclusion of Ahmadis.

The disputative theological engagement of *Ulema* with the Ahmadis dates back to the last decade of the 19th century. The peculiar context of Pakistani politics provided an opportunity to settle this century old theological polemic within a constitutional and legal framework. The developments of 1990s show that these legal definitions and judicial decisions have failed to achieve the desired objective of the *Ulema*, i.e. visible and more public distinction between Hanafi Sunnis and Hanafi Ahmadis. Alternatively, it is then under the pile of paperwork comprising of legal debates, judicial verdicts and administrative registers that differentiating lines along religious communities have been drawn and vigilantly maintained.

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Palestinian Women's Movement: A Missed Opportunity

Fidaa Shehada*

ABSTRACT

Since the 1900s Palestinian women have been fighting for liberation from the Israeli occupation and for equal rights with men. Political and socio-cultural transformations have intertwined to shape the evolution of women's activism in Palestine… an activism that has been challenged at several levels. The paper argues that Palestinian women's activism for equal rights has not materialised into a 'social movement'. Rather, to achieve equal rights, the struggle needs to expand beyond the highly-educated minority and include the marginalised and most victimised women. Also, women's rights activists need to maintain the connection between the dual goals of achieving Palestinian national rights and women rights. This paper includes reflections on the writer's experiences as a Palestinian woman as well as a review of literature on the topic.

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INTRODUCTION

The active participation of Palestinian women in the public sphere and in the national struggle for liberation can be traced back to the early 20th century at the time of the British Mandate (Abdulhadi 1998; Fleischmann 2003). Fleischmann (2003) explained that the founding of the Arab Women's Movement (AWA) in 1929 led to an institutionalised women's movement during the British Mandate with a feminist agenda situated in a nationalist framework. During the 1960s and 1970s, there was a significant emergence of Palestinian women's organisations that continued to strengthen until the 1990s when, after the Oslo Accords,[1] a number of factors led to the weakening of the movement and its failure to bring equal rights to Palestinian women.

This paper aims to highlight some of the political and social discourses that contributed to the failure of the Palestinian women's movement of the late 1980s and early 1990s by successfully restricting its materialisation. It focuses on the effects of the political context on this movement, specifically Israeli occupation, the 'peace process', the creation of the Palestinian Authority via the Oslo Accords, and the rise of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas). Palestinian women's activism for equal rights was directly affected by the various phases of Israeli occupation and the transformation of forms of resistance employed by the Palestinians in their national struggle against this occupation. In order to provide some historical background, the paper first briefly examines the emergence of women's activism in Palestine during the 1960s and 1970s. It then considers whether the political and social context since the negotiations that resulted in Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians (represented by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation) enhanced or hindered women's rights and empowerment in Palestine. This case is a particularly important one as it enables the assessment and critical analysis of the effects of political and violent conflict on women's rights by highlighting the relationship between political and social oppression (Rubenberg 2001). Ray and Korteweg (1999 p. 48) highlighted *'the*

[1] The Oslo Accords are a set of peace agreements between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Israeli government. The Declaration of Principles, (DoP, known as Oslo I), was signed in Washington D.C. on 13 September 1993. The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was concluded in Taba, Egypt on 26 September 1995 and signed in Washington D.C. on 28 September 1995. For more information on the agreements see Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (1993), and Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (1995).

dilemma of particularism versus universalism' in understanding women's interests and activism. They explained that there are too many studies of women's mobilisation that emphasise '*uniqueness*' while many others assume that women's needs are similar. However, since women's needs are not homogenous, they call for expanding theory on '*local and particular cases*.' The case presented in this paper highlights the uniqueness of the Palestinian women's experience with a persistent occupation, pervasive refuge, and a powerless national semi-state. Additionally, it exposes issues of 'power structures' (Richter- Devore 2009, p. 159) that exist between the international and local feminist agendas.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF WOMEN'S ORGANISATIONS IN PALESTINE

Palestinian women were always active in the national struggle for liberation. After 1948, middle and upper-class women began doing charity work and social projects to help the families of refugees by providing food, shelter, medical care, and schooling to their children (Fleischmann 2003; Holt 2003; Richter- Devore 2009; Wing and Kasturi 1995). The formation of the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) in 1965 represented a major development in the participation and representation of Palestinian women in the political sphere. The union was formed under the umbrella of the newly-established PLO, with a political vision to organise and represent the socio-economic and political needs of Palestinian women in the struggle for liberation, both in the diaspora and within the Palestinian territory.[2] Despite this major transformation of women's representation in the public sphere, the image of women in the Palestinian resistance movement continued to be consistent with the traditional cultural expectations of Palestinian society.

Abdulhadi (1998) described three images that are used to portray Palestinian women during the struggle for liberation both within Palestinian society and within the Palestinian resistance movement. The first is of the '*superwoman*' (Ibid. p.655) that excels in her multiple roles as a mother, a wife, an activist, and a combatant. The second image is of the '*fertile mother*' who reproduces children to feed the revolution and defend Palestine (Ibid. p.655), an image that echoes Israeli propaganda that demographic discrepancy in the region could potentially

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[2] See the General Union of Palestinian Women (n.d).

lead to the destruction of Israel. The third image of women is as '*signifiers of national honour'* (Ibid). In this image, the national territory is a pure woman who should be defended by the revolutionary men.

The Zionists used this view of women as signifiers of national 'honour' to their advantage since the ethnic cleansing of the 1947 and 1948 as Holt (2003, p. 227) explained. It was also exploited over the years by Israeli interrogators in their attempts to undermine the Palestinian resistance, recruit collaborators (Ray and Korteweg 1999 citing Haj 1992), and force confessions from the Palestinian women prisoners and their family members by threatening to 'disgrace' their 'honour' (Abdulhadi 1998, p. 655).[3] In addition, due to this entrenched view of honour, in which women are viewed as chaste and virtually untouched, the victims and their families remain silent[4] about their experiences vis-à-vis the brutality of the Israeli occupation. In remaining silent, society reinforces the victimisation of women and allows the oppressor to escape from responsibility.

The war of 1967 motivated groups of middle and upper-class women across the West Bank and Gaza Strip to form committees for the purpose of promoting and organising philanthropic activities to support refugees. The Society of Inash El-Usra, which literally translates as 'the society for the revitalisation of the family', was the most prominent of these charitable organisations and continues to be even up to the present time.[5] The idea of establishing an organisation to benefit women emerged in 1965, but the organisation itself was not established until after the war. Over time, it expanded assistance to families who had been victimised by the occupation, had lost their breadwinners, and had suffered

[3] Several scholars on gender and war elaborate on how the sexual assault of women and men is used deliberately and historically in conflict zones and wartimes as a tool to traumatize communities, demasculinize men, and assert domination over rival factions. See for instance Giles and Hyndman (2004); Al-Ali and Pratt (2009); and Kaufman and Williams (2010).

[4] Aysheh Odeh, one of the first Palestinian women prisoners in Israeli prisons and now a writer, was one of the very few women who opened up about their horrific experience in the Israeli prisons. Odeh guarded her experience of inhuman torture in the Israeli detention centres for more than 30 years, 10 of which were spent inside the prison. She finally documented this experience in a book published in 2004, titled "Ahlam b al- Huria", which translates to 'Dreams of Freedom'. As much as her book reveals the horrific experience of a woman in the Israeli prisons, it divests how the gendered discourse on honour in Palestinian society creates an escape for the occupier, on the one hand, and forces women to cope with their suffering alone in silence, on the other.

[5] See Society of Inash El Usra (n.d.)

other unfortunate social circumstances. In addition, since its establishment, the promotion and conservation of Palestinian heritage and folklore has been at the heart of organisational activities. Other charitable organisations continued to be spontaneously and conscientiously established to support the Palestinian cause through providing a form of social security for deprived families in the absence of a national government. However, these organisations did not incorporate deprived women and younger generations into leadership positions. They were described as 'top down' (Sabbagh 1996b, p. 109), 'conservative' (Hammami 1995, p. 53; Sabbagh 1996a, p. 116), welfare organisations that did not stress issues like women's rights, emancipation from the patriarchal institution, and gender equality, compared to the factional organisations of the 1970s and the liberal non-governmental organisations (NGOs) of the 1990s.

Another major development in the Palestinian women's activism occurred during the 1970s and early 1980s when four women's committees emerged as extensions of the main four Palestinian political parties at that time. This was put forward as a new strategy to incorporate and mobilise all sectors of society, including women, to confront the Israeli attempts to destroy the Palestinians socio-economic infrastructure (Kuttab 2008). The four organisations included the Union of Palestinian Working Women's Committees aligned with the Palestinian Peoples Party (PPP)--the Communist Party at that time, the Union of Palestinian Women's Committees aligned with the Public Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Federation of Palestinian Women's Action Committees aligned with the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Women's Committee for Social Work aligned with Fatah. The factional committees intended to strengthen women's participation in politics, society, and economy. They also introduced women to feminist consciousness. The women committees provided a wide range of services including job training, health care, and child care, and, more importantly, they introduced and promoted the idea of cooperatives (Sarsar 2002) through which women became engaged in income-generating projects such as food processing, knitting, and agricultural production. These organisations are described in the literature as '*more democratic and self-help*' than their predecessors, the charitable organisations (Sabbagh 1996b, p. 109).

The collective action of Palestinian women reached its peak during the first Intifada, which erupted in December 1987 as a spontaneous, non-violent, popular response to the Israeli occupation. At the beginning of the Intifada, Palestinian women in many towns participated in street demonstrations and other forms of resistance alongside men. Women also played a social role by organising themselves into committees to offer and receive first aid training to save lives during the confrontations with the Israeli army, visit prisoners, console the families of martyrs, provide day-care for children so that mothers could participate more effectively in public life, and run neighbourhood schools when Israel closed the regular school system. They also took a leading, innovative role in the popular campaign to boycott Israeli products by creating food cooperatives (Sabbagh 1996b; Wing and Kasturi 1995), cultivating home gardens, and raising chickens and goats. The spirit of the Intifada increasingly mobilised women even in some of the more conservative villages. Additionally, the major women's organisations, including the four organisations mentioned above that were affiliated with the major Palestinian political parties, consolidated their efforts through an organisational body called the Higher Women's Committee. The competition that had existed between the women's committees was replaced by cooperation to avoid work duplication (Sabbagh 1996b) and to insure that the services reached every village and neighbourhood. It is apparent that the potential of women became significant in difficult political times, which is similar to what Sabbagh (1996b, p. 108) noted on the activism of women following the war of 1967: *'[W]omen's positions shift from being the guarantor of life in the maternal context to becoming protector of life and family concerns in the political context.'*

While women's involvement in popular resistance is publicly approved and admired in Palestinian society, men and women continued to engage in different roles in the national struggle. This is consistent with the patriarchal and conservative nature of Palestinian society (Holt 2003) that gives privilege to men and senior citizens (Rubenberg 2001) over women and younger generations. It is most apparent in the aforementioned activities assumed by women during the Intifada and other stages of resistance, as the role of women did not expand very much beyond the traditional, social role of women in Palestine, which is basically oriented around the home, field, and family. Additionally, women's political activism in villages and camps varied during the Intifada depending on the level of men's activism in that locality (Ibid, p. 217). Although women's participation increased their public visibility and offered them more control over their mobility, high-level positions remained off-limits for women in general. There are no records that show that women were actually integrated into the decision-making circles concerning the proceedings of the Intifada. The United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) was composed of masked *shabab* – young men, who met clandestinely, mostly in the dark and in unidentified places, and wrote messages on walls or spread leaflets in the early morning hours detailing upcoming plans. Thus, the context in which these young men met was one that typically excluded women in the conservative society of Palestine. These facts challenge the discourse that there were fundamental changes in women's status in terms of their relationship with men and rather reconfirms that women's political activism alone was not able to challenge the patriarchal arrangement in the Palestinian society. [6]

In addition, an unexpected internal challenge arose when the newly emerged Hamas movement tried to impose *hijab* (veil) on women in the streets (Hammami 1990, p. 40). The irony is that in some cities the women who were the backbone of the Intifada were the targets of stones and eggs thrown by boys from their neighbourhoods if these women went out without covering their heads. It is even more ironic that the leadership of the secular parties and the UNLU of the Intifada did not take a stand on this blatant oppression until more than a year had passed (Abdulhadi 1998; Hammami 1990, p. 40). Basically, the UNLU denounced the attack on women in leaflets and intervened when they witnessed such events. In her study of the attempts to impose *hijab* on women during the first Intifada, especially in Gaza Strip, Hammami (1990, p. 26) concluded that *'this "intifada hijab" is not about modesty, respect, nationalism or the imperatives of activism, but about the power of religious groups to impose themselves by attacking secularism and nationalism at their most vulnerable points: over issues of women's liberation.'*

[6] Similarly, during the movement of independence in India from British colonialism in the twentieth century, women had to find a balance between fighting for their freedom while not being antinationalist. Women participated in meetings, demonstrations, and manufacturing to boycott foreign products in addition to attending to their families' needs in the absence of males (Thapar 1993). However, they were inhibited by national leaders from mobilising against the patriarchal oppression as they would be labeled Western or antinationalist (see Agnew 1997).

PALESTINIAN WOMEN'S ACTIVISM IN POST-INTIFADA AND OSLO ACCORDS PERIOD

In August 1988, the PLO leadership capitalised on the international solidarity of the Intifada via the 'Palestinian Declaration of Independence' in Algeria. After the declaration, Palestinian women who were activists in the occupied Palestinian territories used this political opportunity to increase their visibility and the prominence they had gained by participating in the first Intifada to construct a new legal framework to transform their socio-political status (Holt 2003; Jamal 2001). It was anticipated that the advent of a new political entity–the Palestinian Authority–and the establishment of a legal framework from scratch would present a great window of opportunity for Palestinians to include a progressive framework for women's rights.

It should be kept in mind that the relationship between men and women in Palestine is directly influenced by two legal factors. The first factor is that, over the past century, Palestinians have been subjected to a combination of legal frameworks, including those under the direction of the Ottoman Empire, British Mandate, Jordan, Egypt, the Israeli occupation, and the culturally-constructed, unwritten customary law in Palestinian society. In personal status matters, the Shari'a was always the source of legislation for the Muslim majority with the Shari'a courts continuing to profoundly shape the relationship between women and men. The Christian minority applies their own laws in a separate tribunal. Both Muslim and Christian women endure severe gender discrimination. They are equally forced to follow unwritten customary laws that place restrictions on their movement, create unfavourable terms of marriage, result in unequal inheritance, do not condemn honour killings, and discriminate against them in child custody cases, among others. They also fight together to restrain polygamy, allow for Christian women to receive an inheritance from their husbands, and for equal marital and divorce rights. It should be mentioned that several authors on women's rights in the Middle East explained that it is the customary laws–and not Islam–that repress women. Wing and Kasturi, (1995, p.147) stated that, *'The sharia affords women more protection than customary law'* and Kandiyoti (1991) further argues that Islam is not central *'in accounting for the subordination of women or the role it plays in relation to women's rights'* (p. 9).

The second factor is that the Palestinian population has been dispersed around the world, mainly in the Arab countries, since Al- Nakba[7] of 1948. Over the past six decades, many Palestinians have moved several times between different countries due to expulsion or other reasons for relocating. This is to say that the relationship between men and women while in exile has been influenced by the legal systems and social arrangements of the countries to which they relocate as much as the culture and norms inherited from their homeland. In addition to the broad geographical dispersion of Palestinians in foreign countries, Palestinians living in the Palestinian territory under occupation also experience geographical disconnectedness as a result of three factors: the partitioning of the Gaza Strip on one side and Jerusalem on the other from the rest of the Palestinian territory; the wall; and, Israel's policy of closures and checkpoints. This constant dividing of Palestinian territory has devastated Palestine's local community and disrupted the natural evolution of culture and social norms. Thus, the geographical disconnectedness resulting both from territorial divisions and exile in addition to the risks that are encountered while travelling between villages and cities inside the Palestinian territories continue to dictate the extent to which society allows women their independence from men.

As Wing (1996/1997, p. 349) argued, '*Legal reforms can only be successful if accompanied by societal change*.' Several women's research programmes emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s that published academic studies to assess the status of women in education, employment, and in their families. In addition, for the first time, women's NGOs held conferences to publicly discuss and denounce the attempts of the emerging Islamist groups to impose *hijab* on women in the streets. This was accompanied by different coalitions and partnerships that emerged among committees and organisations involved in defending women's rights. Women also intensified their networking activities with other women's groups at the regional and international level. In 1992, the Women's Affairs Technical Committee (WATC) was formed as a non-governmental organisation that coordinated among women's organisations within the Palestinian Territories. Compared to the GUPW of 1965, WATC is more autonomous from the authority, represented by the Palestinian Authority and the PLO, and is

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[7] Al-Nakba is 'The Catastrophe' in Arabic, referring to the establishment of Israel on Palestinians land in May 1948. Palestinian villages were demolished and more than 700,000 Palestinians were driven out of their homes into refugee camps.

closer to the international feminist liberal movement. Later, in 1994, a group of feminist academics established the Women's Studies Programme at Birziet University, which continues to offer a Master's degree in feminist theory, education, and research opportunities (Abdulhadi 1998). Also, several conferences and seminars were organised to discuss the women's rights agenda and the Personal Status Code of the Shari'a courts (Ibid.). In their support of the 'peace process', international NGOs generously funded programmes on gender equality, reproductive rights, early marriage, sexuality, and education. It should be noted that the aggressive activism of women in the early 1990s was independent from the Palestinian political parties and incorporated women from the different political ideologies on the common ground of changing the status of women (Holt 2003).

This signalled a profound transformation in women's activism to what could be described as a 'movement'. While activism or lobbying can become a movement, the creation of a sustained movement entails certain criteria (Diani 1992). The literature on social movements identifies certain factors that indicate that intensive activism has reached the point of being considered a social movement. These include the development of a) '*networks of informal interaction; b) shared beliefs and solidarity; c) collective action on conflictual issues; [and] d) action which displays largely outside the institutional sphere and the routine procedures of social life*' (Ibid., p. 7). A social movement is the creation of a network of individuals with common beliefs who join around a controversial topic outside an institution (Ibid.). Della Porta and Diani (2006) state that the main differences between a social movement and other collective activism is that social movements reflect a certain duration of involvement and occur on a larger scale. In addition, social movements seek to establish forums in which, participants share beliefs about particular issues.

Palestinian women's activism upon the advent of the Palestinian Authority reflected some of the features of social movements as described above. However, these features did not endure for very long and the Palestinian women's movement remained in an embryonic stage. This was apparent toward the end of the 1990s and became increasingly evident once the second Intifada erupted in September 2000 following the failure of the 'peace process' to guarantee Palestinian national rights. Indeed, women in the second Intifada were expected by the Authority and the leadership of political parties to defer the push for equal rights until after the restoration of national rights. Worse enough, women lost their principal means of staying in the public arena since, unlike the first Intifada; the second Intifada did not provide opportunities for women's political activism. Johnson and Kuttab (2001) explain this by pointing to several factors, including the de-politicisation of Palestinian society for many years after the Oslo Accords, which negatively impacted collective action for both men and women. Also, women's participation was limited due to the militant nature of the second Intifada compared to the non-violent nature of the first Intifada. Additionally, most of the confrontation between the Palestinians and the Israeli soldiers took place at the checkpoints compared to the popular resistance of the first Intifada in which resistance took place within cities and towns. The dominant image of women in the second Intifada, as depicted in the media and in Palestinian society, was that of the *'mothers of martyrs and prisoners'* – not as participants of their own accord.

Challenges to women's activism, and specifically actions to introduce gender-sensitive laws, has become more challenging since Hamas won the parliamentary elections in 2006 and assumed complete control over Gaza Strip in 2007. Shukrallah (1994, p. 15) explained that Islamist revivalist movements arose in the Middle Eastern region since the nationalist project and Western modernisation '*failed to bring about the promised progress, affluence or justice*', especially for the poor and middle classes. In the case of Palestine, this was represented in the failure of the 'peace process' and the Palestinian Authority to end the aggressive occupation and to bring economic and social revitalisation. Since 2006 and the accompanying internal political instability, the opportunities for women to reform discriminatory laws have become fewer.

In spite of the legitimacy and political challenges that Hamas faced at the local and international level upon its victory, it opted to pursue the moralisation of Gaza society. A widely spread story in the media in 2008 was the story of a journalist who was arrested and investigated because she was sitting in a restaurant with male friends and was 'laughing'. Such incidents come as no surprise since women are often considered the bearers of cultural authenticity (Shukrallah 1994; Richter-Devroe, 2009 citing Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989) that Hamas is trying to impose. Also, the Hamas government formally and informally attempted to impose *hijab* on women in schools. Kandiyoti (1991, p. 9) explained that the *'most immediate and visible targets in "Islamization" programmes* *were the dress, mobility and general status of women.'* In September 2009, the President of the Supreme Court issued an order that required all female lawyers to wear *hijab* in the court.[8] However, after an outrage in the media, the Hamas Prime Minister overturned this order.

Since Hammami wrote her article in 1990, *hijab* has become common in Palestine and neighbouring Arab countries. This should not be surprising with the rise of Islamist conservative groups to power. However, *hijab* takes different forms that range from a spread, plain, black, headscarf with a black, plain, long overcoat called the *Islamic dress* to only a colourful headscarf with fashionable clothes or jeans. Women affiliated with Islamist groups in Palestine emphasise the *Islamist dress* as the one that meets the religious obligation clearly stated in Quran and Sunnah. For this reason, in their view, it is regarded superior to the traditional Palestinian embroidered dress (*Thub).* Understanding the logic of the less conservative variations of *hijab* needs more elaboration. Shukrallah (1994) explored the phenomena in Egypt and explained that by wearing *hijab* with fashionable clothes, women practice a form of accommodation within the patriarchal institution to neutralise the attack on their increasing participation in the public sphere as well as to avoid sexual and other forms of harassment. Shukrallah (1994, p. 30) explained this accommodation as *'part of the negotiating process which takes place between subordinate and dominant groups within a hegemonic power relation.'*

The role of women affiliated with Hamas requires some elaboration. Hamas's leaders repeatedly emphasise that the movement supports equal rights for women, as stated in the Shari'a. In her intensive field research on women of Hamas, Jad (2011) revealed that the movement in Gaza, through the Islamic National Salvation Party, the political wing of Hamas, envisioned 'new Islamic women', that is women who are educated, professional, outspoken, politically active, and who adhere to the Islamist dress (*multazemah*) (Ibid., p. 181). Accordingly, Islamist women are integrated into all levels of the Party hierarchy, but are completely absent from the militant wing. The percentages of women at higher levels of the political wing that Jad (2011) provided are similar or less than

[8] See the article Alquds- (2009) 'Palestinian Bar Association: "Hamas" to impose the veil on women lawyers in Gaza,' (Author's translation from Arabic).

the rate of female representation in the higher hierarchy of major Palestinian political parties (Fatah, PFLP, DFLP, and FIDA).

The Women's Action Department of the party holds a one-day annual conference at which economic and political issues are discussed as much as gender issues like co-education in universities, family laws, and the Penal Code in light of Shari'a interpretations as Jad (2011) explained. In her data analysis, Jad (Ibid., p. 184) stated that '*the Women's Department proved extremely successful in mobilising a large number of women to defend the party against the PA harassment, in defending the party line in preserving Shari'a and in discrediting secularists and feminist women's groups…'* In contrast, Islamist women in the West Bank are merely active in charitable organisations that concentrate only on activities related to education, kindergartens and home economics. Jad (2011) stated clearly that these organisations claim that they are 'not political' nor active in organising women. This is similar to the responses that the author received in a field research in 2008 from the heads of some Islamist organisations that emphasised repeatedly that they are not affiliated or financially supported by any political organisation but only adhere to the principles of Islam. These responses are understandable after the depoliticisation of the civil society in Palestine and after both Hamas and the PA closed each other's NGOs each in its 'territories' after the rivalry of 2006 and 2007. However, Jad (Ibid., p.178-179) stated that Hamas refrains from organising female students in the West Bank due to its conservative gender ideology, especially toward unmarried women. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Islamist activism has generated a new space for conservative women to play a public role. The case of the political party Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt should not be far from Hamas with women voicing a desire to have a stronger role in strategic decisions related to the movement which was described as 'Islamic Feminism.'[9]

[9] The definition of *Islamic feminism* has been under a great deal of 'controversy and disagreement' (Moghadam 2002, p. 1135). According to Tohidi (2003), Islamic feminism *'seems to be more appropriate to be used and conceived as an analytical concept in feminist research and feminist theology, or as a discourse'* (p. 138). Whereas Moghissi (2011) states *'Islamic feminism, as a concept, found currency in the mid-1990s, when it was used to distinguish a brand of feminism or the activities of Muslim women seeking to reform, in women's favor, social practices and legal provisions that rule Muslim societies'* (p. 77).

A FAILED MOVEMENT: MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR PALESTINIAN WOMEN'S ACTIVISM

The clear role that Palestinian women had played during the first Intifada did not guarantee equal rights in the new political arrangements of the post-Oslo Accords period and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. This should not be surprising as historically women's participation in national struggles for liberation from colonialism did not go hand-in-hand with their emancipation from patriarchal oppression. The case of Algeria is one such example. Algerian women admirably participated in the revolution against French colonialism but, after liberation, *'the new government of Algeria tended to undercut the gains women had made'* (Tucker 1998, p.112). Women were officially ordered to go back to their roles as wives and mothers (Ibid.). In the Palestinian case, women's activism has by no means materialised into an effective women's movement.

As mentioned above, the post-Oslo Accord period and subsequent formation of the Palestinian Authority would have been assumed to be a window of opportunity in which women could redefine the gender discourse and dynamics in Palestine. However, in the author's view, four issues are at the heart of the experience of women and also represented barriers for women's activism at that critical moment of political transformation to a 'national state': first, the highly fragmented nature of the Palestinian women's movement; second, the hesitance of the Palestinian Authority to change the status-quo, despite having the means to push for gender sensitive laws; third, the coldness and indifference of Palestinian political parties toward including women's rights in broader social rights agendas; and fourth, the lack of support from the transnational liberal feminist movement that did not support the Palestinian goal of liberation. Each of these issues is elaborated upon below.

Fragmentation in the Movement

The activists in the Palestinian women's movement are divided with regard to the strategies, actions, and the ultimate goals (Abdulhadi 1998; Jamal 2001; Johnson and Kuttab 2001) for achieving equal rights. This division is reflective of the political split between Palestinians over the 'peace process' --Women inside the occupied territories and specifically the leftists were the most active and radical about eliminating all forms of discrimination against them. A group of

Palestinian women lecturers at the Birzeit University and some European and American universities articulated feminist consciousness with an insistence that national liberation and women's liberation go together. Meanwhile, women who lived in Tunis (Jamal 2001) and those closer to Fatah were more accommodating (Ibid.). They believe that women's rights should be achieved gradually through development, education, training, and inclusion in the Palestinian Authority (Johnson and Kuttab 2001). It is useful to re-emphasise that Islamist activists exclude themselves from women's rights activism as they believe that implementing Shari'a is the only framework that would guarantee women rights (see Wing and Kasturi 1995). Instead they concentrate on social work, the type of work that later brought Hamas to the pinnacle of Palestinian politics. Indeed, women affiliated with Hamas played a crucial rule in Hamas' successful campaign for the elections in 2006.

Hesitance by the Palestinian Authority

Despite attempts by the Palestinian Authority to present itself as supportive of women's activism for equal rights, basically through the Women's Affairs Ministry and imposing itself on the movement conferences and forums, it has failed to do so, eventually demonstrating its ultimate weakness in this area. This should not be surprising as the authoritative leadership of the Palestinian Authority reinforces patriarchal culture. Upon the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, a tug-of-war took place between the Authority and civil society organisations, including women's organisations. The Authority's grip was backed by the 'Palestinian Law No.1 of 2000 Concerning Charitable Associations and Civil Society Organizations (ch1/a2)', which aimed to control the activities and funds of NGOs. Through its attempts to control civil society organisations, the Authority served to reinforce the power of international neoliberalism by depoliticising (Johnson and Kuttab 2001) and demobilising the Palestinian civil society, including women's NGOs and activism.

After the establishment of the Palestinian Authority, women's activists drafted and circulated several documents, such as the 'Declaration of Principles on Women's Rights' (Sabbagh 1996a), a 'Palestinian Status Code' (Abdulhadi 1998, pp. 666-667), and the Women's Charter (Holt 2003; Wing and Kasturi 1995), that promised gender equality and women's personal, social, and political rights. The Palestinian Authority was reluctant to bypass the principles of Shari'a, which would have surely alienated the conservative popular base at the time of Hamas' ascension as a competitive rival. Furthermore, it seems that the Palestinian Authority's leadership did not perceive women as a source of significant political power of any utility amid the new, prearranged formal politics. Needless to say, women's active representation within the agencies of the Palestinian Authority was and continues to be very low and this has resulted in the expulsion of women from the decision making circles.

The articles of Basic Law (a temporary constitution) guarantee all Palestinians equal rights before the law and judiciary; however, the different laws contain discriminatory provisions and do not state the penalty in cases of gender discrimination. Azzouni (2010, p. 363) explained that the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) *'has avoided addressing issues related to personal status law, focusing instead on administrative, regulatory, commercial, and financial matters; issues pertaining to land and services, including health and education; and political issues, including elections and transference of powers.'*

Indifference of Political Parties

Before the Oslo Accords, most of the Palestinian women's organisations were affiliated with political parties; however, many autonomous organisations were established after Oslo. Since Fatah is the ruling party of the Palestinian Authority, as discussed above, this section concentrates more on the leftist parties. As with the Palestinian Authority, the Palestinian left is no less guilty of disregarding gender equality. Ray and Korteweg's (1999) comparative work on women's movements explained that *'Socialist regimes are accused of being too similar to nonsocialist regimes and parties culturally, and thus they are unable to push forward any liberation of women that challenges the tenets of received culture'* (p. 60). Furthermore, in the discussion of the pros and cons of women's movement autonomy from the left, Ray and Korteweg suggest that there are several reasons cited by proponents of autonomy for pursuing this course, such as the hierarchical and non-democratic structure of the left, dominant male leadership, avoidance of women's interests, and strategic exploitation of women's issues. The Palestinian case of empowering women during the 1980s and dropping their issues afterward is an example used in the literature to explain the political parties' strategic exploitation of women's activism.

The Palestinian left failed to live up to the expectations of the women's movement as it maintained its stance with the popular base in emphasising that this was not the time for women's rights as national liberation had precedence over all other issues (Kuttab 2008; Sarsar 2002). However, it should be restated that the primacy of national struggle is not the only reason to relinquish gender equality for the Palestinian political left. In the 1980s, leftist parties introduced a social discourse incorporated in their political approach that waned in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the general decline of socialist regimes, the war in Iraq, the emergence of fundamentalist Islam in the region, and the hegemony of Fatah over Palestinian politics until 2006. Since the 1990s, leftist Palestinian factions '*have not been able to maintain their activity and viability… [and are] incapacitated by their own internal conflicts and structural weaknesses*' (Kuttab 2008, p. 104). Though the Palestinian left became incoherent and incapable of making changes after 1993, the question of women's movement autonomy is a subject outside the scope of this study as it demands a different level of discussion.

Lack of Support from the Transnational Liberal Feminist-Movement

Another major factor that hampered the maturation of Palestinian women's activism into an influential rights movement was the transformation of formerly grassroots-based women organisations into elite, liberal NGOs alienated from their grassroots base and their objectives. After 1993, international donors invested a lot of funds in Palestine in an attempt to depoliticise Palestinian society, thereby advancing their government's 'peace process' formula (see Jad 2007; Hammami 2000; Johnson and Kuttab 2001). One effective method of depoliticising and demobilising women's NGOs was to cease funding programmes that emphasised the Palestinians national right to liberation as equivalent to women's rights.

In the past two decades, there were many constructive activities funded by international NGOs that raised gender consciousness, including conferences and seminars advocating women's equal rights in law, workshops and legal support against domestic violence, and health programmes. However, by only supporting programmes such as these, in the case of Palestine, the dominant liberal feminist movement homogenised women's needs around the world.

Donors *'promoted gender issues in a limited context of state building and not in the context of a continued struggle for independence …'* (Johnson and Kuttab 2001, p. 29).

In the case of Palestine, the liberal feminist movement solely targeted patriarchal institutions and completely dismissed the clear apartheid created by the occupation in terms of both nationalism and gender, which raises important questions about their judgment as to what constitutes rights and their commitment to equal rights. Their failure to recognise the link between the oppressive conditions of the occupation and the oppressive conditions of patriarchy jeopardised Palestinian feminism in their society.

Similarly, after 1993, international donors generously funded conflict resolution and reconciliation projects between Palestinians and Israelis and tried to engage women's organisations in the vision that women are peaceful by nature. Attempts to increase women's engagement intensified since the passing of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, which emphasises women's participation in peace negotiations and in post-conflict reconstruction. Many NGOs, including women's organisations, participated in such programmes openly in early 1990s, in addition to some NGOs that were created to serve this purpose in spite of the objection of several groups and political parties to these programmes (See Richter-Devroe 2009). Also, the public opposition of these programmes were growing toward the end of the 1990s when people realised that Israel did not meet its obligations as stated in the Oslo Accords, the agreements were not leading to the promised independent state, and the peace initiatives were used as a tool to further the Palestinians' subjugation and deprivation of rights and resources. The activities that used to take place inside the Palestinian territories and Israel stopped during the second Intifada. More recently the general public distinguishes between two types of programmes that involve Palestinians and Israelis: the programmes that involve actions of non-violent resistance of the occupation measures as the Apartheid Wall, land confiscation, and demolition of houses and those of 'conflict resolution' which involve debates and normalisation between the two parties. They looked at the second type with much suspicion (see Richter-Devroe 2009) as it is not aligned with the Palestinian national aspiration.

CONCLUSION

This review of Palestinian women's activism and the impact of the surrounding political and social circumstances on successes and failures shows that there was a trend towards an increase in women's visibility when the following two factors intertwined. The first was the nonviolent resistance during the First Intifada, which was accompanied by a strong impetus for women's activism. The second was the advent of a new political structure, the Palestinian Authority, which was assumed to be a political window of opportunity. However, this opportunity passed due to the vague strategy and lack of support for, or even betrayal of, the nascent Palestinian women's movement. It might not be possible to reach this momentum again soon as the political circumstances have changed abruptly and it is difficult to predict the political direction of the region in light of the volatile conditions in the neighbouring Arab countries after the revolutions and the Palestinian confrontation with Israel. The pressing questions now concern who will be in the Palestinian and neighbouring Arab parliaments and how relations between Palestine and the occupying power will evolve. It appears that more non-liberal regimes will be in power in the region for many years to come with the victory of the Islamist groups and the male-dominated parliaments in Egypt and Tunisia in the parliamentary elections. If Islamic democracies and stable economy rise in the region, including Palestine, women will benefit from collective rights but not individual rights. The future of individual rights would depend on the strength of civil society in each country. Women would be able to fight for equal rights only through the broad interpretations of Shari'a.

Despite the lack of clarity concerning these stated questions, there are constants. First, the liberation of women can never be achieved by an outside force or by a minority of educated women within Palestinian society. Women from all segments of Palestinian society need to be interested and involved. As described above, while participation for women rights included mostly educated women, participation in the national struggle engaged women from all social levels and backgrounds. It is not enough to theoretically educate women in their localities but it is rather necessary to acknowledge their actual concerns and address them. Second, women's involvement in the struggle to attain national rights is a logical response to the state of occupation. The women's movement needs to find strategies that maintain the connection between achieving Palestinian national rights and women's rights, which has the potential to create conditions conducive to reaching women in all sectors of Palestinian society.

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Section V: Integrating Policy Processes with Trade and Development

- Cost of Economic Non-Cooperation to Consumers in South Asia
- Post-MDG Policy Making – Can South Asian Policy Research Organisations make a Difference?
- Challenges of Reflexive Governance and Sustainable Local Development in Rural Nepal

Cost of Economic Non-Cooperation to Consumers in South Asia[1]

Bipul Chatterjee[*] and Joseph George[**]

ABSTRACT

One of the major hurdles in South Asian trade liberalisation process has been hesitancy on the part of countries from the region to subject sectors/products of high intra-regional trade potential to tariff liberalisation programme under the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA). This has caused high cost to consumers in South Asia in terms of avoidable high prices on imported goods, which could have been sourced from regional trading partners at considerably lower prices. Loss of consumer welfare owing to lack of depth in intra-regional trade and non-cooperative economic relations has not been hitherto subjected to thorough research.

This paper carries out a quantitative assessment of potential consumer welfare gains from deeper trade integration in South Asia along with the results of a perception survey analysis on views of key stakeholders on the relevance of consumer welfare in trade discourse. The results show that minimum static annual consumer welfare gains to the tune of 1.9 billion US$ could be realised from enhanced regional trade. The general perception of stakeholders is that bringing in consumer welfare aspects of trade will help rebalance the SAFTA negotiations and towards this goal, initiatives for awareness generation and networking amongst various stakeholder groups is of utmost importance.

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INTRODUCTION

The volume and impact of international trade in the world economy has grown phenomenally over the past few decades. Share of world trade in world GDP has gone up from 39% in 1985 to 50% in 2010 (World Bank 2011). To a large extent, this growth was made possible by an upsurge in the participation of developing countries in global trade, as they underwent a paradigm shift in their national economic policy outlook, embracing the hitherto familiar concept of 'trade - an engine of growth'. This is vindicated by the fact that lower middle income countries experienced a sharper rise in trade to GDP ratio, from 32 to 56% during 1985-2010 (Ibid.).[2] Today, trade liberalisation has become a standard norm throughout the developing world as can be seen from the unprecedented growth in the number of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), albeit with varying degrees of levels and success.

South Asian regional initiative for regional economic cooperation is spearheaded by the SAFTA. Despite this and other bilateral trade agreements currently operational in the region, South Asia remains one of the least integrated regions in the world. Trade negotiations under SAFTA have failed to influence growth in intra-regional trade in a significant way so far. Between 1995 and 2005, intra-regional trade in South Asia hovered around 5% of total trade of these countries. On the other hand, in the case of many other regional economic blocs such (intra-regional) trade ranged between 20-60%. SAFTA member states are also yet to initiate an institutional framework to move towards deeper economic integration beyond trade relations.

It is generally recognised that SAFTA failed to achieve its intended objective of enhancing intra-regional trade as a result of limited product coverage (Moinuddin 2008; Moktan 2008). Though South Asian countries have shifted to more outward looking policies in 1990s, reducing restrictions on private sector involvement in business and trade, remnants from the previous economic policy approaches still remain. Export promotion has replaced import substitution as the central theme for most governments in the region, but there are echoes of mercantilist attitude – increasing exports, while still attempting to restrict

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[2] Middle income countries also registered a sharper growth in trade-GDP ratio and developing countries together now account for about 35% of world trade.

imports (World Bank 2010).[3] Protective tendency of the SAFTA member states is evident from the fact that they maintain long (sensitive) lists of products that are kept out of bounds of the Agreement's Tariff Liberalisation programme.[4]

Concerns of unequal distribution of gains and unbalanced negotiating outcomes have also affected the interests in SAFTA for its members. India being the largest economy by far, it has always been deemed that political involvement, particularly that of India, has to be delicately balanced so as not to threaten the negotiating positions of smaller member countries for the success of the Agreement (Weerakoon 2010). Failure to arrive at this delicate balance is often cited as another reason for the slow rate of progress in regional trade. Longstanding border disputes and political discord, particularly Indo-Pak conflicts, have been accused to have affected economic relations as well.

Following a trend around the world, SAFTA was conceived with a political, rather than economic agenda; and is often seen as a vehicle for promoting political ties between India and Pakistan. Bandara and Yu (2003) and Hussain (1999) express the view that the possibility of free trade will not be operational without resolving political issues between member countries. Frail diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan have been analysed as a major hindrance to the success and future of SAFTA (Hussain 1999; Mukherji 2004; Dhungel 2008). It should be noted that trade negotiations are often seen as a means of resolving political conflict, even though political tensions are accused of preventing the progress of negotiations.

While all these factors have contributed in shaping the weak regional integration status of South Asia, one of the notable and often overlooked results of economic non-cooperation among the regional countries is high costs to consumers. Enhanced regional trade would bring down prices of many key commodities significantly by avoiding additional costs of imports from outside the region. For

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[3]See also World Bank 2007.

[4]SAFTA TLP stipulates reduction of tariff rates to upper limits of 20 and 30% for developing and least developed countries respectively within two years from the date of enforcement of the Agreement (1.1.2006). It also requires annual reduction of 10% for developing countries and 5% for least developed countries during this period for products with tariff rates less than the prescribed upper limits on the date of enforcement.

instance, certain previous estimates show that Pakistan could save US$ 400 million - US$ 900 million on its import bill if it allows imports from India on several items replacing its present imports from other countries at higher cost (Qamar 2005).[5]

This paper addresses the issue of consumer welfare impacts of regional trade liberalisation in South Asia. In the following section, a quantitative assessment of potential consumer welfare gains from full trade liberalisation under SAFTA is presented. The paper also includes the main observations gathered from a perception survey analysis, examining the opinion of key stakeholders in the region on the role and relative importance of consumer welfare aspects in trade negotiations under SAFTA.

POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF SAFTA ON CONSUMER WELFARE: A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT

Benefit from trade has two streams - gains to producers and gains to consumers - which are essentially inseparable. When it is said about trade that the best amongst producers in each traded sector will capture the market by outcompeting inefficient competitors and earn their right to sell, it also means that buyers get to choose from the best quality products at the lowest possible prices. But consumer welfare effects of trade are often neglected as consumers' savings due to imports is not as visible as producers' export earnings. Moreover, import is often viewed with discontent owing to the uncertainty it poses on survival of domestic industries.

Irrespective of the expectations and goals of participating countries and the level at which it operates (multilateral, preferential/regional or bilateral), a trade agreement cannot operate without reciprocal exchange of an import concession for an export opportunity. Trade agreements, by design, cannot serve a unilateral agenda of export promotion along with import substitution. When signatories undermine the importance of imports and view it only as a threat, trade

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[5] Based on 2003-04 data, Qamar (2005) highlights that after excluding the items that are on the positive list for India, 45% of the items could be imported by Pakistan at lesser cost from India than the current cost of import from the rest of the world.

negotiations most likely face an impasse. This may be observed from the way many preferential trade agreements across the globe function.

A survey of existing literature reveals that assessment of consumer welfare gains from trade liberalisation has hardly been subjected to thorough research in the context of SAFTA and neither has such a consideration influenced the course of SAFTA negotiations in any significant manner (Ghani and Din 2006; Dayal et al. 2008). Most of the quantitative studies look into trade benefits from the point of view of expansion of export markets and employment generation. In assessments based on general equilibrium models, figures for aggregate welfare gains are generated which are net of both producer and consumer welfare gains.[6] Exclusive analysis of consumer welfare gains from regional trade has hardly been attempted.[7] Such studies are imperative to bring the topic to the limelight and push the tariff liberalisation agenda forward with better understanding about potential gains and losses, without which deeper economic integration will remain unattainable.

The first step towards this is to realise the importance of granting import concessions, not only as a policy tool to gain export markets, but also as a significant source of economic benefits on its own. In this section, an empirical exercise is undertaken to assess potential welfare gains to South Asian consumers arising out of enhanced intra-regional imports. Towards its end, an elementary method is used to measure consumer welfare impacts of increase in imports as currently reserved product categories are brought under the ambit of tariff liberalisation scheme agreed upon under SAFTA. The basis for this analysis is drawn from the notion that when countries are allowed to choose sectors that can be excluded from tariff preferences under a preferential trade agreement (PTA), domestic lobbies work to ensure exclusion of products in which they may not withstand competition from the partner countries, as is observed from India-Sri Lanka FTA (Baysan et al. 2006). Thus, lists of excluded products often give a good starting point for finding sectors of importance for intra-regional trade.

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[6]See Raihan and Razzaque (2007).
[7]For a detailed survey of quantitative studies, see Kumar and Saini (2007).

ASSESSMENT OF CONSUMER WELFARE GAINS: METHODOLOGY AND PRODUCT SELECTION

One of the primary objectives sought through SAFTA, given the limitations of its predecessor South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA), was to generate sufficient tariff preferences by increasing product coverage under the Agreement's tariff liberalisation programme (TLP). Though member countries adopted reduced sensitive lists containing items which were not earlier subjected to tariff reduction, the respective lists maintained are still large and include many items in which South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) countries exhibit comparative advantage.

With the exception of Bhutan, all other seven members elected to exclude more than 10% of total product lines (HS 6-Digit Level) from the ambit of the TLP. At the time of commencement of preferential tariff reductions under SAFTA in 2006, all the major five member countries kept 15 to 25% of total product lines out of bounds under their respective sensitive lists. Since then only marginal reduction in the lists has been achieved. While India brought down its lists for least developed countries (LDCs) from 744 to 484 product lines, the list for Non-LDCs remains the same at around 860 product lines. While Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka still retain more than 1000 product categories in their lists, with a hitherto unaccomplished commitment to 20% reduction of such product lines.

The method adopted in this study for arriving at consumer welfare gains has two stages. In the first stage, an algorithmic process is followed to select products included in the respective sensitive lists of five major SAFTA member nations (Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) for calculating figures of minimum gains for product categories with maximum potential effects on consumer welfare.

Section of products is carried out by sequentially applying two criteria; (i) products in sensitive lists of a SAFTA member country (m) with high shares in the total exports of SAFTA partner countries (p) to rest of the world (RoW), reflecting the export potential of partner countries in such products, (ii) the list thus selected is further filtered by selecting products in which exports of partner countries to the member country is minimal and imports of the member country is high, reflecting high intra-regional trade potential in future.

In the second stage, the potential consumer welfare gains for each SAFTA member is calculated as the difference between current import expenditure incurred by the member country on the selected products and likely import expenditure if that country were to import the same products from SAFTA trading partners at a lower price currently offered by them.[8]

$\sum CW^{mi} = \sum (P^{mi}Q^{mi} - P^{pi}Q^{mi})$, where;
CW^{mi} – Consumer Welfare due to change in import price of country m in product i
P^{mi} – Import price of member country m in product i from ROW
P^{pi} – Export price of SAFTA partner country (p) in product (i) to ROW[9]
Q^{mi} – Import Quantity of member country (m) in product (i) from ROW

In the second stage calculation process, the product categories in which the current export price of the SAFTA trading partner to RoW exceeds the current import price of a member country from RoW, automatically get eliminated. Only those products with potential for savings on imports leading to reduction in consumer expenditure are considered and thus the estimation method helps to identify products with maximum potential consumer welfare gains for each country and therefore qualifies for removal from their respective sensitive list.

One of the important features of this methodology is that it minimises the risks of displacement of domestic industries owing to imports – the single most important concern of an importing country, because it ensures selection of product categories which already rank high in the import baskets of respective SAFTA members. Another objection often raised against reduction of import

[8]Country wise trade data for the analysis is accessed from UN Commodity Trade database (UNCOMTRADE) and data on import and export prices and quantity for the year 2009 is accessed from Trade Maps, International Trade Centre. The analysis is carried out at HS07 6-Digit level.
[9]Export price for SAFTA members is taken as the current import prices faced by their RoW partners in selected products. These price figures include Most Favoured Nations (MFN) tariff rates and transportation charges which is deemed higher for countries outside the region. Therefore, it is implied here that these figures are likely to be even lower for SAFTA trading partners because of geographical proximity.

tariffs is the loss of revenue from the same. The intra-regional trade scenario emerging from tariff reductions on selected products in their sensitive lists, each SAFTA member stands to gain in terms of increase in export earnings, which could be taxed to offset for the loss of customs revenue. Dependence on customs revenue is to be forgone in any case in due course of multilateral trade liberalisation to which the selected SAFTA members are committed as World Trade Organisation (WTO) signatories.

The estimates arrived at using this method form the basis for more detailed studies on the effects of reduction in transportation costs and other trade facilitation measures, which would further reduce import costs and subsequently prices facing consumers. Thus, the stated methodology used for the study and selection of products based on the mentioned criteria will facilitate comparison of import costs with other trade costs along with the assessment of relative merits of tariff liberalisation in each product category.

RESULTS ON CONSUMER WELFARE GAINS

After identification of products which satisfies the afore mentioned criteria, from the sensitive lists of each of the five major SAFTA members (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka), consumer welfare gains, represented by reduced import bills, arising for each country in each product category were calculated. Table 1 gives the summary of aggregate results.

A combined total of 355 product categories are identified from the sensitive lists of the five countries, which have high regional trade potential and promise high welfare gains. In this regard the current aggregate import bills paid to RoW by the SAFTA members amounts to US$ 6212.83 million. Intra-regional trade at reduced prices would generate 31.36% savings on this import expenditure, leading to annual savings of about US$ 1948.15 million for buyers in the region.

Table 1. Summary of Results on Aggregate Consumer Welfare Gains

Country	Product Lines in Sensitive Lists	Consumer Welfare Gains (in US $ million)	Current Value Imports of Country from ROW (in US $ million)	Percentage of Consumer Welfare Gains in Imports
Bangladesh	50	398.56	2781.33	14.33
India	161	597.29	1095.45	54.52
Nepal	73	457.50	1068.27	42.83
Pakistan	44	206.18	349.24	59.04
Sri Lanka	27	288.61	918.54	31.42
Total	**355**	**1948.15**	**6212.83**	**31.36**

Source: Authors' calculations based on trade data from trade volumes (2009-10) (ITC 2011).

Figure 1 shows the share of each SAFTA member in aggregate welfare gains. India tops the list in terms of share in aggregate regional gains, accounting for about 30% of the total. It is commensurate (in proportion to) with the high number of product lines that qualified for removal from India's sensitive list. Despite the slight variation in shares on total gains, all countries stand to gain substantially in terms of gains per capita, in proportion with their economic size and population. Though Pakistan receives the lowest (only 10.5%) of the total gains, yet it stands to save 59.04% on its current import expenditure on the selected products.

Figure 1: Country-wise share in Aggregate Regional Consumer Welfare Gains



Bangladesh

Fifty product lines qualify for removal from Bangladesh's sensitive list, bringing about US$ 398.5 million worth of savings on imports which is about 14% of their current expenditure (Table 2). Import from SAFTA trading partners is almost even in terms of product lines, but most of the gains accrue from imports from Pakistan (57%) and India (36%). Bangladesh stands to gain mostly through imports of mineral fuels and oil by-products. Other major items that may contribute towards reducing import bills are electrical equipment and pharmaceutical products. Though the contribution of imports from Sri Lanka and Nepal amount to less than 7% of total gains to be accrued to Bangladeshi consumers, the country would save about 30% each on current import spending by importing from these two neighbouring countries.

India

Results for India show total gains worth US$ 597.29 million (Table 2). Even though this figure is much higher in absolute terms compared to other countries, relative gains for India may be lesser than its SAFTA trading partners, given its large economic and demographic size. An interesting feature is that more than 90% of the gains accrue by way of imports from Pakistan are plastic based articles. Though only 5 products (chiefly iron and steel based articles) are eligible for imports from Nepal, India stands to gain 70% on their import bills. Forty-one product lines eligible for imports from Bangladesh chiefly consists of articles of apparel. However, because of comparatively low price differential between the two countries, saving on these items together contribute to only 2.15% of India's total welfare gains.

Nepal

Nepal accounts for about 23.5% of aggregate regional welfare gains. Though import displacement in 73 selected product categories, the landlocked state would save US$ 475.5 million, which is almost 50% of their current import expenditure on these categories (see Table 2). Imports from India and Pakistan account for bulk of the country's welfare gains. Main items which would help Nepal save on spending are mineral fuels and minerals including salt, sulphur and limestone. Nepal's trade prospects with Sri Lanka seem to be weak as the latter's export opportunities lie in rubber based products and apparels. However, with all other countries there exists import opportunities for the country with high prospect of welfare gains.

Pakistan

In the case of Pakistan, the results show a selection of 44 product lines from its sensitive list with an aggregate saving of US$206.18 million which is close to 60% of its current import bills on the selected product categories (Table 2). As a reciprocal case of India, Pakistan stands to gain predominantly through imports from India, accounting for almost all of its total welfare gains. Pharmaceuticals and electrical items would constitute most of its new import basket from South Asian trading partners.

Table 2. Consumer Welfare Gains (Country-Wise Results)

SAFTA Trading Partner	Product Lines	Percentage of Product Lines in Total Product Lines	Consumer Welfare (in US $)	Percentage of Consumer Welfare in Total Consumer Welfare	Current Value Imports by Bangladesh from ROW (in US $)	Percentage of Consumer Welfare in Imports
Bangladesh						
Pakistan	14	28.00	227012665.18	56.96	1317564000	17.23
India	9	18.00	143469447.53	36.00	1388535000	10.33
Sri Lanka	13	26.00	1210361.70	0.30	4142000	29.22
Nepal	14	28.00	26870146.30	6.74	71085000	37.80
Total	**50**	**100.00**	**398562620.71**	**100.00**	**2781326000**	**14.33**
India						
Pakistan	63	39.13	545005991.91	91.25	939533208	58.01
Sri Lanka	52	32.30	32005052.94	5.36	90735000	35.27
Bangladesh	41	25.47	12822800.40	2.15	54663000	23.46
Nepal	5	3.11	7459603.10	1.25	10519000	70.92
Total	**161**	**100.00**	**597293448.35**	**100.00**	**1095450208**	**54.52**
Nepal						
Bangladesh	45	61.64	11233014.82	2.46	25555000	43.96
Pakistan	20	27.40	255041185.55	55.75	586586000	43.48
Sri Lanka	4	5.48	107012.52	0.02	852000	12.56
India	4	5.48	191121724.49	41.77	455279000	41.98
Total	**73**	**100.00**	**457502937.38**	**100.00**	**1068272000**	**42.83**
Pakistan						
India	6	13.64	203878774.21	98.89	339251000	60.10
Sri Lanka	13	29.55	356850.25	0.17	1676000	21.29
Nepal	5	11.36	301170.78	0.15	1362000	22.11
Bangladesh	20	45.45	1639500.07	0.80	6949000	23.59
Total	**44**	**100.00**	**206176295.31**	**100.00**	**349238000**	**59.04**
Sri Lanka						
India	12	44.44	286459853.66	99.25	914684000	31.32
Pakistan	5	18.52	277969.54	0.10	689000	40.34
Nepal	10	37.04	1876641.65	0.65	3168000	59.24
Total	**27**	**100.00**	**288614464.84**	**100.00**	**918541000**	**31.42**

Source: Authors' calculations based on trade data from trade volumes (2009-10) (ITC 2011).

Sri Lanka

Though aggregate welfare gains of Sri Lanka amount to a comparatively lower figure of US$288.61 million, per capita gains would be the highest, it being the least populated amongst the selected South Asian countries. On 27 product categories included in its sensitive lists, diverted imports from within the region would help Sri Lanka to save 31.42% of its current import expenditure. Almost all of its expected gains come through imports from India in mineral fuels and oil by-products. Sri Lanka would not gain by imports from Bangladesh as its own export basket constitutes articles of apparel and is price competitive and capable of capturing part of the South Asian textile market with Bangladesh. Though welfare gains accruing to Sri Lanka by way of imports from Nepal is only US$1.88 million, the island nation is set to save close to 60% of imports from RoW by choosing alternatives from Nepal on certain items.

EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES IN SELECTED PRODUCTS AND TRADE POTENTIAL

Increase in intra-regional trade also implies enhanced export opportunities for each of the SAFTA members. As we have only considered replacement of imports from RoW with cheaper imports from within the region that currently flow to RoW. The difference between current total import expenditure on the selected products and the aggregate savings on import bills by all countries should amount to the total exports that would be internalised by South Asian region. This figure stands at around US$4000 million.

Though it may be argued that only internalisation of exports could occur in this scenario, without real increase in export volume, yet we must consider the dynamic effects on regional exports. The key issue that confronts intra-regional trade potential is the supply capacity of trading partners from the region. If the supply capacity remains static, mere diversion of exports to RoW with exports to SAFTA partners is the probable result, which may lower the aggregate nominal export earnings for a country, but in all likelihood raise the profitability in real terms since lower preferential tariffs within the SAFTA region allows producers/exporters to lower their price while raising profit margins.

Trade potential in a particular product category with a static supply capacity scenario can be assessed as the difference between minimum of the set (importing country's total world imports, exporting South Asian partner's total world exports) and existing imports of the importing country from that particular partner country, where exports and imports are in quantity terms. This simplistic measure shows whether South Asian trading partners could meet each other's import requirements with their current export quantity or not. Though required data on all the selected product categories is not available, intra-regional trade potential assessed using this measure stands between 80 to 90% of current imports from RoW.

There are two key elements to be considered here with respect to potential export market expansion. Firstly, assuming that global market conditions remain the same, there is particularly no reason why existing export markets in RoW cannot be retained by South Asian countries, while new export opportunities emerge within the region. Secondly, depending on the magnitude of the import price elasticity of the respective products in the importing countries, lower price would increase import demand and thereby expand the intra-regional export markets further. Therefore, huge opportunities for substantial export expansion in many product lines face SAFTA members, which may be tapped by addressing supply constraints.

Figure 2 shows main product categories in which export opportunities emerge for each SAFTA member country under consideration. Bangladesh's export basket is heavily skewed with textile products. For India, the export basket is fairly balanced with pharmaceuticals, electrical items and mineral fuels. While for Nepal, articles of iron and steel as well as industrial inputs based on iron, feature prominently in its potential export profile; for Pakistan, mineral fuels dominate accounting for two- thirds of its total export prospects. Sri Lanka's prospect is spread between textile items and cash crops including rubber, tea and spices. The potential export baskets give a clear indication for targeting of export promotion policies in the context of regional trade in South Asia.

Figure 2: Product Category-wise Export Opportunities











From Minimum to Maximum Gains

As stated earlier, the method used in this study gives minimum consumer welfare gains accruing to consumers of five South Asian countries, which would directly arise out of preferential tariff reduction under SAFTA. Even though only selected product categories have been chosen which assure the figures given in the preceding sections, certain counter arguments are often raised in the popular discourse for which further clarification may be needed. More importantly, it needs to be noted that the assessment of consumer welfare gains herewith omits certain crucial aspects because of data limitations, implying that the actual welfare gains could be much higher.

One of the first questions raised is whether the South Asian export price will hold for regional trading partners once preferential trading within the region comes into operation? While there could be no straightforward answers to this, at closer examination it could be seen that export price offered to RoW is likely to go down for regional trading partners. This is because of mainly two reasons; export price to RoW covers mostly the Most Favoured Nations (MFN) tariffs rates as South Asian exporters hardly enjoy preferential rates in their main export destinations. Even in the case of Bangladesh and Nepal, who benefit from Duty Free Quota Free (DFQF) rates applicable to LDCs in certain developed country markets, preferential market access is limited to a fixed number of product lines. Since a preferential rate below MFN is on offer under SAFTA, there is no particular reason for the export price to rise. Further, if it is safe to assume that the transportation costs would be lesser because of proximity to each other within the region, export prices (South Asia to RoW) may actually fall when it comes to intra-regional trade.

Another major concern raised is the possibility of trade diversion. In case of selected products mentioned in the preceding sections, the fact that at least one South Asian partner country has revealed comparative advantage in terms of its current export performance in global markets lessens the probability of negative trade diversion effects. Since South Asian exporters are already price competitive compared to RoW even before liberalisation, removal of these products from the sensitive list is unlikely to replace more efficient producers from outside the preferential region.

Further, the figures for consumer welfare gains generated under this study only show the effects of change in import price with fixed quantity of imports. But the initial changes in import prices owing to preferential trade is only a starting point which triggers other factors into action, with a combined effect of increasing consumer welfare gains several times the initial figures. Specifically, the following three main effects should be considered:

- Effects of domestic price reduction due to enhanced import competition;
- Effects of trade creation due to increase in import demand; and
- Effects of reduction in trade costs and subsequently import prices within the SAARC region following development of trade infrastructure.

The first effect here implies savings on consumer expenditure on not only imported products, but also domestically manufactured items facing import competition. Fall in import prices from within South Asian region will have a competitive effect on domestic manufacturing in the selected sectors as well as exports from RoW, leading to an overall control effect on prices of the commodities under consideration. The second effect of trade creation is closely linked with this. Here, as the affordability of consumers rises because of fall in prices, more of the imported product will be in demand, implying possible trade creation. In general, irrespective of whether trade creation actually occurs or not, consumption baskets of buyers expand as their real income increases.

The third effect refers to an often hidden positive impact on consumption. The fact that South Asian countries are importing the selected products from RoW although regional trading partners are relatively more price competitive, suggests that non-tariff barriers (NTBs) could be impeding trade in such products more than tariffs and that these NTBs hurt South Asian exporters more than RoW exporters. As noted in the previous section, intra-regional trade costs because of poor connectivity, transport infrastructure, costly customs procedures and absence of adequate trade finance is very high in South Asia.

There is a dire need of trade policy reforms at the regional level to improve this situation, which could not be initiated without actual increase in trade volume between South Asian countries. As trade volume increases, it would naturally fuel growth of trade relationship, resulting in better trade facilitation measures, procedural ease and economies of scale in the transport sector, better returns and rents from investments in trade infrastructure and additional incentives for private enterprises to explore regional markets. Substantial cuts in trade costs can surely be expected from such a virtuous cycle of trade to more trade.

PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS ABOUT REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA

The popular discourse on South Asian economic relations has undergone many transformations since the idea of SAARC was proposed and realised in the early 1980s, with one of its main goal as the '*promotion and strengthening of collective self-*

reliance among the countries of South Asia'[10]. This goal has been heavily influenced by the ever tilting kaleidoscope of bilateral political relations between SAARC member states. As a result, objective analysis of economic costs and benefits of open trade in South Asia without considering political implications has always remained inconsequential (Weerakoon 2010).

In the wake of the formation of World Trade Organisation in 1995, closely following policy reorientation in all the leading states in the region towards export based growth strategies, their immediate focus was to expand trade liberalisation through usage of their participation in multilateral negotiations. Though SAPTA also came into force in 1995, regionalism took backstage during this period as exploration of export markers in the neighbourhood was not considered worth the enormous negotiating capital required for keeping non-trade issues at bay. Proliferation of PTAs amongst WTO member nations and success stories elsewhere rekindled interest in SAPTA, leading to its subsequent graduation into SAFTA in 2004.

During this period, mercurial bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, the largest member states, has played a big role in shaping up the expectations of various stakeholders from all over South Asia about the regional trade agreement. Consequently, around the turn of the century, it was widely believed that bilateral trade pacts would have better prospects and were pursued with greater emphasis. India-Sri Lanka (1998), Pakistan-Sri Lanka (2002), India-Bangladesh (amended Agreement, 2006), Bhutan-India (2006) etc. were the major developments in this direction.

Due to this multifaceted approach towards trade policy as well as frequent change in focus of dialogues on trade related issues, opinions about regional trade varies widely between and within different stakeholder groups directly associated with trade in various capacities in all South Asian countries. The diversity in view-points has naturally fed into the policy formulation process at the national level and has very deep bearing on the course of regional trade negotiations thus far. Analysing the perceptions of relevant stakeholder groups

[10] South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Charter, Article 1.

therefore is highly rewarding for understanding the nuances of SAFTA negotiations.

The perception survey of key informants and stakeholders on regional trade integration in South Asia was carried out based on the premise that political economy aspects rooted in conflicting interests of diverse stakeholder group eclipses pure economic reasoning when it comes to trade policy decision making in the region. Different stakeholder groups selected for the survey are: (i) producers/traders/exporters, (ii) government officials, (iii) trade-related service professionals[11], (iv) political persons, (v) academics/researchers, (vi) Civil Society Organisations, (vii) business/industry organisations and (viii) media.[12] Figure 3 gives the country-wise and group-wise share of responses.[13]

How SAFTA is Compared to other Alternatives?

Figure 3: Country-wise share of responses



[11] Transport Sector, Insurance Sector, Banking Sector, etc.

[12] The survey was conducted in 12 cities across five South Asian countries, having a significant place in the political economy of regional trade integration in South Asia. In each city, about 25 questionnaires were executed. In all, about 300 stakeholders were targeted for this survey.

[13] A strictly qualitative assessment of the survey responses is carried out in the following sections.

Figure 4: Group-wise share of responses



One of the common elements in perceptions is the way regionalism is compared to other alternative modes of trade liberalisation. Very few identify with maximisation of efficiency gains from multilateral liberalisation. Those who do admit that self-selection of best producers at the global level results in best possible prices and quality, discredit participation of South Asian countries in the WTO process as uncertain and time consuming. Likewise, in a comparison between SAFTA and bilateral agreements, bilateral are preferred on the same grounds. For beneficiaries, actual and speedy results matter more than what theorists say about the pros and cons of an international trade agreement at all levels.

There are two particular aspects noticeable from comparative viewpoints. Firstly, complexity of negotiations as reflected by reports in the popular media has much larger impact on opinions of stakeholders belonging to all categories. Secondly, those who find merit in trade agreements in the reverse order – from bilateral to multilateral - primarily perceive bilateral approach as building blocks to regional and subsequently multilateral negotiations. Thus, complexity owing to intrusion of non-trade issues[14] into trade talks could be resolved in a stage-by-stage process.

[14]Non-trade issues here refer to border disputes, water sharing arrangements etc. and allied differences on the political front.

An overwhelming 96% of the interviewees suggested that political priorities influence far more than economic logic in trade talks at all levels. Variability of comparative perspectives with reasons for failure of SAFTA returns a high correlation between the two (0.86), showing that SAFTA is considered the second best choice because of more non-trade issues to be sorted out before negotiations can progress, as compared to bilateral negotiations. Following this reasoning, it may so be generalised that:

> *There is hardly any resistance to SAFTA on the grounds that the Agreement lacks economic merits. On the contrary, there is support for it, which would determine its success in future and it will critically depend on the extent to which non-trade issues are disentangled from trade relations.*

On Economics and Politics of South Asian Regionalism

As most of the stakeholders believe that trade talks could not be devoid of political tension, the overwhelming response is that better returns from SAFTA negotiations should contribute to lessen the intensity of international disputes in the region rather than trade negotiations themselves getting affected. Through diverse expressions a common theme emerges; economics and politics of trade negotiations are necessarily complimentary on competing ends. Political establishments setup strongholds in their domestic constituencies by proving themselves harvesters of commercial opportunities wherever available so as to improve standards of living for the masses.

From the options present before the interviewees, lack of complementarity in production; consumption patterns in South Asia; and lack of economic potential were outcompeted by a huge margin by distrust among South Asian countries as the predominant reason why regional economic cooperation agenda stagnates. More than 75% of the respondents who held this view also raised doubts about effectiveness of SAFTA in bringing about a change in the scenario. In conjunction with the earlier observation, it clearly shows that regional trade negotiations have always been seen through the political prism and leadership in the region failed to connect economic benefits with SAFTA negotiations. This fact is also evident from the fact that while trade liberalisation has been aggressively pursued during the reform period, numerous agreements except SAFTA, entered into by South Asian countries turned out to be progressive whenever political leadership delivered on economic promises.

> *A substantial transformation in the course of SAFTA is highly probable if political leadership realises and use potential of the Agreement for the fulfilment of their on non-economic objectives.*[15]

Place of Consumer Welfare in Perceptions on Trade Impacts

Consumer welfare gain is hardly recognised as a positive result of open trade. The general discourse on trade only deals with the production side of it. Across all stakeholder groups including researchers on regional economic issues, either ignorance or neglect of trade issues on the consumption side is widely prevalent. More than 60% of the stakeholders interviewed were hardly aware of consumer welfare impacts of trade, and the potential for such benefits out of SAFTA. Any estimation on reduction in import bills due to cheaper goods in the context of regional trade could not be recalled.

One of the most interesting results from the survey is that out of the respondents who expressed ignorance about the topic, (almost all of them) agreed that consumer welfare aspects should also be considered in future analysis to get a clearer and balanced picture of the potential of the Agreement. Though the conviction behind such opinion in the context of the survey may be questioned, it goes undisputed that a phenomenal avenue for change lies at this point. Mere spread of awareness about this often forgotten topic has a powerful potential to sway the perceptions on trade objectives in general and regionalism in particular, from one way to another. Augmenting the above, it may be stated that;

> *A hitherto ignored catalyst for change in political utilisation of SAFTA is awareness generation on consumer welfare gains from the Agreement, given the fact that consumers as a group constitute the entire electorate.*

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[15]This implies political class would have the incentive to mainstream consumer welfare gains in trade policy discourse; consumers being their largest constituency. Thus, by changing the incentive structure of key stakeholders in terms of their participation in the regional trade negotiations, the direction and the rate of progress of the negotiations are likely to change as the relative position of consumers as a stakeholder group improves.

Stakeholder's View on Future Steps

Apart from lack of inclusivity in trade policy making as one of the main concerns raised by stakeholders, omissions have also been made in the past because of partial or trivial level of involvement of directly affected stakeholder groups due to lack of institutional mechanism to facilitate the same in South Asian countries. While it is recognised that a change in the policy formulation process by way of institutional and procedural restructuring is not possible in the short run, it has been suggested that a proactive move from the part of stakeholder groups can make a difference by way of voluntarily contributing inputs for making the process at the governmental level better informed.

While business community, administrational and political representatives as stakeholders have direct access to policy making process at the national level and academic community has relatively better chance of exerting influence, consumer organisations lack both awareness of trade issues concerning them and channels of influence. In this scenario, it could be noted that ideas on steps for the future differ across groups. For the former categories, objective and in-depth studies on effects of the Agreement featured is a priority, while for consumer groups the urgency is on awareness generation and usage of collective bargaining power to gain access to the policy making process.

On the question of principal deterrents of regional trade negotiations, lack of adequate representation of all categories of beneficiaries was ranked as the second most important factor after political distrust. The majority reported that an attitudinal change is warranted. Protectionism still obscures the right approach to trade negotiations and comes with heavy cost of lagging traditional sectors ridden with productive inefficiencies.

Overcoming Hurdles: Networking is the Key

In a priority based ordering of future steps, all stakeholder categories unequivocally agreed that national dialogues on a wider scale deserve the first consideration. Particularly, three aspects should be highlighted in such dialogues:

1) prospects of peace dividends from economic cooperation;
2) benefits of increase in imports; and

3) other benefits of regional integration, considering growing regionalism at the global level which increasingly threat to restrict market expansion plans of South Asian countries outside the region.

A far as the promotion of such dialogues across countries is concerned, networking and discussion with the objective of awareness generation at the national level should strengthen international initiatives of composite dialogues. In order of priority, they are networking amongst consumer organisations at the national and regional level, media campaign at national and regional level, and networking amongst policy makers, industry and consumer organisations at the national level.

With the objective of weaving in consumer welfare as an important consideration in trade policy making process, deeper research results on the topic is imperative. Richer literature is the starting point for advocacy and the academic community as a stakeholder group should contribute in the respect. It is critical to inspire further detailed studies on the topic of consumer welfare gains, generating more informed discussions and subsequently mainstream the issue in policy making process. With the objective of inspiring further studies a workshop specifically targeting trade economists from within and outside the region should be conducted, which should have a snowballing effect.

As observed from the survey and unlike the popular notion, most stakeholders in the region keep positive expectations about SAFTA, which is only hidden by pessimism about inter-governmental political relations in the region. This general positive expectation can be tapped best by building networks of producer/exporter and consumer organisations in the region. Since consumer welfare is an issue dearer to consumer groups who lack liaison with trade policy making mechanisms and producer groups, though have strong liaison with trade policy making process, are ignorant about how much important pursuing consumer welfare is to their interest, the missing link is proper communication between these groups. Post-research advocacy under the project entitled 'Cost of Economic Non-Cooperation to Consumers in South Asia' (COENCOSA) should tap into the complementarity of mutual interests of consumer and producer group in regional trade liberalisation and use the existing channels of trade/industry organisations to influence policy making.

CONCLUSION

From conceptual as well as practical view points, consumer welfare and producer welfare are two inseparable results of open international trade, since efficiency gains in production would in turn benefit consumers by way of cheaper and better quality products. Increase in imports will also expand the choice sets of consumers. Moreover, trade agreements – the vehicles of liberalisation - can only function on the basis of reciprocal exchange of export opportunities for import concessions. Though consumer welfare gains following open international trade is often more predictable and assured it is not given due consideration in the mainstream discourse on trade and its impacts on economic development.

It is widely recognised that SAFTA members maintain large sensitive lists with high intra-regional trade potential. While protectionist tendencies continue at the regional level, benefits from increase in imports is disregarded in policy circles, despite the fact that denying such benefits is detrimental to expansion of production and exports as well. The end result is stagnating regional trade and recognition of the Agreement as an ineffective tool.

Though literature is divided on the economic effects of South Asian regional trade, evidences exists as to show positive net gains on many counts which are often not considered under traditional analysis done for predictive purposes because of methodological and practical limitations. Moreover, many arguments raised in the literature like potential harmful trade diversion effects are also shown as standing on unsure grounds by subsequent works.

As regards, consumer welfare impact of SAFTA, this aspect is almost completely ignored in earlier works. This study, therefore, attempted an empirical exercise for assessment of consumer welfare gains from SAFTA arising out of subjecting currently excluded products to preferential rates under the Agreement. Using an algorithmic process of selection, those products with high intra-regional trade potential, which are retained in the sensitive lists of 5 largest economies out of the 8 member states of SAFTA (Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) were chosen. Potential consumer welfare accruing to each country was then derived by taking the difference between the total import expenditure in the selected products incurred by the country under consideration and likely import expenditure if that country were to import the same products from SAFTA trading partners at a lower price currently offered by them.

Results show an aggregate minimum consumer welfare gain of more than US$1.9 billion per annum to the South Asian region by way of savings on aggregate consumer expenditure. This figure (savings on consumer expenditure) is about 31% of the total current import expenditure on these categories. The exercise helped to identify products with maximum potential consumer welfare gains for each country and therefore, qualifies for removal from their respective sensitive list. The estimated figures are only starting points or minimal assured gains and enlisting them will facilitate comparison with other trade costs and relative merits of tariff liberalisation in each product category. More detailed studies on the effects of reduction in transportation costs and other trade facilitation measures would result in more gains in a dynamic manner.

The study also carried out a survey of perceptions of key informants associated with trade issues in the region. It was found that opinions about regional trade varies widely between and within different stakeholder groups in all South Asian countries and such perceptions had an important role in shaping the course of regional trade negotiations. Most notably, it came to the fore that most of the stakeholders believe lack of success from SAFTA till date is owing to political rather than economic reasons, for which solutions do exist.

Primary focus should be on separating non-trade issues from trade negotiations as much as possible. Building widespread awareness about untapped and forgotten aspect of consumer welfare gains will help to refocus on economic issues. It would also keep the on-going negotiations better informed and help to check protectionist tendencies in the region. The most important complementary feature of this approach will be to shift the focus of political aspirations of the regional leadership without actually having to eliminate it from SAFTA proceedings. As consumers, as a group, form a strong constituency, prospects of political dividends from catering to their needs will surface and thus political intervention could be constructive in nature rather than damaging as is often experienced in the past. Initiatives for networking amongst consumer organisations at the national and international level in South Asia with this objective in mind offers the prospect of bringing about a long awaited change in the history of regionalism in South Asia.

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Post-MDG Policy Making – Can South Asian Policy Research Organisations Make a Difference?[1]

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ABSTRACT

Great strides have been made towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) over the last ten years. Much of this progress has been made possible in South Asia through national commitments to developing and implementing policies that lead to measurable improvement in peoples' lives. A key element of policy development is access by policy makers to quality and objective information generated through independent research. However, in many countries, much research-based evidence is still produced by researchers situated outside the national policy context. To support effective regional and national policy processes, there is a need for locally-generated information and analysis. This can then be used consistently by policymakers in their efforts to develop and implement policies that lead to more equitable and prosperous societies.

Although researchers in South Asia are engaged increasingly in research on the development challenges experienced within their own national contexts, they often struggle to navigate the "demand-side" for policy-relevant information. Policy-makers may also find it challenging to generate and sustain a policy environment in which the use of evidence-based research for policy design and implementation is embedded. This paper presents the findings of a Policy Community Survey conducted in five South Asian countries. The aim of the survey was to explore the national policy environment, and the perceptions of

[1]This paper draws on the findings of a Policy Community Survey undertaken by GlobeScan on behalf of the Think Tank Initiative, available at:
<http://www.idrc.ca/EN/Programs/Social_and_Economic_Policy/Think_Tank_Initiative/Pages/ArticleDetails.aspx?PublicationID=1032>

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high-level policy-makers regarding their need for information, their ability to access it, and its perceived utility. It discusses the implications of the policy-makers' information needs for the role of national policy research organisations in addressing national development challenges. Drawing on the findings of the study, the paper explores the intersection between demand and supply for social and economic research-based evidence, post-MDGs, in the South Asian context and makes some suggestions about how independent policy research institutions can best position themselves to enhance their potential to influence policy processes.

INTRODUCTION

> *'In 2000, 189 nations made a promise to free people from extreme poverty and multiple deprivations. This pledge became the eight Millennium Development Goals to be achieved by 2015. In September 2010, the world recommitted itself to accelerate progress towards these goals'* (UNDP 2012).

So opens the home page on the website of the UNDP, which provides an update on progress made since the Millennium Declaration was signed in 2000. There is no doubt that achievements with the MDGs have been made, but these are sporadic and unevenly distributed, with particular challenges still remaining in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the UNDP, the world is on track to meet the MDG target of halving the proportion of people living on less than $1 a day, yet even if positive trends continue, in 2015, roughly 920 million people would still be living under the international poverty line of $1.25 a day (Ibid.). Universal primary education will not be achieved in 2015, with too few girls attending school, high drop-out rates (18 million children are out of school in South Asia) (Ibid.) and insufficient teachers. Women's empowerment has made significant strides in some countries, for example, in Pakistan where women account for 19% of representatives in the upper and lower houses (Ibid.), yet globally there is still gender disparity in access to education at all levels. Child mortality rates are decreasing, but need to fall much further if the target is to be met. Maternal mortality remains unacceptably high. Combating HIV/Aids, malaria and other diseases has been a relative success story globally, in part because of the huge financial investment made to address this challenge. More people than ever before have access to clean drinking water, yet the battle to prevent more species from disappearing from the face of the earth is being lost, and the ranks of urban poor are growing. Aid levels remain too low, as official development assistance stands at 0.31% of the combined national income of developed countries, still far short of the 0.7% UN target (Ibid.).

It is clear that even with commendable progress made in some areas and in many countries, many of the Goals will not be met till 2015. This is a cause for huge concern. As Mayor-Zaragoza (2008, p. 25) wrote:

> *'We must now quickly convince ourselves of this, and demand that those in power stop postponing possible and feasible action, so that the few may become many, peacefully without turmoil, 'in a spirit of brotherhood'....there are more*

reasons for hope; for the participation of people; the consolidation of democracy...for words to finally replace force, imposition and violence; for citizens no longer to be subjects, but to be members of the human family, able to develop their distinctive creative ability to the full; citizens who are no longer silent because they are aware of the voice they owe to future generations. The voice of life.'

The question is, how more progress is to be made? Looking at what has happened since 2000, it is clear that much of the progress has been made possible through a combination of factors, but a key element has been "political will". National commitments have resulted in developing and implementing policies that led to measurable improvement in peoples' lives. One significant factor related to both development advances and inertia is the capacity for policy makers to engage in effective policy making processes. Policy making is a complex, non-linear, "messy" process that involves multiple stakeholders and agendas (Carden 2009). Access to information is the key. Different policy actors may have their own particular information needs, enabling them to participate fully and actively in deliberative processes, but if they are to engage in debates and discussions over policy issues in an informed way, it is crucial that they be in a position to easily access the results and findings of research and ensure that they are both relevant and credible. Their sources should be reputable, and the processes through which they are produced should be robust and rigorous.

Unfortunately, many policy actors globally, and specifically in South Asia, face difficulties in accessing relevant and timely information that is credible and trusted. They are often unsure of the means to find such information, and at times resort to the same sources, which may be produced from outside the policy context. These sources may include the media, research organisations, and also their own in-house information repositories.

Research is clearly a vital source of needed information for policy processes, yet it is unclear as to how many policy-actors view research-based information and evidence. At the same time, many researchers in South Asia are engaged increasingly in research on the development challenges experienced within their own national contexts, yet they often struggle to navigate the "demand-side" for policy-relevant information. They are unsure what information is most needed by policy actors and why, and also unclear about how policy actors access that information, and what presentation forms are most useful.

This paper presents the aims and methodology of a Policy Community Survey conducted on behalf of the Think Tank Initiative in five South Asian countries that aimed to shed light on this situation. It discusses the findings of the survey and draws out a number of implications of these findings for the role of national policy research organisations in addressing policy-makers' information needs in tackling national development challenges. Drawing on the findings of the study, the paper poses a number of questions regarding the intersection between demand and supply for social and economic research–based evidence, post-MDGs, in the South Asian context. It also identifies some particular challenges associated with the flow of knowledge and information in the wider policy environment in South Asia, and makes some suggestions for how these challenges can be addressed by independent policy research organisations.

LOCAL KNOWLEDGE AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY –ROLE OF THE THINK TANK INITIATIVE

The Think Tank Initiative is a major collaborative programme involving several donors that has the aim of strengthening independent policy research organisations ("think tanks") in developing countries. Launched in 2008 and managed by Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC), *'the Initiative is a partnership between IDRC, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and the Netherlands Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS)'* (IDRC 2012a). According to the Initiative's Implementation Plan, '*The vision for the Think Tank Initiative is that policymakers in participating countries consistently use objective, high quality research as part of developing and implementing policies that lead to more equitable and prosperous societies*' (IDRC 2008, p.10). To achieve this vision, the Initiative provides support to a group of 50 independent policy research institutions based in East Africa, West Africa, Latin America and South Asia; 16 institutions in total are supported in South Asia; located in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Core funding, provided through non-earmarked, multi-year grants, is intended to enable think tanks '*to provide objective, high-quality research that both informs and influences policy'* (IDRC 2012a). As stated on the Think Tank Initiative website:

> *'Think tanks in the developing world are in a unique position to effect change in their societies. They can strengthen public policy debates and promote more objective, evidence-based decision-making. However, most think tanks never receive predictable core funding, instead depending on short-term project grants and consultancy contracts. The Initiative provides think tanks in countries of the developing world with stable funding so that they can attract, retain and build local talent, develop an independent research programme, and invest in outreach to ensure that research results are used in policy debates….The defining feature of the Think Tank Initiative is its provision of core, non-earmarked funding to participating organisations. The Initiative also assists participating organisations in three broad areas: research methods and skills; communication and outreach; and general organisational development. Four year core grants and two year renewable grants are combined with dedicated technical support to address key weaknesses. The Initiative supports peer-to-peer review, learning and exchange by bringing together supported organisations, outside experts, and other stakeholders'* (IDRC 2012a).

Given the challenges presented in achieving many of the MDGs, the Think Tank Initiative's original premise seems highly pertinent. There is no doubt that policy research institutes, to some extent flourish, in the developing world, including in all countries in South Asia. If it is indeed the case that *'public policies work best when they are designed and implemented by local actors'* (IDRC 2007, p.1), then national research institutions would indeed appear to have a key role to play; a role that is likely to become ever more important.

> *'Public policies work best when they are designed and implemented by local actors. In the developing world, much of the research underlying these policies is led and carried out by external research institutions, as opposed to those based in the country in question. This is unfortunate, as local researchers have a vested interest in the development of the best possible policy. Where externally-driven research is too often detached from the local policy context, local research can more accurately reflect local realities. Quality policy-relevant research requires an understanding of past and present context and future aspirations'* (IDRC 2012b, p.4).

In contrast to many other international programmes of support, the Think Tank Initiative aims to contribute to national policy research institutions establishing a more sustainable basis for their work over an extended period of time. This should allow them to generate a more consistent set of policy research and analysis that serves the information needs of a diverse range of policy actors who can then make more informed policy decisions. This aid fortifies policy research institutions to be able to maintain a forward-looking research agenda that responds to local needs.

EXPLORING THE DEMAND-SIDE OF POLICY FORMATION

As part of the Think Tank Initiative's "learning agenda", efforts are being made to help understand the demand for policy relevant information, and information needs of the policy community in specific countries. The "demand-side" of policy formation may be understood as the extent to which different policy actors need and access the results and findings of research to inform the development and implementation of policies. The demand for research-based evidence by national policy stakeholders is likely to vary, depending on their specific agenda and interests; the diversity and dynamic nature of these interests can make it challenging for researchers and policy research institutions to navigate the policy context. To support this intention to learn more about the policy "demand-side", the Think Tank Initiative undertook, with its collaborator GlobeScan, a Policy Community Survey. The aims of this survey were three-fold, to:

- *'understand the strengths and weaknesses of particular think tanks, as perceived by a subset of the policy community….'*
- *'understand what activities are associated with the success of think tanks in order to help prioritize support strategies'*—e.g., funding, training, and technical assistance;
- *'create a benchmark against which future surveys can be compared to indicate broad changes in the policy community and perceptions of think tanks in selected countries'* (GlobeScan 2011b, p. 7).

The survey was conducted with policy stakeholders, broadly defined, in 23 countries in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia.

> *'Stakeholders of the policy-making process were asked general questions about the policy-making context in their countries, the types of information needed for their work, as well as questions about sources of information and information*

> *formats. They were also asked specific questions about think tanks generally, and how they can be improved. A parallel objective of the survey was to understand strengths and weaknesses of particular think tanks, and to understand what activities are associated with their success, in order to help design and implement support strategies. These findings have been used as a rich source of reflection both by individual think tanks as they identify their own priorities for organisational strengthening and capacity building; and by the Think Tank Initiative as it develops its approach to supporting its grantee organisations in their progress towards sustainability…Lastly, the survey was intended to create a benchmark against which future surveys can be compared, to track changes over time in the policy community and perceptions of think tanks in selected countries. It is important to note that this study was a unique and difficult undertaking, and as preparation is done for a second round of policy community surveys before the end of the Think Tank Initiative's current phase in 2014, the sample, methodology, and questionnaire will be examined closely to identify potential improvements and enhancements'* (Ibid., p.7).

APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

'The study was first fielded in Africa in 2009–2010, and then in Latin America and South Asia in 2010–2011' (Ibid., p.9). *'It was designed to gather views of senior level policy actors within national policy communities'* (Ibid., p.8) on four main dimensions: information and policy making in the national context; the role and contribution of think tanks in that context; familiarity with individual think tanks; and perceptions of the performance of individual think tanks. A questionnaire was developed in order to gather perceptions of respondents, the first part of which aimed to ascertain the perceptions of policy actors on the quality of policy-making processes in the national context; the perceived ease of obtaining information on specific development issues; the usefulness of that information once obtained; and the different sources of that information and its relative usefulness and quality depending on its source.

> *'The questions on these topics were asked to policy actors with reference to their own national policy contexts. The study was not intended to gather perceptions of a larger, representative subset of the policy community which could generate statistically significant findings on the demand for research. This more qualitative approach, with a smaller group of senior-level stakeholders, was chosen deliberately, recognising its limitations, but acknowledging the value of*

understanding perceptions of individuals in senior positions within each national policy community who often are very difficult to reach' (Ibid., p.8).

The development of the questionnaire used in the survey did present some challenges. It was necessary to identify certain key variables, for example, such as the different areas of development (education, trade/industry, environment, gender, poverty alleviation, economic issues, health care, agriculture/food security, foreign affairs, and human rights) in which respondents might have information needs. There was naturally some overlap between these different development areas, which were selected through identification of those areas of development that are most commonly highlighted within policy contexts as critical sectors. The definition of each area was open to interpretation by respondents, based on their personal experience, and on the specific national context. It is unclear from the responses exactly how individuals interpreted specific terms, for example "poverty alleviation" or "human rights". The term "poverty alleviation" is widely used as a core development goal in many international and national contexts, but can include a range of sub-topics, such as gender; similarly the term "human rights" often encompasses a diverse range of issues including peace, justice and inclusion. The precise meanings were left to the respondent's own perspective. During a pre-test of the questionnaire in several national contexts, respondents were able to answer consistently the questions that used these variables, generating a level of confidence in them that allowed the survey to proceed.

As noted later in this paper, some terms used in the survey are also liable to quite different interpretations, for example "research quality", or "quality of policy making processes". For these, a definition was provided to respondents at the time the survey was administered. Recognising that interpretation of the variables and terms used in the survey will inevitably be somewhat nuanced, a follow-up qualitative study would be undertaken with a smaller sub-set of the original sample of respondents, to attain an in-depth interpretation of the variables and terms. The findings of this study will help to shed further light on the findings of the Policy Community Survey, and will also inform the next iteration of the Survey, anticipated in 2013. A total of 985 respondents were surveyed, as indicated in Fig. 1.

'In each region, a target of 40 respondents per country was set with a balanced

quota of responses across different stakeholder categories. The exception was India, where the total number of interviews was increased to 80 to reflect the difference in the size of the policy community, while maintaining consistency with the sample sizes in other countries. The total population surveyed in each of the three regions was determined by the number of countries included in the study, and does not reflect the overall population size of the region. In a number of countries it proved difficult to achieve the target of 40 stakeholders even though a long list of contact names had been generated. Balanced quotas in each country were achieved, with varying degrees of difficulty in the data collection process' (Ibid., p.8).

Figure 1: Indicating Number and Areas of Respondents Surveyed in Each Region

Stakeholder group sample size Number of Interviews by region			
	Africa	Latin America	South Asia
Elected government	36	39	23
Non-elected government	103	37	36
Media	54	34	36
Multilateral/bilateral	42	34	33
NGO	73	35	41
Private Sector	67	36	45
Research/academia	76	38	38
Trade union	N/A	37	N/A

Source: GlobeScan 2011b, p. 10.

FINDINGS OF THE STUDY IN SOUTH ASIA

The results of the study are extensive and this paper highlights a selection of the findings relevant to South Asia. Full details of the survey and its findings are provided in the *Report of the Policy Community in South Asia* (GlobeScan 2011a); a global report was also prepared that synthesised findings across the three regions where the research was undertaken (GlobeScan 2011b). The presentation of the findings in this part of the paper follows the sequence indicated in the previous section.

Considering first the quality of policy making processes, respondents were asked to respond to the following question:
"Overall, how would you rate the quality of the current policy making process in your country?"

Since "quality" can be understood as a somewhat vague term, a definition was given to respondents, which included factors such as *'existence and use of mechanisms for national policy making and implementation; competency reputation of technocrats; participation by individuals other than policymakers in policy processes; openness of policy makers to expert (or technical advice); use of evidence in policy debates and formulation; transparency of the policy-making process'* (GlobeScan 2011b, p. 12). Majority stakeholders gave the quality of the policy-making process neutral ratings (Fig. 2).

Figure 2: Quality of Current Policy-Making Processes in Respondents' Country % of Total Respondents, by Country, South Asia, 2011



The white space in this chart represents ratings of (3); i.e. "Excellent" (4+5) minus "Poor" (1+2)
Scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is "Poor" and 5 is "Excellent."
Full sample *n*=244
Source: GlobeScan 2011a.

Although, there were no strong conclusions drawn from this question, it is interesting to note that government stakeholder respondents tended to rate the quality of policy processes more highly, whereas non-governmental organisations tended to be more critical. When considering the perceived ease of obtaining information, responses to this varied by topic, however. Respondents were asked:

"How easy or difficult is it to obtain information to support policy development in each of the following areas currently?" (Fig. 3)

Figure 3: Ease of Accessing Policy Relevant Information in Specific Areas % of Respondents, by Type of Information, South Asia



Key: Scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is "Very difficult" and 5 is "Very easy."
Sub-sample: those who require information about each issue for their work.
Source: GlobeScan 2011a.

The findings from the survey do not provide sufficient data to interpret the relative ease or difficulty of respondents in accessing specific types of information, but it is interesting to observe the ease of access to education-related information compared with access to information on foreign affairs and human rights. Given that peace, conflict and security issues are such significant topics of concern in South Asia, it is interesting that the majority of respondents in many countries find it difficult to access this information, although policy stakeholders in Pakistan found it easier to access information on human rights than in other South Asian countries. Further research will be necessary to understand the factors affecting this set-up.

Next the respondents were asked the perceived usefulness of information once it is accessed:

"How useful is the information you obtain to support policy development in each of the following areas currently?"

There were significant differences across stakeholders in terms of perceived utility of information received (Fig. 4).

Figure 4: Perceived Usefulness of Information obtained to Support Policy Development

	Total	Elected govern-ment	Non-elected govern-ment	Media	Multilateral/bilateral	NGO	Private sector	Research/academia
Education	56	69*	64	72	47	47	36	52
Trade/industry	52	75*	61	67	46*	23	47	48
Economic/fiscal issues	52	69*	65	60	36	36	55	48
Environment / natural resources / energy	51	61*	62	50	39	30	56	42
Poverty alleviation	51	68*	60	57	38	43	46	58
Health care	48	62*	54	58	39*	38	36	59
Agriculture / food security	46	67	45	54	31	34	46	48
Gender issues	38	60*	43	44	23	41	37*	25
Human rights	38	41*	47*	53	9	43	39	18*
Foreign affairs	32	50*	39*	35	27*	21	34*	27*
	Most useful	Note: two shades of green and yellow have been used when very little differences exist between the bottom or top two responses						
	Least useful							

Key: Scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is "Not very useful" and 5 is "Very useful."
**= small sample sizes for some issues within some stakeholder groups*
Source: GlobeScan 2011a.

Drawing a parallel with the findings from the previous question (Fig.3), it is notable that information relating to human rights and foreign affairs was not only difficult to access, but also perceived as not very useful once accessed, along with gender issues. In general, government and media stakeholders were the most positive about the information they receive; multilateral and bilateral stakeholders were the most critical. Government, media, multilateral and NGO stakeholders found similar types of information to be most useful, these being related to education, trade and economic issues. Private sector stakeholders found sources about the environment most useful, followed closely by economic issues; whilst research and academic stakeholders perceived information on heath care and poverty alleviation of most use.

In response to this same question, but analysing the data by country, it may be noted that there are considerable differences between States regarding the areas in which information is perceived as most useful (Fig. 5). There is variation on perceptions of usefulness from country to country, with no discernable pattern forming, although the value of information on foreign affairs scores low across the board. The perceived usefulness of information on agriculture and food security to Bangladesh stakeholders appears something of an outlier, and would be worth exploring further.

Figure 5: Perceived Usefulness of Information obtained to Support Policy Development

	Total	Bangladesh	India	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka
Education	56	60	56	57	48	53
Trade/industry	52	50	53	50	57	48
Economic/fiscal issues	52	54	45	61	54	50
Environment / natural resources / energy	51	46	49	58	45	55
Poverty alleviation	51	63	44	58	38	58
Health care	48	44	44	55	48	53
Agriculture / food security	46	68	40	55	28	38
Gender issues	38	40	31	54	45	21
Human rights	38	39	42	42	31	29
Foreign affairs	32	23	43	34	32	25

	Most useful
	Least useful

Key: Scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is "Not very useful" and 5 is "Very useful."

Source: GlobeScan 2011a.

A particularly interesting response was gleaned when respondents were asked the question: *"What format(s) of information exchange is most useful to support your involvement in national policy?"*

Although there are a number of rather popular communication channels used quite frequently by research organisations, the answers were surprising. Databases, online reports, and print publications are perceived as most useful by stakeholders, whilst policy briefs, online forums and newsletters were perceived as least useful.

On the issue of sources of data, respondents were asked the question:
"When you require information related to social and economic policies, what types of organisations do you typically turn to for research-based evidence?"

Respondents were offered a list of different organisation types to select from, including independent policy research institutions (as "think tanks" are defined within the Think Tank Initiative). It should be noted here that, similar to the case of areas of development, different organisational types may be somewhat open to interpretation. In some countries, independent policy research organisations may be classified as NGOs; they may undertake varying degrees of advocacy activities alongside their research work, depending on their strategy, mission and goals. Even with the possibility of alternative interpretation of organisation type, all stakeholder groups, with the exception of government stakeholders, said that think tanks are their primary source for information related to social and economic policies (Fig. 6). Government stakeholders, however, stated that the relevant government ministries or agencies were their preferred sources for research-based evidence, possibly because of a reluctance to go outside government sources for data. This finding has significant implications for the ways in which researchers outside government organisations go about engaging with policy actors. In general, stakeholders draw on their own organisation more heavily than others when selecting sources of information, perhaps indicating their relative comfort in consulting “their own”, when they require findings to feed into their policy-related activities.

Figure 6: Types of Organisations turned to by Policy Stakeholders as a Source for Research-based Evidence

	Total	Elected government	Non-elected government	Media	Multilateral/ bilateral	NGO	Private sector	Research/ academia
Independent policy research institutes	60	39	45	61	82	49	63	76
Relevant government ministries/agencies	56	78	71	55	48	41	45	55
International agencies	47	57	40	42	73	32	40	53
Government-owned research institutes	46	65	64	59	33	37	23	42
International university-based research institutes	36	17	40	32	39	31	20	58
Local/national advocacy NGOs	33	39	24	44	39	41	29	19
National university-based research institutes	30	26	47	38	24	27	20	26
Industry associations	27	30	34	44	15	4	46	21

Type of organisation used most often

Source: GlobeScan 2011a.

The survey sought to explore this issue in more depth, by asking respondents, based on their responses to the question regarding their sources, why they turned to a specific organisation most often. The findings drawn from this question (Fig. 7) revealed that relevance and quality of research are the primary reasons given for choosing an information source for the majority of stakeholders. NGO stakeholders rated the high quality of staff and researchers as the most important reason for their using a particular source of research-based evidence. Although personal contact is often cited, anecdotally, as a way in which policy linkages are formed, this did not score particularly highly as a reason for policy stakeholders to make use of a specified source.

Figure 7: Reasons Policy Stakeholders turn to Specific Organisations for Research based Evidence

	Government-owned research institutes (*n*=55)	Relevant government ministries/ agencies (*n*=53)	Independent policy research institutes (*n*=39)	International agencies (*n*=37)	National university based-research institutes (*n*=27)	Local/national advocacy NGOs (*n*=19)	Industry associations (*n*=18)	International university-based research institutes (*n*=14)
Relevance of research	33	42	31	51	30	53	33	36
High quality research	25	17	41	24	41	16	39	29
Only / one of few organisations of this type	18	11	10	5	0	0	0	0
High quality of staff/researchers	4	4	10	3	15	16	0	0
Personal contact	4	8	5	0	0	5	6	14
Only organisation of this type I am familiar with	4	2	0	0	4	0	6	7
Other	11	17	3	14	7	11	11	14

Subsample: Those who say they use type of institute as a primary source (5 on a 5-point scale)

Source: GlobeScan 2011a.

Finally, it is interesting to consider the relationship between responses made by respondents to two related questions:

"When you require information related to social and economic policies, what types of organisations do you typically turn to for research-based evidence?" and
"How would you rate each of these sources in terms of 'quality of research' provided to work on policy issues in your country?"

The response (revealed by showing the responses in a combined chart, Fig.8) was that both high quality and low quality sources of information were used frequently by stakeholders. The chart reveals that international agencies and think tanks are sources of research-based evidence that are used frequently by policy stakeholders and are considered to deliver high quality research. Although university-based research institutes are perceived to produce high quality research (particularly those based internationally), they are used relatively infrequently. Intriguingly, government-owned research institutes and relevant government ministries/agencies are perceived to produce low quality research, yet are used frequently as sources of information.

Figure 8: Analysis of Quality of Research compared with Frequency of Use



Source: GlobeScan 2011a.

The above findings presented fascinating insights into perceptions of policy makers regarding their need for, access to, and usefulness of research-based evidence. The findings could be summarised in the following points:

- The perceived ease of obtaining information varies by topic.
- There are significant differences across types of stakeholders in terms of perceived usefulness of information received.

- Perceived usefulness of information also varies by country.
- Databases, online reports, and print publications are perceived as most useful to stakeholders; policy briefs and newsletters are perceived as least useful.
- All stakeholder groups, with the exception of government stakeholders, say think tanks are their primary source for information related to social/economic policies.
- Relevance and quality of research are primary reasons given by policy stakeholders for choosing an information source.

The finding that both high quality and low quality sources of information are used frequently by stakeholders, is a matter of possible concern for the quality of policy-making processes in the South Asia region. The survey did not reveal specific findings on why information perceived as low quality is used extensively. It appears to stem partly from the fact that government stakeholders are regular users of information produced by governmental organisations, even though the quality of this information is perceived as relatively low. As to why international agencies are perceived as high quality sources of information that are used extensively, it would be important to explore through further research how such agencies have positioned themselves as suppliers of evidence to national policy processes. Are there forms of conditionality that accompany some donor financing, for example prioritizing engagement with certain international research institutions, thus elevating them to have a relatively high profile? The answer to such a question is not provided by the Policy Community Survey, and follow-up work will be required. It is interesting, however, that independent policy research institutions are seen as the most useful sources of research-based evidence by almost all stakeholders, and also receive the most frequent use. This suggests that such institutions already exercise a relatively high degree of influence that they can continue to capitalize upon as they engage further in national processes of policy debate and dialogue.

IMPLICATIONS

The findings of the Policy Community Survey suggest a number of implications for enhancing the role of independent policy research institutions in South Asia. If, by definition, such institutions act independently and are able to prioritise their research agenda based on a strong understanding of their national context and its development needs, there is a real opportunity for them to undertake research that can generate findings of direct use to policy actors. The study described in this paper does indicate that researchers also need to identify the most appropriate means of disseminating these findings, and that many policy actors have a particular need for access to databases that are perceived as credible and robust.

In order to help understand better the ways in which think tanks could enhance their contribution to national policy processes, policy actors were also asked to identify ways in which they felt that policy research institutes could best improve their performance. What could, or should they do to enhance their capacities to explore, analyse and determine future directions for some of the most intractable development challenges? The most common recommendations for research institutions included the following:

- Focus particularly on enhancing the quality and relevance of their research, and the availability of trained and experienced research staff;
- Strengthen institutional governance;
- improve the way they go about disseminating their findings, reaching out more effectively to policy makers and building on the trust that the Survey shows already exists;
- Strengthen public policy debate through more strategic relationships/ alliances between policy research institutions and policy actors, particularly where complementarities and synergies may be found; and
- Play in shaping the "demand side" of the policy context, as information needs can only grow in a post-MDG era.

CONCLUSION

According to most policy actors interviewed in the Policy Community Survey, there is room for improvement in the quality of policy-making processes in South Asia, although government stakeholders tend to have a more positive view of the quality of these processes. Policy actors prioritise information needs in poverty alleviation, economic issues, and the environment, with some significant national differences in expressed need for information in some aspects of development. Research-based evidence is perceived as often hard to get, and its usefulness and its quality are sometimes questioned; especially by policy actors who are outside government circles. Policy research institutions, or think tanks, are a key evidence source in all countries in the region, but government stakeholders still tend to get their information from government sources, even when the quality of that information is not seen as particularly high.

The study suggests that think tanks are in a position to make a significant contribution to policy processes by engaging with policy stakeholders to ensure that they do have access to relevant, high quality research-based evidence. Think tanks are, by and large, seen as trusted, relevant and credible by the majority of high-level policy stakeholders. However, since government stakeholders still prefer to access information from within their own system, it is clear that think tanks have work to do to build up more trust with policy actors in government, and to ensure that they can make their findings easily accessible to these same stakeholders when they need them. In addition, think tanks are just one type of information source amongst many others in the region. Different policy actors turn to a range of sources; some of these sources may have a higher profile than others historically, and are perhaps used habitually rather than because of their sustained research quality. Think tanks clearly have to earn their reputation. Even more challenging, they need to sustain their relevance and quality over time, in a region where post MDG development agendas continue to unfold in highly dynamic political, economic and social contexts.

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Challenges of Reflexive Governance and Sustainable Local Development in Rural Nepal

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ABSTRACT

Local governance is a key site of political participation in resource management and development. In post-conflict transitional politics, political subjects and power dynamics are rapidly evolving within the governance structure with strong impacts on development. This paper uses the 'reflexive governance' approach to analyse and understand the interwoven relationship between the local governance, its actors and the produced/reproduced practices which manifest themselves within Nepal's social systems. It focuses on the 'self-confrontation of governance' (Voss and Kemp 2006) and emergence of new kinds of institutions, strategies, processes and interactions in the local governance system in post conflict rural Nepal. It aims to answer two questions: how differently positioned people enact, subvert, and resist local governance and development projects; and, how local governance transpires through ordinary people's participation, networked arrangements and articulation of local state authority, and civil-society.

This paper reveals that local political parties 'claim' to be the real representatives of people, and act as if they are the legitimate state-actors, while in reality they pressurise local authorities to channelise resources through party-patronage relations, rather than making investments on the basis of problem analysis and local demands; and in doing so they control and subvert governance space. Given an inclusive governance policy of the Government and increased awareness level, local people claim their right to participate in decision-making, challenging the state through different strategies such as public protests, organised networks, and mandated representations. The author argues that given this, new non-state actors are emerging and overtly creating 'public space' for local governance. However, this space might become an 'elite space' in a materialistic and symbolic manner, thus, making the discourse of 'representation' contentious in the public sphere of rural Nepal.

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THE CONTEXT

Nepal's political system is in great transition. The unitary form of monarchical system and a decade long armed conflict (1996-2006) waged by the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) came to an end with the Peace Accord signed in 2006 between the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) and the government of seven-party-alliance. The Maoists agreed to end their armed struggle and admit the liberal-democratic political ambit ousting the King to constitute Nepal as a federal Republic. The Constituent Assembly election was held in 2008 -the only institution of people's elected representatives. The Constituent Assembly had a mandate to complete the peace process and constitution writing within two years. The transition has prolonged as the peace process, state restructuring and constitution writing has not been completed in time because political parties have deviated to infighting and competition for power. The constitution writing and peace process has been wrecked causing the extension of political transition and instability. Local bodies have been vacant for a decade since locally elected representation were dissolved and local elections could not be held due to the Maoist armed conflict. In this political transition, local governance transpires through the All Party Mechanism[1], an ad-hoc governance mechanism.

To facilitate local development, an Integrated Project Selection Committee is formed in each village development committee. It is an inclusive, advisory body where government agencies, political parties, civil society organisations, excluded and marginalised groups, *Dalits*, *Janajatis,* women and other stakeholders come together through mandated representation to discuss local issues for collective decision making.

After the restoration of democracy in 1990, village development committees have become important sites of governance practices, participation, distribution of resources and local development. The Local Self Governance Act 1999 (MOLJ 2004), which gives many state functions to village development committees, is considered a milestone to strengthen local governance and institutionalise grassroots democracy. However, it has not been fully implemented because of

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[1] The Government of Nepal's Ministry of Local Development scrapped the 'All Party Mechanism' (APM) on 3 January 2012. The Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) had directed the Government to scrap APM saying that it was against the law.

the armed conflict and dissolution of locally elected political representatives in 2002. Till now, there are no locally elected representatives and there are less likely chances of conducting local elections until a new constitution is drafted, ratified and the country is reconstituted into federal structures. Given these conditions, the secretary of a Village Development Committee is authorised to execute his/her powers as the VDC chairperson.

In this paper, the 'reflexive governance' (Voss et al. 2006) framework is used to analyse and understand the interwoven relationship between local governance, its actors and the social structures in the eastern hills of Nepal.

> '*Reflexive governance refers to the problem of shaping societal development in the light of the reflexivity of steering strategies – the phenomenon that thinking and acting with respect to an object of steering also affects the subject and its ability to steer*' (Voss and Kemp 2006, p. 4).

Since this framework questions the very foundation of governance itself and envisions alternative new foundations, it is useful to analyse the new, emerging institutions like the All Party Mechanism and Integrated Project Selection Committee, and interactions within the local governance system in post conflict rural Nepal.

The objectives of this research paper are to analyse how differently positioned people enact, subvert, and resist local governance and development projects; and how the All Party Mechanism and local authorities work together in rural Nepal's fragile political situation. It focuses on the processes used by government agencies, civil society and local people in dealing with the current transition and how local governance manages uncertainty, ambivalence and complexity through reflexive governance (Voss et al. 2006), the ideas '*network management*' (Kickert et al. 1997), *'public participation'* (Newman 2001) and emergence of new local institutions which challenge *'traditional state-centred forms of policy-making in deliberative democratic process'* (Swyngedouw 2005, p. 1992).

Data is derived from both primary and secondary sources: primary data from the author's doctoral research in three village development committees of Khotang district, the eastern middle hills district of Nepal. In-depth interviews have been conducted with semi-structured questionnaires. Snowball sampling technique has been used to select respondents and all together forty-five respondents were interviewed. Three focus group discussions were conducted, and Integrated Project Selection Committee and Village Council meeting observed.

REFLEXIVE GOVERNANCE: CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING

Governance is a complex phenomenon (Upadhyay 2006) of mechanisms, processes, relationships, and institutions through which citizens articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations, and mediate their differences. Governance addresses a wide range of issues like *'social, economic and political continuity, security and integrity, collective safety and liberty and rights of self-actualisation of citizens'* (Fox and Ward 2008, p.519). It is a method of distributing power and managing resources and problems. Berkes et al. (2003) argues that the fundamental problems a community faces might not be solved by a linear approach and classical models of resource management are inadequate and ineffective given changing dynamics and transitions. People relate their individual experiences to the social field to govern themselves with responsibilities with regard to them. Beck (2006) elaborates the concept of 'reflexive governance' with an emphasis on uncertainty and unpredictability. The 'reflexivity of governance' as suggested by Beck's notion of reflexive modernisation (Beck 1994) includes the possibility that certain governance patterns undermine themselves by inducing changes in the world that then affect their own working. He writes:

> *'It must be understood that, given the mere fact that the structures typical of classical, industrial modernity have been subverted and transformed, it by no means follows automatically that the society emerging from this subversion and transformation will be one which consciously reflects upon the changes which have produced it'* (Beck 1994, p.36).

According to Voss et al. (2006, p.4):

> *'Reflexive governance (refers to) the problems of shaping societal development in the light of reflexivity of steering strategies- the phenomenon that thinking and acting with respect to an object of steering also affects the subject and its ability to steer.'*

It is a mode of steering that is self-critical, and has its own reshaping continuously in mind (Hendriks and Grin 2006). It involves moving to *'a network-oriented form of strategic communication'* (Bevir 2007) and it most likely enhances dialogues and collaborative efforts among different actors and institutions. The reflexivity of everyday governance and interaction process with the external world makes it critical to existing scientific knowledge and governance process. Voss and Bornemann (2011) prescribe integrating the designs of reflexive governance with politics, of recognising the social learning process, developing safeguards against domination by powerful actors and considering governance in ongoing political dynamics. Fox and Ward (2008, p. 519) raise a crucial question *'how governance can be achieved and sustained within a social context imbued with cultural values and in which power is distributed unevenly and dynamically, and how governance impacts on individuals and institutions.'* They suggest a model of governance that is dynamic and responsive-in-action to address issues in an ever-changing climate. Rhodes (1997) and Sørensen and Torfing (2007) question the established forms of government centred governance and focus on 'governance without government' which explicitly refers to changes in processes and practices of governing in a socio-political sphere.

The power relations among actors of governance in post-conflict in Nepal are rapidly changing and new governance ensembles like the All Party Mechanism and Integrated Project Selection Committee are being formed. Local elections are doubtful, government has scrapped the All Party Mechanism and local governance transpires through bureaucratic mechanisms with uncertainty. As defined 'reflexive governance' is not only a mechanism of envisioning the future when the situation is uncertain (Williams 2006 quoted in Laurie 2011, p. 351), it is also a facilitation of learning and partnership to face future uncertainty (Wynne 1992). In case of Nepal where there is uncertainty and ambivalence in local polity, reflexive governance approach is a useful analytical framework.

LOCAL GOVERNANCE MECHANISM IN POST-CONFLICT RURAL NEPAL

Governance is process of exercising social, political and economic power. It is a result of interactions of many actors with their particular problems, goals and strategies to achieve them. So, local governance in rural Nepal involves conflicting interests and struggle for dominance in community and the local state structure and processes. The very preamble of the Local Self Governance Act 1999 states that it has been introduced to provide opportunity to sovereign people to participate in governance of the state and enjoy democracy at the local level. Local bodies have become important sites of local governance with many state functions. But for more than a decade, there has been no effective local government as there are no elected representatives in local bodies. Until a new provision is made and elections held at the local level, bureaucrats hold the chair of local government bodies. The Village Development Fund Operation Guidelines (2067 BS[2]) for the Village Development Committees, the local governing body (hereafter called VDCs), has envisioned an Integrated Project Selection Committee[3] (MOLD 2010) popularly known as the All Party Mechanism (at the local level) to manage the local development fund, transpire local governance and carry out local development projects in rural Nepal. The Integrated Project Selection Committee is inclusive in its nature which brings together civil society organisations and political parties; and has mandatory representation of women and different caste/ethnic groups.

ALL PARTY MECHANISM AND MANAGEMENT OF LOCAL PROBLEMS

After the Constituent Assembly election in 2008, the Maoist led government, through its budget speech, proposed to establish an interim apparatus to fill the political vacuum and complete absence of accountability and make local bodies responsible towards the people until new elections were held. In this political transition, there are three major actors in local governance: the bureaucracy, political parties and civil society organisations (CSOs). There are conflicting interests, interactions and understanding between these actors, VDC secretary, political parties and other mandated representatives from CSOs. The VDC secretary as chairperson claims and tries to exercise authorised power, on the other hand, political parties claim that they are the legitimate authority because they are peoples' representatives. They claim that the VDC secretary cannot

[2] BS: Bikram Sambat used in Nepali calendar. It is around 57 years earlier than AD.

[3] The Integrated Project Selection Committee is a different institution from the All Party Mechanism since it has representation of all political parties and has mandated representation of civil society organisations, marginalised groups, women, *Dalits* and *Janajatis*. Ordinary people generally understand the All Party Mechanism and Integrated Project Selection Committee as being the same ensemble and use the terms interchangeably.

challenge decisions made by the All Party Mechanism which is a powerful agency in local governance. Local authority cannot challenge its decisions, rather it challenges local authority. One civil society organisation leader in Bamrang VDC opines:

> *'The village development committee secretary enjoy legal authority, however, practically it is different in the villages. Practically, authority comes from the capacity of the leaders and the party or organisations they belong to. Their affiliation and capacity matters most. The powerful and clever leaders make decisions in their favour from the All Party Mechanism and the secretary has to put his/her sign on the document to authorise it legally.'*[4]

The Integrated Project Selection Committee is a new ensemble and platform of local governance in post-conflict transition. The three governance actors (bureaucrats, political party and civil society) use this platform to debate and discuss local development issues, local problems, and other governance issues. This institution might subvert existing caste, gender or class-based hegemonic power relation in local governance which might create new political subjectivity in the community. Competing and conflicting interests mostly arise in project selection, screening and prioritisation. Sometimes, because of political actors and political influences, the Selection Committee fails to finalise projects to be implemented by the VDC causing delay in implementation which has negative effects on development. A civil society representative in the Integrated Project Selection Committee, (which he believes to be the All Party Mechanism), remarks:

> *'It is good to discuss local problems reflexively. But sometimes individual and political interests to channelise budgets to their own area may create problems in local development. Because of these things, we could not allocate budget in time and Ama Samuha (Mother's group) organised a public protest against the All Party Mechanism. They challenged the political parties and chanted slogans pressurising to allocate budget in time as per their needs and demands. People*

[4] Interviewed on 24 December 2010.

> *have realised that if they do not put pressure on the political parties and local authority, they will be deprived from the governance process.'*[5]

The local governance process itself does not work efficiently and actors need to exert pressure to get things done. Local authority and political party leaders channelise the local development fund and resources through their patronage and party relation. One of the *Dalit* people expressed his dissatisfaction with the local authority as well as *Dalit* leaders for not listening to their agendas. He questioned the process of *Dalit* inclusion:

> *'Are there provisions for Dalit representation in local governance through what we have received? Only the rich and educated are enjoying in the name of Dalit. Nobody cares for Dalit's dukha (hardships). We are poor. Our children cannot go to school. Government needs to think of those poor not the elites. Our voices remain unheard. We can do nothing. The inclusion should start from the poor not from the rich. The new kind of hegemony is produced and reproduced within the group by the ruling elite*s.' [6]

He lamented that *Dalit* people are deprived of information and protested against local authority and local leaders since the VDC secretary sends letters to the *ward* level political and civil society leaders who do not make the information public.

In Nepal, class and caste intersects in local governance. Sometimes *Dalit* leaders neglect agendas of their own people and collaborate with high caste and class which hinders substantial participation of local *Dalits* in decision making like *ward* meetings and village council meetings. The reflexivity of this phenomena encourages local people to be organised and prepared to put pressure on local authority and representatives for making decisions in their favour. In the village council meeting, people stay outside the meeting hall to protest if their needs and problems are not addressed. People analyse the risk (Beck 1994) of negation of their agendas in local state and adopt different strategies as shared in the coming sections for having their voices heard.

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[5] Interviewed on 26 December 2010.
[6] Interviewed on 23 December 2009.

Networked Associations

After the restoration of democracy in 1990 in Nepal, there was a wave of organisational development at the local level. The emergence, proliferation and active encouragement of local level organisations like mothers' groups, youth clubs, and users' group have encouraged people's participation in local governance, institutionalisation of democracy and reflection of socio-economic interests (Hachhethu 2002). These kinds of organisational arrangements at the local level have been involved in 'governing' which has played a greater role in policy-making, administration and implementation of development activities. One local ex-representative of the Village Development Committee from Diktel believes:

> *'People are organised in one or more organisations like mothers' group, community forestry users groups, youth clubs, users' group, small saving and credit groups, etc., in the post 1990 democratic era. These organisations were functional in the villages even during a decade long Maoist armed conflict when the local government was non-functional in rural Nepal. These groups and organisations participated in the local governance practices during the armed conflict in the absence of formal government apparatus in the villages.'*[7]

Similar to Somalia's case where *'governance without government has been shaped by the evolving interests and adaptations of a range of actors'*, (Menkhaus 2007, p. 77), local actors shape post-conflict local governance in Nepal. The secretary of Bamrang VDC remarks that the central government provides a guideline, but the local state, political parties, development partners, civil society, and networked associations decide their needs and priorities through deliberative actions. Local networks have become strong through formal and informal local organisations which have a significant role in empowering people, enhancing democracy and institutionalising democratic governance through 'Networked Associations' (Swyngedouw 2005). Deprived and marginalised local communities claim their rights in local development activities through these associations. One female

[7] Interviewed on 22 December 2010.

activist from Bamrang VDC who fought for women rights to participate in the village council meeting said:

> *'When I was trying to participate in the village council meeting in 2005, local political leaders given patriarchal social norms and values, did not allow me to participate. They said that I was not the representative of any political party and I could not attend the meeting because the meetings are organised by the chairman of VDC and only his invitees (political representatives and civil society members) can attend. At that time, locally elected representatives were dismissed and the bureaucratic mechanism was controlling local governance. When I was not allowed to enter the meeting hall, I felt distressed and tried to develop a network among local women groups. I convinced them and we protested against the discrimination against women in local decision making. Since then, we have our representative in the meeting and our 'say' in policy-making, administration and implementation.'*[8]

This suggests that the legal and technical procedures of 'the state' can sometimes be a means of domination and exploitation. In such cases, collective self-organisation and deliberative actions can challenge existing technocratic governance and institutionalise democratic governance at the local level.

Normally, an elite group of politicians and bureaucrats make decisions and ordinary people (who are not powerful enough to influence them) might face long-term consequences in their lives and livelihoods (UNDP 2008). However, disadvantaged groups through networked associations can subvert these decision making structures envisioning alternatives and reshapeing the foundation of governance to solve problems.

The trend of organising themselves in a group has increased the capacity of local people and they can speak out in the public sphere. They put their demands forward in the village council and if the village council does not address their genuine demands, they protest through peaceful means like public demonstrations and group pressure. Such practices by the community have

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[8] Focus group discussion with women on 23 December 2010.

strengthened and institutionalised democratic culture and governance at the grassroots level of rural Nepal.

The participation of women in community organisations, saving and credit groups, and mothers' groups have helped them to be organised, develop 'horizontal networks and arrangements' and develop 'governance without government' (Rhodes 1997; Sørensen and Torfing 2007). These associations make local people empowered and organised enough to put their demands collectively and be involved in post-conflict governance and state building which makes the process easier through a 'mediated state' (Menkhaus 2007).

Public Participation

As per the change in the socio-political process, awareness level of people has increased. They claim their rights and make collective effort to put forward their demands publicly. The political discourse and slogans during the insurgency period (Maoists had challenged the existing state governance system and practiced a parallel government in the name of 'peoples' government' in most of rural Nepal), mass movement 2006, and advocacy and awareness programmes of civil society, I/NGOs, different caste/ethnic groups, and women have created a political space required for substantial transformative process (Sharma and Domoni 2010) at the grassroots level and rural parts of the country.

Nepal has gradually shifted to neo-liberalism since 1990 which claims to solve problems of governance by logic of market forces and citizens' participation in choosing representatives for government through a periodic election system. However, it cannot address issues of social equity and public participation sufficiently. The governance system is controlled by a group of elites and 'exclusionary democratic governance' (Lawoti 2010) continues in parliamentary multiparty democracy. A poor farmer of Buipa VDC in Khotang remarks:

> *'Local users groups are a good platform for ensuring public participation in local governance. However, local elites and political leaders control these organisations. Because of the socio-cultural structures, norms and values, poor and marginalised groups are still excluded. When we try to speak, the village head and other people say that we do not know the process and system. We, poor people, are excluded in local development and other community activities. We are not supposed to speak in the public sphere and even if we speak, our voices*

> *are unheard. So, we generally remain silent and listen to them. We may not know the process but we know our problems and our needs should be addressed in democracy. Democracy has not come for us.'*[9]

The liberalisation process, accompanied by decentralisation of governance and institutionalisation of the democratic practices has favoured the emergence of user groups and associations at the local level. However, the poor farmer of Buipa points out that democratic governance is not in favour of poor people. Another *Dalit* woman from Buipa lamented that though the government has ensured *Dalit* participation in local governance through mandatory representation and allocated some budget to marginalised communities like *Dalit*, *Janajatis* and deprived groups, the clever and elites from the same communities enjoy that provision. She questions:

> *'Is there significant representation of Dalits and other deprived groups in the Constituent Assembly in democratic republic of Nepal? They are making houses in Kathmandu. The situation is same at the local level as well. Only the rich and educated are enjoying resources in the name of Dalit. The scholarships which are allocated for Dalit students are enjoyed by Dalit elites who have access to politics and information. Nobody cares for us.'*[10]

Given the comments above, one can see that the discourse about effective participatory governance (Chhotray and Stoker 2009) is still ongoing, perplexing and contentious with regard to local governance in rural Nepal.

Differently Positioned People

Ordinary people claim that the slogans and doctrines of political parties are rarely respected by local leaders. Informal interactions with the latter highlight the ubiquitous local problems and power relations of caste, class and gender. Some people use political networks and party relations, while those who do not have easy access to political leaders go to community leaders. With the emergence and development of new local organisations after the 1990 political

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[9] Interviewed on 27 December 2010.
[10] Interviewed on 23 December 2010.

changes, many people use their group's strengths and networks to get things done at the local level. For example, Amrita (name changed) is the chairperson of a saving and credit cooperatives. Her husband is a community leader and she is educated as compared to other women in the community, both of which make her influential. She is also involved in women empowerment activities in the communities. When she discovered that the village council meeting was not supposed to allocate the budget without agreement of the women's group, she organised a public protest in front of the VDC office to pressurise the local authority to allocate budget for women empowerment programmes.

It is interesting to note that while the trend of being organised has increased and those who are organised in networks protest to get things done, there is still a huge mass of deprived people who are yet to be organised. The disadvantaged people claim that the local state, political actors and civil society do not listen to them nor do they address their concerns unless they are organised. Though local governance is inclusive in structure, the disadvantaged within disadvantaged groups are still struggling for participation. In one of the village council meetings, there were more than one hundred ordinary people on the premises of a primary school. The local state authority, political party representatives and representatives from civil society organisations were discussing and debating projects recommended by the Integrated Project Selection Committee to be funded in that fiscal year. The public outside was divided into different groups, all waiting for the decisions to see if their needs had been addressed. They were pressurising local authority and political leaders not to be unjust to their needs and concerns. However, even though all the people could not participate in final decision-making, they were making their presence felt by protesting outside the meeting room.

Had there been regular periodic elections, people might have subverted and reacted through periodic participation in choosing their representatives for the government. But during this transitional period, they are denied this opportunity. In Dec. 2009, the author observed a public hearing programme in Diktel, headquarter of Khotang district. People were criticising and challenging political actors, civil society leaders and the public authorities for their unjust activities. People asked pointed questions from authorities and political actors face-to-face in the public sphere. One of the participants of the programme said that it was the right forum to challenge authority and participate in the governance structure.

If things are not done effectively, people make it public through the media, public-hearing programmes and by organising protests. Regular interaction, network arrangements and interface between citizens and local authority can challenge and transform Nepal's governance processes at the grassroots level. However, these processes are complex and interconnected with class, caste, gender, and power relations. The perception and understanding of local people about the concept of inclusive governance is paradoxical e.g. there are differing views regarding inclusion of women in local governance. One female participant in a village council meeting remarked that because of mandated representation, women participation had increased. However, women standing outside the meeting hall dismissed this as 'tokenism' and were demanding a more influential role in the governance.

Implementation of Local Projects

Management of the local development fund has a provision for implementing local development projects through users' group (MOLD 2010). Projects can be implemented either through users' group (projects with estimated cost up to NRS six million) or through private contractors in case user group are unable to implement. However, a local state funded project hardly requires private contractors. User groups are formed involving local beneficiaries who ensure participation of women, *Dalits* and ethnic communities. A monitoring and evaluation committee headed by the chairperson of the VDC, with the help of local civil society members, bureaucrats, and technocrats, together monitor the projects.

The erstwhile conflicting parties share similar political and governance space and play a role in policy-making, administration, implementation and monitoring, and we see local state apparatus, civil society and private contractors joining hands in local development. When the monitoring committee approves that the work has been done as per contract, the VDC gives final instalment of the budget. The user groups and private contractors are controlled by different layers i.e. community people, monitoring committee and the local state authority. This is 'governing beyond the government' in which socially innovative institutional or quasi-institutional arrangements of governance are organised as horizontal associational networks of user groups, local organisations, civil society (usually NGOs) and state actors (Swyngedouw 2005; Dingwerth 2004). Local state authority manages and solves problems of governance and other development works through interaction with different sections of people, stakeholders and civil society at different level according to the socio-cultural and political context. This redefines the very foundations of governance. One of the very strong theoretical facets of reflexive governance - of learning at different levels through interactions – is therefore reflected in local governance in rural Nepal.

CONCLUSION

During the current political transition, political parties in Nepal are exerting an influential role through the All Party Mechanism, though it is only an advisory body from a legal perspective. Local political leaders pressurise local authorities to channelise resources through their party-patronage relations rather than making investments on the basis of problem analysis and local needs. The Integrated Project Selection Committee brings local state authority, civil society organisations, political parties, representatives of women and different caste/ethnic groups together in local governance which is reflective of 'governance-beyond-the-government'.

The provision of mandated representation has provided some space to marginalised and excluded groups. However, the space is largely captured by elites of marginal groups and there arise questions about true representation. Self-confronting views are produced and reproduced through every day practices. However, public participation, network arrangements and articulation of state, civil-society and market possibly create a platform to make reflexive analysis of societal problems collectively. The All Party Mechanism has emerged as a new governance structure, which puts into perspective collective processes to define and analyse societal problems, formulates processes and structures to solve them. Conflicting interests and struggles to make decisions by direct participation or indirect pressure on local authority and political parties has lead to the creation of new governance structures like the Integrated Project Selection Committee. These *'horizontally networked tripartite compositions'* (Swyngedouw 2005) are empowering democracy producing new forms of governance and shaping societal development in light of the *'reflexivity of steering strategies'* (Voss and Kemp 2006) which demonstrate meaningful readjustment and realignment of problems and understanding self beliefs in rural Nepal. Public participation, network arrangements and articulation of state-civil-society and market are gradually creating a platform for collective reflexive analysis of societal problems. In this regard, *'reflexive governance'* both as an interaction process between the state, civil society and people reflecting local problems; and as an analytical tool for policy makers might address governance challenges effectively and possibly be the way ahead in the uncertain and ambivalent state in post-conflict rural Nepal.

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Redefining Paradigms of Sustainable Development

Abid Q. Suleri*

The development scene across the globe is a mixed bag of success stories, partial achievements and utter failures. Similar approaches to development that have worked well in some countries, have had limited success in some other places and did not work at all in many other parts of the world. Consequently many social, economic and environmental problems have survived, and in some cases multiplied, despite numerous efforts to overcome them. Many countries and regions are still facing violence, poverty, food insecurity, gender inequality, energy shortage, consequences of climate change and many other issues.

For the exponents of sustainable development, these are all symptoms of the disease called unsustained and unsustainable development. If a rising economic tide does not lift all boats equitably and leaves many hanging on precariously or even down under, it will, not surprisingly, cause a lot of damage in its wake. This is what the unsustainable development model does: It makes societies unfairly divided along lines of class, creed, caste and gender and it pulverises nature without considering its disastrous environmental consequences. In many places, it has already led to social conflicts and tensions, even wars, over the unfairly distributed economic pie and shrinking natural resources.

Champions of the Washington Consensus, which puts economic growth above all other social and environmental considerations, may like to argue that such prioritisation has led to poverty reduction on a large-scale. But those pushing for it have paid little attention to the structural causes of chronic and acute underdevelopment such as inequality of opportunities and assets, and of distributional consequences of growth. What is even worse is that strict conditionalities applied under the Washington Consensus leave next to no space for social and environmental policies to address the resulting inequalities and

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hazards, thereby undermining even the thought of sustainable development in many countries.

Unsustainable development also gambles away tomorrow for today's gains. Its negative social and environmental impacts lead to only one scenario: an ever-dwindling economic dividend for the future generations. In the long term, an unsustained development model does not even achieve what it purports to achieve at the expense of so much else: Economic Growth. The Green Revolution, for instance, did take care of hunger and food shortage in many countries. But look at what it left behind – polluted and weakened soil, poisoned and depleting water resources, and inorganic agriculture produce heavily dependent on environmentally hazardous fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides. Even its economic gains are now paling into insignificance under the shadow of its harmful medical and environmental consequences.

It is but logical that, in order to be sustainable, a 'development idea' should be relevant for all people, in all countries, in all conditions and for all times to come. In other words, a sustainable development model has to be dynamic, transdisciplinary and ever-evolving.

To come up to these challenges, many academicians, development practitioners, activists and policy analysts have consistently argued for a paradigm shift in development theories, policies and practices. Some recent global efforts at identifying a new development paradigm include the 1992 Earth Summit, the 1994 United Nations Conference on Population and Development, the 1995 Copenhagen Social Summit, the 2000 Millennium Declaration, and the 2012 Rio+20 conference.

All these mega events to propose, prescribe, test and analyse different development approaches have taken place in the foreground of momentous economic, technological, political and demographic changes, especially in developing countries. While globalisation of finance and trade has eased the flow of goods and money across national borders like never before and advancement in information and communication technology has drastically brought down barriers separating people in different parts of the world or different regions in the same country, there have been a lot of political instability and an unprecedented bulge in youth population in many developing countries. All these factors together have necessitated a rethink: do the existing development policies cater to the needs of societies in the throes of such a massive shake-up? The obvious answer is that they do not; otherwise the world would not be witnessing so much violence and turmoil.

The next big question is how to change the policies which have not worked? There are no readymade answers and certainly it makes little sense to offer one in a small volume like this which, instead, focuses on how to learn from local communities -- in whose name development prescriptions are formulated – in finding the most suitable and most sustainable solutions.

The book indeed leapfrogs some distance in the evolution of development theory. Policymakers in the distant past were convinced that people do not know what would work for their development and what would not. Somebody, therefore, needed to tell them what suited them the best. In the colonial era, it was known as white man's burden. But the post-colonial states realised, of course after a lot of tensions, conflicts and violence, that such a top down approach to development was not working any more. Along came the idea in the recent decades of consulting local communities in order to understand what they needed the most. Still, under this model they were recipients of development wisdom rather than generators of it and in most cases consultation processes were rigged to continue the same colonial model of development. Also, consultation without the power to take decisions and allocate resources only created more confusion and frustration among people who had started harbouring ambitions of becoming the masters of their own development.

This in turn led to a new paradigm: the development community thought that people needed to be trained and facilitated to unleash their development potential and to enhance their development choices. While the jury is still out on the merits and demerits of such an approach, another shift has already taken place in the meanwhile – how and what the development community can learn from its perceived "subjects" and "target (communities)". It is this subject that the book explores, leapfrogging over the flaws of the previous approaches.

In this latest paradigm, as the readers have seen in the previous chapters, people facing different development challenges themselves show the way to sustainability. Contributors to this volume have highlighted how development policies can be more successfully sustainable if they are devised and implemented in the light of lessons learned through development discourses and actions at the grassroots level. Certainly each one of them has tackled a different dimension of sustainable development, but together they have posed an important challenge to the current discourses on growth and development.

Take the case of those living in and around forests. From imposing laws to protect trees from the dwellers of forests to involving them in a joint management mechanism, the states have adopted different approaches and, as the case of Swat in Pakistan shows, with limited success. Under the paradigm that the book proposes, people should be seen as custodians of forests and not as their enemies. This is what **Sultan-i-Rome** has advocated: chronic disputes over forest ownership between the state and the people in Swat (a former princely state and now a district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) should be resolved by recognising local people as owners of the forests. He argues that people's right to earn their livelihood from forest resources around them should also be recognised. Once this approach is adopted, those dependent on forests for their bread and butter will find that a sustainable use of forest resources is in their very own interests. The need to have sustainable resources of livelihood will lead to sustainable forest management, he writes, thus redefining and reconfiguring "participatory forest management" as promoted by the International Financial Institutes (IFIs).

An echo of what **Sultan-i-Rome** is proposing in a Pakistani context can be found in **Purna Nepali's** chapter on access to land resources and power relations in Nepal. Nepali discusses issues about access to land and livelihood and argues that such access is inexorably tied to class, caste and gender. In this, the writer is emphasising the historically known truth that distribution of land is a chronic source of imbalance in power relations.

Citing the case of state-owned forests in Indian state of Uttarakhand in the Himalayas, **Bhagwati Joshi** and **Prakash Tiwari** suggest that adaptation is the best way to cope with adverse impacts of climate change. To them, giving people greater access to forests through forest *panchayats* would result in strengthening adaptation strategies that communities living in the forests could apply against climate change. This type of joint forest management may empower local communities to augment their capacity for resilience in the face of changes taking place in the climate. The authors also suggest that local and conventional mechanisms for forest management such as forest *panchayats* should be linked to global carbon markets and REDD plus initiatives. This will give the forest communities a stake in the sustainability of forests and will ensure a sustainable livelihood strategy for them.

The chapter on REDD+ implementation in Nepal takes the same argument forward. The writers of the chapter, **Bhaskar Singh Karky, Seema Karki, Eak B. Rana** and **Rajan Kotru**, discuss five important innovative interventions in the field of participatory forest management and community forestry. They also suggest replicating successful pilot projects in other countries of South Asia which have ecosystems and culture similar to that of Nepal.

Conflicts over access and ownership of natural resources of livelihood, however, are not limited to those between the state and local communities. In many cases, such conflicts have existed between different communities dependent on the same natural resource. In Sri Lanka, for example, local and migrant fishing communities have been fighting over who has the right to fish and where. The civil war in that country has forced thousands of people to migrate from their native lands to other areas. This, argue **Gayathri Lokuge** and **Mohamed Munas,** has led to competition and conflict between the migrants and the local fishing community in eastern Sri Lanka. Resources are scarce and the competition is tough so this may lead to violence between the two groups. The authors recommend that one solution to the problem could be to introduce alternative livelihood strategies for fishing communities so as to diversify their resource base and reduce the pressure on and competition for the existing resources.

Do such alternative livelihood strategies, as proposed by **Gayathri Lokuge** and **Mohamed Munas,** work and if they do what could be the conditions in which they would be successful? In chaotic political and social settings leading to and resulting from violent conflict, it would be difficult to determine who could be the real stakeholder and beneficiaries of such strategies. Talking about such challenges in Nepal, **Tulasi Sharan Sigdel** argues how it is important to remove the chaff from the grain and find out who the real stakeholders are at the local level. Discussing the links between local governance and development in rural areas, he shows how political parties, as well as non-state actors, claim to be representatives of the people and try to take over the governance space. He concludes that reflexive governance may be the way forward for tackling many governance challenges in a post-conflict Nepal.

Another study from Nepal suggests that some innovative strategies may be more successful in certain circumstances. Writing about Nangi village, **Safal Ghimire** shows how a wi-fi installation project has led to remarkable impact on the lives of local people. It has made a huge contribution to health, education and livelihood options in the village. From facilitating online selling and buying portals, to virtual education and tele-medicine clinics – the project has improved people's lives in this remote and far-flung locality in more ways than one. The author argues how a single man's initiative to bring development to his conflict-wrecked and undeveloped hometown has transformed an entire community with just one move.

The need for adaptation of innovative solutions and transformative advances is also highlighted by **Aneel Salman, Bilal Hamid** and **Attique-Ur-Rehaman** in their chapter on the imperatives of a hydrogen society for South Asia and Pakistan. The authors maintain that the complex challenges posed by climate change to modern technology require researchers to delve into unfamiliar territory such as hydrogen energy especially in countries like Pakistan.

All these case studies point to the future – a future of sustainable development led and shaped by the people themselves. But they also point to something else -- starkly contrasting past and present in which both the governments and the non-governmental sector in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal have failed to address structural imbalances in people's access to natural resources of livelihood.

As discussed earlier, most of these earlier approaches to development have led to disastrous consequences like climate change. The link between climate change and food security is well documented from across the world and a **perception study** conducted in four countries -- Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan – clearly brings out the fact that the two are strongly linked to each other. The authors of the study, **Bipul Chatterjee** and **Manbar Khadka**, find out that the farmers in all these countries seem to know well how unexpected and unprecedented floods and droughts have had negative impacts on their livelihood. The study then moves on to gauge the financial extent of such an impact through projections made from real situations. In Afghanistan, for example, approximately 7.4 per cent rice yield was lost in 2005 due to climate factors. Projected over 50 similar periods, such a loss would amount to 26 billion US dollars. Supported with extensive data, the study recommends strategies to counter climate change. These include removing political barriers and establishment of regional food banks, sharing of knowledge and experience (both scientific data as well as local wisdom), and investing in joint research for and production of climate resilient crops.

Many other development challenges spring from factors which have got little to do with nature, and yet hamper effective implementation of development policies and strategies in a massive way. Some of these are linked to information and research about policy development and policy implementation. In most South Asian countries, these two subjects remain exclusive domains of state bureaucracies with little input from independent researchers.

In making a case for facilitating and strengthening independent research to produce better results in fields such the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), **Peter Taylor** highlights how researchers outside policy making and implementation circles face serious challenges to get relevant information. His paper focuses on the initiatives launched by South Asian policy research organisations in the light of post-MDGs policy-making and bases its findings on surveys from five South Asian countries. He suggests as to how independent research organisations (think-tanks) can build their reputation and contribute towards national policy processes by engaging with credible and high-level stakeholders. Such think-tanks, if have their roots among local communities and access to the top decision makers, can bridge the void between local wisdom and state policies.

As has been recorded by so many experts around the world, the single-minded unsustainable focus on economic growth has led to many problems in fields as diverse as crop yields and human, political, economic and gender rights in developing societies. **Bipul Chatterjee** and **Joseph George** argue that some of these problems can be addressed by shifting the focus of existing economic policies, especially in South Asia. Making a strong case for economic cooperation and trade liberalisation across South Asia, they explain how political and strategic considerations have trumped initiatives which may benefit consumers across the region to the tune of 1.9 billion US dollars every year through tariff reduction under the South Asian Free Trade Agreement. The writers, therefore, argue that shifting the focus of trade liberalisation and economic cooperation in the region to consumer welfare may give a greater impetus to these measures. They also say that initiatives for collaboration among consumer organisations may act as a catalyst in creating lasting and effective liaison between South Asian countries.

In two other chapters, the book has taken up the issues of religious freedom and women's rights. The contributions reveal how exclusionary discourses and politics are strongly rooted in the development paradigm that has led to contests and conflicts over sources of livelihood, jobs, administrative and military power etc. In his paper, **Ali Usman Qasmi** takes up the subject of religious identity leading to a segregated polity along religious lines, resulting in the religious, political and economic exclusion of Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan. In a similar vein, **Fidaa Shehada** discusses how a nascent movement by Palestinian women could not be effective, mainly because it was exclusionary and fragmented, in line with the exclusionary and fragmented economic and development paradigm. She says women's activism in Palestine could not transform into an effective social movement because it remained constricted to a minority and failed to include marginalised women. Shehada foresees no major change in Palestine as far as the women's national and collective rights are concerned so long as non-liberal economic and development regimes remain in place in the neighbouring Arab countries.

The case studies, gathered from Pakistan to Palestine, compiled for this volume highlight the need for changing existing paradigms of development. The evidences that local wisdom does deliver in most cases may be used as guiding principle to determine what improvements are required in current development discourses. It is such country-specific and evidence-based case studies which allow us to move away from one-size-fits-all approach and device out of the box solution for reshaping a future which allows inclusive growth and sustainable development. Respecting micro-level examples is all the more important today in order to find local solutions which have local ownership and acceptability.

REDEFINING PARADIGMS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA

SDPI'S FOURTEENTH SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE
13-15 DECEMBER 2011

CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

Tuesday, 13 December 2011	Day One
Opening Plenary	**9:30 am –11:30 am**
Introduction to the Conference: Dr. Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan **Welcome Address:** Dr. Saeed Shafqat, Chairperson, Board of Governors, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan **Book Launch:** SDC 2010 Anthology, *'Peace and Sustainable Development in South Asia: The Way Forward'* **Launch of SDPI's Annual Report** **Remarks by the Chief Guest:** Mr. Syed Naveed Qamar, Federal Minister for Water and Power, Islamabad, Pakistan. **Keynote Speaker:** Dr. Sabina Alkire, Director, Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, Oxford University, UK **Plenary Title:** Multidimensional Poverty Index	
	Discussion
Tea / Coffee	**11:30 am – 12 noon**

Tuesday, 13 December 2011	Day One
Concurrent Panel A-1	**12 noon – 2:00 pm**

Title: Livelihood Options in Conflict-Affected Situations – Session I

Chair: Dr. Ashfaq Hasan Khan, National University of Sciences and Technology, Islamabad, Pakistan

Special comments by: Mr. Richard Mallett, Overseas Development Institute, London, UK

Panel Organisers: Dr. Babar Shahbaz, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

Dr. Bishnu Raj Upreti, Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (North-South), Nepal

Dr. Abid Q. Suleri, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

Speakers	**Title**
Dr. Babar Shahbaz, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	Social Safety Nets in Conflict Affected Areas: The Case of Battagram, Pakistan
Mr. Safal Ghimire, Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South, Nepal	ICTs as a Livelihood Option during Conflict: A Study of Nangi Village, Nepal
Ms Gayathri Lokuge, Centre for Poverty Analysis, Sri Lanka	Whose Rights to Livelihood Matter? A Case Study of Local and Migratory Fishermen in the Conflict Affected Regions of Sri Lanka

Discussion

Lunch	**2:00 pm - 3:00 pm**

Tuesday, 13 December 2011	Day One
Concurrent Panel A-2	**12 noon – 2:00 pm**
Title: Literature in South Asia: Building Bridges through Fact and Fiction **Chair:** Dr. Saba Gul Khattak, Member Board of Governors, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan **Special comments by:** Mr. Harris Khalique, Islamabad, Pakistan **Panel Organiser:** Ms Ayesha Salman, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Ms Ayesha Salman, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	Myriad Platforms for Development Discourse
Ms Sushma Joshi, Writer and Filmmaker, Kathmandu, Nepal	Fiction and the Facts: Writing the History of Development in Nepal
Ms Ameena Hussein, Writer and Publisher, Colombo, Sri Lanka	A Minority within a Minority
Discussion	
Lunch	**2:00 pm – 3:00 pm**

Tuesday, 13 December 2011	Day One
Concurrent Panel A-3	**12 noon – 2:00 pm**
Title: Interrogating Citizenship and the Question of Marginality **Chair:** Prof. Dr. Yunas Samad, University of Bradford, UK **Special comments by:** Dr. Peter Taylor, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada; and, Dr. Tahir Kamran, Cambridge University, UK **Panel Organiser**: Dr. Tahir Kamran, Cambridge University, UK	
Speakers	**Title**
Dr. Ali Usman Qasmi, University of London, England	Debates and Discourses on the Ideals of Polity and Identity
Dr. Yaqoob Khan Bangash, Forman Christian College, Lahore, Pakistan	From Subjects to Citizens: Integrating the Princely States into Pakistan
Mr. Ali Salman, Islamabad, Pakistan	Citizenship, Voting and Marginality in Pakistan: A Public Choice Perspective
Discussion	
Lunch	**2:00pm – 3:00 pm**

Tuesday, 13 December 2011	Day One
Concurrent Panel A-4	**12 noon – 2:00 pm**
Title: An Analysis of Land Rights Situation in Pakistan **Chair:** Ms Sharmila Farooqi, Member National Assembly of Pakistan **Special comments by:** Dr. Lubna Chaudhry, Visiting Fellow, SDPI; and, State University of New York, Binghamton, USA **Panel Organiser:** Ms Mehnaz Paracha, Oxfam International, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Mr. Nasar Hayat, Independent Consultant, Islamabad, Pakistan	Women's Property Rights and Legal Issues in Pakistan
Mr. Zulfiqar Shah, Institute of Social Movement, Hyderabad, Pakistan	Assessment of Land and Housing Rights in Sindh
Mr. Fateh Marri, Hyderabad, Pakistan	Land Reforms for Food Security: Asian Experiences and Case of Pakistan
Discussion	
Lunch	**2:00 pm – 3:00 pm**

Tuesday, 13 December 2011	Day One
Concurrent Panel A-5	**3:00 pm – 5:00 pm**

Title: Livelihood Options in Conflict-Affected Situations – Session II

Chair: Mr. Surein Peiris, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Pakistan

Special comments by: Dr. Anita Ghimire, Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (North-South), Nepal

Panel Organisers: Dr. Babar Shahbaz, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan; Dr. Bishnu Raj Upreti, Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (North-South), Nepal; & Dr. Abid Q. Suleri, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

Speakers	**Title**
Dr. Emma Varley, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore, Pakistan	Medicine at the Margins: The Impacts of Sectarianism for Health Governance in Gilgit-Baltistan
Dr. Bishnu Raj Upreti, Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (North-South), Kathmandu, Nepal	Livelihoods Challenges in Post-Conflict Nepal
Dr. Purna Bahadur Nepali, Consortium for Land Research and Policy Dialogue, Kathmandu, Nepal	Access to Land Resources: Process of Social Exclusion and Power Relation in Conflict Prone Areas
Discussion	

Tuesday, 13 December 2011 — Day One

Concurrent Panel A-6 — **3:00 pm – 5:00 pm**

Title: **18th Amendment and Devolution**

Chair: Mr. Fazal Ullah Qureshi, Former Secretary Planning Division, Islamabad, Pakistan

Special comments by: Mr. Naseem Bajwa, UK; and, Dr. Vaqar Ahmad, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

Panel Organiser: Ms Erum Haider, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

Speakers	**Title**
Dr. Saeed Shafqat, Forman Christian College, Lahore; Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	Pakistani Bureaucracy, 18th Amendment and Challenges of Governance
Dr. Faisal Bari, Open Society Institute, USA	Impact of 18th Ammendment on the Education Sector
Ms Erum Haider, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	The 18th Amendment and Development in the Provinces
Discussion	

Tuesday, 13 December 2011	Day One
Concurrent Panel A- 7	**3:00 pm – 5:00 pm**
Title: Governance Challenge: Is There a Way Out?—Session I **Chair:** Dr. Ehtisham Anwar, Additional Commissioner, Islamabad, Pakistan **Special comments by:** Dr. Peter Taylor, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada **Panel Organiser:** Ms Foqia S. Khan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Dr. Ishrat Husain, Institute of Business Administration, Karachi, Pakistan	Redefining Governance in Pakistan
Dr. S. Akbar Zaidi, Social Scientist, Karachi, Pakistan	Subsidizing the Pakistani Elite: Aid, Taxation, and Development
Ms Foqia S. Khan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	Politics of Non-implementation: The Rule of Law Debate
Ms Shazra Azhar, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	Governance for Sustainable Development: Chapter from the Sustainable Development Report
Discussion	

Tuesday, 13 December 2011	Day One
Concurrent Panel A-8	**3:00 pm – 5:00 pm**
Title: Factors Affecting the Food Security Situation in a Resource Constrained Pakistan **Chair:** Mr. Shafqat Munir, SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan **Special comments by:** Mr. Banaras Khan, National Agronomist, FAO, Islamabad; Dr. Jehangir Khan, Food Security Adviser, Plan Canada; and, Mr. Bipul Chatterjee, CUTS International, India **Panel Organiser**: Ms Mehnaz Ajmal Paracha, Oxfam International, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	
Dr. Wajid Hussain Pirzada, Roots Pakistan, Rawalpindi, Pakistan	Changing Support Price Policies & Institutional Framework and Food Security in Pakistan
Mr. Umer Malik, Mehbub-ul-Haq Centre, Lahore, Pakistan	Food Insecurity in Pakistan: Issues and Choices of a Resource Constrained Economy
Mr. Zubair Faisal Abbasi, Impact Consulting, Islamabad	Corporate Agricultural Farming and Role of Corporate Sector in Pakistan
Launch of CUTS publication: *'Climate Change and Food Security in South Asia'*	
Discussion	

Wednesday, 14 December 2011	Day Two
Concurrent Panel B-1	**9:30 am – 11:30 am**
Title: Education Financing in Pakistan: Challenges and Way Forward **Chair:** Mr. Jemal Ahmad, ActionAid Pakistan, Islamabad **Special comments by:** Mr. Sardar Husain Babak, Minister for Education,Khyber Pukhtunkhwa ; and Mr.Tariq Qamar Baloch, Additional Secretary (Education), Balochistan **Panel Organiser**: Ms Nazima Shaheen, ActionAid Pakistan, Islamabad	
Speakers	**Title**
Dr. Salman Humayun, Institute of Social and Policy Sciences (I-SAPS), Islamabad, Pakistan	Education Budget and Data of District Rahim Yar Khan
Mr. Mukhtar Ahmad, Chief of Party, Citizen's Voice Project, TDEA, Pakistan	An Investigation into the Prospects and Problems of School-based Budgeting in Pakistan's Public Schools
Ms Uzma Tahir, Manager, Policy, Advocacy and Research Outreach, ActionAid Pakistan	Unfolding Education Financing: A Perspective of ActionAid
Discussion	
Tea	**11:30 am—12 noon**

Wednesday, 14 December 2011	Day Two
Concurrent Panel B-2	**9:30 am –11:30 am**
Title: Revisiting Poverty Debate: Alternative Ways for Conceptualization, Measurement and Targeting **Chair:** Dr. Sabina Alkire, University of Oxford, UK **Special comments by:** Dr. Sajjad Akhtar, Former Director, Centre for Research on Poverty Reduction and Income Distribution, Planning Commission of Pakistan; and, Dr. Vaqar Ahmed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan **Panel Organiser**: Mr. Arif Naveed, Senior Research Associate, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Mr. Ali Khizar, Head of Research, Business Recorder, Karachi, Pakistan	Poverty Measurement in Pakistan: A Critical Analysis
Mr. Arif Naveed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute , Islamabad, Pakistan; and Mr. Nazim Ali, US Embassy, Islamabad, Pakistan	Estimation of Multidimensional Poverty in Pakistan: Ranking Districts on Incidence and Severity of Deprivation
Mr. Tanweer-ul-Islam, NUST Business School, Islamabad, Pakistan	Proxy Means Testing to Identify the Poor for Social Protection: A Critical Appraisal
Discussion	
Tea	**11:30 am—12 noon**

Wednesday, 14 December 2011	Day Two
Concurrent Panel B-3	**9:30 am – 11:30 am**
Title: Shrines, Shanti and Sustainable Development **Chair:** Mr. Karamat Ali, Pakistan Institute of Labour Education & Research, Karachi, Pakistan **Special comments by:** Dr. Britta Peterson, Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Lahore, Pakistan; Dr. Lubna Chaudhry, Sustainable Development Policy Institute; & State University of New York, Binghamton, USA **Panel Organiser**: Mr. Ahmad Salim, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Mr. Ahmad Salim, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	Introduction to the Documentary
Ms Humaira Ishfaq, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan	Introduction to the Documentary
Ms Maliha Ahmed	Documentary Presentation
Presentation of Three Documentaries on Sufism	
Discussion	
Tea	**11:30 am – 12 noon**

Wednesday, 14 December 2011	Day Two
Concurrent Panel B-4	**9:30 am – 11:30 am**
Title: Indus River Watershed: Adapting, Mitigating, and Sustaining the Social-Ecological Change — Session I **Chair:** Mr. Shams-ul-Mulk, Former Chief Minister of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, Pakistan **Special comments by**: Mr. Shakeel Ahmad Ramay, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan **Panel Organiser:** Dr. Nuzrat Yar Khan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Dr. Nuzrat Yar Khan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	Indus Basin: Status and Sustainability
Dr. Umer Farooq, PARC, Islamabad, Pakistan	Food and Water Securities Issues and Challenges in the Indus River Basin of Pakistan
Discussion	
Tea	**11:30 pm – 12 noon**

Wednesday, 14 December 2011	Day Two
Concurrent Panel B-5	**12 noon – 2:00 pm**
Title: Development beyond the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) **Chair:** Dr. Saba Gul Khattak, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan **Special comments by:** Dr. Urs Geiser, University of Zurich, Switzerland **Panel Organiser**: Ms Afshan Ahmad, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Dr. Peter Taylor, International Development Research Centre, Canada	Post-MDG Policy Making – Can South Asian Policy Research Organisations make a Difference?
Dr. Sagar Raj Sharma, Kathmandu University; Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (North-South), Nepal	Nepal and the MDGs beyond 2015
Dr. Bishnu Raj Upreti, Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (North-South), Kathmandu, Nepal	Development in South Asia: Revisiting the Past and Redefining the Future from the Conflict and Peace Perspective
Ms Afshan Ahmad, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	MDGs in Pakistan: The Challenges of Development in a 'State-in-the-making'
Discussion	
Lunch	**2:00 pm – 3:00 pm**

Wednesday, 14 December 2011	Day Two
Concurrent Panel B-6	**12 noon – 2:00 pm**
Title: Security and Development: The Geo-politics of China-Pakistan-India Relationship **Chair and Special comments by:** Mr. Hasil Bizanjo, Senator, Islamabad, Pakistan **Panel Organiser:** Mr. Arif Naveed, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Mr. Zulfiqar Halepoto, Thardeep Rural Development Programme, Sindh, Pakistan	Water Conflicts between Pakistan and India: One Basin Approach for Integrated Transboundary Cooperation
Dr. Dibyesh Anand, Associate Professor, University of Westminster, UK	The State-People (Dis)Connect: Revisiting China, India and Pakistan's Security and Development Priorities
Ms Amna Yousaf Khokhar, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan	China-India-Pakistan: An Incongruent Partnership of Economic Development and Security Assurance
Discussion	
Lunch	**2:00 pm – 3:00 pm**

Wednesday, 14 December 2011	Day Two
Concurrent Panel B-7	**12 noon – 2:00 pm**
Title: Climate Change Concerns and their Possible Impact on South Asian Countries **Moderator**: Mr. Shakeel Ramay, Islamabad, Pakistan **Special comments by:** Dr. Muhammad Islam, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan **Panel Organiser**: Mr. Bipul Chatterjee, Consumer Unity & Trust Society International, Jaipur, India	
Speakers	**Title**
Mr. Bipul Chatterjee, Consumer Unity & Trust Society International, Jaipur, India	Climate Change and Food Security in South Asia
Mr. Naseer Memon, Strengthening Participatory Organization, Islamabad, Pakistan	Disasters in South Asia—A Regional Perspective
Ms Maryum Najeeb, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, Pakistan	State Failures: Analysis of the Disconnect between Pakistan's Climate Change Policies, Documents and Stances
Discussion	
Lunch	**2:00 pm – 3:00 pm**

Wednesday, 14 December 2011	Day Two
Concurrent Panel B-8	**12 noon - 2:00 pm**
Title: Indus River Watershed: Adapting, Mitigating, and Sustaining the Social-Ecological Change – Session II **Chair:** Dr. Nuzrat Yar Khan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan **Special comments by:** Mr. Mehmood Cheema, International Union for Conservation of Nature, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Dr. Ghulam Akbar, World Wildlife Fund, Islamabad, Pakistan	Status of the Lower Indus River Ecosystem
Dr. Abdul N. Laghari, University of Engineering, Science & Technology, Nawabshah, Pakistan	A Framework for the Management of Current and Future Water Resources of the Indus Basin
Ms Naghmana Ghafoor, Planning & Development Department - Government of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan	Urban Stress and Mental Health in Indus Basin Pakistan
Dr. Abdullah Yasar, Government College University, Lahore, Pakistan	Conservation of Water Resources in the Indus Basin through Increase in Agricultural Productivity
Discussion	
Lunch	**2:00 pm – 3:00 pm**

Wednesday, 14 December 2011	Day Two
Concurrent Panel B-9	**3:00 pm – 5:00 pm**
Title: Governance Challenge: Is There a Way Out? – Session II **Chair:** Mr. Daniyal Aziz, Governance Institutes Network International, Islamabad, Pakistan **Special comments by:** Mr. Kaiser Bengali, Member National Finance Commission, Karachi, Pakistan **Panel Organiser:** Ms Foqia S. Khan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Dr. G. Shabbir Cheema, East-West Center, Honolulu, USA	Governance for Sustainable Development: The Paradigm Shift in Theory and Practice
Dr. Urs Geiser, University of Zurich, Switzerland	'Governance' between Developmental Ideal and Everyday Realities – The Urgency of Understanding State-Society Relations in the Postcolonial Context of North-West Pakistan
Mr. Tulasi Sharan Sigdel, Nepal Administrative Staff College, Jawalakhel, Nepal	Reflexive Governance and Sustainable Local Development in Rural Nepal
Mr. Janaka Hemathilaka, Practical Action, Sri Lanka	Community Governance in Local Governance—Experience from Sri Lanka
Discussion	

Wednesday, 14 December 2011 Day Two

Concurrent Panel B-10 **3:00 pm – 5:00 pm**

Title: Climate Change: Readapting Forest Management in South Asia

Chair: Mr. Bashir Wani, former Inspector General of Forests, Islamabad, Pakistan

Special comments by: Ms Seema Karki, International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, Nepal

Panel Organiser: Mr. Talimand Khan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

Speakers	**Title**
Dr. Prakash C. Tiwari, Kumaon University, Nainital, India	Climate Change Adaptation in Himalaya: Institutionalizing State Property Forest Resources
Dr. Sultan-i-Rome, Government Jahanzeb Postgraduate College,Swat, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, Pakistan	Contested Forest Ownership: A Study of Swat District, Pakistan
Mr. Shakeel Ahmed Ramay, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	Sustainable Development Report Chapter
Mr. Talimand Khan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	Forest Management and People's Voices
Discussion	

Wednesday, 14 December 2011 — Day Two

Concurrent Session B-11 — **3:00 pm – 5:00 pm**

Title: Transnational Feminisms, Depoliticization, International Development: What does it mean to Listen to Third World Women?

Chair: Mr. Haroon Sharif, Department for International Development (DFID), Islamabad, Pakistan

Special comments by: Ms Nazish Brohi, Independent Consultant, Karachi, Pakistan

Panel Organiser: Dr. Lubna Chaudhry, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan; & State University of New York, Binghamton, USA

Speakers	Title
Dr. Lubna Chaudhry, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan; & State University of New York, Binghamton, USA	Gendered Voices from Post-conflict Swat: The Conundrum of Agency and Implications for Interventions at Grassroots, Advocacy, and Policy Levels
Dr. Farzana Bari, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan	The Politics of Representation in Pakistan
Dr. Fidaa Shehada, State University of New York at Binghamton, USA	The Palestinian Peace Process and the Depoliticization of the Women's Movement
Discussion	

Wednesday, 14 December 2011	Day Two
Concurrent Session B-12	**3:00 pm – 5:00 pm**

Title: Indus River Watershed: Adapting, Mitigating, and Sustaining the Social-Ecological Change – Session III

Chairs: Dr. Iqrar Ahmed Khan, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Pakistan; Ms Feryal Ali Gauhar, Member Board of Governors, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

Discussion

Panel Organiser: Dr. Nuzrat Yar Khan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

Discussion Session

Thursday, 15 December 2011	Day Three
Concurrent Panel C-1	**9:30 am –11:30 am**
Title: Re-imaging South Asian Security **Chair:** Mr. Zia Ahmed, Editor, Daily Express, Islamabad, Pakistan **Special comments by:** Dr. Bishnu R. Upreti, Nepal; and Dr. Sabina Alkire, UK **Panel Organisers:** Mr. Moeed Yusuf, United States Institute of Peace, Washington D. C., US; Dr. Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Dr. Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	Re-imaging Security in Pakistan
Dr. Dibyesh Anand, Associate Professor, University of Westminster, UK	Whose Security? Politics of Majoritarianism and Violence in South Asia
Discussion	
Tea	**11:30 am-12 noon**

Thursday, 15 December 2011	Day Three
Concurrent Panel C-2	**9:30 am – 11:30 am**
Title: Redefining Governance through Social Accountability in South Asia **Chair & Special comments by:** Dr. Dr.Talat Mahmood, Social Science Research Center, Berlin, Germany **Panel Organiser**: Mr. Gulbaz Ali Khan, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Mr. Tanka Raj Aryal, Citizens' Campaign for Right to Information (CCRI), Nepal	Right to Information (RTI): Tool for Promoting Transparency and Service Delivery of Local Governance in Nepal
Mr. Gulbaz Ali Khan and Mr. Fayyaz Yasin, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	Implementing Citizen Report Card in Slums: A Case Study from Pakistan
Mr. A. Z. M. Saleh, Centre for Research and Action on Development, Dhaka, Bangladesh	Gender Budgeting in Bangladesh: The Importance of Quantifying Mechanisms
Mr. Zahid Abdullah, CPDI – RTI Implementation in Pakistan, Islamabad	Freedom of Information in Pakistan
Discussion	
Tea	**11:30 am – 12 noon**

Thursday, 15 December 2011	Day Three
Concurrent Session C-3	**9:30 am – 11:30 am**
Title: Energy and Sustainability: Exploring Efficient Alternatives in South Asia **Chair & Special comments by:** Mr. Arshad Abbasi, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad. **Panel Organiser**: Mr. Kanwar Iqbal, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Prof. Dr. Mohammad Bilal Khan, Centre for Energy Systems, Islamabad, Paksitan	Pakistan's Energy Incentives
Ms Nafeesa Irshad, Fatima Jinnah Women University, Rawalpindi, Pakistan	Carbon Footprints in Pakistan and Policy Initiatives for Integrated Solutions
Mr. Bilal Hamid, Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology, Topi, Pakistan	Hydrogen Economy: A Step in the Right Direction of Renewable Energy in Pakistan
Ms Farzana Yasmin, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	Combating Climate Change and Energy Crisis through Solar Radiation Management - Cool Roofs
Discussion	
Tea	**11:30 am – 12 noon**

Thursday, 15 December 2011	Day Three
Concurrent Session C-4	**9:30 am – 11:30 am**
Title: Rethinking Education for Pluralism: Representation of Religious Minorities in Public and Madrassah Education **Chair:** Dr. Tahir Kamran, Cambridge University, UK **Special comments by:** Dr. Peter Taylor, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada **Panel Organiser:** Ms Afsheen Naz, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Mr. Abdul Wali Jamali, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, Pakistan	Madrassah Reforms: A Key Step to Tackling the Rising Militancy in South Asia
Mr. Aamir Riaz, General Manager, Ilqa Publications, Lahore, Pakistan	Compromising Pedagogy & Critical Thinking in Nation Building: A Case of Misuse of Nationalism, Religion and Ideology in School Textbooks of Pakistan
Mr. Sanaullah Rustamani, Hyderabad, Sindh, Pakistan	Religious Diversity: Evaluating the Syllabus and Teaching Practices in Public Sector Schools and Madrassahs of Sindh, Pakistan
Ms Afsheen Naz, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	Attitude of Female Teachers towards Religious Minorities: A Case Study of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Female Madrassahs
Discussion	
Tea	**11:30 am – 12 noon**

Thursday, 15 December 2011	Day Three
Concurrent Session C-5	**12 noon – 2:00 pm**
Title: Cost of Economic Non-Cooperation to Consumers in South Asia **Chair:** Mr. Gareth Aicken, The Asia Foundation, Islamabad, Pakistan **Special comments by:** Mian Waqas Masud, Fazal Group of Industries, Islamabad, Pakistan **Panel Organiser**: Mr. Bipul Chatterjee, Consumer Unity & Trust Society International, Jaipur, India	
Speakers	**Title**
Mr. Bipul Chatterjee, Consumer Unity & Trust Society International, Jaipur, India	Assessment of Consumer Welfare Gains under SAFTA
Dr. Vaqar Ahmad, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	Some Dimensions of Pakistan-India MFN Talks
Mr. Shafqat Munir, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	Cost of Economic Non-Cooperation to Consumers in Pakistan
Mr. A.Z.M. Saleh, Centre for Research and Action on Development, Dhaka, Bangladesh	Cost of Economic Non-Cooperation to Consumers in Bangladesh
Discussion	
Lunch	**2:00 pm – 3:00 pm**

Thursday, 15 December 2011	Day Three
Concurrent Session C-6	**12 noon – 2:00 pm**
Title: Celebrating Literature by Rabindranath Tagore, Faiz Ahmad Faiz and Ustad Daman **Chair:** Mr. Mehfuz-ur Rahman, Deputy High Commissioner of Bangladesh, Islamabad, Pakistan **Special comments by:** Ms Qurutul Ain, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Islamabad, Pakistan **Panel Organiser**: Mr. Ahmad Salim, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Mr. Ahmad Salim, Sustainable Development Policy Institute , Islamabad, Pakistan	Ustad Daman: The Poet, the Activist
Dr. Niaz Zaman, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh	Rabindranath Tagore and the Creation of National Identity
Ms Humaira Ishfaq, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan	Faiz: Globalisation versus Internationalism
Discussion	
Lunch	**2:00 pm – 3:00 pm**

Thursday, 15 December 2011	Day Three
Concurrent Session C-7	**12 noon – 2:00 pm**
Title: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation Plus (REDD+): A Spotlight on South Asia **Chair:** Dr. Sarwat N. Mirza, Faculty of Forestry, University of Arid Agriculture, Rawalpindi **Special comments by:** Dr. Chanda Gurung Goodrich, South Asia Consortium for Interdisciplinary Water Resources Studies, India; and, Dr. Jefferson Fox, East West Centre, USA **Panel Organiser:** Mr. Kanwar Javed Iqbal, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Dr. Ahmad Hussain, Planning and Development Division, Islamabad, Pakistan	Supporting Policies for REDD-plus in Pakistan and Future Initiatives
Dr. Muhammad Afzal and Ms Aqeela Mobeen Akhter, Punjab Forestry Research Institute, Faisalabad, Pakistan	Estimation of Biomass and Carbon Stock: Chichawatni Irrigated Plantation in Punjab, Pakistan
Ms Mehwish Ali, NUST Islamabad; and, WWF, Karachi, Pakistan	Assessment of Carbon Stocks of Moist Temperate Forests of Pakistan using Remote Sensing Methods and Forest Inventory
Mr. Eak Bahadur Rana, International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, Nepal	The Forest Carbon Trust Fund and Local Communities: Findings from a Pilot Project in Nepal
Discussion	
Lunch	**2:00 pm – 3:00 pm**

Thursday, 15 December 2011	Day Three
Concurrent Session C-8	**12 noon – 2:00 pm**
Title: Regional Cooperation for Water Governance **Chair:** Syed Imtiaz Gillani , Vice Chancellor, University of Engineering and Technology, Peshawar, Pakistan **Panel Organisers**: Mr. Shakeel A. Ramay; Mr. Arshad H. Abbasi; and, Ms Farzana Yasmin, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Speakers	**Title**
Mr. M. Maniruzzaman Miah, Former Vice Chancellor, Dhaka University, Bangladesh	Joint Management by Co-riparian Countries of a River Basin for Sustainable Development
Ms Shahnaz Huq Hussain, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh	Impact of Tipaimukh Dam in Bangladesh: Research Partnership for Sustainable Development in the South Asian Region
Mr. Arshad Abbasi, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan	
Dr. Anjal Prakash, South Asia Consortium for Interdisciplinary Water Resources Studies, India	
Dr. Jasveen Jairath, Independent Consultant, India	
Curtain Raiser: East West Center Inception Workshop	
Discussion	
Lunch	**2:00 pm – 3:00 pm**

Thursday, 15 December 2011 Day Three

Closing Plenary 3:00 pm – 5:00 pm

H. U. Beg Memorial Lecture

Keynote Speaker: Mr. Shahid Hafiz Kardar, Former Governor, State Bank of Pakistan

Plenary Title: Sustainability of Macroeconomic Fundamentals and Structural Reforms

Launch of SDPI's Web TV

Launch of SDPI's Urdu Publications

SDPI Lifetime Achievement Awards: Brig. Muhammad Yasin; Dr. Mahmood A. Khwaja; Mr. Ahmad Salim, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

Remarks by the Chief Guest: Dr. Nadeem-ul-Haq, Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission of Pakistan and Chancellor Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad, Pakistan

Vote of Thanks: Dr. Abid Qaiyum Suleri, Executive Director, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad, Pakistan

High Tea / Coffee

Redefining Paradigms of Sustainable Development in South Asia

Over the past 5-6 years, there has been much debate, discussion and argumentation about the multiple crises the world has been grappling with, forcing governments and other institutions alike to critically evaluate systemic concerns linked to local, national and global institutions and structures. This book showcases research conducted by academics from the North and South that tries to provide unique and fresh perspective about how some of the challenges South Asia faces can be tackled using innovative, local and 'redefined' initiatives and ideas. The purpose of this book is to share the lessons learned, advice and recommendations from advocates in the field of economics, environment, public policy, social sciences and beyond.

Section 1 *New Directions in Energy Sustainability and Climate Change* explores transformative advances in energy sciences given the complex challenges posed by climate change to modern technology requiring researchers to delve into unfamiliar territory such as hydrogen energy especially in a country like Pakistan. While fuel cells and a hydrogen infrastructure can together pave a sustainable energy future for the country, the state has to play a critical role in encouraging and funding R and D in alternative energy. The feasibility of bringing state forests under a community based, participatory institutional framework for effective management of forest resources for Uttarkhand State in Himalaya, India is discussed at length in chapter two. The third paper draws linkages between climate change and food security from the perspective of farmers from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, and recommends establishment of food bank, knowledge sharing and investing in climate resilient agriculture.

Section 2 *Sustainable Livelihood Options and Local Communities* first discusses the case of Sri Lankan fisher community and provides indicative insights into the tensions between local and migratory fishermen based on perceptions of inequality and identity, manifesting themselves in competition for a rapidly declining resource. The case identifies several creative and alternative practices for peaceful co-existence. The next two chapters on Nepal look at the political economy of existing land distribution in the country that has caused social exclusion, injustice, inequity and disparity leading to skewed power relations; and the inspiring story of remote Nangi village where installation of a wireless fiber (wi-fi) project has left remarkable impacts on lives of the local populace in the village.

Section 3 *Readapting Forest Management* deals with the historical and legal nuances of forest ownership in Swat district of Pakistan contested by both the state and the people. Based on archival record, statutory and oral sources, the paper calls for immediate and urgent action to resolve the crisis of ownership before it escalates into potential conflict. Highlighting Nepal's community forestry model, the second paper in this section discusses five innovative interventions for implementing REDD+.

Section 4 *Interrogating Religious and Gender Identities* first traces the historical trajectory of a religiously and legally defined citizenry in Pakistan. It argues that Pakistan's political elite instrumentalised Islam as means of forging an all-inclusive national identity in a state marked with religious plurality and ethnic diversity, by creating distinctions between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens of the country to exclude one particular community. The chapter on Palestinian women's movement recommends that the movement needs to find strategies that maintain the connection between achieving Palestinian national rights and women's rights, which has the potential to create conditions conducive to reaching women in all sectors of Palestinian society.

Section 5 *Integrating Policy Processes with Trade and Development* first explores an empirical study of consumer welfare impact of SAFTA on Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It highlights the need of trade policy reforms at the regional level in South Asia in order to fuel growth of trade relationship, resulting in better trade facilitation measures, procedural ease and economies of scale in the transport sector, better returns and rents from investments in trade infrastructure and additional incentives for private enterprises to explore regional markets. The next chapter in this section suggests that think tanks should work to build more trust with policy actors in government, and ensure that their research findings are easily accessible, relevant and hi-quality over time, in a region where post MDG development agendas continue to unfold in highly dynamic political, economic and social contexts. Through the lens of reflexive governance, the final chapter of this book focuses on the emergence of new kinds of institutions, strategies, processes and interactions in the local governance system in post conflict rural Nepal. It shows how differently positioned people enact, subvert, and resist local governance and development projects; and, how local governance transpires through ordinary people's participation, networked arrangements and articulation of local state authority and civil-society.

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